phouse
Airman
Yes, I made the mistake of reading the text and not the specs. I was wrong Civettone.
My consideration with respect to the United States and resources spent, my assumption is that the bombers will be escortless and with the radar stations the US would invariably build, they would know about the bombers in time to have interceptors waiting for them. This assumes nominal numbers on Germany's part though. I'm going to reveal my episteme here but I think history is a series of contingencies but only within certain parameters. I doubt Germany could have done more than scare the US!
Finally, a comment on the Luftwaffe entering 1943 and manpower. The Luftwaffe from the Battle of France forward sustained attrition rates that hovered around 20%. During the Battle of Britain, according to "Logistics and the Battle of Britain" by Peter Dye, the number of servicable 109s may have dropped as low as 40%! Of course, this addresses material craft and not my assertion regarding pilots.
Since my book is on loan and my searches in Google are dry, I'm going to attempt to quote some statistics that may not be entirely accurate. If I recall correctly, only 1 in 5 Luftwaffe squadrons were operating above 80%, while most of the rest hovered around 60%-79%. I'm commenting to keep this conversation alive; once I retrieve my book with its charts and tables, I'll correct myself for sake of accuracy. I still feel that Germany, given its near constant loss from 1940 onward and inability to supply pilots at a rate to keep up with that loss that they would not have been able to set aside any considerable number of pilots to launch any sort of considerable bombing attack. Just look at the train wreck of the second Battle of Britain!
My consideration with respect to the United States and resources spent, my assumption is that the bombers will be escortless and with the radar stations the US would invariably build, they would know about the bombers in time to have interceptors waiting for them. This assumes nominal numbers on Germany's part though. I'm going to reveal my episteme here but I think history is a series of contingencies but only within certain parameters. I doubt Germany could have done more than scare the US!
Finally, a comment on the Luftwaffe entering 1943 and manpower. The Luftwaffe from the Battle of France forward sustained attrition rates that hovered around 20%. During the Battle of Britain, according to "Logistics and the Battle of Britain" by Peter Dye, the number of servicable 109s may have dropped as low as 40%! Of course, this addresses material craft and not my assertion regarding pilots.
Since my book is on loan and my searches in Google are dry, I'm going to attempt to quote some statistics that may not be entirely accurate. If I recall correctly, only 1 in 5 Luftwaffe squadrons were operating above 80%, while most of the rest hovered around 60%-79%. I'm commenting to keep this conversation alive; once I retrieve my book with its charts and tables, I'll correct myself for sake of accuracy. I still feel that Germany, given its near constant loss from 1940 onward and inability to supply pilots at a rate to keep up with that loss that they would not have been able to set aside any considerable number of pilots to launch any sort of considerable bombing attack. Just look at the train wreck of the second Battle of Britain!