Malayan Command - Focus is finding and killing invasion force

[Admiral Beez]

Really? And what forces are the going to use to invade French Indochina?

I said above, it may not be necessary to fire a shot. France invited/allowed nearly four hundred thousand British troops into France in Sept 1939 as part of mutual defence. Did Britain offer to do the same in FIC against the clearly expansionist IJA? A few thousand Indian troops moved from Malaya to FIC in 1939 or 1940 (before France falls) to show the British flag will suffice to complicate Japan's plans to invade FIC.

 

[buffnut453]

I said above, it may not be necessary to fire a shot. France invited/allowed nearly four hundred thousand British troops into France in Sept 1939 as part of mutual defence. Did Britain offer to do the same in FIC against the clearly expansionist IJA?

Again, using what forces? There were only 17,000 soldiers to defend Malaya...and that was woefully inadequate just for that job. Where are you going to get ANY British forces from to go into FIC in the summer of 1940? How are you going to get them there when the biggest threat on the planet is at your front door? Are you really going to dedicate resources to go to some far-flung, French-owned colony "just in case" when you have Nazi Germany on your doorstep?

You're applying the retrospectroscope and assuming that Britain had any idea, in 1940, of how things would pan out in the Far East....and then accusing Britain of being spineless. Your coulda-shoulda-woulda comments don't consider what was NOT known in the summer of 1940.

Brooke-Popham did have clear guidance. He could not attack Japanese forces before those forces made a move on British possessions. It put him in an unfortunate position but, I'm afraid, that's the reality. Britain was not in a position to embark on another operational front in 1940 and the forces in Malaya and Singapore weren't even adequate for defence, let alone going on any kind of offensive.

I know you don't like people shooting down your what-iffery but your questions need to be leavened by some dose of reality based on the challenges of changing the course of action from what actually happened.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Again....

I don't think I can satisfy your questions. That's okay.

 

[buffnut453]

I don't think I can satisfy your questions. That's okay.

Well you're the one saying Britain should have done "something". Since we can't magic forces out of thin air, what do you think Britain could have reasonably done, based on force locations as they stood in the summer of 1940...and not presupposing foreknowledge of Japanese intentions?

 

[EwenS]

It's noteworthy how spineless and lacking in initiative the late Empire British were compared to the earlier Brits. There's a fark'n invasion fleet amassing in FIC and Formosa and we'll do nothing, in fact we'll employ willful deniability and ignorance by not monitoring this build-up. Now there's an invasion fleet sailing towards us, but we can't attack it because we're afraid of making the first move, when the act of sailing an invasion fleet IS the first move. Can you imagine the US taking this position if they'd discovered the Kido Butai a hundred miles off Hawaii launching its strike aircraft? "Oh, maybe they're just exercising their fleet, I'm not sure, let's wait and see if they take the first shot?" No chance, the USAAC and USN would have attacked it without hesitation - in fact the USN did attack IJN submarines outside Pearl Harbour before the IJNAS strike began - what would Phillips have ordered if a couple of IJN submarines were discovered sailing outside the Singapore port? What were his ROEs?

It seemed the 1930s-40s Brits were always lacking any aggression or assertiveness, always hoping that the enemy will just leave them alone. Clearly, even though they now possessed the largest navy in the world, a large air force and credible army (and yes, they were busy in the North Atlantic, North Africa and Med), the demographic and economic catastrophe of the First World War had scarred many a British leader into a jelly-like state. Compare this to the British military and political leaders of the 18th and 19th Century, even as late as the 1890s Fashoda crisis the British were willing to march right into the face of an opponent and make them blink. But the world, including Tokyo watched a neutered, frightened Britain do nothing when Germany remilitarized the Rhineland in 1936 in clear violation of Versailles and the world had Britain's measure.

20th Century Britain needs some 18 and 19th Century British backbone. First of all, at the fall of France in May 1940, Britain needs to march into FIC (with a Free French general in front) before Japan does. And do it before you piss off everyone by sinking the French navy in July 1940. And this doesn't mean you need to deplete the forces in the UK then fighting the Battle of Britain and the Battle of the Atlantic. FIC is defended by a relatively small, ill-equipped French force, and if well played diplomatically (such as Britain making sure a Vichy general does not take over FIC) can be taken without a shot. But really what Britain should have done is when they offered to send the BEF to France in Sept 1939 Britain should have requested to send a smaller (mostly Indian, or even better French Canadian) BEF to FIC to offer similar support against Japan. With this in place at the fall of France, Japan can't invade in summer 1940 without fighting the Brits.

What Brooke-Popham. Phillips and Percival need is a firm tripwire ROE from London that does not require further reassurance or recheck - and make them known to the Japanese, Thais, DEI, FIC and the USA. "If we see any IJN or IJA forces in Malay (or Thai) water this will be considered a violation of our territory and a state of war will be in place between Japan and Britain, and such forces will be forcibly engaged". And then move whatever submarines available from the Home and MTO to Terengganu along with your PBYs to keep an constant monitor of FIC ports. And on the assumption that their still going to invade, put the RAF in place to attack the invasion fleet. I'd also position Force Z with working radar (and with dedicated Buffalo cover) at Terengganu - it's no good sitting in Singapore far to the south when Percival predicted years back that the invasion will come via Thailand and northern Malaya. Put a RAF man in the radar plot room aboard HMS Prince of Wales to coordinate the RN/RAF response.

Hilarious!

The Britain of the 1930s was nothing like that of the late 1800s. WW1 had seen to that. Economically Britain had been bankrupted. The death toll had been horrendous, not to mention the numbers carrying the scars of battle, both physical and mental, for the rest of their lives and visible on the streets of every community in the country every day of the week. No one in the country, public or politicians, wanted a repeat.

As for the RN, the 1889 Two Power Standard, under which Britain was supposed to match the next two largest naval powers in the world (initially France and Russia) was finally buried once and for all at the 1922 Washington Conference. Instead we were left with a 5/5/3 relationship between Britain the US and Japan. Why did we accept it? Because we couldn't afford not to. It offered a means of keeping others in check while limiting the drain on our finances. And on the whole it worked until at least 1930.

There are two major factors in British pre-WW2 planning that fundamentally changed by June 1940:-
1. No one planned for war in both Europe and the Far East simultaneously. It was either war against Germany and/or Italy or against Japan.
2. No one expected the Fall of France. In one stroke we lost the use of the French fleet to counter the Italian fleet in the Med, which would have allowed the movement of some RN ships to the Far East to protect against Japan and at the same time the Germans gained the use of French west coast ports so multiplying the effectiveness of their U-boat fleet several fold and requiring a much greater RN commitment to the protection of Atlantic convoys.

So by Aug 1940 Britain has to face the reality that its Far East policy, based since 1937, around the dispatch of a fleet to Singapore within 3-6 months of the outbreak of war with Japan is no longer workable. So the fall back for Malaya is to rely on the Air Force and Army. But where are those forces to be found. Especially when the crises and the losses, particularly in the Med, just keep on mounting through 1941, while the commitments just keep on increasing eg Iraq, Syria, Persia, northern and southern Russia.

Ultimately the decision is that what needs to be protected are those things that are most important. Australia, New Zealand, India and the shipping routes in the Indian Ocean to both the Middle East and India. The loss of Malaya and Singapore, while a disaster, is something that can be suffered.

For anyone interested in just how the British Chiefs of Staff and Govt saw things in Aug 1940, a quick Google turned up the Staff Appraisal that was captured from the Automedon. Written by those on the spot at the time with a full understanding of the position, it makes sobering reading some 80 years later.

http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pdfs/small/cab-66-10-wp-40-302-33.pdf

As for your point about the USN attacking the Japanese midget sub off Pearl Harbor, there is a bit of a difference between that obviously hostile act (if it was innocent it would have been on the surface) carried out inside US territorial waters, and what you are proposing ie an attack on a potential enemy carrying out its right of peaceful passage in international waters.

As for occupying FIC, others have commented and I agree. Ultimately however they remained French territory under the direction of the Vichy Govt. A lot of effort went into persuading French Colonies to join the Free French call in 1940. Some of these succeeded, as in French Equatorial Africa (modern day Chad, Central African Republic, Republic of the Congo and Gabon, the rest stayed loyal to Vichy France. That helped getting aircraft from Takoradi on the Gold Coast to Egypt.

An attack on FIC could have made already difficult relations with Vichy even worse (they were bad enough after the RN bombarded French colonial ports in June 1940). The last thing Britain needed was for Vichy to stop sitting on the sidelines between June 1940 and Nov 1942, and become an active participant in the war in the Med against Britain, whether in concert with the Axis or not.

 

[Admiral Beez]

what do you think...?

I think we're in an infinite loop here.

My OT premise was that RAF Malaya's focus is narrowed to finding and countering landings in Thailand and northern Malaya rather than defending Singapore et al. I have already given my ideas on possible changes to RAF deployments and we have covered above why those may not work. What we're missing is other's ideas on how RAF Malaya could or would have changed its deployment and plans if given this narrow focus. If you feel the entire premise is unrealistic, that focusing the RAF to this task rather than spreading out its aircraft across all of Malaya and Singapore is implausible, then this is likely not the thread for you.

 

[SaparotRob]

If it wasn't for The Admiral's threads, I would have never known that there was anything of interest going on in that Theatre. His posits got me interested in the subject. I learned more about it in the last year and a half or so than I had known before. Just sayin'.
Thanks Admiral.

 

[buffnut453]

I think we're in an infinite loop here.

My OT premise was that RAF Malaya's focus is narrowed to finding and countering landings in Thailand and northern Malaya rather than defending Singapore et al. I have already given my ideas on possible changes to RAF deployments and we have covered above why those may not work. What we're missing is other's ideas on how RAF Malaya could or would have changed its deployment and plans if given this narrow focus. If you feel the entire premise is unrealistic, that focusing the RAF to this task rather than spreading out its aircraft across all of Malaya and Singapore is implausible, then this is likely not the thread for you.

I'm willing to discuss what-if scenarios but they must have a foundation that is reasonable based on the situation at the time. I'm not pushing back on the original question in the thread. I'm pushing back on some of the simplistic/impractical ideas that depict Britain as "spineless".

Attacking Japanese transports before they land troops in Malaya would be an act of war...and, as late as 7 Dec 1941, Britain and Japan were at peace. Apart from the scale of operation, there's no legal difference between Britain attacking Japanese transports in the Gulf of Siam and the IJN springing a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor. Equally, pushing a Free French -vs- Vichy agenda in French Indochina must be backed up by some sort of force, either to threaten or to support French forces in-country and those forces must come from somewhere else because there aren't enough forces in Malaya to defend that colony.

I do have a scenario that I'll share later this evening once I have chance to gather my thoughts. It's based on research I did for my History of Warfare MA thesis in 2006-2007. Maybe that will offer additional food for thought.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I'm struggling to think how the French might think differently about a British occupation of FIC compared to a Royal Navy attack upon French fleet units in Africa. Both attacks are apparently an attack on the rump French state, and it seems to me that both would likely be regarded as hostile by Vichy-- especially if we are excluding any Vichy general from leading the expedition into FIC.

That's not even to address the point that the Brits simply didn't have the forces at their call to actually occupy FIC, or adequately defend it. That strikes me as overstretch redoubled, further enabling defeat in detail.

 

[Shinpachi]

Why don't they use the B-17s in Java?
Even the Lockheed Hudson was serious threat for them.

 

[buffnut453]

Ok...here goes with a scenario to answer the OP. These details were gleaned from original files at the UK National Archives. I'm working from memory but I have all the references once I locate the hard drive that is the back-up for my MA thesis.

The key challenge for Brooke-Popham was time. He needed time to implement Operation MATADOR but waiting until the Japanese landed in Malaya wouldn't afford sufficient time. Equally, Brooke-Popham couldn't attack the Japanese troopships before the landings commenced because that would be contrary to the Hague Convention of 1907. Britain had been courting Thailand, attempting to persuade Bangkok to ally with Britain against Japan in hopes that MATADOR could be launched pre-emptively....but without success. Brooke-Popham needed incontrovertible proof of Tokyo's intentions before the Japanese forces started landing, preferably in a way that could be shared with Bangkok to enable MATADOR to be launched in time....and hunting for Japanese convoys in the Gulf of Siam would NEVER provide the necessary warning or evidence.

In early 1941, Brooke-Popham identified a set of key intelligence indicators that would warn of a Japanese attack. The most important of these was the arrival of Japanese fighter aircraft in the region. Bearing in mind that Japanese forces were already established in French Indo-China, it was logical to assume that any deployment of fighters would be to that country. Thus a key task for the Far East Combined Bureau (FECB), Singapore's intelligence analysis organization, was keeping tabs on airfields and the air order of battle in French Indo-China. Now, in reality, the IJA only deployed fighters at the last minute, just a few days before the invasion forces landed on the east coast of the Kra Isthmus...however, a few days would still provide much better warning than a message saying that landings had already begun.

One of the Assistant Consuls in Saigon was a man named William Meiklereid. In late-1941, Meiklereid sent a report to London and Singapore about Japanese airfield construction activity in French Indochina. One of the most active developments was the creation of a brand new airfield on the island of Idu Phu Quoc which was, geographically speaking, the closest point in French Indochina to the eventual landing points at Singora, Pattani, and Kota Bharu. Meiklereid's report provided a sketch map of Japanese aircraft dispositions and the locations of airfields that were under construction. Although the report is undated, it almost certainly arrived in Singapore before the commencement of hostilities.

British expectation was that the Japanese invasion convoys would land in French Indochina before embarking on a northward overland invasion into Thailand and around the northern shore of the Gulf of Siam to reach Malaya. However, the development of airfields on Idu Phu Quoc pointed to a different course of action. If the Japanese intended to push north then they would have expended their energies building airfields in the north near the border between French Indochina and Thailand. Instead, they built airfields to the west on an island. Now, it's a basic tenet of air defence that you put your fighters up-threat from the locations you're trying to defend. If Japan intended a move northward into Thailand, surely their fighter aircraft would have been aligned in the north? However, if Japan's intentions were westward facing, then fighters could be expected at the new airfield on Idu Phu Quoc. Brooke-Popham should have been watching that airfield like a hawk. Unfortunately, either FECB dropped the ball or Brooke-Popham himself started over-obsessing about the location of the invasion convoys.

Photographic reconnaissance assets were available in Singapore that could have kept watch on Idu Phu Quoc. Two Buffalo airframes had been converted for the PR role, one a "short range" (SR) airframe with a single camera (serial W8136) and the other a "long-range" Buffalo with extra fuel and oil tanks, and a pair of cameras providing stereo imagery (serial W8166). Development of the LR Buffalo was problemmatic and it wasn't ready for operations until after the Japanese invasion. However, even the SR Buffalo had sufficient legs to reach Idu Phu Quoc from airfields in Northern Malaya. A further PR platform was developed by adapting a Bristol Beaufort. Some 6 airframes had arrived in Singapore in November 1941 from Australia, the first of a planned replacement fleet for the Vildebeests of 36 and 100 Sqns. Given the deteriorating political situation, and teething troubles getting the Beauforts into service, it was decided to send 5 airframes back to Australia but to retain one for PR purposes. It, too, had sufficient range to reach French Indochina, indeed it was tasked with just such a PR mission on 6 and 7 Dec 1941...unfortunately, it was tasked to photograph ports and harbours rather than the new Japanese airfields.

If FECB and Far East Command set up a dedicated imagery collection effort against Idu Phu Quoc, it's likely that the arrival of IJA fighter aircraft would have been detected days before the Japanese invasion of Thailand and Malaya. The photographic evidence of the deployment could have been provided directly to the Thai government in Bangkok and, through embassy contacts, to the US. Such solid evidence of Japanese intentions could have forced a change of heart in Bangkok, and an invitation to British forces to help defend the key port at Singora....essentially enabling MATADOR before the Japanese invasion. Sadly, the fleeting opportunity was missed and the rest is history.

However, the above is a viable option for Brooke-Popham to respond more effectively to the Japanese threat, and it employs resources that were already available to him in November 1941.

 

[SaparotRob]

Great post, Buffnut!

 

[EwenS]

From the Japanese perspective it seems to have changed very little. It had been drafted in Aug 1940 and the Japanese didn't get to see it until mid-Dec. Boyd "The Royal Navy in Eastern Waters" concluded about the Automedon incident

"....Overall, set against the other factors the Japanese had to consider in contemplating a move into Southeast Asia - above all the American response, but also the evolving strategic picture through 1941 - it seems unlikely the Automedon capture had more than a marginal impact on Japanese decisions."

I'm not even clear when, or even if Britain learned of its capture. They knew the ship had been sunk but of the actual capture of the documents? The weighted bag that report, and much else, was contained in should have been thrown overboard. German shelling killed those with responsibility for doing that. It took the Germans hours to break into the strong room to find them, so no help given by the surviving crew. And the surviving crew went into captivity arriving back in France some months later.

From the British perspective the Automedon incident did not change anything. That Aug 1940 appreciation is viewed by Boyd as "...a reasonably honest assessment of Britain's predicament in the Far East....." Its capture didn't cause Britain to go out and make any changes to its strategy or its military deployments, so far as I can see. Amongst the documents captured, it probably wasn't the most significant. Code books were also captured. But I can't immediately find any information on changes of RN codes in the aftermath of the Automedon incident.

So, overall an unfortunate incident, but not one that had any great effect on British plans for the defence of Malaya.

Just as a follow up to this I found an excerpt from "Mrs Ferguson's Tea set....." detailing the capture of the Automedon and the unfortunate circumstances that led to the discovery of the documents despite the best efforts of the senior surviving officer on the Automedon. But for her request for her luggage, and a chivalrous German Captain, they might well have gone to the bottom.

It seems word was got back to Singapore and the Admiralty was informed that the documents had probably fallen into the wrong hands on 30 Dec 1940.
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=u_V5DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA58&dq=Mrs.+Ferguson%27s+Tea-set,+Japan,+and+the+Second+World+War&client=firefox-a&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=3#v=onepage&q=Mrs.%20Ferguson's%20Tea-set%2C%20Japan%2C%20and%20the%20Second%20World%20War&f=false

 

[EwenS]

Ok...here goes with a scenario to answer the OP. These details were gleaned from original files at the UK National Archives. I'm working from memory but I have all the references once I locate the hard drive that is the back-up for my MA thesis.

The key challenge for Brooke-Popham was time. He needed time to implement Operation MATADOR but waiting until the Japanese landed in Malaya wouldn't afford sufficient time. Equally, Brooke-Popham couldn't attack the Japanese troopships before the landings commenced because that would be contrary to the Hague Convention of 1907. Britain had been courting Thailand, attempting to persuade Bangkok to ally with Britain against Japan in hopes that MATADOR could be launched pre-emptively....but without success. Brooke-Popham needed incontrovertible proof of Tokyo's intentions before the Japanese forces started landing, preferably in a way that could be shared with Bangkok to enable MATADOR to be launched in time....and hunting for Japanese convoys in the Gulf of Siam would NEVER provide the necessary warning or evidence.

In early 1941, Brooke-Popham identified a set of key intelligence indicators that would warn of a Japanese attack. The most important of these was the arrival of Japanese fighter aircraft in the region. Bearing in mind that Japanese forces were already established in French Indo-China, it was logical to assume that any deployment of fighters would be to that country. Thus a key task for the Far East Combined Bureau (FECB), Singapore's intelligence analysis organization, was keeping tabs on airfields and the air order of battle in French Indo-China. Now, in reality, the IJA only deployed fighters at the last minute, just a few days before the invasion forces landed on the east coast of the Kra Isthmus...however, a few days would still provide much better warning than a message saying that landings had already begun.

One of the Assistant Consuls in Saigon was a man named William Meiklereid. In late-1941, Meiklereid sent a report to London and Singapore about Japanese airfield construction activity in French Indochina. One of the most active developments was the creation of a brand new airfield on the island of Idu Phu Quoc which was, geographically speaking, the closest point in French Indochina to the eventual landing points at Singora, Pattani, and Kota Bharu. Meiklereid's report provided a sketch map of Japanese aircraft dispositions and the locations of airfields that were under construction. Although the report is undated, it almost certainly arrived in Singapore before the commencement of hostilities.

British expectation was that the Japanese invasion convoys would land in French Indochina before embarking on a northward overland invasion into Thailand and around the northern shore of the Gulf of Siam to reach Malaya. However, the development of airfields on Idu Phu Quoc pointed to a different course of action. If the Japanese intended to push north then they would have expended their energies building airfields in the north near the border between French Indochina and Thailand. Instead, they built airfields to the west on an island. Now, it's a basic tenet of air defence that you put your fighters up-threat from the locations you're trying to defend. If Japan intended a move northward into Thailand, surely their fighter aircraft would have been aligned in the north? However, if Japan's intentions were westward facing, then fighters could be expected at the new airfield on Idu Phu Quoc. Brooke-Popham should have been watching that airfield like a hawk. Unfortunately, either FECB dropped the ball or Brooke-Popham himself started over-obsessing about the location of the invasion convoys.

Photographic reconnaissance assets were available in Singapore that could have kept watch on Idu Phu Quoc. Two Buffalo airframes had been converted for the PR role, one a "short range" (SR) airframe with a single camera (serial W8136) and the other a "long-range" Buffalo with extra fuel and oil tanks, and a pair of cameras providing stereo imagery (serial W8166). Development of the LR Buffalo was problemmatic and it wasn't ready for operations until after the Japanese invasion. However, even the SR Buffalo had sufficient legs to reach Idu Phu Quoc from airfields in Northern Malaya. A further PR platform was developed by adapting a Bristol Beaufort. Some 6 airframes had arrived in Singapore in November 1941 from Australia, the first of a planned replacement fleet for the Vildebeests of 36 and 100 Sqns. Given the deteriorating political situation, and teething troubles getting the Beauforts into service, it was decided to send 5 airframes back to Australia but to retain one for PR purposes. It, too, had sufficient range to reach French Indochina, indeed it was tasked with just such a PR mission on 6 and 7 Dec 1941...unfortunately, it was tasked to photograph ports and harbours rather than the new Japanese airfields.

If FECB and Far East Command set up a dedicated imagery collection effort against Idu Phu Quoc, it's likely that the arrival of IJA fighter aircraft would have been detected days before the Japanese invasion of Thailand and Malaya. The photographic evidence of the deployment could have been provided directly to the Thai government in Bangkok and, through embassy contacts, to the US. Such solid evidence of Japanese intentions could have forced a change of heart in Bangkok, and an invitation to British forces to help defend the key port at Singora....essentially enabling MATADOR before the Japanese invasion. Sadly, the fleeting opportunity was missed and the rest is history.

However, the above is a viable option for Brooke-Popham to respond more effectively to the Japanese threat, and it employs resources that were already available to him in November 1941.

Re the PR assets available in Malaya in late 1941.

The short range PR Buffalo (W8136) is credited in "Eyes for the Phoenix. Allied Aerial Photo-Reconnaissance Operations South-East Asia" as follows:-

"Successful photographs were taken with this aircraft from 13,000 feet, but it had a range of only 300miles....."

When I looked up the distance of Phu Quoc from Kota Bharu, I got a figure of 302 miles, all of it over water. So it appears to be right at the limit of the operational abilities of that aircraft. Not impossible but risky for one of the few PR aircraft you have. A lot then depends on the dead reckoning navigational skills of the single pilot flying in the potentially bad weather that prevailed in the area at this time. It probably also explains the conversion of the second aircraft as a long range version. The same book credits W8166 with "an operational radius of 700 miles".

I think there is confusion between Beauforts and Blenheims.

The 6 Beauforts arrived in Singapore from Australia on 5th Dec 1941 and 5 were flown back a few days later. The remaining aircraft flew its first recce sortie on the 7th after relocating from Singapore to Kota Bharu. This was to the anchorage at Koh Kong Island (on the Thai / Indochina border) looking for the Japanese invasion convoy. The aircraft was forced back by bad weather soon after take off. It flew its second mission on the morning of the 8th up towards Singora, after which it was destroyed in an air attack on the airfield.

However in Oct/Nov 1941, some of the Blenheim IV aircraft (34 squadron at Tengah, Singapore was the only unit with that model) were fitted with cameras. 6 in total IIRC, with one source referring to them as being fitted with "survey cameras". But "Eye of the Phoenix" has this to say about them:-

"In October Far East Command set about the conversion of Blenheim IVs for photographic reconnaissance, but no use could be made of these aircraft as no long-range tanks were available and it was impossible to obtain accurate information of Japanese aircraft on aerodromes in Siam and Indo-China."

Another consideration. Photo interpretation. "Eyes of the Phoenix" then continues:-

"....For such photographs as could be obtained, there was a need for trained interpreters. In response to a request made in December, the Air Ministry agreed to the formation of a Far Eastern Interpretation Unit in January 1942, its HQ to be located at Singapore with mobile detachments in other areas as dictated by operational requirements. The few photographic interpreters who embarked for Singapore did not reach their destination in February before it fell into Japanese hands. Consequently, they were diverted to India to assist in building up the photographic interpretation work there."

How much of a limitation that is I don't know but it reinforces the dearth of PR assets in the theatre at the time.

 

[buffnut453]

Re the PR assets available in Malaya in late 1941.

The short range PR Buffalo (W8136) is credited in "Eyes for the Phoenix. Allied Aerial Photo-Reconnaissance Operations South-East Asia" as follows:-

"Successful photographs were taken with this aircraft from 13,000 feet, but it had a range of only 300miles....."

When I looked up the distance of Phu Quoc from Kota Bharu, I got a figure of 302 miles, all of it over water. So it appears to be right at the limit of the operational abilities of that aircraft. Not impossible but risky for one of the few PR aircraft you have. A lot then depends on the dead reckoning navigational skills of the single pilot flying in the potentially bad weather that prevailed in the area at this time. It probably also explains the conversion of the second aircraft as a long range version. The same book credits W8166 with "an operational radius of 700 miles".

I think there is confusion between Beauforts and Blenheims.

The 6 Beauforts arrived in Singapore from Australia on 5th Dec 1941 and 5 were flown back a few days later. The remaining aircraft flew its first recce sortie on the 7th after relocating from Singapore to Kota Bharu. This was to the anchorage at Koh Kong Island (on the Thai / Indochina border) looking for the Japanese invasion convoy. The aircraft was forced back by bad weather soon after take off. It flew its second mission on the morning of the 8th up towards Singora, after which it was destroyed in an air attack on the airfield.

However in Oct/Nov 1941, some of the Blenheim IV aircraft (34 squadron at Tengah, Singapore was the only unit with that model) were fitted with cameras. 6 in total IIRC, with one source referring to them as being fitted with "survey cameras". But "Eye of the Phoenix" has this to say about them:-

"In October Far East Command set about the conversion of Blenheim IVs for photographic reconnaissance, but no use could be made of these aircraft as no long-range tanks were available and it was impossible to obtain accurate information of Japanese aircraft on aerodromes in Siam and Indo-China."

Another consideration. Photo interpretation. "Eyes of the Phoenix" then continues:-

"....For such photographs as could be obtained, there was a need for trained interpreters. In response to a request made in December, the Air Ministry agreed to the formation of a Far Eastern Interpretation Unit in January 1942, its HQ to be located at Singapore with mobile detachments in other areas as dictated by operational requirements. The few photographic interpreters who embarked for Singapore did not reach their destination in February before it fell into Japanese hands. Consequently, they were diverted to India to assist in building up the photographic interpretation work there."

How much of a limitation that is I don't know but it reinforces the dearth of PR assets in the theatre at the time.

Ewen,

Entirely agree that using the SR Buffalo was risky, not least because flying a single-engined, single-seat aircraft over such a large swath of sea and at the limit of operational range is fraught with danger. However, given the importance of the target and the potential impact of the intelligence, it may have been worth that risk.

Also concur on the inability to use Blenheims but I'm not confusing Blenheims with Beauforts. There's an incredible document in the UK National Archives, the Air HQ Far East "Fighter Command Operations Diary" which is essentially a blow-by-blow record of the operations that the Fighter Ops Room was tracking in Singapore. The activities of the PR force are included in that record. The PR Beaufort undertook at least 2 test flights on separate days (alas, I can't remember the specific days) but the content of the contemporaneous diary contradicted the notion that the Beauforts arrived in Singapore on 5 Dec. The PR Beaufort test flights noted very poor performance from the airframe, including below-par operational ceiling and speed. The second test flight showed some improvement but it still was some way from the documented performance specs for the Beaufort.

One thing that has puzzled me for a number of years is why AHQFE didn't direct the installation of cameras in a few Hudsons? The Hudson had the longest range of any aircraft within Far East Command. Installing a camera should be a straightforward modification, easily achievable by 151 MU (which modified the PR Beaufort and Buffalos). The only answer I can come up with is that AHQFE lacked flexibility of thought and got distracted by wanting Hudsons to focus on maritime patrol.

Regarding Photographic Interpretation, reportedly the Command Photographic Officer, Sqn Ldr C G R Lewis, who was the boss of 4 PRU, reviewed the photos after each mission. I suspect he had help because, again, the Fighter Operations Room Log, provides details of virtually all the PR missions. From 7 December onwards, there was scarcely a day where at least one of the PR Buffalos didn't fly, and many days where both aircraft were operating. Regardless, the results of the PR were released daily and were recorded in various messages emerging from AHQFE.

 

[EwenS]

And on the other hand the 100 Squadron Operational Records Book at TNA shows the following.

"Seletar 5/12/41 14.00 Six Beaufort aircraft arrived from Australia. Four officers (pilots) and nine airmen (ground crew) returned from detachment. F/Lt Burton attached to 100 squadron w.e.f 5/12/41"

After this point the ORB begins to distinguish between Beauforts and V.V. (Vickers Vildebeest). Prior to that all movements of squadron aircraft are described as "aircraft" except as noted below.

"Seletar 7/12/41 06.50 one Beaufort (F/Lt Mitchell Pilot) proceeded to Kota Bharu for photographic and reconnaissance duties."
"Kota Bharu 8/12/41 10.00 one Beaufort (F/Lt Mitchell) on reconnaissance damaged in FB action. Landed at Kota Bharu. Later caught fire in attempted take off and burnt out."

There is a local Beaufort recce flight recorded on 10/12/41. It then records the departure of 4 Beauforts to Australia on 19th followed by the last on the 22nd. No test flights are recorded for any aircraft, but that is not unusual since they were part of everyday flying.


Interestingly back on 10/8/41 the ORB records 100 squadron receiving 2 Blenheims (one dual one solo later two dual) under the heading "Pilot's Conversion Course to Modern Type Aircraft". 7 pilots had gone solo on the Blenheim by the end of the month, wrecking one Blenheim in the process which was not being replaced. I can't see any note of the second Blenheim being withdrawn from the squadron.

From mid Aug air and ground crew begin to be posted to Australia to convert to the Beaufort. That coincides with the first Australian built Beaufort coming off the production line at Fisherman's Bend on 22nd Aug 1941 and being delivered to the RAF/RAAF on 3 Sept. The first from the Mascot production line followed on 20 Oct. The first delivery to 100 squadron in Australia was on 2nd Oct. Only 9 production aircraft flew before the end of 1941 so far as I can tell. There were a lot of personnel movements into and out of the squadron after mid Aug including many RAAF personnel.

"The Beaufort File" describes the aircraft arriving in Singapore thus
"Major problems caused by the use of inappropriate materials in fuel-line washers made these early aircraft, initially designated Mk.IIs, totally unreliable in tropical conditions. In addition, their crews had received no operational training (that had been due to take place in Singapore but was prevented by the Japanese invasion) and there were in any case no torpedo racks, as long-range fuel tanks had been fitted."

It was the least troublesome aircraft that was selected as the PR aircraft.

So now I'm really curious about the document you refer to as it is the only source, primary or secondary, that I have that has a different narrative. I had a quick look at TNA but couldn't find it. But once I can get the PC at the weekend I might have more luck. This iPad sucks for delving into that archive.

 

[buffnut453]

And on the other hand the 100 Squadron Operational Records Book at TNA shows the following.

"Seletar 5/12/41 14.00 Six Beaufort aircraft arrived from Australia. Four officers (pilots) and nine airmen (ground crew) returned from detachment. F/Lt Burton attached to 100 squadron w.e.f 5/12/41"

After this point the ORB begins to distinguish between Beauforts and V.V. (Vickers Vildebeest). Prior to that all movements of squadron aircraft are described as "aircraft" except as noted below.

"Seletar 7/12/41 06.50 one Beaufort (F/Lt Mitchell Pilot) proceeded to Kota Bharu for photographic and reconnaissance duties."
"Kota Bharu 8/12/41 10.00 one Beaufort (F/Lt Mitchell) on reconnaissance damaged in FB action. Landed at Kota Bharu. Later caught fire in attempted take off and burnt out."

There is a local Beaufort recce flight recorded on 10/12/41. It then records the departure of 4 Beauforts to Australia on 19th followed by the last on the 22nd. No test flights are recorded for any aircraft, but that is not unusual since they were part of everyday flying.


Interestingly back on 10/8/41 the ORB records 100 squadron receiving 2 Blenheims (one dual one solo later two dual) under the heading "Pilot's Conversion Course to Modern Type Aircraft". 7 pilots had gone solo on the Blenheim by the end of the month, wrecking one Blenheim in the process which was not being replaced. I can't see any note of the second Blenheim being withdrawn from the squadron.

From mid Aug air and ground crew begin to be posted to Australia to convert to the Beaufort. That coincides with the first Australian built Beaufort coming off the production line at Fisherman's Bend on 22nd Aug 1941 and being delivered to the RAF/RAAF on 3 Sept. The first from the Mascot production line followed on 20 Oct. The first delivery to 100 squadron in Australia was on 2nd Oct. Only 9 production aircraft flew before the end of 1941 so far as I can tell. There were a lot of personnel movements into and out of the squadron after mid Aug including many RAAF personnel.

"The Beaufort File" describes the aircraft arriving in Singapore thus
"Major problems caused by the use of inappropriate materials in fuel-line washers made these early aircraft, initially designated Mk.IIs, totally unreliable in tropical conditions. In addition, their crews had received no operational training (that had been due to take place in Singapore but was prevented by the Japanese invasion) and there were in any case no torpedo racks, as long-range fuel tanks had been fitted."

It was the least troublesome aircraft that was selected as the PR aircraft.

So now I'm really curious about the document you refer to as it is the only source, primary or secondary, that I have that has a different narrative. I had a quick look at TNA but couldn't find it. But once I can get the PC at the weekend I might have more luck. This iPad sucks for delving into that archive.

Ok...managed to dig out my old thesis and, alas, it's time for a bit of humble pie on my part (in my defence, I did say I was working from memory...and mine is clearly fallible). The issues I recalled with the Beaufort actually relate to efforts made by AHQFE to generate a second PR airframe after the first was lost on 8 Dec. The specific text I was mis-remembering reads "After T9543 was destroyed on 8th December a second PR Beaufort was prepared but persistent fuel-flow problems badly reduced its maximum altitude to 16,000ft on 9th December, while the next day it reached 22,000ft but its 110mph maximum speed was unsuitable for operational flying."

Some other details may also be of interest. According to a contemporaneous report on PR capabilities at Singapore (AIR 2/7559), the SR Buffalo (W8136) had a maximum range of 800 miles (the 300 mile radius you quoted did seem low to me). It also had a ceiling of 29,500ft (Source: AIR 24/501).

In terms of imagery analysis, two PI officers, Flt Lt Parks and F/O Rawson, arrived in Singapore in December 1941 from Egypt (Source: AIR 20/5586). There were only two stereoscopes in all of Far East Command (Source: AIR 2/7559). The theatre also suffered from a lack of adequate imagery processing capabilities, including lack of developing resources and film that was out of date which often resulted in fogged images, even after the PRU pilots had braved long hours in an unarmed aircraft over enemy-held territory (Source: AIR 2/7559).

Finally, you asked about the Fighter Operations Room Diary. It's rather unhelpfully labelled in the UKNA catalogue. The actual records are AIR 23/3577, 3578 and 3579, which respectively cover December 1941, January 1942 and February 1942. Other sources I used to compile the record of 4 PRU's operations included: AIR 27/795; AIR 27/1474; AIR 24/502; WO 106/2553; AIR 20/2160; AIR 23/4717; AIR 20/12337; AIR 23/3579; AIR 8/612. Another useful source are the daily Air Staff Operational Summaries which were held by the RAF Historical Branch.

Hope the above is of interest.

 

[EwenS]

Thanks for the above.

SR Buffalo seems a bit more possible.

The two pilots from Egypt were probably sent ahead of the two PR Hurricanes that were due to be sent from an MU in Egypt where they had been converted to the role. They fetched up in Burma Jan/Feb 1942 IIRC.

 

[buffnut453]

Thanks for the above.

SR Buffalo seems a bit more possible.

The two pilots from Egypt were probably sent ahead of the two PR Hurricanes that were due to be sent from an MU in Egypt where they had been converted to the role. They fetched up in Burma Jan/Feb 1942 IIRC.

The 2 officers from Egypt were Photographic Interpreters, not pilots.

Yes, 2 PR Hurricanes did end up in India but they arrived too late to operate from within Burma, though. The serial number of one of the airframes was BM969. One of the ex-4 PRU pilots, Donald Pearson, ended up flying one of the PR Hurris from India.

 

[Shinpachi]

Beside the prewar situation beween the two powers, though already may be acknowledged, lucky factors for the Japanese side are said like these,

1. As Lt. Gen. Yamashita underestimated the scale of British troops in Malaya (said around 35,000), he could go straight to Singapore without hesitation.

2. Indian soldiers in the front were glad to surrender. Some of them were even cooperative as police to control the local residents behind the battle.

3. Lt. Gen. Percival accepted surrender on the day (Feb 15) that Yamashita wanted. If it had delayed one or two days, Japanese landing forces in the island of Singapore would have exhausted almost ammunition.

In addition, as IJA Air Force was not under Yamashita's control but GHQ in Saigon, the air force could put its top priority on taking the air superiority first in the peninsula even neglecting the casualties on the ground for sometime.