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That would be perfectly reasonable, as the Spitfire had been phased out, but you wouldnt phase them out until P-51s were there to replace them. 109 P-51s would have made no progress at all without the others, as with animals that hunt in packs, some do the chasing, some do the herding and some do the final kill.In view of the actual statistics on kill ratios, thats an entirely reasonable viewpoint, yes. By 25th Feb,
1 in 6 escorts were Mustangs, but made nearly HALF the kills. Who, placing themselves in the role
of a top USAAF administrator in 1944, and being presented with these figures, would possibly have in good
faith done anything other than phase out the 38 & 47?
View attachment 632355
That would be perfectly reasonable, as the Spitfire had been phased out, but you wouldnt phase them out until P-51s were there to replace them. 109 P-51s would have made no progress at all without the others, as with animals that hunt in packs, some do the chasing, some do the herding and some do the final kill.
There is no way I will disparage the P-51 in any way but you pee with the pot you have and the the P-47 was there when others werent. A massive amount of operational knowledge was gained with the P-47. Also when you look at the LW bases in Belgium and Netherlands many were already abandoned because of attacks by P-47s and others before the P-51 became active.View attachment 632357
Well yes that is true, you dont just instantly ditch everything else, but virually all units were switched over to 51s as soon as practicably possible.
Another interesting set of stats:
Fuel required top operate each aircraft type per hour (averaged over a mission) - US Gal/hour (sorry I have forgottten the source, but I think it was USSBS report)
B-29 = 600
B-24 = 320
B-17 = 248
PR Mosquito = 130
P-38 = 130
P-47 = 119
P51 = 65
A top USAAF administrator in 1944 would have done as you say, No question.In view of the actual statistics on kill ratios, thats an entirely reasonable viewpoint, yes. By 25th Feb,
1 in 6 escorts were Mustangs, but made nearly HALF the kills. Who, placing themselves in the role
of a top USAAF administrator in 1944, and being presented with these figures, would possibly have in good
faith done anything other than phase out the 38 & 47?
A little more 'serious' than a 'general guideline'. As a Planning document validated by flight Testing and extensive documentation to sort out loading conditions, it represents 'exceed at your own risk' when planning an Op. If you look at aforementioned Encounter Reports detailing fights nearing the outer Radii - but not beyond - you rarely see periods of extended MP of more than several minutes, but great comments regarding low fuel upon return..
Further, the escorts, even target escorts were rarely straight line to RV, Straight Line to target, straight line to Break Escort and straight line back to base in clear weather with no headwinds. A Mission Map with Routes and Waypoints were highlighted with red or shaded 'blotches' to warn/and avoid heavy flak concentration. Even missions to Berlin and Beyond frequently tracked inbound over the Baltic over water - meaning the route was greater than a 'radii'.
My father planned and led the last Shuttle Mission 9-18 thru 9-22 and it serves to illustrate the 'unplanned'. First the Penetration Escort was 4th and 357th FG Mustangs with planned RV at Stettin, thence to Warsaw, thence to Piryatin beyond Kiev. Total airmiles in 1350-1400+ mile range. Instructions were to fly directly toward the R/V at Stettin on SOP Cruise settings. Do not use fuselage fuel tank until the external 110s were drained and released. Squadron leaders instructed o direct a flight for interception, and the flight should not pursue fleeing LW. Planned reserve was 35 minutes as Piryatin was located in wheat field fairly close to B-17 location Poltava - but break escort to look for Piraytin was 5o mi away from Polatava and no navigation (other than my father) was available at high level of expertise within the 355th FG for that mission. IIRC he had 12 mission Route maps to address N. Germany/Sweden, Poland N., Poland S. and Ukraine for inbound leg. Same complexities for Ukraine to Italy with Hungary, Bulgaria, Greece and Italy. Then Italy, France and Britain S.
S--t happened. The bombers reported being late as 355th was west of Berlin and he ordered a throttle back to 190mph TAS to conserve fuel. Ten minutes later the 13CBW reported thy were 12 minutes early. My father had to immediately plot (yank the correct two maps) an intercept course over heavy flak concentrations at MP to a new R/V south of Stettin and nw of Warsaw - about the time they dropped external tanks - and switched to fuselage tank. They had three fights Warsaw area- small scale - but fuel burning for 12 pilots dispatched (one from Borax, one from 357 and one from 358 FS. 354 FS remained intact in high escort) during the throttle up and intercept.
My point - by luck or skill they were 10 minutes short of planned landing time at Piryatin, my father landed last to give the rest of the Borax squadron he was leading a chance to get in fast. He had 8 hours log time and 13 gallons of fuel despite perfect weather for last 200 miles. Nobody had more that 13 gallons after landing. That's good for about 10 minutes of searching remaining before Mustangs started crash landing.
The wild card was the high MP run to execute the new intercept.
The total distance travelled was Less than the Planning Combat Radius.
Combat Radius per AAF Planning Definitions were fairly specific and tabulated for 10,000 and 25,000 feet. Sources with somewhat conflicting tables (but not definition) are contained in USAF Study 136 "Long Range Escort Fighter", "Americas One Hundred Thousand", VIII FC Combat Operations Planning documents sourced from Wright and Eglin type tests for Range, Craven and Cates "Army Air Forces in World War II", to name a few.
If you parse 1000's of Encounter Reports you will note that Victory Credits achieved in ETO by VIII and IX FC escort fighters are at a Range LESS than table values for Combat Radius.
A decent sample is on Spitfireperformance but mine were largely found in the microfilm of squadron histories obtained from USAFHRC over the course of 45 years. I think Dr. Frank Olynyk may have included the site of each victory credit in his many volumes on the subject. I have his data by VC by type AC by Theatre by date by Squadron/unit - but not specific location/time.How many of these documents are available online?
Are such reports available online in any systematic way? Or it is more split up among a multitude of websites?
First, I agree that an oft overlooked fact of P-47C/D operations in ETO is that all of the P-51 Mustang FGs that converted from P-47 accelerated their results against the LW because a.) they had received significant combat experience in the P-47 against the LW, b.) retained a high % of their experienced fighter pilots because the LW chose to not aggressively engage the Patrols and Sweeps - which gradually increased confidence of the US pilots, and c.) a Major overlooked fact is the skill and experience of forming and flying 'large wing' excursions in really crappy weather.There is no way I will disparage the P-51 in any way but you pee with the pot you have and the the P-47 was there when others werent. A massive amount of operational knowledge was gained with the P-47. Also when you look at the LW bases in Belgium and Netherlands many were already abandoned because of attacks by P-47s and others before the P-51 became active.
A top USAAF administrator in 1944 would have done as you say, No question.
However the argument was made that the P-47s didn't get extra fuel and range until after air superiority had already been won by the allies.
While not as efficient as the P-51s the P-47s certainly contributed to winning air superiority in the 2nd 1/2 of 1943 and the first 1/2 of 1944.
They were given more fuel and performance enhancements before air superiority was truly won.
They still weren't as good as P-51s.
Argument started when the poster claimed the P-47 was over rated because it could NOT do long range escort in 1943.
No allied fighter available in squadron/group numbers in 1943 (except for a few weeks in Dec?) could do long range escort either.
So if the P-47 was over rated because it couldn't do long range escort (in an 8th Air Force sense) then every other Allied fighter in service in 1943 is over rated because none of them could do that mission either.
I do appreciate the tables and charts.
I'd like to have an award for "insightful".I am sympathetic to this view and I understand it. However, I "think" that the following example regarding the Spitfire, might partly help explain. This is a letter written
by the head of Rolls Royce (Ernest Hives) on 17th Nov 1942 to Freeman. (so a year before what we were talking about above happened). (see my book pg 247).
It might "look" very odd why planes like the 47 were obviously being de-prioritised slighty before the actual operational results proved it`s worth, but, keep in mind
that planes (eg the Mustang in this case) had been evaluated and tested for a very long time before they entered the European theature in operational service.
The point I`m making is, that the planners etc, had formed their view that it was VERY highly probable that it would prove the best option long before it started
proving it in combat. So they would have already started shifting priority to the 51, way in advance. Otherwise, if operational stats came in proving that it WAS
indeed working as expected, there would have been a disastrously long time-lag before whatever new aircraft it was (in this case the 51) could be employed
in full. I think in war you had to make "educated bets" like that all the time, I dont think you could always wait until you had stats to match expectations with
operational performance before you put your chips on the table.
Here, for example, you can see the British are already reckoning in 1942 that the Spitfire (unless something really drastic changed) would be totally outclassed
by the two-stage Mustang when it came into full use. I think this is far more likely the explanation for the 47 being edged out even before the 51 had
fully started service, much more likely than a certain series of YouTube videos on a conspiracy to pull the rug out from the 47 by cloak and dagger.
One popular YouTube creator cites the lack of drop tank development, but the fact is (see my last post) that the 47 consumes about double the fuel
per hour of operations that a Mustang does, its not difficult to understand why it was much more difficult to equip such an aircraft with
a realiable system of long-range tanks - I dont think they had the resources to create a long range P47 and P51 airfleet, and had to
make a "bet" in 1942/43 about where to put their money, and the P-51 got the backing. I dont view that as a conspiracy, but just
pragmatism in wartime planning. Anyway, thats my view on it essentially. P-47 a great plane, but I also dont think that the P-51
suceeded without merit, I think it was just a little bit better at what was needed, and thats about it.
View attachment 632405
Thoughtful insight.. I devoted a lot of ink on this topic also.I am sympathetic to this view and I understand it. However, I "think" that the following example regarding the Spitfire, might partly help explain. This is a letter written
by the head of Rolls Royce (Ernest Hives) on 17th Nov 1942 to Freeman. (so a year before what we were talking about above happened). (see my book pg 247).
It might "look" very odd why planes like the 47 were obviously being de-prioritised slighty before the actual operational results proved it`s worth, but, keep in mind
that planes (eg the Mustang in this case) had been evaluated and tested for a very long time before they entered the European theature in operational service.
The point I`m making is, that the planners etc, had formed their view that it was VERY highly probable that it would prove the best option long before it started
proving it in combat. So they would have already started shifting priority to the 51, way in advance. Otherwise, if operational stats came in proving that it WAS
indeed working as expected, there would have been a disastrously long time-lag before whatever new aircraft it was (in this case the 51) could be employed
in full. I think in war you had to make "educated bets" like that all the time, I dont think you could always wait until you had stats to match expectations with
operational performance before you put your chips on the table.
Here, for example, you can see the British are already reckoning in 1942 that the Spitfire (unless something really drastic changed) would be totally outclassed
by the two-stage Mustang when it came into full use. I think this is far more likely the explanation for the 47 being edged out even before the 51 had
fully started service, much more likely than a certain series of YouTube videos on a conspiracy to pull the rug out from the 47 by cloak and dagger.
One popular YouTube creator cites the lack of drop tank development, but the fact is (see my last post) that the 47 consumes about double the fuel
per hour of operations that a Mustang does, its not difficult to understand why it was much more difficult to equip such an aircraft with
a realiable system of long-range tanks - I dont think they had the resources to create a long range P47 and P51 airfleet, and had to
make a "bet" in 1942/43 about where to put their money, and the P-51 got the backing. I dont view that as a conspiracy, but just
pragmatism in wartime planning. Anyway, thats my view on it essentially. P-47 a great plane, but I also dont think that the P-51
suceeded without merit, I think it was just a little bit better at what was needed, and thats about it.
Thanks Bill informative as always. I would add that the experience gained by the planners controllers and everyone else down to the tea lady was also invaluable. This discussion started with the P-47 being called inadequate, the term is purely relative, the P-47 was inadequate for deep penetration escort in Germany but the P-51 was inadequate to escort a raid on Moscow. That doesnt mean useless, without all the lessons learned from mistakes, errors, panics and complete screw ups made with the P-47 all of the same mistakes errors panics and screw ups would have happened later.First, I agree that an oft overlooked fact of P-47C/D operations in ETO is that all of the P-51 Mustang FGs that converted from P-47 accelerated their results against the LW because a.) they had received significant combat experience in the P-47 against the LW, b.) retained a high % of their experienced fighter pilots because the LW chose to not aggressively engage the Patrols and Sweeps - which gradually increased confidence of the US pilots, and c.) a Major overlooked fact is the skill and experience of forming and flying 'large wing' excursions in really crappy weather.
As previously I was making a general point, not specifically about deep penetration raids into Germany. The web site I was referring to is here but it is a PDF format so hard to quote easily but for exampleOTOH, while a strafing attack was executed by the 55th FG prior to Doolittle's order to "Pursue in the air and on the ground" in January 1944, it was a freak occurrence (in November 1943). The 353rd FG had some limited claims Jan 14 and 21 and the 78th FG had first recorded VCs over France based airfield in early February, but the first two Significant airfield attack by 351/353rd FG (Feb 22 at Bonn) and 354FS/355FG on (March 8 was at Hosepe) Germany - both Flight level force, both on way back from Penetration Support. It was the last P-47 equipped mission by the 355th - and first loss to airfield flak for both FGs. Notably the top AAF ace Walter Beckham was lost on that 2/22 strafing attack to airfield flak.
My only point is that if any significant damage was obtained by strafing French/Belgium/Netherlands it was by RAF and to my knowledge neither JG 2 nor JG 26 abandoned any airfields due to AAF strafing by either P-47 or P-38.
I agree completely which is why I contested the "P-47 range was inadequate". The RAF received over 800 P-47s used mainly in Burma utilising the "cab rank" system where range is expressed as loiter time waiting to be called by ground control.My only point is that if any significant damage was obtained by strafing French/Belgium/Netherlands it was by RAF and to my knowledge neither JG 2 nor JG 26 abandoned any airfields due to AAF strafing by either P-47 or P-38.
My last observation is that dominance over LW, pre-D Day, was not achievable without the combined forces of 8th and 9th AF P-47, P-38 and P-51Bs - augmented by RAF Mustang III as required. The tactic of tasking the P-47 to Penetration and Withdrawal Support was crucial to permit P-38/P-51 to fly straight to deep Germany RV to initiate Target escort with maximum internal fuel for combat.
This discussion started with the P-47 being called inadequate, the term is purely relative,
Also in my opinion range alone is almost useless, what is the point of flying to Berlin with machine guns? Unless you have a lot of bombers with you, you have a very expensive aircraft and more expensive pilot trading blows with every platoon that has a heavy Mauser. From the start of the war to the end the highest performing allied aircraft took pictures, true of the Spitfire, Mosquito but also the Mustang/P-51.Coo-rectamundo! The presumption that the P-47 was "short-ranged" in 1943 is ignorant of the facts as they were at the time and is based entirely on someone looking through the good ole retrospectoscope. For a single-seat fighter to possess the range and combat radius of the Mustang on its debut in 1942 was extraordinary, that the P-38 and P-47 could go as far as they did when they did was extremely useful at the time and replacing them with the P-51, with its capabilities was just doing what anyone in that position would have done, but in no way does it diminish what the P-38 and P-47 achieved.
wow...really?In my opinion, the most overrated (when reputation exceeds contribution) fighter airplane of WW2 was the Spitfire. It made its reputation and became a public legend during the Battle of Britain but its contribution to the war effort afterwards and eventual victory was very little.
The Spitfire didn't see service in the Mediterranean theatre, Malta or Africa, until the middle of 1942. The RAF had been in combat against the Italian Air Force since June 1940 (East African campaign). The predominant fighter types of the British Commonwealth throughout the North African campaign would have been the P-40 and Hurricane.Malta, N Africa?