Meanwhile, on the Eastern Front. . .
- Thread starter NTGray
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Njaco
The Pop-Tart Whisperer
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
T-34 - lend-leased aluminium for the batteries and US tools for the production of turrets.
I think that steel could be provided from domestic resources. But trucks carrying infantry (without it, T-34 were doomed) and fuel were mostly American since 1943.
Most of my sources are in Russian as those mentioned in another thread:
VVS bombers accuracy in WWII
Russian military historian Mark Solonin has published recently three videos under the general topic "aircraft vs tank". Pretty good work and highly recommended to anyone who can read(listen) Russian. In the third video, the author displayed one interesting table: bombing accuracy of VVS medium...
ww2aircraft.net
Combat Aircraft Versus Armour in WWII - Operation Barbarrosa
Return to Great Myths of WWII Modern literature on WWII is replete with accounts of devastating air strikes on tank units. There are many stories about dozens or even hundreds of enemy tanks being destroyed in a single day, thereby destroying or blunting an enemy armoured offensive. These...
www.operationbarbarossa.net
Think It's Easy to Destroy Tanks With Airplanes? Think Again
A close examination of the historical record reveals that ground-attack aircraft in World War II were not as successful against armor as many believe.
www.historynet.com
Regarding Il-2, in the nutshell. There was no weapon that had enough energy to disable a tank AND had sufficient accuracy. One notable exception was the PTAB bomb. But its period of glory was short as Germans quickly found an antidote in the form of skirts and meshes. Another problem was that Il-2 had to fly straight at 200 m altitude over the target. Almost suicidal...
Thumpalumpacus
Major
Bear in mind as well that the engine of the T-34 also had an aluminum block.
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
Was aluminum used in both the diesel and the few gas powered variants?
Thumpalumpacus
Major
So far as I know, it was the diesel variant, but I admittedly know very little about the gasoline variants and welcome correction on that score.
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
With the exception of the initial run of the 1940 models, all T-34s were diesel.
The first 1940 models had a gasoline powered MT-17 installed until the V-2 became available.
The MT-17 was a licensed copy of the BMW VI, by the way.
The first 1940 models had a gasoline powered MT-17 installed until the V-2 became available.
The MT-17 was a licensed copy of the BMW VI, by the way.
This is true, but the figures you produced pertain to the first production variant of the Zero that entered service in 1941. By 1944 when the Yak-3 is entering service, the Zero has a more powerful version of the Sakai producing 1,130 hp in the fighter from the A6M3 onwards and has better performance all round, although performance wise the Yak still has an edge. Still, the manoeuvring of the Zero was formidable and the skilled Yak pilot should know not to engage a Zero at low speed in a turning fight.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Staff Sergeant
- 845
- Sep 30, 2021
For an idea on USSR losses, Soviet casualties and combat losses in the twentieth century general editor G.F. Krivosheev ; authors, G.F. Krivosheev ... [et al.] ;
Soviet Economy, Mark Harrison Soviet Planning in Peace and War 1938-45. Plenty of data available from that.
Most allied aid to the USSR statistics use departure date, and you need to add months to that before front line service. The amount of aid that arrived in 1941 and 1942 was limited. Sending semi finished items like steel ingots saved the USSR mining for ore and fuel plus smelting. The USSR chemical industry was heavily disrupted and the shipping of the chemicals needed to make explosives was probably the most important individual item, heading towards vital.
The 1940 USSR population was 194.1 million, by November 1941 the territory formerly occupied by 40% of the population was in German hands, the homes of some 77.6 million people, but the population of the USSR was around 130 million.
When it comes to the 1941 offensive the Germans ran out of supplies while they also ran out of combat power, and spare parts for vehicles was a big factor in loss of combat power. So Guderian could strike south while the rest of the army group was stopped by lack of supply. The forces left in the west and south would have made the supply problems worse, not better. What would have made a difference to the supply issues was German access to the British vehicle pool and production. The Germans had 35 infantry and 2 panzer divisions in the west and 1 infantry and 2 panzer divisions in Africa.
The German army in the east as of 6 November was rated as follows by OKH the 101 infantry divisions equivalent of 65 at full strength, the 17 panzer divisions the equivalent of 6 full strength. Army Group Centre was receiving 50% of required supplies. According to General Halder cumulative casualties were 15,919 and 496,157 men wounded, 6,017 officers and 139,164 men killed, 496 officers and 28,355 men missing, total casualties 686,108
It appears there were major coal mines around Moscow that were lost or shut down by operation Typhoon in 1941 and they became a high priority rebuild in December 1941 as soon as the Red Army had pushed the German's back. In 1942 the Mosbas coal fields produced 8.5 million tons of coal versus 10 million tons in 1940. In January 1942 coal reserves in some parts of the country were down to 1 days consumption, iron and steel works 3 to 4 days, wood and other fuels were substituted for coal wherever possible. The USSR appears to have had a regular winter coal crisis most of the war years, in many ways like England, but worse.
The list of German capabilities in the east as of 30 March 1942, 162 combat divisions, 8 ready for any mission, 3 for offensive operations after some rest, 47 for limited offensive operations, 73 for defensive operations and 2 not battleworthy. The 19 Panzer divisions were down to 140 operational tanks, from Barbarossa to 1 March 1942 the army had lost around 600 more tanks than had been produced, yet Hitler had raised another 4 panzer divisions in the period and had allocated a tank battalion to each of the motorised divisions.
The effective strength of the army in the east had started at around 3,300,000 at Barbarossa and had declined steadily to 2,700,000 by July 1942,
As of 31 March 1942 cumulative casualties of the army in the east were 23,541 officers and 799,389 men wounded, 8,827 officers and 223,553 men killed, 855 officers and 51,665 men missing, total casualties 1,107,830, which does not include men reporting sick.
In the period June 1941 to July 1942 the Heer order of battle went from 213 to 226 divisions, field army strength went from 3,800,000 to 3,948,000, while suffering around 417,000 killed and missing during the time period according to Matthew Cooper in "The German Army". Halder's figures are 359,998 killed and missing in the east to end July 1942.
The decline in ability can be seen from the change from a near all German attack along the entire front in 1942 to using axis allied armies in the front line and attacking on about half the front in 1942.
It is interesting to note the Soviet war production did not rise very much after the end of 1942 or early 1943. It looks like the extra resources mainly went to the civilian sector or to cover the losses taken.
Soviet Economy, Mark Harrison Soviet Planning in Peace and War 1938-45. Plenty of data available from that.
Most allied aid to the USSR statistics use departure date, and you need to add months to that before front line service. The amount of aid that arrived in 1941 and 1942 was limited. Sending semi finished items like steel ingots saved the USSR mining for ore and fuel plus smelting. The USSR chemical industry was heavily disrupted and the shipping of the chemicals needed to make explosives was probably the most important individual item, heading towards vital.
The 1940 USSR population was 194.1 million, by November 1941 the territory formerly occupied by 40% of the population was in German hands, the homes of some 77.6 million people, but the population of the USSR was around 130 million.
When it comes to the 1941 offensive the Germans ran out of supplies while they also ran out of combat power, and spare parts for vehicles was a big factor in loss of combat power. So Guderian could strike south while the rest of the army group was stopped by lack of supply. The forces left in the west and south would have made the supply problems worse, not better. What would have made a difference to the supply issues was German access to the British vehicle pool and production. The Germans had 35 infantry and 2 panzer divisions in the west and 1 infantry and 2 panzer divisions in Africa.
The German army in the east as of 6 November was rated as follows by OKH the 101 infantry divisions equivalent of 65 at full strength, the 17 panzer divisions the equivalent of 6 full strength. Army Group Centre was receiving 50% of required supplies. According to General Halder cumulative casualties were 15,919 and 496,157 men wounded, 6,017 officers and 139,164 men killed, 496 officers and 28,355 men missing, total casualties 686,108
It appears there were major coal mines around Moscow that were lost or shut down by operation Typhoon in 1941 and they became a high priority rebuild in December 1941 as soon as the Red Army had pushed the German's back. In 1942 the Mosbas coal fields produced 8.5 million tons of coal versus 10 million tons in 1940. In January 1942 coal reserves in some parts of the country were down to 1 days consumption, iron and steel works 3 to 4 days, wood and other fuels were substituted for coal wherever possible. The USSR appears to have had a regular winter coal crisis most of the war years, in many ways like England, but worse.
The list of German capabilities in the east as of 30 March 1942, 162 combat divisions, 8 ready for any mission, 3 for offensive operations after some rest, 47 for limited offensive operations, 73 for defensive operations and 2 not battleworthy. The 19 Panzer divisions were down to 140 operational tanks, from Barbarossa to 1 March 1942 the army had lost around 600 more tanks than had been produced, yet Hitler had raised another 4 panzer divisions in the period and had allocated a tank battalion to each of the motorised divisions.
The effective strength of the army in the east had started at around 3,300,000 at Barbarossa and had declined steadily to 2,700,000 by July 1942,
As of 31 March 1942 cumulative casualties of the army in the east were 23,541 officers and 799,389 men wounded, 8,827 officers and 223,553 men killed, 855 officers and 51,665 men missing, total casualties 1,107,830, which does not include men reporting sick.
In the period June 1941 to July 1942 the Heer order of battle went from 213 to 226 divisions, field army strength went from 3,800,000 to 3,948,000, while suffering around 417,000 killed and missing during the time period according to Matthew Cooper in "The German Army". Halder's figures are 359,998 killed and missing in the east to end July 1942.
The decline in ability can be seen from the change from a near all German attack along the entire front in 1942 to using axis allied armies in the front line and attacking on about half the front in 1942.
It is interesting to note the Soviet war production did not rise very much after the end of 1942 or early 1943. It looks like the extra resources mainly went to the civilian sector or to cover the losses taken.
The Red Army reached pre war Poland in January 1944, by the 6th they were 12 miles inside the 1939 Polish border, pre war Romania in March 1944. What is the western allied set of operations that keeps the Red Army (mostly) inside the 1938 USSR borders? In 1945 the US Army cut rations to its non combat ETO personnel by 10%, with a similar cut to the combat troops after VE day. The European food situation remained precarious until 1948, any extended continuation of the fighting past May 1945 would result in famines.
Cold war propaganda from all angles has, over time caused a polarisation of thought regarding the effects of lend lease. It became an all or nothing
scenario.
The truth as usual is somewhere in between.
Some examples;
1. Lend lease had no effect on barbarossa up to and including the Battle for Moscow. In fact, equipment in the form of tanks from Britain was put
to good use at the time in the form of Matildas which at that point were a good match for any of the Panzers. Soviet medium and heavy tanks were
actually thin on the ground by this stage. To balance this the Soviet resistance to the invasion had caused large losses to Germany in manpower
and equipment - this included the Luftwaffe.
2. Lend lease only accounted for around 4 to 7% of the total resources used by the USSR. This depends on how those resources are added up
and what specific effect they had. In early 1942 the last large aluminium plant at Dnepropetrovsk had to be evacuated. Soviet supply of aluminium
was basically down to nil for the six months after that. Lend lease supplies of aluminium including aircraft aluminium allowed production of
airframes through to engines to continue.
There are other examples but a middling look shows that from the allied perspective it was a joint effort.
scenario.
The truth as usual is somewhere in between.
Some examples;
1. Lend lease had no effect on barbarossa up to and including the Battle for Moscow. In fact, equipment in the form of tanks from Britain was put
to good use at the time in the form of Matildas which at that point were a good match for any of the Panzers. Soviet medium and heavy tanks were
actually thin on the ground by this stage. To balance this the Soviet resistance to the invasion had caused large losses to Germany in manpower
and equipment - this included the Luftwaffe.
2. Lend lease only accounted for around 4 to 7% of the total resources used by the USSR. This depends on how those resources are added up
and what specific effect they had. In early 1942 the last large aluminium plant at Dnepropetrovsk had to be evacuated. Soviet supply of aluminium
was basically down to nil for the six months after that. Lend lease supplies of aluminium including aircraft aluminium allowed production of
airframes through to engines to continue.
There are other examples but a middling look shows that from the allied perspective it was a joint effort.
- Thread starter
- #53
Back to comparing the Japanese and German expectations: the Japanese never thought they could "conquer" America, but they did think they could force a peace settlement that would be advantageous for Japan. But Hitler fully expected to conquer Russia, and his hope was not unreasonable. However, in both cases the goal needed to be attained fairly quickly, and by failing to conquer Russia within six months, Germany learned that the Russians were much better able to fight during their winter. The cold went way beyond being merely inconvenient for the Wehrmacht; its soldiers were not supplied with clothing that was adequate for the severe cold, and the Germans did not fully understand how to keep engine-powered machinery (including airplanes) operating in serious sub-zero temperatures.
The winter of 41-42 did not turn the tide, but it stopped it to a degree sufficient to give the Russians opportunity to regroup and save Moscow. Then, the situation in 1942 was somewhat similar to the Pacific situation that same year: neither side had a clear advantage, and there was considerable back-and-forth movement. But time was on the side of Russia, just as it was on the side of America.
Then the winter of 42-43, and the breaking of the siege of Stalingrad in November, helped the Russians force the Germans to begin retreating all up and down the battle front.
The winter of 41-42 did not turn the tide, but it stopped it to a degree sufficient to give the Russians opportunity to regroup and save Moscow. Then, the situation in 1942 was somewhat similar to the Pacific situation that same year: neither side had a clear advantage, and there was considerable back-and-forth movement. But time was on the side of Russia, just as it was on the side of America.
Then the winter of 42-43, and the breaking of the siege of Stalingrad in November, helped the Russians force the Germans to begin retreating all up and down the battle front.
Snautzer01
Honourably banned
- 40,848
- Mar 26, 2007
Dont forget Afrika, Greece, airwar over Europa etc . Resources are the name of the game. And transport of that is a a game changer in 41 to 43 Logistics is a main part of war i think. And Allied was far better at it.
Yes, the engine block. My mistake about the batteries. Also copper for the generators, etc.
Thumpalumpacus
Major
I imagine those tens of thousands of tanks could probably get by on the gasoline engine, but I imagine that would impact its survivability.
Let's define "to conquer" in this case. (USSR, not Russia).
The plan was to eliminate the Red Army and to advance to the A-A line.
- Thread starter
- #58
That was especially true in the Pacific. The Japanese had nothing comparable to our naval underway refueling/replenishing capability, or to our temporary forward bases at Majuro and then Ulithi. Nor could they build forward airfields to the same standards that our SeaBees did. They also wasted a lot of material by discarding damaged things that we would have repaired and put back into service.
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- Thread starter
- #59
Not entirely sure what you mean. I think everybody is agreed that Hitler intended to occupy and Germanize the land as far as the Ural Mountains (functionally the same as the Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line). Hard to do that without eliminating the threat of the Red Army.
And, yes, I know the difference between Mother Russia and the CCCP. I, like most Americans, just don't care. The Soviet Union was, after all, just another name for the Russian Empire.
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
…and thanks for letting me know what the A-A line is.
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