GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
Or what appears to be "selective memory retention", perhaps?
Most Overrated aircraft of WWII.....?
- Thread starter Lucky13
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There is also this online, USAAF Combat Operations 1941 - 1945
I don't see how anything can be criticised for being short ranged when the accepted wisdom was that long range escort wasn't required or couldn't be done. Although B-17s were escorted by Spitfires and then P-47s many were still arguing that they weren't needed well into 1943.
P-39 Expert
Non-Expert
Wider prop blades and water injection didn't do anything for the P-47's inadequate range in '43, did they?It might help of you actually read a bit more.
The P-47s were getting the wider prop blades starting in Dec of 1943. Likewise the early water injection kits were being fitted from Nov on, most P-47s having gotten the water injection by the end of 1943, but hey, by end of Dec 1943/early Jan 1944 air superiority had already been won over Europe (by what????? inquiring minds want to know)
In what sense was it inadequate, what was better? Who wanted long range escort in Jan 1943? Didnt the P-51 and Spitfire get wide blade props?
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SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
I'm too lazy to look it up. What was the range of the 1943 P-47 mentioned in post #2444 and the range of the P-39 at the same time?
drgondog
Major
Jeff Ethell and Alfred Price should have cited the 9th AF Escort Strength as the 358FG and 362FG (P-47) and 354FG (P-51) were escorting the 8th AF on 6 March, plus 363rd FG which stood down recovering from 11 weather related losses returning from Berlin on March 4th.
The Combat Radius for the P-47D's modified for the external pylon plumbing was 425mi w/2x150 gal tanks. As noted, very few P-47D-16s had arrived in squadron strength, nor had the Depot wing mods been installed for earlier blocks of P-47s at BAD1 Burtonwood.
The combat radius for the P-38J-15 with LE 55 gal tanks and 2x165gal external tanks was 650 miles - and most of the J-10s had been modified by 6 March.
The combat radius of the P-51B-1 and -5 and C-1 modified with 85 gal fuse tank plus 2x75 gal was 700mi.
For Comparison, the 56th and 78th furthest encounter was at Steinhuder Lake, short of Frankfurt ~ 350 mi from Boxted. As a sanity check, the most extreme examples of Penetration victory credits for P-47D in Spring 1944 was Lubeck/Kassel/Stuttgart radii wit 1x108 CL/2x150 pylon tanks in April/May.
Francis Dean drew from AAF Planning Documents produced at Wright and Eglin Field as validated by flight tests - to present his data for America's One Hundred Thousand -
Shortround6
Major General
Man, talk about changing the goal posts. We aren't even on the same field.
"And it really didn't matter that the P-47s provided escort through April '44, their range was still way too short. P-47s did get more fuel and wider propeller blades, but only after air superiority had been won over Europe. When the AAF needed them most in 1943, P-47s were inadequate."
This has been shown to be completely false. The P-47s did a lot to help win air superiority, even with their short range.
Not the P-47s fault that Air Force planners wanted to hit targets beyond the range of the P-47.
I would note that the first P-38 Group to operational in Europe with the P-38 does so in Oct of 1943 using the P-38H with 300 gal of internal fuel, range isn't much different than P-47s.
There are already 7 fighter groups in the 8th Air Force using P-47s.
Things changed by the month.
In June of 1943 P-47s were good for around 230 miles of radius.
In August they made about 340 miles
In Sept/Oct they could make 375/380 miles.
In Jan 1944 they were fitting under wing drop tanks.
In April/May of 1944 the late P-39Ds with 370 gallons internal start showing up.
In 1943 there were no other adequate fighters in Europe for escort or indeed anywhere in the world.
By the end of 1943 there were two operation P-38 groups and P-51s were just starting to do sweeps over France and the low countries as part of their training.
drgondog
Major
SR - your points were on point, but data and dates are a little off - and important to the narrative regarding crisis of confidence in 8th AF in August 1943.
"Things changed by the month.
In June of 1943 P-47s were good for around 230 miles of radius. The 4FG, 56, 78 and 353FG performed a longer penetration support on July 28 at end of Blitz Week. Closer to 215mi with unpressurized 205 gal tub tank -
In August they made about 340 miles In August the first c/l 75 gal pressurized combat tank combat radius was 230mi
In Sept/Oct they could make 375/380 miles. In September the 108 gal tank combat radius for P-47C/D was 275 mi
In Jan 1944 they were fitting under wing drop tanks. But delivered P-47D-16 with Pylons in squadron deployment in late March, Depot mods in squadron quantity also in late March and 150gal C/L tank arriving in December 1943. Max combat (operational) combat radius in squadron strength in January w/150 gal C/L tank was ~ 375mi.
In April/May of 1944 the late P-47Ds with 370 gallons internal start showing up. First operational individual sorties mid May, but not squadron strength until late June. The new P-47D-25 with 370g internal was ~ 600 mi with 2x150 plus 1x108gal externals. At that time only 4 P-47 Groups remained for escort and zero were assigned to Target Escort until P-47M started for 56th FG in February 1945.
In 1943 there were no other adequate fighters in Europe for escort or indeed anywhere in the world."
By the end of 1943 there were two operation P-38 groups and P-51s were just starting to do sweeps over France and the low countries as part of their training."
Eaker believed he could win the war of attrition, Arnold wasn't sure that he could win the war of opinion with Churchill and FDR.. The P-38 was re-routed to ETO in August and P-51B routed to ETO (October) for 9th AF Tactical (stupid politics stateside). Recall that the 3 equipped P-38FGs were deployed to 8th AF (plus one w/o aircraft (78th)) - in Summer 1942 but sent to Africa in November 1942. The P-38s were flying 400 mi escort missions in SWP and MTO in 1943 using 300 gal ferry tanks, but that didn't help Eaker in ETO.
The Point you were making is that P-47s were essential to 8th AF gaining control of the air until summer 1944 when the three of last four P-47D FGs stated conversion to P-51,
Important facts about P-47C/D in ETO.
Pushed escort past the Kanal in mid 1943
Pushed escort to east Netherlands in late 1943
Pushed escort to Steinhuder Lake in Feb 1944 for Penetration/Withdrawal Support - essential to pushing T/E Me 210s/410s/Ju 88s deeper and deeper into Germany.
Provided Very effective escort to Kassel/Brunswick line to enable the fewer P-38/P-51 FGs to effectively perform target escort in Feb/Mar 1944 during the transition from P-47 to P-51.
The performance of the WI equipped R-2800 and paddle blade props (late 1943/early 1944) enabled a wider envelope of performance superiority above 22K over Fw 190A-6 and A-7 and Bf 109G-6. Even the ROC and turn favored the P-47D-11 at 8th AF escort altitudes. Residual turbosupercharged R-2800 Hp up to 32K was huge above the FTH of BMW801D-2 and DB605A.
Shortround6
Major General
Thank you.
I was using AHT as a quick reference and obviously what first use or what one squadron/group could do was not spread across all groups. There is a lot of incorrect information out there.
Again thanks for the more accurate information.
I am not arguing that the P-47 was long range (at least not until the summer of 1944
But harping on it's short range when the allies had few, if any, planes that were much better in 1943 seems a bit of a side show. Better planes were on the way. It took time.
We know the Spitfire was short ranged but the Typhoon wasn't much for range either. 185 US gallons internal wasn't going to do the job for escort work even if the Sabre engine would have worked at 25,000ft.
I was using AHT as a quick reference and obviously what first use or what one squadron/group could do was not spread across all groups. There is a lot of incorrect information out there.
Again thanks for the more accurate information.
I am not arguing that the P-47 was long range (at least not until the summer of 1944
But harping on it's short range when the allies had few, if any, planes that were much better in 1943 seems a bit of a side show. Better planes were on the way. It took time.
We know the Spitfire was short ranged but the Typhoon wasn't much for range either. 185 US gallons internal wasn't going to do the job for escort work even if the Sabre engine would have worked at 25,000ft.
33k in the air
Staff Sergeant
- 1,281
- Jan 31, 2021
They are designated in the section detailing the escort assignments. But the 9th AF fighters were usually only assigned to 8th AF missions when it was a 'maximum effort' and the 8th AF itself couldn't supply the number of escorts needed.
33k in the air
Staff Sergeant
- 1,281
- Jan 31, 2021
This was the case in the ETO, where it was believed that large, tight formations of heavily armed B-17s and B-24s would be able to adequately defend themselves. It took bitter experience to disabuse the USAAF commanders in Europe of this notion.
Gen. Kenney, in the Southwest Pacific, with limited resources and greater distances to contend with, had found through experience that escorts for daylight bombing would always be needed to keep losses to acceptable levels.
33k in the air
Staff Sergeant
- 1,281
- Jan 31, 2021
550-600 miles with 300 gallons external, according to some USAAF documents I've come across.
The question is how many 'J' models were on hand at that time.
The P-38's combat radius in Europe will always be contentious due to the difference between 'ideal' and 'practical' considerations. Freeman's Mighty Eighth War Manual notes the radius actually achieved was, due to engine issues and other matters, often quite shorter than what could be theoretically achieved.
There's also the well-known story of how Charles Lindbergh was able to significantly extend the operational radius of P-38s in the Pacific by changing engine management procedures. The way it had been done was not nearly as fuel efficient as it could be.
The question is how many P-51s had been so modified in March of 1944.
Combat radius figures always vary depending on source. Part of it is how it is defined and measured, and part of it is the exact aircraft model (since they had different internal fuel loads) since that is sometimes not specified.
I did a fair amount of digging through various references and found generally similar, though not identical, figures. I also noted some apparent typographical errors in some sources. Alas, all of this is on my other computer which I cannot access at present.
33k in the air
Staff Sergeant
- 1,281
- Jan 31, 2021
Something else to note is that penetration radius and escort radius were not necessarily the same thing. There's also the matter of the exact nature of the escort procedure impacting combat escort radius.
The implementation of the 'relay' method of escorting bombers (such as was used on 6 March 1944) helped extend the escort radius.
As I recall, initially the combat radius was about 175 miles or so. But as pilots and maintenance crews became more familiar with operating the aircraft, this was extended to about 230 miles.
To go further than that required drop tanks.
The implementation of the 'relay' method of escorting bombers (such as was used on 6 March 1944) helped extend the escort radius.
As I recall, initially the combat radius was about 175 miles or so. But as pilots and maintenance crews became more familiar with operating the aircraft, this was extended to about 230 miles.
To go further than that required drop tanks.
drgondog
Major
The 9th AF FC was under operational control of 8th AF deep into May with only certain P-47 groups tasked to tactical air ops in mid May. The crossover was in mid may when pre- D-Day invasion tasking began and the 9th AF Jugs began supporting 9th AF missions. The P-38 equipped 367th and 474th released in last week of May. The 363rd and 354th P-51s finally moved full time to escorting 9th AF Medium bombers on June 1. The 363rd did perform a non-8th AF escort for B-26s on May 29th.
Virtually Every 8th AF mission in from Big Week forward into the end of May was a 'max effort' strike against German airfr4am Industry and Oil targets. One of the advantages of the 9th AF delegating IX FC to 8th AF was to develop experience in planning and executing escorts for Medium bombers post May for all the new FGs inbound pre-invasion.
drgondog
Major
33k in the air
said"Combat radius figures always vary depending on source. Part of it is how it is defined and measured, and part of it is the exact aircraft model (since they had different internal fuel loads) since that is sometimes not specified."
Combat Radius per AAF Planning Definitions were fairly specific and tabulated for 10,000 and 25,000 feet. Sources with somewhat conflicting tables (but not definition) are contained in USAF Study 136 "Long Range Escort Fighter", "Americas One Hundred Thousand", VIII FC Combat Operations Planning documents sourced from Wright and Eglin type tests for Range, Craven and Cates "Army Air Forces in World War II", to name a few.
I consolidated all the variations for 25,000 feet in my book.
The definition for combat radius was the Range for table conditions for the Type, Internal Fuel and external fuel.
The assumptions to develop the Combat Radius value for specific cruise altitudes included: Full Internal Combat GW plus external fuel per table, Warm up and Take Off in 5 min, Climb to Altitude - Normal Power, Cruise 210 IAS to extreme combat radius, drop tanks (if still attached), Fight for 15 Min at MP/ 5 min at WEP, cruise home with 30 minutes reserve. Cruise at 210mph IAS for 25000 feet. No calculation made for formation assembly, formation flying variances per throttle settings and/or winds aloft. Single airplane with conditions to differentiate from a ferry flight Range.
"I did a fair amount of digging through various references and found generally similar, though not identical, figures. I also noted some apparent typographical errors in some sources. Alas, all of this is on my other computer which I cannot access at present.
"I have a few typos also but the Map and Tables conform in agreement.
33K in the Air said "550-600 miles with 300 gallons external, according to USAAF documents.
Not true for P-47C-2 through P-47D-22 with only 305 gal internal fuel. True for P-47D-25 and newer at 25,000 feet for USAAF VIII FC Operations documents
33K in the Air said "The question is how many 'J' models were on hand at that time.
The P-38's combat radius in Europe will always be contentious due to the difference between 'ideal' and 'practical' considerations. Freeman's Mighty Eighth War Manual notes the radius actually achieved was, due to engine issues and other matters, often quite shorter than what could be theoretically achieved.
As noted above Combat Radius has specific values tabulated for the estimated fuel consumptions for each stage of the defined sortie for each type, for each max Gross Weight combat Load out. If you parse 1000's of Encounter Reports you will note that Victory Credits achieved in ETO by VIII and IX FC escort fighters are at a Range LESS than table values for Combat Radius.
The Tables are for planning purposes only - not absolutes
To answer your question: Both the Lockheed 55 gal LE kits and NAA 85 gal fuselage tank kits began arriving in November 1943. The first modifiedP-51B-1/-5 and C-1 were being delivered to squadrons in January and at squadron level deployment in February for Big Week. Ditto P-38J-10 and early J-15s.
Number wise that would amount to three P-51FG so equipped for Big Week and 2 P-38J equipped FGs. I don't have precise quantities other than the five groups mentioned could dispatch 48 at a time.
There's also the well-known story of how Charles Lindbergh was able to significantly extend the operational radius of P-38s in the Pacific by changing engine management procedures. The way it had been done was not nearly as fuel efficient as it could be."
.VIII Air Technical Services finally implemented Lockheed and Allison SOP for major improvement to operations in Northern Europe. aying attention to detail, the AAF Combat Radius assumptions were based on 210mph IAS (faster than escorted B-17 and B-24s) at 25000 feet. Lindbergh's fuel management in ETO would have been disastrous.
The question is how many P-51s had been so modified in March of 1944.
The aforementioned three (354, 357 and 363 in February before Big Week, plus 4th FG in late February prior to March 6 Berlin, plus 355FG prior to March 9 Berlin. plus partial conversion of 352nd FG in late March.
The Crossover date in which the few P-51 equipped FGs outscored all the 8th and 9th AF P-47 (and all 8th and 9th AF P-38FG) combined on a daily basis was March 18 when the 56th FG had a big day. March also marked the month that LW quit using T/e night fighter in Defense of Reich and pushed day fighter Me 110/410 bases past Munich, Leipzig and Berlin to try to stop the bleeding
33k in the air
Staff Sergeant
- 1,281
- Jan 31, 2021
That was my main point. Radius figures are generally guidelines.
Oh, undoubtedly. Different situations. Just pointing out how various factors can impact combat radius in a given environment.
The only person moaning about its range moans about the weight of a compass. The P-47 wasnt short ranged it just didnt have huge range, its range improved when it was asked to have improved range. In my opinion how things panned out was probably a blessing in disguise.I am not arguing that the P-47 was long range (at least not until the summer of 1944
But harping on it's short range when the allies had few, if any, planes that were much better in 1943 seems a bit of a side show. Better planes were on the way. It took time.
We know the Spitfire was short ranged but the Typhoon wasn't much for range either. 185 US gallons internal wasn't going to do the job for escort work even if the Sabre engine would have worked at 25,000ft.
Deleted member 68059
Staff Sergeant
- 1,058
- Dec 28, 2015
Obviously those 109 P-51s had won air superiority over Europe allowing those 415 P-47s to survive.
In view of the actual statistics on kill ratios, thats an entirely reasonable viewpoint, yes. By 25th Feb,
1 in 6 escorts were Mustangs, but made nearly HALF the kills. Who, placing themselves in the role
of a top USAAF administrator in 1944, and being presented with these figures, would possibly have in good
faith done anything other than phase out the 38 & 47?
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drgondog
Major
A little more 'serious' than a 'general guideline'. As a Planning document validated by flight Testing and extensive documentation to sort out loading conditions, it represents 'exceed at your own risk' when planning an Op. If you look at aforementioned Encounter Reports detailing fights nearing the outer Radii - but not beyond - you rarely see periods of extended MP of more than several minutes, but great comments regarding low fuel upon return..
Further, the escorts, even target escorts were rarely straight line to RV, Straight Line to target, straight line to Break Escort and straight line back to base in clear weather with no headwinds. A Mission Map with Routes and Waypoints were highlighted with red or shaded 'blotches' to warn/and avoid heavy flak concentration. Even missions to Berlin and Beyond frequently tracked inbound over the Baltic over water - meaning the route was greater than a 'radii'.
My father planned and led the last Shuttle Mission 9-18 thru 9-22 and it serves to illustrate the 'unplanned'. First the Penetration Escort was 4th and 357th FG Mustangs with planned RV at Stettin, thence to Warsaw, thence to Piryatin beyond Kiev. Total airmiles in 1350-1400+ mile range. Instructions were to fly directly toward the R/V at Stettin on SOP Cruise settings. Do not use fuselage fuel tank until the external 110s were drained and released. Squadron leaders instructed o direct a flight for interception, and the flight should not pursue fleeing LW. Planned reserve was 35 minutes as Piryatin was located in wheat field fairly close to B-17 location Poltava - but break escort to look for Piraytin was 5o mi away from Polatava and no navigation (other than my father) was available at high level of expertise within the 355th FG for that mission. IIRC he had 12 mission Route maps to address N. Germany/Sweden, Poland N., Poland S. and Ukraine for inbound leg. Same complexities for Ukraine to Italy with Hungary, Bulgaria, Greece and Italy. Then Italy, France and Britain S.
S--t happened. The bombers reported being late as 355th was west of Berlin and he ordered a throttle back to 190mph TAS to conserve fuel. Ten minutes later the 13CBW reported thy were 12 minutes early. My father had to immediately plot (yank the correct two maps) an intercept course over heavy flak concentrations at MP to a new R/V south of Stettin and nw of Warsaw - about the time they dropped external tanks - and switched to fuselage tank. They had three fights Warsaw area- small scale - but fuel burning for 12 pilots dispatched (one from Borax, one from 357 and one from 358 FS. 354 FS remained intact in high escort) during the throttle up and intercept.
My point - by luck or skill they were 10 minutes short of planned landing time at Piryatin, my father landed last to give the rest of the Borax squadron he was leading a chance to get in fast. He had 8 hours log time and 13 gallons of fuel despite perfect weather for last 200 miles. Nobody had more that 13 gallons after landing. That's good for about 10 minutes of searching remaining before Mustangs started crash landing.
The wild card was the high MP run to execute the new intercept.
The total distance travelled was Less than the Planning Combat Radius.
