Training, training, training...
The FAA Corsair pilots were trained by the USN in carrier ops.
I understood it was a regular occurrence that only a portion of a fighter formation would actually open fire in an intercept. There is Malan's rules about teamwork and top cover for systematic reasons why, so those pilots who do not fire are contributing. Beyond that setting up a shot tends to lose you situational awareness, making a good number 2 valuable including while you figure out what to do next. As the formations close the fighter leaders will be moving to set up the best intercept as they see it, which usually seems to leave some pilots without obvious targets, or the same target, then there the faulty estimates of range and speed ruining the chance of a shot, pilots overshooting and losing touch, being in the middle of a fight, where it seems someone is always about to get on your tail or is shooting at you, plus hitting slipstreams and avoiding all the other solid objects in the airspace. And so on.
P-38 was superior to the P-40 in 1941/42. The P-40 was superior in roll and turn but P-38 would always be able to extend if combat scenario not favorable.
If the British FAA never adopted the Corsair they still would have had the Hellcat which was able to deliver the same capabilities as the former. This would make it a "world beater" as far as carrier fighters are concerned.
Why did the Russians like the P-39 so much? This may be the answer to your question.
IMO, no. There are manifold pressure limits shown in the flight manual and vary depending on what turbo (B-13 or B-33) is in the aircraft flown, I believe the P-38H could have either/ or. P-38J and later used the B-33 turbo. The turbos were controlled with the throttles and light illuminated when you were going into over-speed. Late P-38J and P-38Ls had supercharger regulators that prevented over-speed and did not have warning lights.
There were plenty of pilot trainees coming down the pipe when the war started for the US.
Not correct, according to the numbers. The initial success of the A6M0 was more due to surprise than anything else. It did in fact outmaneuver everything else; nobody disputes that. Wildcat pilots were told not to engage a Zero in a dogfight, because they would lose. However, after the Americans had time to analyze the Zero's strengths and weaknesses, they were able to come up with tactics that emphasized the Wildcat's strengths and negated the Zero's advantages. The result was that in the period from May to August, 1942, the Wildcat:Zero kill ratio was slightly better than 1:1, showing that at the very least the Wildcat was just as good as the Zero in head-to-head combat. And by the end of the Guadalcanal campaign the Wildcat:Zero kill ratio was approaching 6:1. So being more maneuverable did not directly translate to being a better airplane to be flying.
I have been led to believe that it was the British who devised the turning approach to a carrier, giving the pilot good visibility right up until the last moment, when he had to trust the LSO. (But didn't trust in the LSO always play a key role?) So, is that not correct? What else are the British credited with that is not necessarily accurate?
This myth is well busted in the book "The Jolly Rogers" by Tom Blackburn. Written by the CO of VF-17, the source doesn't get any better!
US Navy F4Us had been performing that particular turning approach from the very beginning. It was modifications to the landing gear oleos and the addition of a stall strip on starboard wing which really improved the Corsair's ability to safely land on carriers.
Pilots had been using a curved approach to an airfield since WW1.
