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Were the Germans aware that the US used a master bomber and if so was that plane identifiable and targeted by either flak or fighters?
I read about a mosquito attack, I think on a target in Norway, where the bombers entered into a shallow dive to throw off the predicted flack, not really an option to a bomber group but they were aware of the predicted flak.A quick scan reveals bombing altitudes against German targets varying between 18,000ft and 25,000ft. I did notice a raid against a target in Norway on which the bombing height was only 11,000ft, but the opposition appeared to be one flak boat moored in a fjord, not exactly Schweinfurt or Berlin! Some were a little higher (27,000ft)
The bombing heights tally well with typical Luftwaffe fighter interception reports, the vast majority reporting the bombers between 6,000m and 8,000m.
Cheers
Steve
That would be true - except that the B-17 and B-24 bombed at same altitudes - roughly 25000 feet at 8AF operations initiation and the B-17 maintained that general altitude into late 1944. But the B-24s dropped to 22-20000 feet. In the fall of 1944 and into spring 1945 when many of the missions dropped below 20,000 feet for the bombers.
The disparate speeds and handling qualities between the bombers drove the different doctrines as the B-24 was about 20Kts faster and difficult to maintain tight formations above 22000 feet.
If you are drawing a contrast against daylight RAF doctrine with Bomber Command the 8th did fly higher - but didn't change due to flak. What they 'changed' was to order the crews to Not fly evasive maneuvers from the IP to the target.
Soon the RAF would be bombing, in daylight, from 12,000 ft.
The reason they bombed from those altitudes was flak. The USAAF decided to do so based on over confidence in its bomb sight. It felt it could still bomb accurately from a supposedly safe altitude. This was more of an issue for the USAAF which continued a pretence of 'precision' bombing right up to the point when it started bombing through cloud on radar, than for the RAF which had developed tactics to compensate for a lack of accuracy.
Late in the war the quality of heavy flak in particular started to decrease. By late 1944 only about 40% of the 1.2 million personnel in the flak arm were regular Luftwaffe personnel and the level of training had decreased. Even earlier, when Overlord took place, flak resources were moved to confront allied forces in France. Flak units were moved to protect the oil industry in reaction to the allied campaign against it with more success. This is the experience of one man, just a small cog in the gearbox of an enormous machine, attacking an oil target.
In response to the original question, flying that 13 miles, straight and level with no possibility of any evasive action, must have been one of the most difficult things to do. Crews certainly hated it.
But the extra defences came from somewhere, another target, and it was usually a city, had less protection. In July 1944 the decision was taken to concentrate flak in centres of gravity around the most important targets. If you were not attacking one of these (deemed so by the Germans, not the USAAF or RAF) you would likely encounter much lighter defences. For example 500 heavy flak guns were moved from the protection of industry to the protection of communications and transport routs. Eventually a flak belt extended the length of the Rhine!
Hitler' gamble in the Ardennes alone cost the Luftwaffe 100 heavy flak batteries, 110 light flak batteries and 16 search light batteries.
In September 1944 the 8th Air Force reported an increase in flak losses and damage, probably due to the concentration of flak around its targets. As soon as late October it was reporting a "sharp decrease" in flak losses. This can be attributed to problems with gun laying radar (both less effective and shortages), a shortage of ammunition, less well trained gun crews and of course poor autumn weather. A corner had been turned at the end of 1944. The flak arm, like just about everything else in Nazi Germany, was on the verge of defeat. Soon the RAF would be bombing, in daylight, from 12,000 ft.
Cheers
Steve
The Americans employed lead ships, on whose cue all the others in their formation bombed. The Germans were aware of this and flak definitely targeted the leading aircraft in the US formations. I said above, it was point number 3 in a 1943 flak manual.
I doubt the fighters had such a luxury, generally attacking whichever aircraft they could get a good firing position on.
Did only the lead ships employ Nordon bombsights or did all bombers use them?
If the latter, didn't bombing on cue from a lead ship negate somewhat negate the Nordon bombsight?
The Norden was standard equipment in all the U.S. bombers as it's tachometric design and auto-pilot features were better than the older Vector type sights.I think that a few crews had the Norden, but the bulk did not.
There were a few back up lead bombers in case the lead bomber was lost.
The reason for dropping on cue from the leader was that it enabled the bombers to remain in formation and maximise their defensive fire against fighters. It also reduced the time the formation remained over target.
The Norden required a long straight run up to the target. If every bomber had to go through the procedure they woudl be over the target much longer.
I believe you're correct about Dresden's flak having been shifted, but from memory it had been shifted east, not to the oil refineries. The front wasn't far away in February.
He's being unfair to the Norden which was as good as any bomb sight of the period, but he does explain the practice of dropping on the cue of the lead ship(s).
Perhaps it's not that he's being unfair, maybe he just didn't buy into all the hype about the Norden.
"Later in the war when long range fighters and 2 years of pounding had all but made the Luftwaffe non-existent, the bombardier was replaced with a toggler. Where the bombardier was a commissioned officer, the togglers were enlisted men. When a toggler was on the aircraft, it did not carry a Norden Bombsight. When the toggler saw the lead plane drop his bombs, he would toggle the bombs to drop out of his aircraft"
B-17 Flying Fortress--Queen of the Skies
"What is a Bombardier? What is a Togglier?
A crew bombardier was trained in all the technical phases of the "dropping the bombs" task. It was his job to operate the bomb sight in his plane to drop the bombs on a target.
However, when it was decreed by 8th AF headquarters that all 36 planes in a Squadron formation would drop their bombs simultaneously, only the bombardier in the lead plane ran a bomb sight and functioned as a true bombardier. All the other 35 planes dropped when he did. The job of the bombardier in all the other 35 planes then was just to trip the bomb release switch in his own plane when the lead dropped his bombs. This method/technique was intended to concentrate the bomb pattern for maximum destruction. So, when there were personnel shortages, some enlisted crew members were selected to sit in the bombardier's position and timely trip the switch when the lead plane dropped his bombs. That job was called a togglier, sometimes spelled toggleier, a combination of toggle + ier."
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