Light Weight, pilot-only, Fulmar Thread?

[FLYBOYJ]

Because rarely would any aircraft fly in a straight line when it's being attacked, whether it had an observer, a tail gunner or the entire L.A. Dodgers' team sitting in the back seat...

Now if the SF Giants were back there, different story!

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Unfortunately most fighter aircraft were flying in straight lines when shot down, and never saw their attackers. Unless the pilot has warning, by sighting the attacker, or from a friendly aircraft, or from a rear facing observer or by "The Force" he cannot know when to stop flying in a straight line...

And with that said, fighter pilots (or even combat aircraft doing recon or patrol work) "should be" trained NOT to fly in a stright line - combat pilot 101

 

[oldcrowcv63]

L.A. Dodgers' team sitting in the back seat...

Not the whole team… Just Sandy Koufax, Don Drysdale or maybe Orel Hershiser and Don Sutton.

 

[Aozora]

And why would an aircraft be doing aerobatic manoeuvres if it didn't see the attacking aircraft? Are you saying that rear gunners in two seat aircraft cannot also warn the pilot of impending attack, as well as shooting back?

A properly trained fighter pilot who finds himself alone over enemy territory would not be flying straight and level; the pilot would be constantly changing direction. He would also be turning his head constantly, quartering each sector around his fighter while manouvering to enable him to cover his blind spots.

Fighters flying in a decent formation, such as the Finger Four, would be covering one another's blind spots, while the function of a wingman was also to cover the blind spots of his formation leader.

Eg: During the battle of Midway, a section of F4Fs were able to hold off superior numbers of A6M2s because they were flying the "Thach Weave", where each F4F manouevered to cover one another's butts. In WW 2 aerial combat observers, particularly those who didn't have a weapon to fire back with, were obsolete, if not a liability because, more often than not a two-seat, single engined aircraft was slower and less manouverable than a single-seat fighter of equivalent power.

(sic! F4F Wildcat)

I don't want to argue this endlessly, but having a rear facing observer obviously has benefits in combat, and those benefits have to be weighed against the increase in performance obtainable by omitting the observer.

What benefits? As already noted properly devised fighter formations and good teamwork rendered observers obsolete. In long-range reconnaissance missions they were handy, although Spitfire recce pilots (for example) showed that observers weren't always needed either.

 

[RCAFson]

Right, no WW2 fighters were ever shot down by unseen opponents...LoL

"Air combat experience going at least back to WW2 suggests that surprise in the form of the unseen attacker has been pivotal in 3/4 or more of the kills. In writing about his experiences flying long range escort missions during WW2, P-38 pilot Lt col. mark hubbard stressed that 90% of all fighters shot down never saw the guy who hit them. Hubbard was by no means alone in observing that friction in the form of the unseen attacker from 6 o'clock played a dominant role in engagement outcomes. The American p-47 pilot Hubert Zemke (17.75 kills) stressed "that few pilots are shot down by enemies they see." Similarly the German Me-109 pilot Erich Hartmann, whose 352 kills during WW2 made the top scorer of all time, later that he was "sure that 80% of kills never knew he was there before he opened fire."
Clausewitzian Friction and Future WarBy Barry D. Watts

 

[GrauGeist]

Right, no WW2 fighters were ever shot down by unseen opponents...LoL

Now, let's look at all the aircraft that WERE shot down with an observer/rear gunner aboard...

Got any numbers, there?

 

[GregP]

Never have SEEN those numbers, but would like to ...

 

[Aozora]

Morgan and Shacklady state (page 505) that the Luftwaffe sank the Courageous...so I'm not sure how much to trust their account of the Seafire development!

One peripheral mistake in how many pages, and its all over? Morgan Shacklady have done an excellent job of describing Seafire development - after all, the entire purpose of the book was to describe the Spitfire/Seafire. I can point to other peripheral mistakes in the book, but that doesn't dilute the basic quality of the research that went into the main subject matter.

You're really beating a dead horse here, as there's no way that a better Seafire would miraculously emerge in 1940, given the intensive work on it even years later, that failed to make it into a sufficiently robust carrier fighter. In 1944/45 the FAA could afford to right off Seafires with little thought of where the next one would come from as the aircraft was in volume production, but that wasn't the case in 1940 when even the RAF didn't have enough.

You have no idea what might have emerged in 1940-41, had the project received proper support from the likes of Fairey; instead what happened was the FAA realised too late that 2 seat fighters were obsolescent, and that the Blackburn Sabre engined project was well behind schedule. Supermarine and Westland were forced to come up with an improvisation, instead of having the time to develop the Sea Spitfire properly.

A 1940 folding wing Seafire project has all the earmarks of a complete disaster waiting to happen, and thankfully someone pulled the plug on it.

Speculation with no real evidence to back it up.

 

[Aozora]

Now, let's look at all the aircraft that WERE shot down with an observer/rear gunner aboard...

Got any numbers, there?

How many Fulmars, with observers, were shot down by unseen attackers?

 

[RCAFson]

keep in mind, that all I was suggesting is that the single seat Fulmar be lighter with improved performance to provide a better single seat CAP aircraft for CV air defense. The recon fulmar would remain the same and also be embarked. Removing the 600 lbs from the observers section is a good start. It brings the weight (9,000 lbs) down to almost that of a max load F4F-4 (8,763 lbs) with about 100+ extra hp in the F-II. Also there were apparently some additional streamlining and weight savings (~300 lbs) planned that may have not made it past the drawing board. The finished Fulmar II product was only designed to be a multirole aircraft and filled the role well until the advent of the Firefly. But it also possessed folding wings. A lighter higher performing, point-defense weapon might have had some utility. Just wondering 'aloud' as it were. With 4 x .50HMGs on the F-II with 370 rpg, some additional weight savings mightt be gains by reducing the fuel load, and ammo load from 370 rpg to perhaps 250 rpg (slightly more than the F4F-4.). You also get back some of the operational ceiling loss that hampered both marks.

Did both the Fulmar I II have the filter system that created significant drag?

I don't think much fuselage redesign is reasonable in this scenario. Taking a length-section out of the fuselage with the same landing gear would raise the nose, losing some of the good forward visibility the type enjoyed. With that wide landing gear, the Fulmar looks to me to be a very suitable naval aircraft.

Not looking for the performance of a Spitfire or a Hurricane but just a real folding wing, single seat naval fighter available to the FAA in approximately 1940 time frame to augment fleet defense.

One of the problems faced by Fairey was the need to get the aircraft into to production ASAP. Fairey was able to begin series production of the Fulmar 1 in April 1940, or less than 2 years after the initial order for 127 aircraft, while the first production aircraft flew in Jan 1940. This was actually a very remarkable achievement; a folding wing, 8 gun monoplane fighter from order to first flight in 19 months, while at the same time Fairey was building the Battle and Swordfish, finishing design work on the Albacore for production in 1939, and would fly the first prototype Barracuda on 7 Dec 1940. At the same time Fairey was designing the Firefly.

Initially Fairey had been contracted to begin Fulmar production in early 1941! We can see that they were forced to skip much of the development work to get the aircraft into production so quickly, and of necessity this meant skipping much of the refinements that later appeared on the Fulmar II. It was probably beyond Fairey's capacity to build a parallel single seat variant, especially since the Air Ministry/Admiralty were issuing contracts for such small numbers of aircraft, which didn't permit enough investment for volume production and parallel development, and this is probably why such things as Fulmar bomb racks and drop tanks were delayed until late 1941.

AFAIK, the Fulmar II had the capacity to fit a tropical filter for landbased operations but this could be removed if the aircraft was operating from a carrier.

 

[RCAFson]

One peripheral mistake in how many pages, and its all over? Morgan Shacklady have done an excellent job of describing Seafire development - after all, the entire purpose of the book was to describe the Spitfire/Seafire. I can point to other peripheral mistakes in the book, but that doesn't dilute the basic quality of the research that went into the main subject matter.

It's such a glaring error that it really does make me wonder the accurate their account of Seafire development is. Trying to paint Fairey as the villain of the story is also a bit of a stretch by M&S. Clearly, Fairey knew that these plans were unrealistic and would have seriously impaired Fairey's ability to design and build the aircraft it was already contractually committed to. Why the Admiralty didn't pursue the Sea Hurricane in lieu of the Spitfire is really puzzling.

You have no idea what might have emerged in 1940-41, had the project received proper support from the likes of Fairey; instead what happened was the FAA realised too late that 2 seat fighters were obsolescent, and that the Blackburn Sabre engined project was well behind schedule. Supermarine and Westland were forced to come up with an improvisation, instead of having the time to develop the Sea Spitfire properly.

We don't need to speculate. We know how Seafire development proceeded.

Speculation with no real evidence to back it up.

NO. You're the one speculating. You're trying to tell us that somehow Fairey could magically turn the Spitfire into a folding wing carrier fighter, and produce hundreds of them by 1940, when we all know the production problems that plagued the Spitfire's early years, and we all know that years of development work were required to turn the Seafire into a barely passable folding wing carrier fighter.

 

[RCAFson]

Now, let's look at all the aircraft that WERE shot down with an observer/rear gunner aboard...

Got any numbers, there?

You're trying to turn the most basic factors of aerial combat on it's head:

Paying attention to what was happening outside the cockpit and spotting enemy aircraft was the key to the subsequent events of air combat. Moreover a decisive advantage was often gained by seeing the enemy before being seen. The result was often surprise and quick victory.

The importance of surprise seems hard to overestimate. Posts war analyses of combat reports along with the reflections of veterans indicate quite strongly that the overwhelming percentage of fighter aircraft which were shot down in combat were lost as a result of being 'bounced by undetected attackers. In short, pilots who, for whatever reasons failed to monitor the skies around them usually did not last long.

Courage and Air Warfare: The Allied Aircrew Experience in the Second World War
By Mark K. Wells, p.38.

Having a rearward facing observer did pay dividends in terms of visibility and situational awareness. It's impossible to argue otherwise, however the addition of the observer must be balanced against the loss of performance, but probably on the Fulmar, which couldn't be substantially lightened, the observer was worth the weight penalty.

 

[Aozora]

It's such a glaring error that it really does make me wonder the accurate their account of Seafire development is.

Try David Brown's "Seafire" as a source of info instead, and let Morgan and Shacklady gather dust on the top of a forgotten bookshelf.

...we all know that years of development work were required to turn the Seafire into a barely passable folding wing carrier fighter.

Your claims that the Seafire was some sort of disaster or barely passable after years of development are wide of the mark. The reason the Seafire incurred heavy non-combat casualties in the Aegean in 1943, for example, had a great deal more to do with the conditions under which operations were conducted, rather than to failings of the design. In the Pacific the Seafire proved capable of more than besting the A6M, something the Fulmar couldn't do in 1942

Overall, in spite of its problems, the Seafire was a better fighter than the Fulmar could have ever hoped to be.

You're trying to turn the most basic factors of aerial combat on it's head:

Paying attention to what was happening outside the cockpit and spotting enemy aircraft was the key to the subsequent events of air combat. Moreover a decisive advantage was often gained by seeing the enemy before being seen. The result was often surprise and quick victory.

The importance of surprise seems hard to overestimate. Posts war analyses of combat reports along with the reflections of veterans indicate quite strongly that the overwhelming percentage of fighter aircraft which were shot down in combat were lost as a result of being 'bounced by undetected attackers. In short, pilots who, for whatever reasons failed to monitor the skies around them usually did not last long.

Courage and Air Warfare: The Allied Aircrew Experience in the Second World War
By Mark K. Wells, p.38.

Since when did having an observer guarantee immunity from being caught by unseen attackers? How many two seat aircraft with observers were shot down by attackers that the observer saw, but could do nothing about because the aircraft he was in did not have the performance to get away from the attackers? How many aircraft with observers were caught by unseen attackers because the observer's attention was distracted?

The facts are single seat fighters without observers generally did okay when it came to defending themselves, or attacking others - as mentioned by your quote, it was those pilots who failed to apply the basic principles of keeping a good lookout who were caught.

Having a rearward facing observer did pay dividends in terms of visibility and situational awareness. It's impossible to argue otherwise, however the addition of the observer must be balanced against the loss of performance, but probably on the Fulmar, which couldn't be substantially lightened, the observer was worth the weight penalty.

It wasn't much use having an observer when the penalty was such that it was impossible for the Fulmar to get away from modern, high performance, single seat fighters. The fact is, the Fulmar was fortunate enough not to have encountered Bf 109Fs, Fw 190s or similar in large numbers - most of its opposition consisted of bombers or lower performance fighters.

 

[wuzak]

Trying to paint Fairey as the villain of the story is also a bit of a stretch by M&S.

I don't think M&S were making Fairey the villain. At least as much blame needs to go to the Air Ministry for not ordering them to do it.

Clearly, Fairey knew that these plans were unrealistic and would have seriously impaired Fairey's ability to design and build the aircraft it was already contractually committed to.

Contracts for supply of aircraft were often altered or cancelled. Given that the production order was given in mid 1938, at roughly the same time as the request for work on the Spitfire, it is quite conceivable that production Seafires could have been rolling out during the early months of 1940.

Why the Admiralty didn't pursue the Sea Hurricane in lieu of the Spitfire is really puzzling.

It's not at all puzzling.

Quite simply, the view was that the performance of the Hurricane I was barely sufficient compared to the German bombers at the time, and that a Sea Hurricane's performance advantage was going to be even more marginal.

The only reason they eventually got the Sea Hurricane was that they still couldn't get the Seafire.

You're the one speculating. You're trying to tell us that somehow Fairey could magically turn the Spitfire into a folding wing carrier fighter, and produce hundreds of them by 1940, when we all know the production problems that plagued the Spitfire's early years, and we all know that years of development work were required to turn the Seafire into a barely passable folding wing carrier fighter.

The "barely passable" Seafire could fly rings around the Sea Hurricane, the Fulmar and, probably, the Martlet.

FWIW, the Fulmar was developed from the Battle, to the original specification O.8/38 for an observation aircraft. It wasn't really intended to be a fighter.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

One of the problems faced by Fairey was the need to get the aircraft into to production ASAP. Fairey was able to begin series production of the Fulmar 1 in April 1940, or less than 2 years after the initial order for 127 aircraft, while the first production aircraft flew in Jan 1940. This was actually a very remarkable achievement; a folding wing, 8 gun monoplane fighter from order to first flight in 19 months, while at the same time Fairey was building the Battle and Swordfish, finishing design work on the Albacore for production in 1939, and would fly the first prototype Barracuda on 7 Dec 1940. At the same time Fairey was designing the Firefly.

It was indeed an extraordinary feat whose accomplishment probably owed much to the existing Battle.

Initially Fairey had been contracted to begin Fulmar production in early 1941! We can see that they were forced to skip much of the development work to get the aircraft into production so quickly, and of necessity this meant skipping much of the refinements that later appeared on the Fulmar II. It was probably beyond Fairey's capacity to build a parallel single seat variant, especially since the Air Ministry/Admiralty were issuing contracts for such small numbers of aircraft, which didn't permit enough investment for volume production and parallel development, and this is probably why such things as Fulmar bomb racks and drop tanks were delayed until late 1941.

AFAIK, the Fulmar II had the capacity to fit a tropical filter for landbased operations but this could be removed if the aircraft was operating from a carrier.

I think the biggest problem with the notion is how much performance do you get for the proposed mods and also the admiralty would probably need a crystal ball to see the need clearly. With the first production Fulmar I appearing in January 1940, before the fall of France and the associated loss of Med. Sea coverage by the French fleet.

OTOH, I am not proposing a parallel development but rather a modified production line wherein, say after June of 1940 half to 3/4 of the Fulmar I production is completed without the 600 lbs of radioman and gear. Once deployed, it is operated with a diminished armament (4 to 6 x LMG?) and ammo supply (300 rpg?) as well as a nearly 50% reduction in fuel load. So the asset is not a parallel development so much as it is a streamlined production line deleting certain components. Based on what the RAAF apparently did with the P-40E, in actual practice I would expect the a/c to be operated with all guns retained, the ammo to be somewhat reduced and the fuel load diminished.

With a total of 250 Fulmar I's delivered from Fairey. I would think that perhaps 100 to 150 of the single seat variant might be produced. AS to performance gain:

Fulmar I empty weight: 6,315 lbs (w/o server and associated gear)
Hurricane I empty weight: 5,658 lbs.
a difference of 660 lbs.

Hurricane carried 330 rpg while F-I has 500 rpg.

Fuel carried
Fulmar I 155 gallons
Hurricane I: 97 gallons. (difference 330 lbs.)

In the event, I believe the first Sea Hurricanes were fielded even more quickly than the Fulmar I, so the single seat fighter performance deficiency was corrected pretty quickly all things considered.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Having a rearward facing observer did pay dividends in terms of visibility and situational awareness. It's impossible to argue otherwise

That's your opinion - in the end the rearward facing observer in a fighter romanticized with open cockpits and silk scarves sailed into the sunset as those fighters that came after the Fulmar showed. To try to up play this is nothing more than a revisionist take...

however the addition of the observer must be balanced against the loss of performance, but probably on the Fulmar, which couldn't be substantially lightened, the observer was worth the weight penalty.

Yep, that observer was so valuable the Fulmar was replaced as a fighter by 1942.

I'm not saying the Fulmar was a bad plane, I think you're trying to make more of it than what it was. Face it, as a fighter it served well, the observer helped, but the aircraft had limitations, was replaced by other aircraft better suited to operate in a pure fighter role and soon saw use in other roles where it served well.

 

[Shortround6]

The Fulmar was NOT developed from the Battle except in a very general way. It was developed from the Fairey P.4/34 which was shorter (2ft 4 in) and had a smaller wing (almost 7ft less span) than the Battle. They were desingned by the same man and team so there is a strong family resemblance. " The second prototype P.4/34 (serial K7555) was therefore modified with, among other things, a reduced-span wing and lowered tailplane as an aerodynamic prototype for the Fulmar." Further distancing it from the Battle.

But the Fulmar is still a big airplane, it has more wing area than P-47N, more than P-38,more than the Fw 187 and more than an F6F Hellcat. AND more than the Firefly.
You can lighten it up a bit but there is so much drag that it is never going to be a fast plane with a single stage Merlin engine and taking out 600lbs is going to change the climb rate from dismal all the way up to pathetic.

A P-40E that dropped 600lbs (from 8100lbs to 7500lbs) picked up about 250fpm in climb (from 2050fpm at low level to 2300fpm). About a 7.4% reduction in weight resulted in about a 12% increase in climb rate. How much are you going to have to take out of the Fulmar? ANd a 12-15% improvement gets you what?

From one website so may very well be in error;


"Fulmar I: Max speed 265mph at 7500ft (new), 230mph at sea level or 247mph at 9000ft (in service). Max diving speed 450mph. Endurance 4 hours with combat reserves. Search radius 250 miles at 10,000ft at 168mph. Climb: 4min 20sec to 5000ft, 10,000ft in 8mins, 15,000ft in 15min. Ceiling: 21,500ft / 16,000 practical."

"Fulmar II: Max speed 266mph at 9600ft (new), 238mph at sea level, 259mph at 9000ft, 245mph at 15,000ft. Endurance: 5hours 30mins with reserves and external tank. Search radius 320 miles at 174mph at 10,000ft with external tank. Strike radius: 220 miles with 500lb bomb and internal fuel. Climb: 3min 13sec to 5000ft, 7min 10 sec to 10,000ft, 12 mins to 15,000ft. Ceiling: 23900ft / 16,000ft practical."

P-40E could climb to 10,000ft in 4.8 minutes at 8100lbs and took 4.4 minutes at 7500lbs.

You need a 63% increase in climb from the MK II to 10,000ft to match a 7500lb P-40. And lets face it, there were very few people who though the P-40 was fast climbing airplane.

Link to other website. Fairey's Fulmar: Maligned, Forgotten - Misunderstood? - Historical Board, general section. - War Thunder - Official Forum

 

[RCAFson]

Performance data for the Martlet IV and Fulmar II
View attachment 231438
View attachment 231439

UK testing of the Kittyhawk gave somewhat lower climb figures and at 8480lb:

The performance on climb has been measured at a weight of 8480 lb. The results show:-
The maximum rate of climb 1640 ft/min at 11,400 ft.
Time to 10,000 feet. 6.2 minutes
Time to 20,000 feet. 14.2 minutes.
Service ceiling 28,700 feet.
Estimated absolute ceiling 29,900 feet.
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/P-40/AK572.pdf

Fitting a Merlin X/XX to the Fulmar would probably have been the best alternative.

 

[tomo pauk]

Merlin XX, by all means. 1300-1400 HP from 15000 ft to SL, on 5 min rating even early on.
Fulmar's quality was the fuel capacity, but perhaps this was a bit overboard - 155 imp gals internally (more than pre-1944 Mustangs) plus 60 imp gals in a drop tank. It might be okay to cut the internal fuel down to ~120 imp gals, that would make ~240 lbs less, plus maybe some 20 lbs because smaller tank is used. 750 rpg is a vast quantity of ammo, maybe cut this down to 500 rpg?
Wonder whether the decrease in wing span would be easy to pull off (Fairey managed with later Firefly version(s)), the wing was huge for the power installed.

 

[Shortround6]

UK testing of the Kittyhawk gave somewhat lower climb figures and at 8480lb:.

In this test they were running the Allison at 2600rpm and 37in (3 1/2lbs)of boost, It is little wonder the performance is a bit off from using 3000 rpm and 44in ( 7lbs) boost.