fastmongrel
1st Sergeant
Great picture of a Crusader Tank being juiced up with a 4 Gall can and a funnel also made from a 4 Gall can
Malta 1940
- Thread starter Shortround6
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fastmongrel
1st Sergeant
And a British Jerry petrol can from 1942
stug3
Staff Sergeant
Flight Lieutenant Dennis Barnham, flight commander of No. 601 Squadron RAF, in the cockpit of his Spitfire Mark VB at Luqa, Malta, at a time when his victory tally was five enemy aircraft. Pilot Officer M H Le Bas looks on.
Is that some kind of inlet to the right of the windscreen?
Is that some kind of inlet to the right of the windscreen?
Airframes
Benevolens Magister
Yes, it's the cool air inlet, which could be opened or closed. Just read Barnham's book, describing his tour on Malta, April - July 1942 - powerful stuff, and really brings home the ordeal of the most bombed place on Earth!
stug3
Staff Sergeant
40mm Bofors anti-aircraft gun position overlooking Grand Harbour, Malta, 1942
A 4.5-inch anti-aircraft gun opens fire during an air raid on Malta, June 1942.
Vertical aerial photograph of Ta Kali airfield, Malta, following bombing raids of April 1942.
Army and RAF personnel and Spitfire Mk V, Malta, 17 June 1942.
A 4.5-inch anti-aircraft gun opens fire during an air raid on Malta, June 1942.
Vertical aerial photograph of Ta Kali airfield, Malta, following bombing raids of April 1942.
Army and RAF personnel and Spitfire Mk V, Malta, 17 June 1942.
I've just spent a few days working in Malta and have read this thread with increasing dismay.
The premise seems to be that the Italians should attempt a seaborne assault on Malta in 1940 sometime between their entry into the war in June 1940, and before the destruction of Marshal Graziani's 10th Army in North Africa by General O'Connor's Anglo-Indian 13th Corps and before the raid on Taranto in November which sent the remaining serviceable Italian ships bolting for the safety of Naples, La Spezia and Genoa. The R.N. was subsequently able to reduce the number of Battleships in the Mediterranean (Ramilles and Malaya were sent home).
I don't believe that the Italians had a snowball's chance in hell of mounting such an operation.
After the German intervention in Greece this became a German problem. General Warlimont (deputy chief of operations for the OKW) relates that the question discussed was essentially whether to seize Crete or Malta. The staff unanimously concluded that Malta should be seized "since this seemed to be the only way to secure permanently the sea route to North Africa". It was Hitler who vetoed this leading to the attack on Crete because he felt, according to Warlimont, that there was a danger of "attacks on the Roumanian oil fields" and more fancifully that bases on Crete would open up "far reaching possibilities for offensive action in the Eastern Mediterranean".
General Thoma was sent to North Africa in October 1940 to assess whether and how German forces might support the Italians. He reported that any campaign would depend on regular supplies and that this matter would be decisive. British possession of Malta rendered this uncertain and therefore compromised the intended campaign. The OKW rejected any plan for invasion and the alternative plan, to bomb the island into submission, was adopted.
Thoma was correct. By April 1942, despite the relentless bombing of the island, the Axis supply situation in North Africa was serious if not desperate. Up stepped General Student with a plan for a joint Italo-German invasion of the island. German paratroops would seize a bridgehead to be quickly reinforced by an overwhelming Italian seaborne force of up to 8 divisions.
" I hoped", recalled Student, "to carry out the plan not later than August (42)". He was summoned to a final conference on the operation in June at Hitler's HQ. Unfortunately Hitler had just received a very unfavourable report on the state of Italian forces in North Africa and their morale from General Cruwell. Hitler took alarm and felt, according to Student, that if the British Fleet appeared on the scene the Italian ships would bolt for their home ports. The plan was abandoned.
Just as in 1940, in 1942 the Axis had neither the wherewithal, nor the will to invade Malta. The failure to do so cost the Axis dear.
Cheers
Steve
The premise seems to be that the Italians should attempt a seaborne assault on Malta in 1940 sometime between their entry into the war in June 1940, and before the destruction of Marshal Graziani's 10th Army in North Africa by General O'Connor's Anglo-Indian 13th Corps and before the raid on Taranto in November which sent the remaining serviceable Italian ships bolting for the safety of Naples, La Spezia and Genoa. The R.N. was subsequently able to reduce the number of Battleships in the Mediterranean (Ramilles and Malaya were sent home).
I don't believe that the Italians had a snowball's chance in hell of mounting such an operation.
After the German intervention in Greece this became a German problem. General Warlimont (deputy chief of operations for the OKW) relates that the question discussed was essentially whether to seize Crete or Malta. The staff unanimously concluded that Malta should be seized "since this seemed to be the only way to secure permanently the sea route to North Africa". It was Hitler who vetoed this leading to the attack on Crete because he felt, according to Warlimont, that there was a danger of "attacks on the Roumanian oil fields" and more fancifully that bases on Crete would open up "far reaching possibilities for offensive action in the Eastern Mediterranean".
General Thoma was sent to North Africa in October 1940 to assess whether and how German forces might support the Italians. He reported that any campaign would depend on regular supplies and that this matter would be decisive. British possession of Malta rendered this uncertain and therefore compromised the intended campaign. The OKW rejected any plan for invasion and the alternative plan, to bomb the island into submission, was adopted.
Thoma was correct. By April 1942, despite the relentless bombing of the island, the Axis supply situation in North Africa was serious if not desperate. Up stepped General Student with a plan for a joint Italo-German invasion of the island. German paratroops would seize a bridgehead to be quickly reinforced by an overwhelming Italian seaborne force of up to 8 divisions.
" I hoped", recalled Student, "to carry out the plan not later than August (42)". He was summoned to a final conference on the operation in June at Hitler's HQ. Unfortunately Hitler had just received a very unfavourable report on the state of Italian forces in North Africa and their morale from General Cruwell. Hitler took alarm and felt, according to Student, that if the British Fleet appeared on the scene the Italian ships would bolt for their home ports. The plan was abandoned.
Just as in 1940, in 1942 the Axis had neither the wherewithal, nor the will to invade Malta. The failure to do so cost the Axis dear.
Cheers
Steve
parsifal
Colonel
Its a good summary Steve, and I agree with everything youve raised. however, I should point out that with, or without Malta, Axis logisitics were severely compromised. certainly the loss of cargoes made Axis preparations just that much harder, but the main constraint affcting Axis supply wasnt just Malta, it was also the wodefully inadequate port capacities that they struggled with. The main ports were Tripoli, followed by a very distant second place Benghazi. All the rest, including tobruk (totally and hopelessly wreckewd by the time it was captured) were laregely irrelevant.
According to OKW Quartermaster estimates, Rommel needed 60000 tons of supply per month to undertake operations at a normal pace. He received, on average 56000 tons oif supply per month AT THE PORTS OF DISEMBARKATION. Two things, however conspired to undo him. the first was Rommels complete disregard for his logistics limitations. He just kept attacking, and advancing, lengthening his supply lines well past the danger point. A division that is mobile and advancing will consume an average of 400 tons supply per day, in periods of heavy action, whereas a unit in a static position, or in mopping up operations, could consume about 60-100 tons per day. Obviously divisions sometimes on the move and sometimes in heated fights will be somewhere in between, and obviously a division that has been gutted will have lower supply demands than one that is full strength. Conversely, I am unsure if that 60000 tons would cover the numerous support echelons, like Corps troops and the like. Pz Armee Afrika used over 30000 trucks at full establishment, which was more than the entire AGS provisions....for just 12 divs.
Infantry Divs (unmotorized) were about half those numbers. In the middle of 1942, the Axis had about a dozen division, plus their air force, and their rear area garrisons to worry about. 60000 tons was not enough especially with Rommel disobeying orders and attacking like crazy all the time.
If Rommel had not advanced as he did, and did not attack so constantly, one might think he would survive a little longer. perhaps, But again, by June 1942, there were simply too many troops in North Afdrica, operating at very long distances from the supply heads, at an unsusceptible pace of operational tempo, for this to ever be a front that they were going to win.
Most unloading occurred from tripoli, about 1500 miles from Alamein. Tobruk is 300 miles, whilst Benghazi is 600. If we compromise, and assume for the excercise the supply head to be Benghazi, then for every 1000 tons unloaded at the port, only 636 will get to the front....the rest is lost in the trip (not inlcuding enemy action. In point of fact, of that 56000 tons per month, after we take into account the DAF operations and acts of sabotage by the LRDG and similar, less than half that 56000 tons was making it to the front (most estimates are about 26000 tons). Rommel at Alamein had 12.5 divs, of which 8 were mechanized, and 4.5 were german. Italian Infantry were only about 60% strength, , so in German equivalents, there were about 9 divs feeding on that supply line, plus about 350 a/c (roughly the equivalent of about 3.5 divs in terms of supply demand). Thus we have 12 div equivalents feeding off that supply line, with a minimum supply demand, even in the static role, of about 12-1500 tons per day. That equates to a minimum of around 36000 tons per month just to remain effective in a defensive situation.....but in mobile operations that figure would multiply by about 4 times.
Malta was critical, dont get me wrong, but Rommels supply problems were not solely due to Malta. Even without Malta to impede the flow of ships, Rommel would still have foundered due to a lack of supply. And that was mostly due to the limited port capacities available to the Germans.
According to OKW Quartermaster estimates, Rommel needed 60000 tons of supply per month to undertake operations at a normal pace. He received, on average 56000 tons oif supply per month AT THE PORTS OF DISEMBARKATION. Two things, however conspired to undo him. the first was Rommels complete disregard for his logistics limitations. He just kept attacking, and advancing, lengthening his supply lines well past the danger point. A division that is mobile and advancing will consume an average of 400 tons supply per day, in periods of heavy action, whereas a unit in a static position, or in mopping up operations, could consume about 60-100 tons per day. Obviously divisions sometimes on the move and sometimes in heated fights will be somewhere in between, and obviously a division that has been gutted will have lower supply demands than one that is full strength. Conversely, I am unsure if that 60000 tons would cover the numerous support echelons, like Corps troops and the like. Pz Armee Afrika used over 30000 trucks at full establishment, which was more than the entire AGS provisions....for just 12 divs.
Infantry Divs (unmotorized) were about half those numbers. In the middle of 1942, the Axis had about a dozen division, plus their air force, and their rear area garrisons to worry about. 60000 tons was not enough especially with Rommel disobeying orders and attacking like crazy all the time.
If Rommel had not advanced as he did, and did not attack so constantly, one might think he would survive a little longer. perhaps, But again, by June 1942, there were simply too many troops in North Afdrica, operating at very long distances from the supply heads, at an unsusceptible pace of operational tempo, for this to ever be a front that they were going to win.
Most unloading occurred from tripoli, about 1500 miles from Alamein. Tobruk is 300 miles, whilst Benghazi is 600. If we compromise, and assume for the excercise the supply head to be Benghazi, then for every 1000 tons unloaded at the port, only 636 will get to the front....the rest is lost in the trip (not inlcuding enemy action. In point of fact, of that 56000 tons per month, after we take into account the DAF operations and acts of sabotage by the LRDG and similar, less than half that 56000 tons was making it to the front (most estimates are about 26000 tons). Rommel at Alamein had 12.5 divs, of which 8 were mechanized, and 4.5 were german. Italian Infantry were only about 60% strength, , so in German equivalents, there were about 9 divs feeding on that supply line, plus about 350 a/c (roughly the equivalent of about 3.5 divs in terms of supply demand). Thus we have 12 div equivalents feeding off that supply line, with a minimum supply demand, even in the static role, of about 12-1500 tons per day. That equates to a minimum of around 36000 tons per month just to remain effective in a defensive situation.....but in mobile operations that figure would multiply by about 4 times.
Malta was critical, dont get me wrong, but Rommels supply problems were not solely due to Malta. Even without Malta to impede the flow of ships, Rommel would still have foundered due to a lack of supply. And that was mostly due to the limited port capacities available to the Germans.
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I agree.
The cost of defending and sustaining Malta was enormous. One battleship, two aircraft carriers, four cruisers, one fast minelayer, twenty odd destroyers and minelayers, forty submarines were all sunk. There was huge damage to many other vessels. 1600 civilians and 700 soldiers died on Malta. The RAF suffered about 900 dead. It lost 547 aircraft in combat and another 160 on the ground. The Royal Navy lost about 1700 submariners (often overlooked) and about 2,200 surface personnel. About 200 merchant seamen died.
An island, initially described as indefensible had proven itself indestructible thanks to these men and the incredible resilience of the islanders themselves.
I would argue that the long running battle for Malta was one of several pivotal points in the battle for democracy. Had it been lost the war would have progressed differently, how we will never know because it was a battle won.
It has been argued by some that the cost was too high and it was a battle not worth fighting (a view held by Admiral King, admittedly no friend of the British). This is not a view to which I subscribe.
Cheers
Steve
The cost of defending and sustaining Malta was enormous. One battleship, two aircraft carriers, four cruisers, one fast minelayer, twenty odd destroyers and minelayers, forty submarines were all sunk. There was huge damage to many other vessels. 1600 civilians and 700 soldiers died on Malta. The RAF suffered about 900 dead. It lost 547 aircraft in combat and another 160 on the ground. The Royal Navy lost about 1700 submariners (often overlooked) and about 2,200 surface personnel. About 200 merchant seamen died.
An island, initially described as indefensible had proven itself indestructible thanks to these men and the incredible resilience of the islanders themselves.
I would argue that the long running battle for Malta was one of several pivotal points in the battle for democracy. Had it been lost the war would have progressed differently, how we will never know because it was a battle won.
It has been argued by some that the cost was too high and it was a battle not worth fighting (a view held by Admiral King, admittedly no friend of the British). This is not a view to which I subscribe.
Cheers
Steve
Civettone
Tech Sergeant
You say this and back it up with a whole range of reasons dating after Crete. What is the point in that ???
Malta was virtually undefended in June 1940, but the Italians chose not to invade. Why? Because they did not see the need. Britain was going to sue for peace anytime soon. Nor Hitler nor Mussolini expected them to continue to fight.
Then, Britain reinforced Malta and it would require a large operation to conquer it. Instead, the Italians chose to neutralize it by air attacks. That failed due to a lack of bombers and payloads.
You can say that they did not have a chance either in 1942. But Student, who you like to refer to, was convinved it would have been a success if operation Herkules had not been cancelled. And indeed, Malta was neutralized in 1942 and the Italians ruled over the Central Mediterranean Sea. Italians and Germans had superb elite troops trained just for this and I am positive Malta would have fallen. The only reason why it was cancelled is because Rommel was on a roll and needed all the air and armoured support. It was a risk but it could have been brilliant: if Rommel had pushed through El Alamein he would have taken Alexandria and the Suez Canal and the Royal Navy would be neutralized and Malta would be out of range to interrupt the shipments. In the end, Rommel was stopped AND Malta was allowed to re-invigorate.
Kris
What resources were the Italians supposed to use for their 1940 landings on Malta? It is true that the island was virtually undefended apart from the presence of the Royal Navy. If the Italians had mustered the resources to mount an invasion from somewhere and been prepared to confront the elements of the Royal Navy which would have appeared they had a good chance of success. My argument is that they didn't have the will to attempt it. It was just one of many opportunities which they threw away in the first months after their entry into the war.
It is also true that the Marine Militaire appeared to enjoy local superiority. Unfortunately for it Napoleon's old adage "the moral is to the material as three is to one" held good. The MM repeadtedly failed to press home its advantage.
Campioni's excuse to retire after Somerville's typically aggressive manoeuvring (culminating in Renown opening fire at 27,000 yards) during operation "Collar" sums it up in one example.
The "state of affairs was unfavourable to us numerically and qualitatively" which it was not.
A British commander making such a report would need to be mindful of the fate of Admiral Byng at Minorca. With a four hundred year tradition, something the MM notably lacked, he would have been too.
From a British perspective Somerville reported that "almost immediately after opening fire the enemy cruisers and destroyers commenced to emit dense smoke and retired behind it."
He wanted to pursue the Italians but was told by Holland not to as the Italians enjoyed a three knot speed advantage which was true. Despite this Somerville still had to face an Admiralty Board who felt he might have forced a big gun duel on the Italians. The First Sea Lord, Sir Douglas Pound thought that Somerville had not been aggressive enough, should have handed the convoy over to Cunningham and gone after Campioni. The Chairman of the Board, Lord Cork seems to have shared this view. In the end, but not until December 7th, Somerville was cleared and his actions deemed "correct and spirited".
We are talking about two very different navies here.
Whilst the Axis did enjoy a measure of control in the central Mediterranean it was most certainly never Mussolini's "Mare Nostrum". The example above also illustrates just why the Germans, in 1942, had so little faith in their ally, as reported by Student.
Cheers
Steve
It is also true that the Marine Militaire appeared to enjoy local superiority. Unfortunately for it Napoleon's old adage "the moral is to the material as three is to one" held good. The MM repeadtedly failed to press home its advantage.
Campioni's excuse to retire after Somerville's typically aggressive manoeuvring (culminating in Renown opening fire at 27,000 yards) during operation "Collar" sums it up in one example.
The "state of affairs was unfavourable to us numerically and qualitatively" which it was not.
A British commander making such a report would need to be mindful of the fate of Admiral Byng at Minorca. With a four hundred year tradition, something the MM notably lacked, he would have been too.
From a British perspective Somerville reported that "almost immediately after opening fire the enemy cruisers and destroyers commenced to emit dense smoke and retired behind it."
He wanted to pursue the Italians but was told by Holland not to as the Italians enjoyed a three knot speed advantage which was true. Despite this Somerville still had to face an Admiralty Board who felt he might have forced a big gun duel on the Italians. The First Sea Lord, Sir Douglas Pound thought that Somerville had not been aggressive enough, should have handed the convoy over to Cunningham and gone after Campioni. The Chairman of the Board, Lord Cork seems to have shared this view. In the end, but not until December 7th, Somerville was cleared and his actions deemed "correct and spirited".
We are talking about two very different navies here.
Whilst the Axis did enjoy a measure of control in the central Mediterranean it was most certainly never Mussolini's "Mare Nostrum". The example above also illustrates just why the Germans, in 1942, had so little faith in their ally, as reported by Student.
Cheers
Steve
parsifal
Colonel
guys
weve already looked at this adnauseum, and i think it fair to summarise that there are two diametrically opposed viewpoints. One is that the italians had a small window of opportunity probably around August in which they had opportunity and resources to undertake the operation. The opposing view is that the italains never had such opportunity.
We can happily go round and do this allover again, but it wont add anything to the body of knowldge already in this thread. Weve done the issues already, Unless there is something we missed, I think we would just be working over the cold ashes of an old argument.
weve already looked at this adnauseum, and i think it fair to summarise that there are two diametrically opposed viewpoints. One is that the italians had a small window of opportunity probably around August in which they had opportunity and resources to undertake the operation. The opposing view is that the italains never had such opportunity.
We can happily go round and do this allover again, but it wont add anything to the body of knowldge already in this thread. Weve done the issues already, Unless there is something we missed, I think we would just be working over the cold ashes of an old argument.
parsifal
Colonel
(duplicate post)
- Thread starter
- #93
Shortround6
Major General
Pretty much the window of opportunity was there, but it was fleeting. To time an Invasion for the window of opportunity would have required marshaling the required air and sea lift capability and the required troops before Italy declared war on France.
It might also have required Italy postpone it's invasion of Southern France or weakened it. The window starts closing in Sept/Oct as re-reinforcements arrive.
It might also have required Italy postpone it's invasion of Southern France or weakened it. The window starts closing in Sept/Oct as re-reinforcements arrive.
Actually I think that the opportunity did exist briefly, this of course with the benefit of hindsight.
I don't believe that the Italians had the resources or ability to seize it. They did have the ability to seize various other opportunities to inflict serious damage on the British in 1940-42 but almost invariably failed to do so.
Later the Germans may have had the ability to seize Malta, but they lacked the will and certainly were not prepared to bank on their Axis allies.
Cheers
Steve
I don't believe that the Italians had the resources or ability to seize it. They did have the ability to seize various other opportunities to inflict serious damage on the British in 1940-42 but almost invariably failed to do so.
Later the Germans may have had the ability to seize Malta, but they lacked the will and certainly were not prepared to bank on their Axis allies.
Cheers
Steve
fastmongrel
1st Sergeant
Not to be racist in any way but the Italian armed forces of the time couldnt co-operate and organise a drinking contest in a brewery. This pretty much was the same with all armed forces of the day inter service co-operation even today sometimes goes spectaculary wrong. Its a skill that comes from a long list of **** ups and experiments how do the Italians suddenly master the art when they arent even at war.
My take on it yes it could be done but the list of things that could go wrong is long and painful. It would take a braver man than Benny to do it.
My take on it yes it could be done but the list of things that could go wrong is long and painful. It would take a braver man than Benny to do it.
There are many factors that make or break a fighting force. The individual bravery and heroism of many Italian fighting men is well established and on the record. What the MM did not have was the esprit de corps of the RN. This is not something that can be developed overnight but is rather something that ALL military organisations invest a lot of time and effort developing. The RN had a several hundred year head start on its Italian adversary in 1940, it was arguably the only advantage it had.
It is worth saying that the Admiralty was worried about how merchant seamen would perform at war. The Merchant Navy is a bit of a misnomer, an invention of WWI propagandists. It comprised a motley collection of privately owned vessels. These varied from the liners of Cunard-White Star and the P and O Navigation Company (where every deck officer was a master mariner) to the "pound and pint" tramp ships manned by seamen on minimum wage and victualled to the minima laid down by the Board of Trade.The inter war depression had hit these men badly, the British Merchant Fleet had been largely idle.
The performance of the Master and crew of SS Cornwall, a 10,600 ton cargo liner, badly damaged by three Italian bombs when part of convoy MF 2 on 30th August 1940, did much to allay such fears. Surgeon Lieutenant Adnams was transferred from HMS Juno to Cornwall to treat her wounded and reported that "the officers took their extra labours very lightly quite as though it was normal procedure. The ship's company also showed excellent spirits and a cheerful and helpful manner. All difficulties were minimised."
The commander of the convoy, Captain PJ Mack gave a more sober, but complimentary report. He praised the Master's (Pretty) achievement in "keeping an accurate course with no steering gear at all" as "a most seamanlike performance."
SS Cornwall made Malta, off St Elmo's lighthouse on the morning of 2nd September. The heavily listing but no longer burning ship was towed into Grand Harbour by the tugs Ancient and Jaunty just two hours behind her escorts. She carried nine wounded men, some serious and one dead, Junior Radio Officer Chamberlain, killed by the second hit.
Cheers
Steve
It is worth saying that the Admiralty was worried about how merchant seamen would perform at war. The Merchant Navy is a bit of a misnomer, an invention of WWI propagandists. It comprised a motley collection of privately owned vessels. These varied from the liners of Cunard-White Star and the P and O Navigation Company (where every deck officer was a master mariner) to the "pound and pint" tramp ships manned by seamen on minimum wage and victualled to the minima laid down by the Board of Trade.The inter war depression had hit these men badly, the British Merchant Fleet had been largely idle.
The performance of the Master and crew of SS Cornwall, a 10,600 ton cargo liner, badly damaged by three Italian bombs when part of convoy MF 2 on 30th August 1940, did much to allay such fears. Surgeon Lieutenant Adnams was transferred from HMS Juno to Cornwall to treat her wounded and reported that "the officers took their extra labours very lightly quite as though it was normal procedure. The ship's company also showed excellent spirits and a cheerful and helpful manner. All difficulties were minimised."
The commander of the convoy, Captain PJ Mack gave a more sober, but complimentary report. He praised the Master's (Pretty) achievement in "keeping an accurate course with no steering gear at all" as "a most seamanlike performance."
SS Cornwall made Malta, off St Elmo's lighthouse on the morning of 2nd September. The heavily listing but no longer burning ship was towed into Grand Harbour by the tugs Ancient and Jaunty just two hours behind her escorts. She carried nine wounded men, some serious and one dead, Junior Radio Officer Chamberlain, killed by the second hit.
Cheers
Steve
parsifal
Colonel
The failure of the Italian armed forces arose for a multiplicity of reasons.The problem for the italians was that whilst other nations at various times in their history have faced one or two of the generic problems standing in the way of military efficiency, in the case of the Italians in the lead up to WWII faced nearly all of them at the same time.
Italian officers were inherently conservative and conventional in their thinking. italian tactics and training was flawed (instances of italian Infantry at the beginning of the war in the desert forming square are true, and well documented, and known to have occurred on many occasions). Italian society was suffering from deep social stresses and inequalities, so that the sense of community....workingas a team, was very lacking. There was little or no trust between officers and their men. Average recruits lacked depth of education, and tended to be more focussed on family over community....the lack of education made advances in the technical aspects of the army more difficult.
There were numerous equipment failures, logistic support was poor, the TOE of the army left a lot to be desired.Equipment was old,sometimes in poor repair, and often in short supply. There were no less than 16 different calibers of weapons just for basic rifles.....and the list goes on and on. The ability of the italian supreme command system was chaotic, to say the least. In my opinion there were simply too many factors at work to ever make it possible for the italians to serioulsy consider or be able to pull off something as complicated as a major seaborne invason. And from day 1 it would have required significant forces to be committted. The largest amphibious operation the italians had ever attampted to that point was the invasion of Albania, where the italians had strained (and expended much of their very meagre ampbibious lift capability) to put 1500 men ashore against virtually no opposition. They passed on the projected invasion of Corfu and Crete (until goaded to do so by the germans,and even then it was an abject failure).....the italians themselves had little or no faith in their ability to mount any significant amphibious invasions during the war.....and the british were busily fortifying and recruiting in malta prewar from 1937 onward, such that from june 1940 there were about 4 battalions of regulars and 6 battalions of local militias already on the island.
i dont think there was a snowfalkes chance in hell of the italians ever being able to invadee the island on their own, in 1940. Too many problems, too little capability.
Italian officers were inherently conservative and conventional in their thinking. italian tactics and training was flawed (instances of italian Infantry at the beginning of the war in the desert forming square are true, and well documented, and known to have occurred on many occasions). Italian society was suffering from deep social stresses and inequalities, so that the sense of community....workingas a team, was very lacking. There was little or no trust between officers and their men. Average recruits lacked depth of education, and tended to be more focussed on family over community....the lack of education made advances in the technical aspects of the army more difficult.
There were numerous equipment failures, logistic support was poor, the TOE of the army left a lot to be desired.Equipment was old,sometimes in poor repair, and often in short supply. There were no less than 16 different calibers of weapons just for basic rifles.....and the list goes on and on. The ability of the italian supreme command system was chaotic, to say the least. In my opinion there were simply too many factors at work to ever make it possible for the italians to serioulsy consider or be able to pull off something as complicated as a major seaborne invason. And from day 1 it would have required significant forces to be committted. The largest amphibious operation the italians had ever attampted to that point was the invasion of Albania, where the italians had strained (and expended much of their very meagre ampbibious lift capability) to put 1500 men ashore against virtually no opposition. They passed on the projected invasion of Corfu and Crete (until goaded to do so by the germans,and even then it was an abject failure).....the italians themselves had little or no faith in their ability to mount any significant amphibious invasions during the war.....and the british were busily fortifying and recruiting in malta prewar from 1937 onward, such that from june 1940 there were about 4 battalions of regulars and 6 battalions of local militias already on the island.
i dont think there was a snowfalkes chance in hell of the italians ever being able to invadee the island on their own, in 1940. Too many problems, too little capability.
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stug3
Staff Sergeant
Flight-Sergeant G F "Screwball" Beurling of No. 249 Squadron RAF, standing by a sandbag revetment at Ta Kali, Malta, with the rudder and unit emblem cut from a crash-landed Macchi MC.202 of the Regia Aeronautica, one of four enemy aircraft which he shot down over Gozo on 27 July 1942.
Ground crew refuelling a Supermarine Spitfire Mark VC(T) from a petrol tin at Ta Kali, Malta
Ground crew refuelling a Supermarine Spitfire Mark VC(T) from a petrol tin at Ta Kali, Malta
Civettone
Tech Sergeant
I agree with your analysis of the Italian state of affairs. But let's take a look at a similar analysis of Maltese defences. Those troops you mentionned were undertrained and lacking just about everything. In fact, British military planners had already given up on Malta. It was expected to put up token resistance.
Like I said before, the later Herkules invasion was much much more difficult, but back in June 1940, Malta was ripe for the taking. The Italian Navy, suppemented with a few Stormi of Italian bombers would have been able to land a couple of divisions on the island and that would have been the end of it. Italian losses might have been heavy. But ... there is no way that the Italians could have been driven back into the sea as NO British replacements were going to be send to Malta. In worst case scenario, Italian losses would have been heavy, but it would have been only a matter of time before the weak Maltese defences would have collapses.
There is only ONE reason why the Italians did not invade: political. Mussolini believed that Britain was going to sign an armistice as soon as France has capitulated. He believed the war would have been short and limited. Malta could be neutralized and be acquired at the negotiation table.
Kris
