Messerschmitt Me 264 and Heinkel He 277.

[phouse]

Yes, I made the mistake of reading the text and not the specs. I was wrong Civettone.

My consideration with respect to the United States and resources spent, my assumption is that the bombers will be escortless and with the radar stations the US would invariably build, they would know about the bombers in time to have interceptors waiting for them. This assumes nominal numbers on Germany's part though. I'm going to reveal my episteme here but I think history is a series of contingencies but only within certain parameters. I doubt Germany could have done more than scare the US!

Finally, a comment on the Luftwaffe entering 1943 and manpower. The Luftwaffe from the Battle of France forward sustained attrition rates that hovered around 20%. During the Battle of Britain, according to "Logistics and the Battle of Britain" by Peter Dye, the number of servicable 109s may have dropped as low as 40%! Of course, this addresses material craft and not my assertion regarding pilots.

Since my book is on loan and my searches in Google are dry, I'm going to attempt to quote some statistics that may not be entirely accurate. If I recall correctly, only 1 in 5 Luftwaffe squadrons were operating above 80%, while most of the rest hovered around 60%-79%. I'm commenting to keep this conversation alive; once I retrieve my book with its charts and tables, I'll correct myself for sake of accuracy. I still feel that Germany, given its near constant loss from 1940 onward and inability to supply pilots at a rate to keep up with that loss that they would not have been able to set aside any considerable number of pilots to launch any sort of considerable bombing attack. Just look at the train wreck of the second Battle of Britain!

 

[machine shop tom]

As a point of interest, in early 1944, a Ju390 made a trip to a point some 12 miles from the US coast, north of NYC. I think that if any plane, Ju390, Me264 or whatever, had dropped bombs on the US mainland, there would have been a big re-deployment of forces to counter this threat. It wouldn't have to have been a terribly effective bombing to have been a rude wake-up call that the US wasn't untouchable. If you look at the resources used to keep the Tirpitz bottled up, it isn't hard to realize how much out-of-proportion the use of resources would have been to counter a perceived bomber threat.

tom

 

[Civettone]

Phouse, you're absolutely right that Germany was not capable of launching a credible bombing offensive against the US. In fact, no bomber fleet would have been able to cross the ocean, attack targets and lose sustainable numbers, until the arrival of supersonic bombers.

But like I said, it would have been a good investment for the Germans though of course it wouldn't have changed the outcome. But let it be clear that the bombing during Big Week had a much larger indirect effect than the actual destructions. Defence systems had to be enlarged and improved, shelters had to be build, further decentralization of production, construction of underground facilities, relocation to the east, ... which swallowed up large amounts of resources and manpower.

Your comments on the Luftwaffe during and after the BoB are interesting though I wonder if they belong in this thread.


Tom, the Ju 390 story is well known on the internet. Unfortunately it's not supported by any flight data of the specific unit and probably never happened. Although a Ju 390 could be modified to fly to NY and back, it would probably not have been able to carry bombs. But especially the 12 miles from NY is a bit weird. Once you're that close you can just as well go the distance and try to get back with economical flying. 12 miles isn't enough to abort if your entire mission is over 5000 miles.

Oh, and the Ju 290 didn't fly to Manchuria either.

Kris

 

[plan_D]

Any long-range German bombers put into service in 1943 would have been used against the Russian industry, it would not have been wasted on mindless U.S attacks or suicidal daylight raids on Great Britain.

Remember now, the Bf 109 did not have the effective range to escort bombers any further north than London so British industry was safe from escorted bombers; those that went up without escort would be met by Spitfire IXs for an uncomfortable ride, which did carry cannon. In the event, Hurricane IIC and IV would be made ready for interception duties with four 20mm. This is on top of the USAAF readily available for action in Great Britain.

But that is all null and void, as I said, the Luftwaffe would use its bomber force against the Ural industry as it would finally be in range.

 

[phouse]

But like I said, it would have been a good investment for the Germans though of course it wouldn't have changed the outcome. But let it be clear that the bombing during Big Week had a much larger indirect effect than the actual destructions. Defence systems had to be enlarged and improved, shelters had to be build, further decentralization of production, construction of underground facilities, relocation to the east, ... which swallowed up large amounts of resources and manpower.

Kris

Good point. I'll drop any further defense of my assertion regarding manpower in 1943 to keep this thread relatively on topic.

 

[machine shop tom]

.........
Tom, the Ju 390 story is well known on the internet. Unfortunately it's not supported by any flight data of the specific unit and probably never happened. Although a Ju 390 could be modified to fly to NY and back, it would probably not have been able to carry bombs. But especially the 12 miles from NY is a bit weird. Once you're that close you can just as well go the distance and try to get back with economical flying. 12 miles isn't enough to abort if your entire mission is over 5000 miles.

Oh, and the Ju 290 didn't fly to Manchuria either.

Kris

I'll have to debate you on this one, Kris. My source is the book "The Warplanes Of The Third Reich" by William Green. This book was copyrighted in 1970 and was meticulously researched for years before being published. It also predates the internet by decades.

From the book: "In January 1944, the Ju 390 V2 was delivered to Fernaufklarungs-Gruppe 5 at Mont de Marson, south of Bordeaux, for operational evaluation. The Ju 390 V2 carried sufficient fuel for an endurance of 32 hours, and after a few short-distance flights, the aircraft flew from Mont de Marsan to a point some 12 miles from the U.S. coast, north of New York, returning successfully to its base."

This feat is also mentioned in the book "The Encyclopedia Of Aircraft Of WWII", published in 2004.

Of the Manchurian trip, Green's tome says: "........(In the spring of 1944) three aircraft were recalled to Germany where, within 48 hours at Finsterwalde, they had been completely stripped of armour and armament, fitted with two additional 550 Imp. gal. fuel tanks to increase the total fuel load to 5,235 Imp. gal. From Odessa and Mielec, the aircraft (Ju 290A-4s or A5s) were flown non-stop to Manchuria with special cargoes, refuelling and returning to Mielec with strategic materials that were in critical supply in Germany."

I see no reason to doubt these two resources, especially Green's.

tom

 

[bigZ]

I cant see the introduction of a small number of 4 engine bombers significantly effect the war. It would only be a small force due to the lack of suitable materials.

I also agree with Alder on how long it takes to introduce new aircraft designs. Their are exceptions such as the He 162. Just how many new types of aircraft did the Germans actually manage to introduce operationally during WWII not including upgrades to existing designs?

Even if they do bomb the US the effect on the course of the war will be slight. I also cant see them doing significate damage to factories in the Urals.

In reality the 4 main points that stopped Germany having a strategic 4 engine bombing force was the lack of materials/economy the death of General Wever and being a contintental power the priority to defend itself before it could bring a strategic bomber force into play.

 

[Civettone]

Any long-range German bombers put into service in 1943 would have been used against the Russian industry

Plan_D, I have to disagree with you. Speer is very very clear on this: even as late as 1944 Speer tried to get the Luftwaffe to attack industrial targets in Russia. To be exact, it was the power central near Moscow. He was convinced this would have had an effect as he noticed what the American air raids did to 'his' industry.
Yet he failed to get a fleet together as the army leaders kept using bombers for tactical missions.

On the other hand, the Amerika project was very real and Hitler kept pushing for it. Even in 1945 Amerika bombers were being designed and built!
Horten Ho XVIII - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

My source is the book "The Warplanes Of The Third Reich" by William Green.

I know, Tom.
Green is the first to mention this story and many (lesser) publications and websites have simply copied the story. Yet I can assure you that no flight ever took place. Probably it was just one guy mentioning such a flight and this story getting a life of its own.
Too bad it didn't happen...

Kris

 

[Civettone]

I cant see the introduction of a small number of 4 engine bombers significantly effect the war.

Well, if they carry an atomic bomb, I can.
But like I said, bombing the US would not significantly effect the war. Yet it seems clear that it would have lead to less American fighters, guns and other resources fighting in Europe.

It would only be a small force due to the lack of suitable materials.

I also agree with Alder on how long it takes to introduce new aircraft designs.

I do to but that doesn't seem to have been the question. The starting point of this thread is that Germany has these bombers ready for production.

In reality the 4 main points that stopped Germany having a strategic 4 engine bombing force was the lack of materials/economy

That's not true. The Germans built over a thousand 4 engined bombers. That's enough to have a strategic bombing force.

the death of General Wever

This is an outdated vision. In fact, in the days of Wever there were no bombers powerful enough to reach the Urals. What Wever had in mind, was unrealistic.

and being a contintental power the priority to defend itself before it could bring a strategic bomber force into play.

What do you base this on? How do you see Germany was prioritizing defence. I think it's clear that the Germans believed in strategic bombing: just see what they did in Guernica, Rotterdam, Warsaw, London, ...
They made a deliberate choice to build multifunctional bombers instead of dedicated heavy bombers.

Kris

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

I agree Adler but my point was that those weapons and resources would have to stay there!

Kris

Does not matter. The US had the production capacity to build more and more than what they were doing. The weapons and resources that were used to defend the east coast would only have been a fraction.

Not much would have been required to shoot down the few bombers anyhow. It is not like they would have had fighter cover escorting them from Germany to the US....

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

[
What's significant?
Fact is that those guns and fighters would not have been used in Europe. Seen on an economical scale it's also obvious that the Americans would have to assign more resources to set up a defence than the Germans would if they were to field a couple dozens semi-operational bombers.

Again the US production capacity was so large it would not have mattered.

 

[machine shop tom]

.......
I know, Tom.
Green is the first to mention this story and many (lesser) publications and websites have simply copied the story. Yet I can assure you that no flight ever took place. Probably it was just one guy mentioning such a flight and this story getting a life of its own.
Too bad it didn't happen...

Kris

Which flight? The trans-Atlantic flight or the Manchurian trip?

I guess we'll have to agree to disagree (why can't political and religious leaders do that?). I really can't prove that it they happen (although Green does mention the groups that the planes came from and approximate dates and such) and your proof that it didn't happen seems to satisfy you. Kinda like the Bigfoot thing, the proof is hard to pin down.

tom

 

[bigZ]

Well, if they carry an atomic bomb, I can.
But like I said, bombing the US would not significantly effect the war. Yet it seems clear that it would have lead to less American fighters, guns and other resources fighting in Europe.

I do to but that doesn't seem to have been the question. The starting point of this thread is that Germany has these bombers ready for production.

That's not true. The Germans built over a thousand 4 engined bombers. That's enough to have a strategic bombing force.

This is an outdated vision. In fact, in the days of Wever there were no bombers powerful enough to reach the Urals. What Wever had in mind, was unrealistic.

What do you base this on? How do you see Germany was prioritizing defence. I think it's clear that the Germans believed in strategic bombing: just see what they did in Guernica, Rotterdam, Warsaw, London, ...
They made a deliberate choice to build multifunctional bombers instead of dedicated heavy bombers.

Kris

Yes you are quite right in stating this thread was about the 264 and the 277 being operational in 1943 although they would have stuggled to became operational by 45 if they hadn't of been cancelled. But I cant succesfully argue a point if you slap on another what if (German Atomic bomb?). Japan was already bombing the US during WWII how much resources where given to that? OK so they where only balloon bombs mostly blowing up trees on the West coast.

I would be intrested to see a breakdown of the 1000 bombers constructed. 20,000 Spits where produced but it didn't mean Fighter Command could use them all in the BOB.

Most of my other points regard the failure of the URAL Bomber and the hope the Luftwaffe could tack on a strategic bomber command in the 40's. Pre war Germany considered France an imediate threat. Its no use having a strategic bomber force if the enemy has overrun the country. This is not to say Germany did not realise the potential just the prioty. Yes 2 engined bomber can perform both strategic missions as long as the target is in range.

Before the war the German economy was close to collapse, strategic materials had to be imported. During the war resources where freed up with the conquests(especially France). Fortunately they where wasted. An example would be 44 fighter production and the immense increase in output for the same amount of Ali used 2 years previously. Out of all the ocuppied counties only Czechovakia made any significant impact on Luftwaffe aircraft production. If the 264 went into production the 262 would have had to be dropped.

PS anyone tell me how to reply directly to each individual point in a persons post?

 

[Denniss]

AFAIR it's not even proven that the V2 was actually build or even finished/made ready for flight operations.

I remember seeing a comment somewhere the V2 was either not built or it was parked somewhere on an airfield without engines.

 

[Civettone]

BigZ, I agree with what you say but I don't really see your point. What are you getting at?

Your comment on the German economy is flawed as a war economy cannot collapse on its own. The Germans managed to build a thousand He 177s, so they could also have built a thousand Me 264s. This would result in about a 100 operational bombers which is sufficient to speak of a bomber force.

I agree with Adler that it wouldn't have changed the outcome of the war but that's not really the point either as not a single thing the Germans could have done after 1941 could have changed the outcome.

I guess we'll have to agree to disagree

Tom, I doubt if that's the way it goes.
Green is the only one who mentioned this transatlantic flight. The records of the unit which was supposed to have flown this mission do not show this mission. The survivors of the unit do not remember any mission to NY.
You are entitled to your opinion but sometimes there's no room for personal opinion when it comes to clear historical facts.

Try browsing around on the internet for similar discussions. You'll see similar conclusions. (I hope )

Kris

 

[davparlr]

Where do you come up with this stuff? The B-36 was not almost ready to go in 1941. The US did not even have an operation jet fighter in 1941, so how were they going to have a bomber with 4 jet engines along with the 6 Prop engines?

The USAF requested a design of a very long range bomber on April 11, 1941! That does not mean that it was almost ready in 1941. The designs had just begun in 1941...

You are not going to get a plane of those proportions flying in a few months from design to first flight. Come on Healz use some common sence here.

The XB-36 did not even fly until 8 Aug 1946...

The first prototype failed to meet the standards place in the requirement of 1941 and it was plagued with problems. The first prototype to meet the standards did not even fly until 4 Dec. 1947.

Do some research man...

All correct except for the need for jets on the B-36. The first B-36s only had the six piston engines. The four jets were added in '49 to add dash speed.

Some B-36 comments, when all was well, the engineer stated "six turning, four burning".

Pilot to engineer, "shut down three!"
engineer to pilot, "which three?"

One of the men I used to work with flew on a B-36. Training missions typically flew out of Maine to Alaska over to Greenland and back to Maine. All at 230 kts!

Those bombers mentioned would not have expedited the B-36 or B-29. Bombers don't fight bombers. However, the fall of Great Britain would certainly have sped up the development of the B-36.

A strike on America would only be a gnat bite, as Alder has said. Impact to the American forces facing Germany would not have been noticable.

German war against Russia may have been impacted.

 

[machine shop tom]

Tom, I doubt if that's the way it goes.
Green is the only one who mentioned this transatlantic flight. The records of the unit which was supposed to have flown this mission do not show this mission. The survivors of the unit do not remember any mission to NY.
You are entitled to your opinion but sometimes there's no room for personal opinion when it comes to clear historical facts.

Try browsing around on the internet for similar discussions. You'll see similar conclusions. (I hope )

Kris

After spendiing a few hours researching this subject on-line, I would have to pretty much agree with you, Kris. At best, I would give it a 90% chance that it didn't happen. I'd have to leave a least a small chance that it did just because it can't be proven 100% that it didn't happen. But I don't think that it did.

Thank you for your patience.

tom

 

[Civettone]

Not many people are willing to openly change their mind. Kudos to you.

And for the record, I was very disappointed when people set me straight about the subject because I really wanted to believe it!

Kris

 

[wink104]

Excellent discussion regarding the Me 264 V1. With all the what ifs going on I thought you may be interested in what finally happened to the project. On 18 July 1944, the 15th Air Force set out to destroy 70+ planes sighted at Memmingen under repair.
They ran into bad weather, lost their escort and only half of the bombers reached the target zone, including the 483rd and 2nd bomb groups. Radio messages directed them to bomb alternative targets but these were unverified.
On reaching the target, fierce opposition was engaged in the form of approx 200 Me 109's and FW 190's with heavy armor, nicknamed "Battering Rams". The 483rd lost 14 out of 26 planes, while the 2nd was spared, only losing one plane which managed to crash land in Switzerland.
My Father, 1st Lt. William S. Winkler, and his crew were led to believe this was a "milk run" to draw the GAF away from troop movements on the front but it turned out to be a well defended developmental base. Post war intel revealed that the only operational Me 264 V1, as well as parts for the V2 and V3 were destroyed in the raid.
That's war - luck, weather, life and death. The German war machine was crippled by allied daytime strategic bombing but at great cost. I'm sure glad my Dad had a horseshoe up his butt! 50 missions with no loss of crew or plane.
If I see any interest or activity on this thread, (which is a bit old by now,) I will gladly provide reference links.

 

[drgondog]

Any long-range German bombers put into service in 1943 would have been used against the Russian industry, it would not have been wasted on mindless U.S attacks or suicidal daylight raids on Great Britain.

Absolutely - to strike at US with the extra range/diminished payload - having to baiscally fly great circle route with bases in Iceland, Nova Scotia and Canade en route before actually getting to US - would risk a lot of valuable resources for little return - otherwise they are in range from UK/Scotland bases - not to mention placing Carrier Task Force further south.

Remember now, the Bf 109 did not have the effective range to escort bombers any further north than London so British industry was safe from escorted bombers; those that went up without escort would be met by Spitfire IXs for an uncomfortable ride, which did carry cannon. In the event, Hurricane IIC and IV would be made ready for interception duties with four 20mm. This is on top of the USAAF readily available for action in Great Britain.

But that is all null and void, as I said, the Luftwaffe would use its bomber force against the Ural industry as it would finally be in range.

Neither of those bombers would have been impervious to the 38, 47 or 51's even with existing basic armament - and would have suffered even worse losses than unescorted USAAF daylight raiders because of the huge 'hostile environment'.

From an upgun perspective, if needed, the 51 wing was already stressed for four 20mm cannon before switching over to 50 caliber.

It would have been even tougher than B-29 ops over Pacific - equivalent to say, B-29s subject to fighter attacks from 500 miles outbound all the way to the target and back, instead of just the last 200 miles into and back from target..