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Because rarely would any aircraft fly in a straight line when it's being attacked, whether it had an observer, a tail gunner or the entire L.A. Dodgers' team sitting in the back seat...
Unfortunately most fighter aircraft were flying in straight lines when shot down, and never saw their attackers. Unless the pilot has warning, by sighting the attacker, or from a friendly aircraft, or from a rear facing observer or by "The Force" he cannot know when to stop flying in a straight line...
L.A. Dodgers' team sitting in the back seat...
And why would an aircraft be doing aerobatic manoeuvres if it didn't see the attacking aircraft? Are you saying that rear gunners in two seat aircraft cannot also warn the pilot of impending attack, as well as shooting back?
I don't want to argue this endlessly, but having a rear facing observer obviously has benefits in combat, and those benefits have to be weighed against the increase in performance obtainable by omitting the observer.
"Air combat experience going at least back to WW2 suggests that surprise in the form of the unseen attacker has been pivotal in 3/4 or more of the kills. In writing about his experiences flying long range escort missions during WW2, P-38 pilot Lt col. mark hubbard stressed that 90% of all fighters shot down never saw the guy who hit them. Hubbard was by no means alone in observing that friction in the form of the unseen attacker from 6 o'clock played a dominant role in engagement outcomes. The American p-47 pilot Hubert Zemke (17.75 kills) stressed "that few pilots are shot down by enemies they see." Similarly the German Me-109 pilot Erich Hartmann, whose 352 kills during WW2 made the top scorer of all time, later that he was "sure that 80% of kills never knew he was there before he opened fire."
Clausewitzian Friction and Future WarBy Barry D. Watts
Now, let's look at all the aircraft that WERE shot down with an observer/rear gunner aboard...Right, no WW2 fighters were ever shot down by unseen opponents...LoL
Morgan and Shacklady state (page 505) that the Luftwaffe sank the Courageous...so I'm not sure how much to trust their account of the Seafire development!
You're really beating a dead horse here, as there's no way that a better Seafire would miraculously emerge in 1940, given the intensive work on it even years later, that failed to make it into a sufficiently robust carrier fighter. In 1944/45 the FAA could afford to right off Seafires with little thought of where the next one would come from as the aircraft was in volume production, but that wasn't the case in 1940 when even the RAF didn't have enough.
A 1940 folding wing Seafire project has all the earmarks of a complete disaster waiting to happen, and thankfully someone pulled the plug on it.
Now, let's look at all the aircraft that WERE shot down with an observer/rear gunner aboard...
Got any numbers, there?
keep in mind, that all I was suggesting is that the single seat Fulmar be lighter with improved performance to provide a better single seat CAP aircraft for CV air defense. The recon fulmar would remain the same and also be embarked. Removing the 600 lbs from the observers section is a good start. It brings the weight (9,000 lbs) down to almost that of a max load F4F-4 (8,763 lbs) with about 100+ extra hp in the F-II. Also there were apparently some additional streamlining and weight savings (~300 lbs) planned that may have not made it past the drawing board. The finished Fulmar II product was only designed to be a multirole aircraft and filled the role well until the advent of the Firefly. But it also possessed folding wings. A lighter higher performing, point-defense weapon might have had some utility. Just wondering 'aloud' as it were. With 4 x .50HMGs on the F-II with 370 rpg, some additional weight savings mightt be gains by reducing the fuel load, and ammo load from 370 rpg to perhaps 250 rpg (slightly more than the F4F-4.). You also get back some of the operational ceiling loss that hampered both marks.
Did both the Fulmar I II have the filter system that created significant drag?
I don't think much fuselage redesign is reasonable in this scenario. Taking a length-section out of the fuselage with the same landing gear would raise the nose, losing some of the good forward visibility the type enjoyed. With that wide landing gear, the Fulmar looks to me to be a very suitable naval aircraft.
Not looking for the performance of a Spitfire or a Hurricane but just a real folding wing, single seat naval fighter available to the FAA in approximately 1940 time frame to augment fleet defense.
One peripheral mistake in how many pages, and its all over? Morgan Shacklady have done an excellent job of describing Seafire development - after all, the entire purpose of the book was to describe the Spitfire/Seafire. I can point to other peripheral mistakes in the book, but that doesn't dilute the basic quality of the research that went into the main subject matter.
You have no idea what might have emerged in 1940-41, had the project received proper support from the likes of Fairey; instead what happened was the FAA realised too late that 2 seat fighters were obsolescent, and that the Blackburn Sabre engined project was well behind schedule. Supermarine and Westland were forced to come up with an improvisation, instead of having the time to develop the Sea Spitfire properly.
Speculation with no real evidence to back it up.
Now, let's look at all the aircraft that WERE shot down with an observer/rear gunner aboard...
Got any numbers, there?
Paying attention to what was happening outside the cockpit and spotting enemy aircraft was the key to the subsequent events of air combat. Moreover a decisive advantage was often gained by seeing the enemy before being seen. The result was often surprise and quick victory.
The importance of surprise seems hard to overestimate. Posts war analyses of combat reports along with the reflections of veterans indicate quite strongly that the overwhelming percentage of fighter aircraft which were shot down in combat were lost as a result of being 'bounced by undetected attackers. In short, pilots who, for whatever reasons failed to monitor the skies around them usually did not last long.
Courage and Air Warfare: The Allied Aircrew Experience in the Second World War
By Mark K. Wells, p.38.
It's such a glaring error that it really does make me wonder the accurate their account of Seafire development is.
...we all know that years of development work were required to turn the Seafire into a barely passable folding wing carrier fighter.
You're trying to turn the most basic factors of aerial combat on it's head:
Paying attention to what was happening outside the cockpit and spotting enemy aircraft was the key to the subsequent events of air combat. Moreover a decisive advantage was often gained by seeing the enemy before being seen. The result was often surprise and quick victory.
The importance of surprise seems hard to overestimate. Posts war analyses of combat reports along with the reflections of veterans indicate quite strongly that the overwhelming percentage of fighter aircraft which were shot down in combat were lost as a result of being 'bounced by undetected attackers. In short, pilots who, for whatever reasons failed to monitor the skies around them usually did not last long.
Courage and Air Warfare: The Allied Aircrew Experience in the Second World War
By Mark K. Wells, p.38.
Having a rearward facing observer did pay dividends in terms of visibility and situational awareness. It's impossible to argue otherwise, however the addition of the observer must be balanced against the loss of performance, but probably on the Fulmar, which couldn't be substantially lightened, the observer was worth the weight penalty.
Trying to paint Fairey as the villain of the story is also a bit of a stretch by M&S.
Clearly, Fairey knew that these plans were unrealistic and would have seriously impaired Fairey's ability to design and build the aircraft it was already contractually committed to.
Why the Admiralty didn't pursue the Sea Hurricane in lieu of the Spitfire is really puzzling.
You're the one speculating. You're trying to tell us that somehow Fairey could magically turn the Spitfire into a folding wing carrier fighter, and produce hundreds of them by 1940, when we all know the production problems that plagued the Spitfire's early years, and we all know that years of development work were required to turn the Seafire into a barely passable folding wing carrier fighter.
One of the problems faced by Fairey was the need to get the aircraft into to production ASAP. Fairey was able to begin series production of the Fulmar 1 in April 1940, or less than 2 years after the initial order for 127 aircraft, while the first production aircraft flew in Jan 1940. This was actually a very remarkable achievement; a folding wing, 8 gun monoplane fighter from order to first flight in 19 months, while at the same time Fairey was building the Battle and Swordfish, finishing design work on the Albacore for production in 1939, and would fly the first prototype Barracuda on 7 Dec 1940. At the same time Fairey was designing the Firefly.
Initially Fairey had been contracted to begin Fulmar production in early 1941! We can see that they were forced to skip much of the development work to get the aircraft into production so quickly, and of necessity this meant skipping much of the refinements that later appeared on the Fulmar II. It was probably beyond Fairey's capacity to build a parallel single seat variant, especially since the Air Ministry/Admiralty were issuing contracts for such small numbers of aircraft, which didn't permit enough investment for volume production and parallel development, and this is probably why such things as Fulmar bomb racks and drop tanks were delayed until late 1941.
AFAIK, the Fulmar II had the capacity to fit a tropical filter for landbased operations but this could be removed if the aircraft was operating from a carrier.
That's your opinion - in the end the rearward facing observer in a fighter romanticized with open cockpits and silk scarves sailed into the sunset as those fighters that came after the Fulmar showed. To try to up play this is nothing more than a revisionist take...Having a rearward facing observer did pay dividends in terms of visibility and situational awareness. It's impossible to argue otherwise
Yep, that observer was so valuable the Fulmar was replaced as a fighter by 1942.however the addition of the observer must be balanced against the loss of performance, but probably on the Fulmar, which couldn't be substantially lightened, the observer was worth the weight penalty.
The performance on climb has been measured at a weight of 8480 lb. The results show:-
The maximum rate of climb 1640 ft/min at 11,400 ft.
Time to 10,000 feet. 6.2 minutes
Time to 20,000 feet. 14.2 minutes.
Service ceiling 28,700 feet.
Estimated absolute ceiling 29,900 feet.
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/P-40/AK572.pdf
UK testing of the Kittyhawk gave somewhat lower climb figures and at 8480lb:.