Loss of Singapore - Whose fault was it?

[Glider]

First class post Parsival. I think its also worth remembering that the mistakes of PQ18 were studied and changes made namely the importance of having 2 x CVE with the convoy. It also reminds everyone that the RN AA fire wasn't as impotent as many people believe and in this period was probably as good, if not better, than any other navy

 

[Freebird]

Aggressively committing the available RN carriers to the FE in earl '42, absent coordination with the USN carrier force (which is an interesting what if) would highly likely have meant simply losing them. The limited number of ships and small fighter contingents, partly of obsolete types like the Fulmar (as far as fighter combat, at least) were simply not enough to effectively defend them against the JNAF level of anti-ship capability and long range single engine fighter escort capability.

Joe

I tend to agree with Joe on this, considering that the British could send at most perhaps one modern carrier and one smaller one, it isn't going to be enough to take on a significant Japanese force.

If the Admiralty had postponed the refit of the HMS Furious for a couple of months (say, from Oct to Dec/Jan), I could see them sending HMS Victorious and perhaps HMS Eagle to the Far East in Oct/Nov 1941.
That would leave Furious, Argos Ark Royal in the N. Atlantic until the return of the Illustrious Formidable, with Hermes probably sent to patrol the S. Atlantic.

The best course of action after the Japanese landings would indeed be to propose a joint effort with the US, 3 British carriers with 1 or 2 US carriers would be a decent force, and still leaves 2 or 3 US carriers as a Central Pacific force. The best course of action might be to try to draw the Japanese carriers into range of shore based air units, and try for a night strike.

 

[buffnut453]

.Why...there are no 1st line japanese carriers within a range of about 3000 miles in 1941, and an anti-shipping force amounting to less than 100 a/c.

But that wasn't known at the time. Even during the fighting, inaccurate reporting often led to over-estimation of the IJN forces available, for example:

9 Dec: 1 battleship, 2 cruisers and 7 destroyers sighted off Kota Bharu
14 Dec: Information received that an enemy convoy of 140 ships (including 100 transports and one or two aircraft carriers) has been sighted off the coast of Indochina heading SSW.
18 Dec: A reconnaissance was made 250 miles east of Singapore to search for an enemy aircraft carrier. Glenn Martins operating from Sinkawang reconnoitred the Miri area for Japanese Naval forces. Six aircraft attacked from 14,000ft. A direct hit and a near miss were scored on a cruiser and 2 near misses on a large transport vessel thought to be a seaplane or aircraft carrier.

for some time, AHQFE refused to believe that the Japanese fighters achieving such success over northern Malaya were land-based.

 

[renrich]

On December 7 , 1941, a large portion of the Australian Army, the Second Australian Imperial Force, was overseas fighting for the UK. Australia had a negligible Navy and Air Force. The SAIF was brought home to defend the home country but the US had to supply most of the air and naval forces to defend Australia. The US also sent ground forces to Australia. Without air and naval forces, Australia would have been difficult to defend if the Japanese had decided to invade and without air and naval forces New Guinea would have undoubtedly fallen allowing the Japanese to interdict supply lines to Australia.

 

[parsifal]

On December 7 , 1941, a large portion of the Australian Army, the Second Australian Imperial Force, was overseas fighting for the UK. Australia had a negligible Navy and Air Force. The SAIF was brought home to defend the home country but the US had to supply most of the air and naval forces to defend Australia. The US also sent ground forces to Australia. Without air and naval forces, Australia would have been difficult to defend if the Japanese had decided to invade and without air and naval forces New Guinea would have undoubtedly fallen allowing the Japanese to interdict supply lines to Australia.

There are a few serous factual errors that need to be corrected, before we can move on.

The US in the South pacific only ever committed very limited numbers of ground troops, and until they were properly trained and acclimatized, were found to be of very limited value in any offensive role. 41st US infantry division was committed from November 1942, in the buna fighting, and fell apart so badly they had to be withdrawn. 2 Marine was of course engaged on Guadacanal, but were essentially on the defensive for most of the time. many argue that the americans never got the hang of the jungle fighting in PNG, and I tend to agree. they relied on the "wither on the vine" strategy, which was essentially to take key points held weakly and bypass more heavily defended areas. The trouble with that is that bypassed garrisons still needed to be contained and defeated , which the americans were forced to rely on their allies to do .....

Even if for some reason people dont want to accept that the US Army was lacking in its ability to fight in the Jungle, it was always the junior partner in terms of numbers. The Australian army was still fielding about 450000 frontline troops to the TO, compared to less than 150000 US troops. It was a very similar story in terms of land based air. In terms of naval resources, the heavy ships were almost exclusively American, as were the supply trains, but the lighter ASW forces were mostly Australian.

In the context of the japanese offensive period, until coral sea and Midway, the US contribution to the defence of australia was decidedly minimal. And the AIF had returned by April 1942.

Its a source of constant amazement to me how both the american and British members of this forum can claim, with a complete straight face, how their respective armed forces "knew" how to defeat the japanese in the Jungle. they didnt. for the British, they needed Wingate and slim to develop the necessary skills, whilst for the Americans, it was Eichelbirger who worked out the techniques for the americans

 

[parsifal]

But that wasn't known at the time. Even during the fighting, inaccurate reporting often led to over-estimation of the IJN forces available

,


Have disagree. Just prior to the Dow the British had a clear picture of the naval forces committed. british intell in the months prior to the attack had a very accurate estimate of the strength ranged against them. What was badly estimated was the quality of that force. Plus, I will admit the British simply refused to consider some pieces of intelligence handed to them. ]

 

[parsifal]

I tend to agree with Joe on this, considering that the British could send at most perhaps one modern carrier and one smaller one, it isn't going to be enough to take on a significant Japanese force

.

Joes position was that British carriers were marginal and could not defend themselves properly. that is a complete fabrication, based on the limited victories achieved by the FAA. Compounding the situation in the far east was the over-extension of the RN after they must have known what was coming, and after they had promised to send a substantial fleet to singapore. It also completely fails to take into account the extremely limited numbers of anti-shipping types available, known to the british, but for some reason not being acknowledged in this discussion. Even Fulmars against Nells would have highly effective

Consider if the brits had not engaged in greece or Crete, and had withdrawn Fce H around June or July 1941, so as to meet the committments they had made to defence in the far east. That would have given them Ark Royal Formidable and possibly ilustrious and Victorious in a pinch. It would have been better to retain Furious, Eagle, hermes argus and the three escort carriers in home waters because of range and speed considerations.

Without prior preprations the plan wont work. More pilots, Sea hurricanes were needed

The best course of action after the Japanese landings would indeed be to propose a joint effort with the US, 3 British carriers with 1 or 2 US carriers would be a decent force, and still leaves 2 or 3 US carriers as a Central Pacific force. The best course of action might be to try to draw the Japanese carriers into range of shore based air units, and try for a night strike.

 

[renrich]

The fact remains that if the USN had not stopped the Japanese at Coral Sea and decimated the Kido Butai at Midway in 1942, the Japanese had designs on Australia and if there were no invasion plans carried out they could and probably would have isolated Australia and made it very difficult for outside help to get through. The USAAF played the major role in obtaining air superiority in the New Guinea campaign. I never said the US learned to outdo the Japanese in jungle fighting and I question how much good Wingate did for the overall war effort cavorting around in the jungle in Burma. Slim was the owner of most of the success there and in India.

 

[Glider]

I do sometimes wonder as to how well the Japanese would have done had they landed in Australia. Its a huge country with vast distances between the major cities and precious little infrastructure between them. They were already stretched by prior commitments and were probably the least mechanised army in the war. It is quite probable that they may have been able to take say Darwin, but to move out from there by land or sea could easily stretch them to breaking point.

The Janese Navy was very efficient but it wasn't that large and to try and Isolate Australia would probably been too much.

 

[parsifal]

The fact remains that if the USN had not stopped the Japanese at Coral Sea and decimated the Kido Butai at Midway in 1942, the Japanese had designs on Australia and if there were no invasion plans carried out they could and probably would have isolated Australia and made it very difficult for outside help to get through. The USAAF played the major role in obtaining air superiority in the New Guinea campaign. I never said the US learned to outdo the Japanese in jungle fighting and I question how much good Wingate did for the overall war effort cavorting around in the jungle in Burma. Slim was the owner of most of the success there and in India.

no argument that it was american naval and airpower that turned the tide on the japanese. I also have no argument that the US ground forces after 1943 were the spearhead of the Allied counteroffensive, for which the japanese had no answer.

It is also true that if the naval battles of 1942 had been lost, the road back to victory would have been much longer, perhaps to the point of being prohibitive. Japan may well have achieved her war aims....a negotiated peace, if she had had two or three years of relative quiet on her frontiers because the Allies had lost these naval enagaements.

However it is simply untue that these battles stopped any massive or impending Japanese offensives either in the direction of Hawaii or Australia. Both were well beyond her shipping capacities, and in the case of the the invasion of Australia, well beyond any troop availabilitities or land based logisitics. Moreover the japanese had already decided that by the beginning of April 1942. At their Imperial conference in early April, the Army had steafastly refused to provide the additional 10 divisions they thought was needed. there were other reports that made quite clear they thought it impopssible for them to gather the necessary land transport. The Navy estimated they needed an additional 2 million tons of shipping which they simply did not have. Without any significant setbacks, the Japanese had already concluded they could not undertake either the invasion of Hawaii or Australia with the resources at their disposal. Neither could they invade India or Ceylon.

However, what they were confronted with was an outstanding first phase in their offensive. They had achieved all that they had set out to do, at a fraction of the cost they had thought would be needed, and in a time frame that was about 6 months ahead of what they had estimated would be required. These easy victories made them over confident, and dismissive of the allies. However, the expected negotiated peace still evaded them, so reasons for that had to be found, and some way found to force the allies to the negotiating table. The chief threats were thought to be the threat from Australia, and the repeated raids by the USN on their eastern flank. Yamamoto determined that what was required to force the issue was a decisive battle, which led to midway, and a new limited offensive into the south west pacific, designed to isolate Australia. Coral sea (and Midway) helped to thwart that, though it was still up to the land forces to stop a more gradual occupation of Port Moresby, Milne bay, and beyond that (ie projected); espiritu, noumea and fiji).

The best way of describing the importance of the naval victories of 1942 were not that they defeated the japanese, or that they saved australia. They did not. What they did do was was to avert defeat, and blunt the final Japanese offensives that may have forced a negotiated peace settlement, or created the opportunity to establish fixed fortified lines of defence, difficult to breach.

 

[parsifal]

The USAAF played the major role in obtaining air superiority in the New Guinea campaign

Not on the basis of sorties flown in New Guinea. The USAAC always remained very much the junior partner in this regard, though i will concede it was US equipment in both the RAAF and the USAAC. RAAF was flying about twice as many sorties as the USAAC in new Guinea, though the USN made some impact earlier on. In the Solomons (a different TO by that time, it was a different kettle of fish, this was almost exclusively a US run affair, so perhaps you are referring to the SoPac rather than SWPac.

I never said the US learned to outdo the Japanese in jungle fighting

I know and acknowledge that. however the forces committed by the US, early as they were, were also totally unready for any sort of offensive combat until 1943. Eventually the US did field very good jungle warfare units, superior in every respect to the Japanese forces but only in very limited numbers...perhaps 2 or 3 RCTs for New Guinea, and latterly only used in Macs island hopping strategy. A really good example of this sort of selective contribution was the Nadzab airborn drop. as part of the Markh landing by 9 Aus. A full battery of Australian artillery was detailed as part of the airborne operation. The only part of the operation that was american was the 503 parachute Bn and the transport command that converyed them. But these troops fought very well in the jungle....

and I question how much good Wingate did for the overall war effort cavorting around in the jungle in Burma. Slim was the owner of most of the success there and in India.

And that places you in the same boat as these guys that are claiming that the Argyll and Sutherlanders knew about how to fight in the jungle, and therefore the british Army also knew how to fight in the Jungle. Brilliant as he was, Slim and indeed the army that he was part of, had no idea of how to fight the Japanese in the Jungle, until after Wingate showed them how. Slim was still sending troops into the Jungle with 90 lb packs on their backs, still issueing steel capped hobnail boots as jungle kit, still thought armour could not operate in the jungle, still would go to water whenever his flanks were threatened until after wingate demnstrated in spades what could be done.


"Orde Wingate was a British general in World War Two who helped to revolutionise the way war could be fought in the jungle. Orde Wingate was by any standards unconventional but his impact in the war in the Far East should not be underestimated - neither should the part played by his Chindits.

In May 1942, Wingate was sent to Burma where he formed 'Wingate's Raiders' - though they are better known as the Chindits, named after the Burmese word 'chinthe' meaning lions; after the lion statues that guarded the temples in Burma. General Wavell, Commander-In-Chief, India, already knew about Wingate as he had come near to court-martialing him for insubordination when General-Officer Commanding the Middle East. Wingate arrived as a major but was quickly promoted to colonel.

This group was to cause chaos to the Japanese behind their lines. They used classic hit-and-run tactics against the Japanese who up to 1942, had only really experienced military success. Now they had to fight an enemy they could not see. The Chindits were especially successful along the Irrawaddy River where they caused a great deal of damage to Japanese supply lines. The Chindits also sent information back to the Royal Air Force to assist their operations. This unit did a great deal to weaken the Japanese force that was in Burma and its work continued even after Orde Wingate was killed in a plane crash in April 1944.

"Wingate saw himself as a boot up the backside of Man. The fact that most of his ideas ran directly against those of his superiors did not worry him in the slightest."

(Arthur Swinson)"

The main contribution of Wingate was his unconventional tactics....dont worry about flanks and rely n air supply for logistics. His actual material achievements are limited as you say, but his impact on strategic thinking throughout the 14th Army were nothing short of revolutionary.....

 

[renrich]

Well, I have read a number of books about Wingate and the Chindits as well as Merrill's Marauders and it makes interesting and exciting reading but I believe that a number of historians and commanders of Allied forces believe that those escapades were mainly a waste of good men, materiel and mules. One of the best, from a personal point of view is "The Road Past Mandalay" by John Masters. A good read.

I certainly agree that, even if the Japanese had tried to invade and conquer Australia, even without any interference from US forces, they would have failed. Perhaps, under favorable circumstances they could have occupied Darwin and perhaps Brisbane but probably could not have held on long there.

From memory, I think Masters was the son of an officer in the Indian Army, a Brit of course. Masters went to the military academy in India and in WW2 was an officer in a Ghurka outfit. He served in the Middle East and then in the Chindits. I believe at the end he was the adjutant for the CO of the Chindits after Wingate was killed. If memory serves there were only around 1500 Chindits left on their feet and a medical team was sent in to see how many were fit for duty. Only a dozen or so were adjudged fit. Masters was on a leave when the atom bomb was dropped. He became a novelist and several of his books were made into movies. He had moved to the US and lived in the Wind River Mountains in Wyoming. Later he moved to Santa Fe and died there a few years ago. An exciting lfe.

 

[yulzari]

In no order of significance.

Were the Japanese not responsible for the loss of Singapore?

Singapore itself was an indefensible self governing prison camp without control of the other side of the Johore Straits. Perhaps a more (pedantically) accurate title would be the Loss of Malaya?

Given the mindsets of the troops and unit commanders, could the British strategy, when unable to contain the Japanese assault, not have been to deliberately choose to give up the peninsula and concentrate at the south with a view to bringing the Japanese to battle on British terms?

 

[Vassili Zaitzev]

Hey guys, hope you don't mind if I put some more life into this thread. I have with my my senior thesis, which researched the Battle of Singapore. Feel free to critique it, and I hope it opens new avenues of discussion.
View attachment Final Copy to professors.zip