Malta 1940

Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules

For true i thinked to telegraphy.
there were minifields? where? and if new minefields (not as historical but following more info on possible italian attack) where were the ships? and the mines?
surely intelligence had some infos also w/o break in codes, recon idk if there wer capability of recon fly from Egypt, Malta as historically did also bombing mission but italian pressure was very low with a pression need for prepare the invasion i think is easy take out most of flying capability from Malta
maybe, but remember the RN had the force divise, if italian waiting the training of their BBs and attack around the september full moon day the british had their 5 BBs, 4 in Alex (3 QE and 1 R) and 1 a Gib (Renown) they are good BB but are not impossible win it also because is not compulsory to be lucky under italian air attack
 
The allies knew about the Italian intention to declare war a month before it happened. they knew that the italians were going to attack in the western Desert (graziani's offensive). They knew in advance of the Italians attack on Greece. they knew that the italians were sending air reinforcements to the Albanian front. There is no way they couldd keep the planned invasion of Malta a secret. to claim otherwise, that somehow the Italians would just restrict their communications to wire communications is just silly and not supported by any of the other major events and attacks that they actually carried out. Onl;y when the combat was purely a navy affair were the British ignorant of Italian movements, such as taranto, wherer there was no benefit derived for the attackers. This proposed operation would have involved all three services and the diplonatic service. There is no possibility they could keep it a secret if the allies were reading high grade army and airforce ciphers, low grade navy ciphers and a high percentage of Italian diplomatic ciphers.

With regard to the vulnerability of Maltas coastal artillery, much of the coastal guns at tarawa were open and based on the British pattern of defence. Many of these guns were still firing right up to their capture, so they could not be destroyed after four days of furious fighting. The gun emplacements on the southern side of the island are still there, and visible. I will say this however, gun emplacements on Tarawa were not generally neutralised by the USN battlewagons, though they did try. most of the suppression work had to be done by DDs attached to provide direct support, firing mostly at point blank range (a couple of hundred yards maybe, and just pumping shells into these positions

The Maltse had Martello towers which date back to Napoleon. These towers were in turn based on fortifications built by the knights of St John during the middle ages. However these towers were modernized generally by adding a reinforced concrete embrasure at the base of the tower. These towers and the concrete embrasures were not the latest and best thing in coastal defence thats for sure, but they were also remarkably tough. We dont have combat performce for Malta but similar Martello towers at ramsgate and Dover put up with sporadic German shelling for four years. I dont think it can be validly or convincingly argued that these gun emplacements on Malta were somehow vulnerable to the magical powers of the italian Batteships. in any event the italian fleet will be fighting for its life against a superior number of British Battaleships that will in all likleihood have been placed in ambush positions because theu know the italian fleet is coming, thanks to the now known security failures .
 
i don't tell that british don't know that italian were preparating the invasion just don't known the actual plane.
i don't know the battle of tarawa.
the british BBs are not superior in number, and you can not ambush it the navy book code was not break and the break in enigma was useless. known that the fleet is coming is not sufficient for a ambush.
 
there were minifields? where? and if new minefields (not as historical but following more info on possible italian attack) where were the ships? and the mines?
Click to expand...


Naval History.net confirms that there were no minefields laid in 1940, because the Allies knew no invasion was planned. However, if they knew the italians were planning an invasion, as surely they would, there were forces already available for that capability There were cruiser minelayers operating with virtual impunity in an out Malta for many months. There was a dedicated Coastal Minelaying flotilla, the 3rd Minelaying flotilla, based at Malta.

In the waters around Scapa and dover, the British laid over 60000 mines in the first threee months of the war. ive seen a report somewhere that the resources in the med capable of laying around 36000 mines around Malta in a similar time frame.

surely intelligence had some infos also w/o break in codes
Click to expand...

A gross understatement. According to the information you posted yourself, the British were reading the code traffic from all three services up to June, and then all but the navies high grade ciphers after June.


Possibly, but there is nothing to support the claim, The Italians and the Germans took many months to reduce the air strength of Malta to nothing , so I am doubtful that the italians with their poor serviceability rates could actually do it.



True that the RM could operate from interior lines and that the RN forces were divided, but even though classically this was a theoretical disadvantage, the British actually on several occasions used it to their advantage. RNM never gained much benefit by operating from a central position.

I dont understand your BBs numbers at all. For one thing you assume that the Italians will know exactly when to strike and exactly when the british BB forces will be at their weakest. they never had that ability to know enemy dispositions that accurately. You also assume that the british will initiate diversionary attacks on the french or into the Atlantic even when they know the Italians are prepring for something this big is just wishful thinking. The primary mission of both Force H and the Med flt was for both forces, the defeat of the italains and the control of the med. If they know something is coming that big, every ounce of their strength will be devoted to ambushing the Italians....they wont be frittering away their strength on sideshows like Dakar I can tell you.

In any event, my reading of Naval History/net gives the British 7 BBs, not 5. I think that they had available the following ships for part or most of September

Barham, Malaya, Valiant, Warspite, Ramillies, Resolution (part rt of Fce H, Fce H primary mission included protection of Malta, not diversions to Dakar, there would be no Dakar if there was a credible threat to Malta) ) At Gib until 6th September, then sailed as part of Force H to Dakar, torpedoed and damaged 20th, eventually removed from the effective list),Renown (In September from 23rd took part in Menace, but still part of Fce H with priority for the med ops)
 
i don't tell that british don't know that italian were preparating the invasion just don't known the actual plane.
Click to expand...

THe co-operation of the air force and the army would both be needed. These services would give dates and locations for the fleets and the times for departure. The RN would know from pre-war intercept the italian plans to invade Malta. They would therefore almost certainly be lying in wait just outside Z501 range (the only a/c that the RM could rely on for good search reports....the RA never gave this level of support to the RM. The RN would attack from two directions and the italians would crumble.

i don't know the battle of tarawa.
Click to expand...


Its one of the first allied opposed landings, so the skill levels are similar. The island is much smaller than Malta, and the terrain much easier to fight over.

the british BBs are not superior in number, and you can not ambush it the navy book code was not break and the break in enigma was useless. known that the fleet is coming is not sufficient for a ambush
Click to expand...
.

I think they were superior in number, but instead of squabbling about it lets work together and get an agreed figure. The allies dont need to read the navy codes, they will all the information they need from the leaky army and air force ciphers, as the link you posted clearly points out.
 
Parsifal i'm bored of your propaganda agenda.
1) the impunity derive of low intensity action of italian forces, how many days/weeks need to sunk the few ship on Malta?
2) i was just agreeing with vinnye that also w/o code break intelligence can work, not is easy as you write, "So the British had been expecting the Italian attack from Libya into Egypt on 13th September 1940, though the decrypts did not give the actual date" so they knew the attack but not the plan.
3) if you don't understand the numbers is your problem. i choice the full moon days not the weakest day, after that the italian BBs get operations, the only days that british had more BBs was from 29th august to 6th september when they had 6 or 7 (from 2 sept) BBs and Barham was not part of force H was sent to Gib specifically for Menace operation. So you think no Menace operation because the italian was planning malta invasion since 1937 and was preparating just from start of war or before (need before for be ready in summer '40)?
4) the cooperation need but when you talking with italian comand in italy i think was relatively common use wired comunication. sure some go wireless (talking flying plane or sealing ship). So you have the full plane intercepted pre war (and i've doubt on this) but you don't know the day don't know all the changes, and because the planes crew don't get the info in the briefing but with radio oh yes so they need used the radio for all the Parsifal agenda not work fine. fine idea wait out Z 501 range with possible enemy subs, and if they used bombers (common for the long range recce) they must go to wait where?
5) you've show already not be a reliable source, so you word on tarawa battle w/o confirmation ae not valuable for me
6) already reply above
 
Vincenzo said:
The full moon days were:

i don't think was realistic german deployement, italian never would recquired it and german deployement had the trouble that germans use enigma...
Click to expand...
Vincenzo said:
Just again for clear you can not intercept the wired comunication.

on coastal artillery i did some research most of large pieces fired in open so the capability to remain operational is limited
Click to expand...

Vincenzo, the problem is that the Italains diddn't know that enigma or their communications were compromised, so there is no reason to avoid them.

As Parsifal wrote, the British would certainly be aware of the operation in general terms, and the arrive of aircraft large numbers of shipping and landing craft would signal that a landing is imminent

DonL said:
To speak with parsifals words, it is hot air to imply the RN would be at Malta when a invasion would be started.
30 hours minimum to arrive.

When you attack at the morninglight, you have full moon for the navigation.
Click to expand...

Unless of course the British send the battleships en route to Malta as they figure out than an invasion is imminent.

However an attack on a moonlit night might well allow a night torpedo attack by the Swordfish



Well the Royal Navy would have 7 battleships in the Med or Gibraltar, two more than the Italian numbers:
Warspite, Malaya, Valiant, Barham, Renown, Resolution Ramillies. - this would assume that the invasion is full-moon of mid september.

Now, if the invasion is mid-August the RN might only have 5 or 6 but Italy might not have Duilo or Cesare.

Vincenzo, do you have a reference to the date that Cesare is repaired from damage?
 
Last edited:

There are also 10 x twin mounts of 6 pdr (57mm) on Malta, to repel smaller craft.

The main danger to the landings would not be the larger 9.2" guns, but rather the heavy concentration of light heavy mobile artillery, including mortars, that would be used against landing craft.

There is a good wbsite here with Malta deployments: Malta Garrison 1940

There are two forces on Malta in 1940, both Royal Artillery Royal Malta Artillery
There are over 3,000 men deployed in the RA, RMA and Malta Dockyard Defence Battery

In Nov 1940 there was serious concern over the threat to Malta, and an additional 3+ regiments were deployed:


10th Hvy AA - RA
12th Field - RA
59th light AA - RA

Had the British gotten intelligence that an attack was imminent in Aug 1940, they may well have sent some regiments earlier

Royal Artillery

On 10 June Italy entered the war. On the following day it launched its first air raids on Malta.
In Dec 1940, the Heavy Defence Units were redesignated Coast Defence Units.
•7th AA Regt RA. Strength (30 Sept 1940): 19 officers, 364 rank and file.
◦10 AA Bty RA. From 2nd AA Bde to 7th AA Bde RA in Oct 1936.
◦13 AA Bty RA. From 2nd AA Bde to 7th AA Bde RA in Oct 1936.
◦27 HAA Bty RA – Arrived Oct 1940. Left Mar 1944.

•13th Mobile Coast Defence Regt RA. Strength (30 Sept 1940): 14 officers, 234 rank and file.
◦15th ATK Bty RA.
◦40th ATK Bty RA. (40th and 71st linked temporarily in August 1939).
◦48th ATK Bty RA.
◦71st ATK Bty RA.

•4th Heavy Regt HQ RA. Strength (30 Sept 1940): 20 officers, 378 rank and file. Located at Fort Tigne.
Became 4th Coast Regt with 6th and 10th Coast Bty RA.
◦6th Heavy Bty RA
◦10th Heavy Bty RA
◦23rd Heavy Bty RA

•26th Anti Tank Regt RA – Arrived on 13 Apr 1939 on HMT Nevasa. Strength 284 men. Left Sept 1943.
In Sept 1940 it was redesignated 13 Mobile Coast Defence Regt RA (280 men).
◦15th ATK Bty RA.
◦40th ATK Bty RA. (40th and 71st linked temporarily in August 1939).
◦48th ATK Bty RA.
◦71st ATK Bty RA.

•12 Fld Regt RA – Arrived on 10 Nov 1940 as a mobile artillery. Operated smoke screen of the Grand Harbour.
Left for North Africa in Sept 1943. ◦6/23 Fld Bty
◦49/91 Fld Bty

•10th Heavy Anti Aircraft Regt arrived Nov 1940. Left May 1943.
◦190 HAA Bty RA (T)
◦191 HAA Bty RA (T)
◦222 HAA Bty RA (T)

•59th Light Anti Aircraft Bty arrived from Liverpool in Nov 1940 and marched to Fort Ricasoli.
•4 SL Regt RA/RMA. Arrived Nov 1940. Left Mar 1945.
◦484 Search Light Bty RA (TA) joined 4 SL Regt RA/RMA – from the UK on Nov 1940.

Royal Malta Artillery

Strength (30 June 1940): 78 officers, 1,624 men.

•HQ Royal Malta Artillery
•1 Coast Regt RMA Dec 1940 to June 1956. ◦ 1 Coast Bty RMA
◦ 2 Coast Bty RMA
◦ 3 Coast Bty RMA. HQ Bty attached to No 3 Heavy Bty
◦ 4 Coast Bty RMA

•1st Heavy Regt RMA – Formed Dec 1939. Left Dec 1940. On 3 Sept 1940 4 Heavy Bty RMA was formed in 1st Heavy Regt RMA.
•11th AA Regt RMA formed on 21 Sept 1939.
◦20 Heavy AA Bty (T).
◦21 Heavy AA Bty (T).
◦22 Heavy AA Bty (T). 22 Bty was equipped with Bofors and joined 3rd LAA Regt RMA (T) on its formation in March 1941.
◦23 Heavy AA Bty (T) formed on 25 Nov 1940.

•2 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regt Raised on 2 Dec 1939 with non-commissioned-officers from 1st Coast Regt RA and new recruits. Disbanded Sept 1945.
◦ 5th HAA Bty. Formed at Mtarfa on 1 July 1939. Sailed for Egypt on 7 May 1940. Returned to Malta in 1943 Manned AA defences in Egypt and the Coast defence battery at Port Tewfik.
◦ 6th HAA Bty. Formed in Aug 1939. Joined 2 AA Regt RMA on its formation on 2 Dec 1939.
◦ 7th HAA Bty. On 2 Dec 1939 joined 2 AA Regt RMA. Disbanded Mar 1945.
◦ 8th Search Light Bty. – Formed Jan 1940. In Nov 1940, it joined 4 S/L Regt RA/RMA on its formation.

•9 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Bty. Raised Nov 1940. ◦10 Light Anti-Aircraft Bty. Raised Dec 1940.
◦30 Light Anti-Aircraft Bty. Raised Mar 1940 to May 1941.
◦4 Heavy Bty. Raised Sept 1940 to Dec 1940..
◦7 Searchlight Battery Bty.
 
Last edited:
freebird the italians refused, as historically, german help (with troops not in material/weapons rather this were recquired) until they were defeat in the british first offensive in NA, within our timeline in this WI i think is right put not germans in the operations.
freebird the italian navy as historically not used their old enigma variant as common, please read the source linked previously.
i'm sure that british intelligence would be aware of italian invasion fleet sailing and don't need of ultra for this.

Swordfish need to came with the fleet, with around 3 months of attack i've doubt that an air attack can start from malta.

As i writed the british had 7 BBs in medit only from 2nd to 6th september, just because Barham was waiting in Gibraltar for Menace operation.

unlucky no atm, i've searched but i found only data of arrive in La Spezia..... i just came in mind an other book to check
 

Actually the strength of Malta is much higher than that, there are 7 battalions on Malta in June 1940, + another battalion arrived in the Autumn. (There is an additional militia battalion defending Gozo AFAIK)

An additional battalion, 3rd Buffs (East Kent) seems to arrive in 1940 but I'm not sure what month.

I've posted a map of the rough deployment areas below.



DonL said:
Laut Ordersofbattle.com:
1.Dorste: regulär
2.Devon: regulär
2.West Kent: regulär
2.RIF: regulär
8.Manchaster: 1st Line TA
1.KOMR: regulär
2.KOMR: War Formed (15.01.1940)
3.KOMR: War Formed (01.07.1940 !)

hardly impressive!
Click to expand...

7 battalions may not seem so impressive at first glance, but consider:

In 1944 the planners for US V corps planned to land 34,000 men and 3,300 vehicles on Omaha beach on D-Day transported and guarded by a force of some 2,000 ships (not including any of those in the British sector!)

The US forces took some 3,000 casualties landing at Omaha, and yet the landing was only opposed by just 3 battalions - a single battalion of the 352nd division and 2 battalions of the 716th Static division!

From Hyperwar:


Assuming that the 716th division had 7 battalions defending the coast (with a couple more in reserve) that amounts to about 7.5 miles of frontage per battalion.
From what I can tell, the coastline of Malta has about 45 - 48 miles of coastal frontage, and had 6 battalions deployed, with another in reserve. All of the battalions had about a 6 - 7 mile frontage, except for about 9 or 10 miles in the 2nd Malta militia sector facing the South coast, which was mostly high cliffs and without a major useful port or bay.


Would somebody like to compare the amphibious capabilities of the Italians in 1940 vs the US landing at Omaha?
 
Last edited:

I would agree, however they might requested some material help .

Vincenzo said:
i'm sure that british intelligence would be aware of italian invasion fleet sailing and don't need of ultra for this.
Click to expand...

That's my opinion as well.
The interesting question is how they might prepare for an invasion, with the intel that they get.


Vincenzo said:
As i writed the british had 7 BBs in medit only from 2nd to 6th september, just because Barham was waiting in Gibraltar for Menace operation.
Click to expand...

Somehow I doubt that the British would go through with "Menace" if they were expecting a massive battle around Malta in September, the Dakar operation was not urgent and may well have been postponed
 
The point is: the italian was preparing malta invasione since somewhere before of war, for ready in time almost from september '39, the british can be sure the invasion coming in that month or the follow month? so they postponed for ever the Manace operation? and Barham was sent for Manace w/o Manace you don't have Barham (but you've Ark Royal).

on Cesare back: the book have not date but there is a table with bimestral report of ready ship (the italian words are "pronte all'impiego" i think this would be that the ship are in the fleet is a decision of Admiral (the Squad (Corps) Admiral) the use: 1/7/40 BBs: 4, 1/9/40 BBs:4, 1/11/40 BBs:6, 1/1/41: BBs:3, 10 june 1940:2, this not help we already knewn that Cesare was back in operation to end of august.
 
Looks like i need to produce the sources that prove 7 Battleships available in September. Remember, it is faulty to asssume the british would divert strength or resources to sideshows (for Fcee H or the Med Flt) until after Italians had either committed to the operation, or it became clear that they had lost their nerve. Destruction of the french fleet could well wait until after taranto


The ships we need to look at for September are


So lets see what Nav History has to say forthese ships in September

Barham

Passage to Gibraltar.
2nd - Arrived at Gibraltar.
6th - Sailed from Gibraltar in company with aircraft carrier ARK ROYAL, battlecruiser RENOWN, battleship RESOLUTION, and screened by destroyers FAULKNOR, FORESIGHT, FORESTER, FURY, GREYHOUND, ECLIPSE, ESCAPADE and INGLEFIELD. (ECHO joined later after completing repairs at Gibraltar).
20th - Pre-operation conference held on board at Freetown.
21st - Sailed from Freetown for Operation MENACE. (Note: cruisers DEVONSHIRE, CORNWALL, AUSTRALIA (RAN) and DEHLI had joined MENACE at Freetown.)
23rd - Arrived off Dakar to find the area shrouded in fog.
24th - In misty weather BARHAM, RESOLUTION, AUSTRALIA and DEVONSHIRE carried out a further bombardment of the port area and the shore batteries at a range of 14000 yards. BARHAM concentrated her fire on the RICHELIEU. The return fire from RICHELIEU and the shore batteries was concentrated on BARHAM and she was hit by two shells causing slight damage.
At 1325 hours the bombardment was checked and the bombarding force moved out to sea. An assessment of the results was that despite the battleships having fired 400 rounds of 15in little or no damage had been caused to RICHELIEU or the shore batteries. Engaged French submarine PERSÉE with depth charges (this was after an extended bombardment....so much for it being "easy" to take out shore batteries)
25th - In clear weather she launched her Walrus aircraft which then spotted for her when a further bombardment of RICHELIEU was carried out which obtained one hit. (Note: Post war evidence records this caused no damage.) The Walrus was shot down.
At 0910 hours RESOLUTION was torpedoed by French submarine BÉVÉZIERS. Shortly after this BARHAM was hit in the bows by a 15in shell from RICHELIEU.
At 0930 hours the attack was called off. BARHAM took RESOLUTION in tow and they proceeded to Freetown.
28th - BARHAM towing RESOLUTION arrived at Freetown.

Now, if people want to believe that its "propaganda (as Vincenzo so eloquently puts it) to say that this whole operation would be cancelled or postponed with an imminent invasion of Malta known and on the cards, then fine, but given the primary mission of Fce H was the protection of British interests in the Meditteranean, I dont think saying she was available is propaganda at all. The propaganda here is giving the Italians super powers that they never possessed whilst assuming massive stupidity on the part of the RN....
 
Resolution was at Gibraltar as part of Fce H from 28th August. She had a similar history as the barham, except she took a torpedo and was moderately damaged. If she had not been diverted to Dakar, as is highly likley with an invasion of malta likley, she would have remained on station in the Med for some time. To be fair, I dont think that her replacement was likley to arrive in the following month

For the remaining 5 Battleships/Battlecruisers I dont think there is any argument between the two sides as to their availability

Im enjoying this "propaganda". Bring it on
 
The point is: the italian was preparing malta invasione since somewhere before of war, for ready in time almost from september '39, the british can be sure the invasion coming in that month or the follow month
Click to expand...
?


They had full access to the Italian secret ciphers up until they were changed. they most certainly WOULD know the planned invasion date if it was set before 10 une 1940.

so they postponed for ever the Manace operation? and Barham was sent for Manace w/o Manace you don't have Barham (but you've Ark Royal).
Click to expand...


Incorrect. Barhams transfer to Fce H was sheduled from well before MENACE was finally decided upon. She was part of the British build up in the Med, not a special transfer just for MENACE. Resolution is a bit more "iffy" but it just shows that the British had the capability to make such increases to the force structure if the need arose.

In the Summer of 1940, the Admiralty believed that provided they had a fast Battleship at Scapa (ie the Hood) and 2 other slow Battleships (Revenge was one of them) they had sufficient battelship strength to contain the German Navy Seelowe notwithstanding. In September, the Germans had no battlships ready for service, so the general plan was to increase the pressure on the italians whilst they could. Hence the gradual build up of strength. Fce H was initially set up to replace the French fleet, its destruction was bitterly opposed by all except Adm Phillips (of Fce Z fame) and Churchill. But on several occasions Somerville showed his merttle and refused to be drawn into hairbarained schemes ordered by Churchill. Eventually he was subjected to an inquiry (over the battle Of Site, but his subordinate was actually court martialled - and exonerated, over the failure to intercept Richelieu with Renown). The point is this, The Amiralty, not Churchill issued the operational priorities, and proved many times that if they could not achive their primary objectives, they would not do Churchills bidding. This hypothetical situation fits perfectly that situation, but I doubt even Churchill would allow Malta to be placed at risk in favour of a Dakar style operation.
 
on Barham you've too smart you selected the quote ahahah:
August
Nominated for support of planned French landings at Dakar. (Operation MENACE – For details see MENACE by A Marder, ENGAGE THE ENEMY MORE CLOSELY by C Barnett, and Naval Staff History.)
28th - Took passage from Scapa Flow escorted by destroyers ECHO, ECLIPSE, ESCAPADE and INGLEFIELD.
September
Passage to Gibraltar.
2nd - Arrived at Gibraltar.

so they was sent to Gibraltar for Menace. I've already writed i'm not agree the virtually infinite posponing of Menace operations the british don't know the data of the invasion until after the fleet sail, and operation Menace had a sense if did.
Set the invasion date before of war??? and again they had access to intercepted comunication there is no reason for put on air a war plan before of war... (for true also after for the plane as a whole). Barham Nominated for Medit Fleet ? and because in naval history this there is not? and a Source for the opinion of Admiralty? or are just your opinions?
 
On Omaha beach the defend unit was the 352nd divison, a rgt of 716th division was under of 352nd divison, on the beach there were III/726 and the I/916 btls. in the area there were the 3 rgt of 352nd division and the attached 726 of 716th, the Panzer Lehr division later was added to defend forces
 


I quoted availability for September, which is the month you nominated. If you actually bothered to have a read of barnett, instead of selectively quoting bits and pieces of him, you would know that from the middle of August on, the British were receiving increasingly detailed decrypts of the German invasion plans. they were worried, but not enough to hold back forces, including Barham, for Menace. If they were prepred to transfer Barham for a bombardment of French ports, why would they be less likley to send the Barham to give the Italians some stick. Your argument is just non-sequita. Haha right back at ya sunshine......


so they was sent to Gibraltar for Menace. I've already writed i'm not agree the virtually infinite posponing of Menace operations the british don't know the data of the invasion until after the fleet sail, and operation Menace had a sense if did.
Click to expand...

Here we go again, giving the italians perfect strategic vision, giving the british isurmountable stupidity

Set the invasion date before of war???
Click to expand...

Yes, of course, oh i forgot the italians are supermen, they dont need to set a date until the day of the invasion. The Germans, with their inadequate planning for Seelowe set the date for the invasion in the final plan in July for a late september invasion, it changed a couple of times, but well in advance. The Allies, in planning for the cross channel assault set the invasion day initially for June 4th I think back in January 1944. The italians, with their inherently innefficient interservice co-operation, and the need to requisition shipping and obtain foreeign help would need months or yeasrs to prepare for an assault like this. The Japanese were planning their amphibious operations for December 1941, as far back as July, planning for the Midway operation began in January 1942, and detailed planning was occuring from the middle of March. The amphibious excercises Ive been involved in take years to organize, but the actual planning for a brigade sized asault generally takes about 3 months to plan and prepare for. This is a Corps sized assault, so planning and preprations would take at least a year, allowing for the low levelof italian efficiency, probably about 12.5 years. Everything from beach surveys to shipping contracts and req1uisitions, training, selection of equipment, working out the tactical loading sequences, how to solve the beaching and beach unloiading problems.....trust me there are lots of issues...


and again they had access to intercepted comunication there is no reason for put on air a war plan before of war... (for true also after for the plane as a whole).
Click to expand...

You would say that as well about Operation MI (invasion of midway), but they did. You would say it about seelowe, but they did too. You would say that about Overlor, but they did. The difference is that Allied Ciphers were secure enough to protect secrets like that, Axis (including the Italians) were not.


Barham Nominated for Medit Fleet ? and because in naval history this there is not? and a Source for the opinion of Admiralty? or are just your opinions?
Click to expand...

I was going to suggest several chapters of Barnett, but that might be a waste of time seeing you already quoted him, and must therefore have a copy that is missing several chapeters. Probably better to just ask you this....if the British were confident to send Barham and Resolution to Gibraltar and then to Freetown why would they be any less likley to send Barham to Gibraltar and then Malta for a decisive shown with the italians?
 

How much of that force was actually on the frontline and absorbed the initial shock of the assault. how many battalions were in each of these regiments and and how many companies attached to each battalion.

Its very dangerous to assume full strength for german formations in 1944

One more thing about the map ive attached....the length of coastline held by that single battalion was longer than the entire eastern flank of Malta, which is the most likley place for an assault. Moreover, Matese Beaches arent like the Normandy beaches. Maltese Beaches tend to be short affairs, punctuated by steep rocky outcrops. There are only about 5 or 6 beaches suitable for amphibios craft by the loof of it, so the Beach defences are going to be formidable. Once the threat of airborne assault recedes, the Britsh could deploy some of the Maltese reserve units to the battle as well.

This is not a good look for the italians at all......
 

Attachments

  • Omaha.jpg
    57.1 KB · Views: 127
Last edited:
You must log in or register to reply here.

Users who are viewing this thread

Total: 1 (members: 0, guests: 1)

Similar threads

The Netherlands 1940
Replies
3
Views
750
swampyankee
Smith and Wesson model 1940 Light Rifle
Replies
0
Views
1K
The Basket
Losses in France for British 1940
2 3
Replies
47
Views
9K
fastmongrel
First deportations from Poland to deepths of Russia- 1940
Replies
0
Views
2K
v2
De Peel, traces of war
2
Replies
20
Views
6K
Airframes
Menu
Log in
Register