Freebird
Master Sergeant
The Brits had shown that cariers could operate within disputed airspace with even only moderately performing aircraft and limited numbers. The Jaopanese were an altogether different proposition, that much i will concde, but it is at least plausible that the RN could have repeated it achievements in the med against the European Axis, ie operate for extended periods in enemy controlled airspace.
That's not how I would interpret it.
The carriers were an excellent tool for control of the seas and neutralizing enemy sea power. (eg. Sinking of Bismarck, V. Vento damaged at Matapan etc)
However only when operating beyond the range of shore based air power, otherwise the enemy will overload carrier defences and sink or put out of action the carrier.(Illustrious Formidable in the Med)
Given the fact that there are already 2 carriers out of action (in summer '41) attempting to interdict the Japanese in the Gulf of Siam is too risky a prospect. (IMO)
The task would be better done by aircraft (that's why they built the airbases in the first place )
According to the official history, Australia produced 12,987 sea mines.
Excellent information, thanks very much Wildcat.
That's why you needed intel that could be shared with other interested parties so that a unified, concerted effort could be brought to bear. There were no guarantees that the Japanese fleet was going to invade Malaya and Thailand until the first troops hit the beaches. Brooke-Popham would have done far better had he stuck to the original indicators of impending attack - the arrival of short-range Japanese fighters.
With this intel, it might (stress might) have been possible to convince Washington and Bangkok that a more cooperative defence approach was needed, enabling MATADOR to be called perhaps as early as 5 Dec - it's a slim margin but it would probably be enough, with Thai troops supporting, to make life much more difficult for Yamashita.
Agreed, but there is no guarantee that this would work.
I would certainly have no problem with planning for Matador, and with a better mix of assets, (ie: tanks) the mission would be much more viable, even if the Japanese landing had already taken place.
However, I wouldn't want to depend on some foreign power (Bankok or Washington) for the success of the mission.
Better to assume that Thailand would remain neutral and make plans for that event. If they later agree to participate - great - but if they don't I would want a "Plan B" ( Plan C)
If the Matador plan isn't used (or they lose control of the port) I would propose a major strategic strike to disable the port facilities. Continued night strikes would continue to keep the port out of action.
Destroying the airbase would be helpful too.
Even if Japan is able to reopen the port for use sometime later, the added logistics demand of repairs, AA and port defence will eat away the supplies needed for the 25th Army.
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