Light Weight, pilot-only, Fulmar Thread?

[GrauGeist]

Ah, I see, so I can presume, then, that you wanted to see if I had read it?

Indeed...as your chastising retort presumed no one here had read the Specification and suddenly, in another post, you suggested that the FAA didn't order it.

Which of course, the Specification states otherwise...

 

[Greyman]

Confusion between tare weight and empty equipped?

From Boscombe Down:

Tare Weight:	7384 lb
Fixed Military Load:	469 lb
Weight Light:	6915 lb
Service Load:	1146 lb
Fuel:	1162 lb
Oil:	112
Total:	9804 lb

 

[Shortround6]

Thank you .

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Aircraft Weight Balance Terms

Tare: the weight of chocks, blocks, stands, etc. used when weighing an airplane. Tare weight is included in the scale readings and deducted from the scale reading to obtain the actual (net) airplane weight.

Huh? The unmodified empty and full up Fulmar I weight (6,915 lbs and actually 9,800 lbs respectively) I was using was taken from Brown.

Since no one else has commented:

What I find extraordinary about the FAA's use of the Fulmar I is that they were able to do so much in the CAP role with so few and in such an ungainly platform. It's dramatically different than the Pacific experience where the USN was faced in 1942 with similar large raids but had to put up a curtain of at least a dozen or more single-seat fighters (Or SBD ersatz-fighters) to defend their carrier. That's virtually the entire embarked squadron of Fulmars on a RN Carrier. Admittedly, the Luftwaffe Ju-87 aircrew did not have the, culturally-enforced, death-defying dedication of the IJN raiders, but they were no less skilled in their profession. This seems a naval counterpart to the owed-few during the BoB and in some respects even more laudable.

 

[Shortround6]

That is the problem with some of these definitions and short data lists.
The definitions change with time and with the using country or service (or both?)

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/hurricane/z3564-weights.jpg

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/gladiator/gladiator-k7964.pdf

Spitfire Mk I K.9787 Trials Report

The British, at least at the time of these tests, seemed to figure that "Tare" weight was the "Light" weight plus the fixed military load and since things like the guns and radios (or a large part of them?) are included in the "service load" we are left wondering what the fixed military load is for some planes. It is spelled out pretty clearly in the documents for the Gladiator. It is NOT " chocks, blocks, stands, etc. used when weighing an airplane" at this time and/or service.

 

[parsifal]

My opinion is that a single seat Fulmar would be a lightened fighter with better fighter performance than the actual aircraft that entered service.

But such an aircraft would have been a near disaster for the RN. Thats probably why the F4F in those early months was not rushed to be embarked. The very first marks of the Wildcat did have issues with non wing folding and a few other things nasty, but even the other later marks were not rushed into the very front line service despite some obvious advantages performance wise. Later as the carrier and pilot droughts eased things did change, but in the dark years of 1940 and early 41, nope, the Wildcat was left on the shelf, and for good reason.

The RN was a completely different kettle of fish to the USN and faced with challenges far earlier than the USN, and with severe limitations on it fleet air arm. its why our compatriots and enthusiasts from the USN simply cant get their heads around the operational limits of the RN

The Fulmar was a quick lash up, a development from a light bomber rejected by the RAF and picked up as table scraps by the RN which had only just won back the independance of its air arm. Even though it was again a separate air arm, it was still beholden to the RAF for the supply and training of its aircrew, and aircrew were in pitifully short supply. In 1939 the FAA received the grand total of 16 new pilots. 1940 was slightly better, with about 80 pilots received. It was not until 1943 that the RN began to receive substantial numbers of pilots.

Not that it would have mattered, RN carrier capacities simply did not allow dedicated single purpose aircraft to be embarked. The carriers were spread so thin that there were only rare occasions when more than a single carrier could operate together. With air capacities of around 40 aircraft per flat top, there was never the slightest possibility of a single purpose aircraft being appropriate in those early years. the aircraft embarked simply had to be multi role, and that carried with it inherent penalties. thus the Swordfish combined Torpedo, Spotter and recon roles, and the Fulmar combined observation escort and point defence into the one airframe. For some of those roles it needed a second crew member. and that was that. A single seat aircraft might have been able to muddle through, but I doubt it. The second crewman was needed for communications and navigation.

The other problem was a question of timing. However much the Fulmar needed to be improved, it was all that was available in 1940-41, and any delay in its introduction would have prevented the RN from meeting critical obligations it simply had to meet. And further design work on the type would have delayed that service delivery unacceptably.

Despite its obvious limitations the Fulmar did pretty well. It was slow, and that was its main draw back, but it was stable and carried a lot of ammunition and fuel. Those attributes, stability and endurance made it ideal as a fleet defence aircraft, and as a result it fought with a great deal of distinction. It was found that it could operate in restricted seas, even with enemy fighters about, and in the first six months of its introduction had destroyed well over 100 enemy aircraft for very modest losses of its own. most importantly however it fulfilled its main mission profiles of fleet observation and air defence fighter.

So, in my opinion, in the context of the fleet it served, it was just fine as it was, and a move to make it a single seat aircraft an overall liability.

 

[Shortround6]

Here is one historic example that spurred the thinking. It's January 10, 1941. The only aircraft embarked on the RN carrier Illustrious providing CAP are its 15 Fulmar I. It's escorting the Operation Excess convoy. The Illustrious is about to be hammered by Fliegerkorps X. It's about noon. 5 Fulmar's have been providing CAP and been active (as well as effective) in driving off a number of unescorted Regia Aeronautica raiders. As recounted by Ian Cameron in Wings of the Morning, one of the Fulmar's is damaged and RTB, and two are out of ammo while the remaining two are down to 50% ammo and at low altitude having chased off a pair of SM.79s.

RADAR detects raiders raiders at high altitude at 12:25 PM. The raid apparently consists of 18 He 111s, 43 Ju87s escorted by 10 Bf-110s. Of the total, 30 Ju-87s targeted Illustrious.

Clearly, a shorter legged Fulmar with less ammo would require a different launch and recovery cycle and probably a different command protocol for launch and recovery of aircraft. As it was there was a 4 minute delay in launch of the relief Cap. Routine CAP altitude was apparently at 14,000 ft. so that may indicate the threat altitude. (I've read that typical Stuka dive bombing altitude began at ~13,000 ft but its final dive on its target was made from 7,000 ft. Admittedly, there are lot's of unknowns here.

The FDO immediately alerts the Airborne Fulmars with orders to climb and defend their carrier. The first of the four spotted relief CAP (Fulmars and also Swordfish for relief ASW patrol)is launched at 1234.5 and the last 12:36. The attack is reported to have begun at either 12:37 or 12:38.

Roughly 13 minutes to climb and take a defensive position against the incoming raid. The Fulmar I is reported to have required 15 minuets to reach 15,000 ft. The timing suggests to me that a lightened Fulmar might just have been able to make a more effective defense. As it turned out, the airborne CAP, even the ones without ammo, did manage to do some disruption but unfortunately for Illustrious, not enough to substantially mitigate the Stuka attack.

You can take many historic incidents and try to show how a certain modification to an aircraft might have affected the outcome. However if other things change just little bit it affects the out come also.

In this instance even SeaFire MK IIc's on the flight deck could not have reached 14,000ft between the historic take-off time and start of the attack, so ANY Fulmar without a rocket engine wasn't going to do it either.

Now maybe if there hadn't been a 4 minute delay and they had launched at 12:30 to 12:31.5 they might have been able to climb to 7-9000ft and catch the Stuka's there, it is still mighty fine timing.

You also have to be careful what you ask for as you just might get it. IF the first CAP had been using "lightened" Fulmars ALL of them might have been out of ammunition when the German raid arrived even if they still had enough fuel to intercept. You can't really pick and choose which CAP of the day gets the fully loaded aircraft (full fuel and ammo boxes) and which gets the part filled tanks and 1/2 empty ammo boxes. You don't KNOW when the enemy raids will arrive as apparently in this case they only had less than 20 minutes (60 miles at 180mph) which is nowhere near enough time to fool with ammo gas loads.

Wither they had 4 planes or 8 available to intercept the raid had too few interceptors for too many attackers.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

You can take many historic incidents and try to show how a certain modification to an aircraft might have affected the outcome. However if other things change just little bit it affects the out come also.

In this instance even SeaFire MK IIc's on the flight deck could not have reached 14,000ft between the historic take-off time and start of the attack, so ANY Fulmar without a rocket engine wasn't going to do it either.

Now maybe if there hadn't been a 4 minute delay and they had launched at 12:30 to 12:31.5 they might have been able to climb to 7-9000ft and catch the Stuka's there, it is still mighty fine timing.

You also have to be careful what you ask for as you just might get it. IF the first CAP had been using "lightened" Fulmars ALL of them might have been out of ammunition when the German raid arrived even if they still had enough fuel to intercept. You can't really pick and choose which CAP of the day gets the fully loaded aircraft (full fuel and ammo boxes) and which gets the part filled tanks and 1/2 empty ammo boxes. You don't KNOW when the enemy raids will arrive as apparently in this case they only had less than 20 minutes (60 miles at 180mph) which is nowhere near enough time to fool with ammo gas loads.

Wither they had 4 planes or 8 available to intercept the raid had too few interceptors for too many attackers.

In general I agree with what you've said and said as much myself in assuming modified cyclic ops would be implemented with a different light-weight fulmar I. That by itself would likely comprise a whole different set of circumstances difficult to predict. Also, the ones, I was considering as having a shot, albeit with your caveats, were the 4 Fulmars already airborne, not really the four spotted on the flight deck. With respect to numbers to foil an attack. it was common for large raids to be foiled to the point of impotence by the use of small numbers of fulmar I's. Consider the example of May 8, 1941 when the Ark Royal (with 12 of its 16 embarked Fulmar I's serviceable) covering Convoy Tiger. From 1615 through about 2000, the convoy was attacked by about dozen Savoias.
At 1915 Fliegerkorps X made its appearance. approximately 60 to 70 raiders by some accounts and over 30 in other accounts. The attacks were driven off by low numbers of Fulmar Is: a maximum of 7 Fulmars were airborne at any one time and more typically 4 defenders at a time. In one case one fulmar is reputed by Cameron to have driven off a raid of 16 Ju-87s. So, low numbers of Fulmar Is thrown against the Luftwaffe were curiously effective. As Parsifal has suggested, the RN FAA experience was very different than the situation in the Pacific.

Also, with respect to the admiralty and procurement of one aircraft to fill both roles, I can do no better than quote the 5th Sea Lord a year before the events in the Med transpired and about the time of the Fulmar's first flight:

from: Fulmar: Development â€" Armoured Aircraft Carriers in World War II

"NOTES BY FIFTH SEA LORD OF FLEET AIR ARM MEETING HELD ON 4 JANUARY 1940
[ADM 1/ 10752] 22 JANUARY 1940

A. LONG TERM POLICY:

It was agreed that Fleet Air Arm Fighters were required for the following duties:–
(1) To destroy enemy shadowers.
(2) To intercept enemy striking forces.
(3) To destroy enemy spotters and to protect our own.
(4) To escort our own striking forces to their objectives.

2. Functions 1, 2 and 3 could be met by a Single Seater using the homing beacon as a navigational aid. Function 4 was considered to be problematical but apart from this it was agreed that there would be many occasions when fighters would be required to fly over the sea outside beacon range of their parent ship. It was therefore considered to be a sound policy to develop a 2 Seater fighter having navigational facilities, provided this did not entail a serious reduction in performance compared to a Single Seater.

3. It was, however, agreed that the provision for the second member of the Fighter's crew should be kept to a minimum of essentials. It appeared feasible to keep the additional structural weight down to 400 lbs., making, with the Observer (200 lbs.), a total additional weight of some 600 lbs. 4. It was agreed that the experience of the present war had shown that Fleet Air Arm Fighters must have sufficient speed to cope with German Aircraft of the following types, which were likely to attack the Fleet in the North Sea:"

I don't think the admiralty necessarily made the wrong decision. It's just interesting to ponder the effects of a slightly different decision with an aircraft that, for its time, had some quite novel Naval capabilities and performed arguably beyond strictly performance-based expectations.

 

[wuzak]

4. It was agreed that the experience of the present war had shown that Fleet Air Arm Fighters must have sufficient speed to cope with German Aircraft of the following types, which were likely to attack the Fleet in the North Sea:[/COLOR][/I]"

Interesting document oldcrowcv63.

Do you have the list of aircraft that FAA fighters needed to be able to engage?

 

[oldcrowcv63]

From the same source: Fulmar: Development â€" Armoured Aircraft Carriers in World War II

(1) Shore Based Anti-Ship Bombers. The most modern German antiship bomber in quantity production likely to be encountered is the Junkers 88 with a top speed in level flight of 285 m.p.h.

(2) Long Range Fighters escorting striking forces. The new Messerschmidt 110 which was likely to be used for this purpose is reputed to have a top speed of 350 m.p.h."

 

[Edgar Brooks]

suddenly, in another post, you suggested that the FAA didn't order it.

What I suggested (or tried to) was that the RN, having specified that they wanted a two-seat version, would not have accepted a single-seat Fulmar.
In "what-ifs" (and using hindsight) it's easy to make Their Lordships look somewhat foolish, but, in 1938, the only foreseeable enemy was Germany, who had no aircraft carriers, so the threat against the Navy consisted solely of land-based bombers, with which the Fulmar was expected to cope.
The entry of Japan changed everything, and the FAA had to play catch-up.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

What I suggested (or tried to) was that the RN, having specified that they wanted a two-seat version, would not have accepted a single-seat Fulmar.
In "what-ifs" (and using hindsight) it's easy to make Their Lordships look somewhat foolish, but, in 1938, the only foreseeable enemy was Germany, who had no aircraft carriers, so the threat against the Navy consisted solely of land-based bombers, with which the Fulmar was expected to cope.
The entry of Japan changed everything, and the FAA had to play catch-up.

I think you are correct and in 1938 or even in early 1940, the admiralty didn't have a Mark IA Crystal Ball to see into the future. But, I'd also argue there was an alternative path that was available, without any intent to belittle the Admiralty Lords. In fact, quite the contrary, I think they did about as well as could be expected in advance of the unforeseen, sobering events in the Mediterranean previously mentioned. They recognized that while the Fulmar I didn't quite meet their expectations, it was probably good enough to get them through the crisis until better options such as airframe and engine improvements became possible/available.

The suggestion that they might have marginally improved the Fulmar's performance to the point of meeting or barely exceeding their original specifications by selecting a subset of the aircraft for deletion of the observer and associated equipment was only made in recognition that the original decision and procurement didn't have the benefit of hindsight. The what-if is thus based upon hindsight that in fact didn't exist and so does not mean to second guess the Lord's perfectly understandable decisions. In other words, lacking crystal ball foresight, there is no realistic single-seat option.

By the time of Japan's entry into the war, the situation was already in the process of being ameliorated by the next incremental stop-gap measure: the incorporation of single-seat, fixed-wing: Hurricane and Martlet fighters, into RN CV Air Groups.