Most overrated german plane?

[wuzak]

Yes, the V-1 was inaccurate. But that was partly due to misinformation that the British fed back to the Germans through their double agents.

So the Germans did not have the ability to properly correct course and range of the weapons.

If, as you suggest, they were aimed at the post D-Day landing sites in Normandy they could have seen the fall of the bombs and made corrections.

V-1s could have caused serious disruption in the unloading of soldiers and equipment at the temporary dock facilities if that was their target.

 

[Ivan1GFP]

My friend BMW 801 had terribly bad power to weight ratio. It weighted 1012 kgr and needed c3 fuel tp produced 1700 ps. 70 of those ps were absorbed by it s cooling fan. Even when was cleared for 2000ps after the summer 1944, it still was inferior.

Hello Dedalos,
How much of that 1012 Kg is the actual engine and how much is all the accessories, oil cooler, and cooling fan that are built into the "power egg"? No, the BMW 801 was not a light engine by any means and but wasn't as bad you might believe in the later D-2 versions. For some reason, the Germans never did change the designation even though the engine received quite a few improvements. (It is much like the Me 109G-6 which could describe vastly different aircraft depending on subtype.)

The Cooling Fan actually was much less power hungry than your description might imply.
At low forward speeds, it DID need about 70 PS to power it.
At practical speeds, there was enough air flow coming into the cowl to drive the fan and it drew no power at all from the engine.

For comparisin the Homare 21 produced 2000hp from 810kgr, using inerior 92 octane fuel, and with smaller diameter. The BMW 801 on b4 fuel when used in bombers was just capable for 1560 ps.Above the 6000m the 801 was even worse.

Technically, you are correct. In practical terms, the Ha-45 / Homare series engines had much shorter duration (5 minutes?) for its 2000 HP War Emergency Rating. Depending on the power adder in use, the BMW 801D-2 might have a WEP duration of 5 minutes or "as long as the emergency lasts".
Keep in mind that the durability and reliability of the BMW 801D-2 and Nakajima Homare were no where close.
The Homare / Ha-45 in service was quite unreliable and actual power output was often well below 1500 HP.
The other factor to consider is that although the Homare / Ha-45 was using 91 or 92 octane fuel, it was running Water Methanol injection at anything over cruise settings.
The Japanese didn't just use 91 or 92 octane fuel because they wanted to. It was the best that they had in a useful quantity and they had to use anti-detonant to keep things working.
Just to see how bad this can be, for the Ki 84 with 700 Liters of actual fuel, it also carried 130 Liters of Water Methanol.

The wing was terrible because although it was small, which means high wing loading, had very high drag. The Fw190A9 on 2400ps would barely touch 590km/h at sea level. The sea fury on the same power was over 60 km/h faster , despite the fact that it was a larger aircraft with more wetted area. The Fw 190D9 on 2100ps, and assuming that it was properly built, could just exceed 600kmh/h at sea level. The P51H on the same power was 60-70 km/h faster. The la7 on 250 ps less hp, claimed 620km/h( to be honest i have my doubts about the soviet claiming)

For what it's worth, the Wing profile of the FW 190 series was the same NACA 23000 series that was used on numerous other contemporary fighters. It wasn't a Laminar flow section but it was a pretty good balance between CoL and Drag which is why so many other designs used it.
What is your source for the 590 KPH on 2400 PS. I find this very interesting because the standard 190A-8 was not that much slower (about 570 KPH) on a lot less power. The claim for the Lavochkin La-7 is very suspicious as you have already pointed out, so I don't understand why it is worth quoting.
As for the Sea Fury and P-51H, neither one really made it into the war and both were next generation aircraft.
If you really like going in that direction, you should check out the Supermarine Spiteful / Seafang that wasn't in the war either but was quite a fast propeller driven fighter.

Yes, it had decent rate of roll, but thats a property that requires a well trained pilot, to convert it to desicive advantage in combat.
Finally after , the A5 version, the 190 was simply far too heavy for its size, resuting in bad power and wing loadings

You are possibly the first person I have ever seen who did not regard Roll Rate as important.
Just about every direction change begins with a Roll.
The British tests of Faber's FW 190A against a Spitfire Mk.IX actually concluded that the FW was more maneuverable except for turning circles and the major advantage the FW had was in Roll Rate.
Some of the later Ground Attack versions of the FW 190 were actually fairly high powered and with reduced gun armament were considerably lighter than the normal fighter versions and were quite agile after dropping their ordnance.

- Ivan.

 

[tomo pauk]

Hello Dedalos,
How much of that 1012 Kg is the actual engine and how much is all the accessories, oil cooler, and cooling fan that are built into the "power egg"? No, the BMW 801 was not a light engine by any means and but wasn't as bad you might believe in the later D-2 versions. For some reason, the Germans never did change the designation even though the engine received quite a few improvements. (It is much like the Me 109G-6 which could describe vastly different aircraft depending on subtype.)

The Cooling Fan actually was much less power hungry than your description might imply.
At low forward speeds, it DID need about 70 PS to power it.
At practical speeds, there was enough air flow coming into the cowl to drive the fan and it drew no power at all from the engine.

1012 kg figure does not include oil system, but it does include cooling fan & it's drive. link
The BMW 801 'moved' thrugh almost a whole alphabet - A, B, C, D, E, F, G, J, L, M, N, R, S (some engines were series produced, other remained prototypes, some remained in 'paper' stage).
Cooling fan didn't used 70 PS flat-rated. Eg. at 5.7km, in Notleistung, it used 50 PS on the fully-rated 801D. The lower power setting, the lower power is consumed by the fan. We might recall that there was a bennefit due the tightly cowled engine that used a fan - a lower drag.

 

[Ivan1GFP]

1012 kg figure does not include oil system, but it does include cooling fan & it's drive. link
The BMW 801 'moved' thrugh almost a whole alphabet - A, B, C, D, E, F, G, J, L, M, N, R, S (some engines were series produced, other remained prototypes, some remained in 'paper' stage).
Cooling fan didn't used 70 PS flat-rated. Eg. at 5.7km, in Notleistung, it used 50 PS on the fully-rated 801D. The lower power setting, the lower power is consumed by the fan. We might recall that there was a bennefit due the tightly cowled engine that used a fan - a lower drag.

Hello Tomo Pauk,
Thanks for the link to a most interesting and detailed thread about the BMW 801.
I saw in one of your tables that the output at the propeller increased with forward speed.
Does this power increase reflect ram effect?
My understanding was that the airflow through the cowl opening was enough to drive or unload the fan at some forward speed that was not terribly high. I posted the number from my notes on another thread some time back. I can't seem to find my notes on this at the moment but IIRC, it was only about 170 - 200 MPH or so.


Although there were a lot of variants of the BMW 801 used on other aircraft, from late 1942 to the end of the war (with the exception of the A-9 and D series) the BMW 801D-2 was used. There were general improvements and those inherited from the prototypes that were never mass produced and various power adders, but the designation remained "D-2".

- Ivan.

 

[tomo pauk]

Hello Tomo Pauk,
Thanks for the link to a most interesting and detailed thread about the BMW 801.
I saw in one of your tables that the output at the propeller increased with forward speed.
Does this power increase reflect ram effect?
My understanding was that the airflow through the cowl opening was enough to drive or unload the fan at some forward speed that was not terribly high. I posted the number from my notes on another thread some time back. I can't seem to find my notes on this at the moment but IIRC, it was only about 170 - 200 MPH or so.

Ram effect was certainly present on the BMW 801, despite the narrow layout of ram air intake and the thing where fresh air suffered plenty of 'kicks' during it's path from prop to the start of the intake. Power should get just a bit of increase with ram effect, where most of the gains lay was (or it was supposed to) was rated height. The engine installation with outer ram air intakes were better in this regard, but those wee draggy on the BMW 801S, thus 'killing' the speed under the rated heights vs. the inner intakes.
I don't have exact figures on 'behavior' of the fan during actual flight.

Although there were a lot of variants of the BMW 801 used on other aircraft, from late 1942 to the end of the war (with the exception of the A-9 and D series) the BMW 801D-2 was used. There were general improvements and those inherited from the prototypes that were never mass produced and various power adders, but the designation remained "D-2".

- Ivan.

Germans (RLM?) were against adopting the BMW 801E in production, since it was judged that production lines would've needed many of tooling replaced vs. the 801D. The 801S introduced improvements from the 801S (predominatly supercharger and heads) that were added to the basic 801D, and was serise produced from Autumn of 1944 on.
BMW 801s seldom used 'power adders' in form of MW 50 or GM1, though the GM1 was used on some Ju-88s that have had BMW 801 installed.

 

[pbehn]

Yes, the V-1 was inaccurate. But that was partly due to misinformation that the British fed back to the Germans through their double agents.

So the Germans did not have the ability to properly correct course and range of the weapons.

If, as you suggest, they were aimed at the post D-Day landing sites in Normandy they could have seen the fall of the bombs and made corrections.

V-1s could have caused serious disruption in the unloading of soldiers and equipment at the temporary dock facilities if that was their target.

In the peculiar world of intelligence, the Germans fitted transponders to some V1s which proved they were overshooting, however the Germans believed the "spies" they had on the ground and ignored the findings of the transponders. Perhaps the thought that all their spies were lying was too terrible to contemplate, so they didn't.

 

[taly01]

The number of V1 built is staggering i have seen the figure of 30,000 given, add to that the crews involved in launching them etc and I think it was overrated.

I do know that the V1 tied up a lot of AAA and fighter resources but still I don't think they were *that* useful as they only targeted non-military targets, and no politician is bothered to fight to the last civilian. I say it was another one of those technologies that Nazi Germany fielded before it was really developed like the Komet, Hs293 TV guided missile etc

 

[GrauGeist]

The V-1 is one of the forebearers of today's cruise-missiles (the Kettering Bug is the Great-Grandfather of all) and like many other emerging technologies of WWII, it didn't have a period of maturation where it's accuracy and guidance systems could be perfected.
This works in the favor of the British (and later, Allied troops) who would have suffered far worse had the Germans been able to develop a more accurate aiming system.

 

[swampyankee]

Yes, the V-1 was inaccurate. But that was partly due to misinformation that the British fed back to the Germans through their double agents.

So the Germans did not have the ability to properly correct course and range of the weapons.

If, as you suggest, they were aimed at the post D-Day landing sites in Normandy they could have seen the fall of the bombs and made corrections.

V-1s could have caused serious disruption in the unloading of soldiers and equipment at the temporary dock facilities if that was their target.

So, it's the fault of the British that the V-1 wasn't effective? Gee, talk about blaming the victims.

 

[Shortround6]

targeting London and targeting the Normandy beachheads are rather different things.

A V-1 that misses the Mulberry docks or ships by 100ft or more is going to do relatively little damage. A V-1 that misses the Thames is going to hit something.

The Normandy beachhead/Mulberries were a much smaller target than London and despite being a high concentration of ships had much less density than large parts of London.

How many V-1 hits on actual ships/docks/infrastructure would it have taken to seriously impede the transfer of material/supplies and how many V-1 would it have take to get those hits?

 

[Ivan1GFP]

The number of V1 built is staggering i have seen the figure of 30,000 given, add to that the crews involved in launching them etc and I think it was overrated.

I do know that the V1 tied up a lot of AAA and fighter resources but still I don't think they were *that* useful as they only targeted non-military targets, and no politician is bothered to fight to the last civilian. I say it was another one of those technologies that Nazi Germany fielded before it was really developed like the Komet, Hs293 TV guided missile etc

Hello Taly01,
Of course this is an opinion, but I don't think the V-1 really counts as an overrated aeroplane,
An overrated weapon perhaps, but airplane it is not.
I figure it is best counted as ammunition. After all, missiles ARE ammunition, right?

I also don't believe it was such a bad idea. Most things have room for development and I believe that with a better guidance system, it would have been quite dangerous.

- Ivan.

 

[tomo pauk]

Along with Stuka - I don't think that people were singing praises to the V1. Thus it can hardly be seen as over-rated.

 

[Ivan1GFP]

Along with Stuka - I don't think that people were singing praises to the V1. Thus it can hardly be seen as over-rated.

I suppose that along the same lines, one must ask "Overrated by WHOM?"
Are we discussing an inflated opinion of its worth by the people using it in combat?
Are we discussing some mystical abilities credited to the weapon by those who had to oppose it?
Are we looking at the impact of the aircraft on the course of the war?
Do we adjust this expectation based on the number of aircraft that were actually manufactured or those that were used operationally?
Are we looking at the cost of the program as compared with the results?

The answers are quite different depending on the criteria for evaluation.

- Ivan.

 

[GregP]

I think over-rated, in this context, might be seen to mean: It is "overrated" if the cost to the government in money, people, and resources was "a lot more" than the wartime results would warrant. That is, had they known what the wartime results would eventually be, they would likely not have expended the resources to make it in the first place, or "the cost-to-benefit ratio was too high."

I believe the cost-to-benefit ratio of the V-1 was too high, along with same for the V-2, Me 163, Me 262, Me 264, and at least the Tiger tank. The Germans would have been better off concentrating on the Fw 190 series and making actual improvements to the Bf 109 family than what really happened (V-2, Me163, Me 262, Me 264, Hs 132, Tiger tank, etc.). They literally pissed away major portions of scarce resources on projects that contributed NOTHING to the war effort, and didn't even seem to THINK about logistics on the Russian Front and other places. They also never had strategic bombing airframes at all. The closest they came was the Me 264 and He 277, and they dropped Me 264 after making viable airframes. Had they built the He 277 instead of the He 177, they might again have had a viable strategic bomber.

Something always seemed to make them turn away from the path that would have helped make a difference to the outcome of the war. I really wonder if we know the full story, or if they were massively infiltrated by people chosen to bring Hitler down by getting close and offering very bad advice. Wildly successful infiltrators that are not uncovered during the operation are very rarely exposed after the fact, at least by competent agencies.

 

[tomo pauk]

I suppose that along the same lines, one must ask "Overrated by WHOM?"
Are we discussing an inflated opinion of its worth by the people using it in combat?
Are we discussing some mystical abilities credited to the weapon by those who had to oppose it?
Are we looking at the impact of the aircraft on the course of the war?
Do we adjust this expectation based on the number of aircraft that were actually manufactured or those that were used operationally?
Are we looking at the cost of the program as compared with the results?

The answers are quite different depending on the criteria for evaluation.

- Ivan.

I think about being overrated as "having a higher opinion of (someone or something) than is deserved". Granted, 'by whom' is an important qualifier, in my opinion that would mean the sources or 'sources' of information that is supposed to be widely available to the wide audience. (professionals are supposed to have a more level opinion about the gear they used or tested) Talk about books that try to appeal to anyone, magazines and other newspapers, and today it is much more about the 'net and it's consumers. So we have people talking about Hellcat all but winning the Pacific war just by itself, people lying about Ta 152 G limit and such, Il-2 and Hs 129 destroying whole tank divisions, XP-39 making 400 mph, 5 Shermans = 1 Tiger etc - even today after 75+ years worth of reserach (and 'research').

 

[Ivan1GFP]

I think over-rated, in this context, might be seen to mean: It is "overrated" if the cost to the government in money, people, and resources was "a lot more" than the wartime results would warrant. That is, had they known what the wartime results would eventually be, they would likely not have expended the resources to make it in the first place, or "the cost-to-benefit ratio was too high."

Hello GregP,
Cost is a subjective thing. Perhaps opportunity cost is a better consideration here.
If you were the leader of a Germany being bombed night and day and pressed on multiple fronts, then what use is it to save money when it will be worthless in a couple years? Spend it now while you still have a chance.
Perhaps the Allies had a more clear vision of when the war was going to end, but from the German side, I don't see how they could have determined the time even if the outcome was not in doubt.
As for programs that were going to pay off during the war, if we use the same evaluation for Allied Programs, then the Atomic Bomb was pretty worthless as were Allied Jets. That assumes accurate predictions of the duration of the war though.
The Germans had already made that mistake earlier in not designing a worthy successor to the Me 109 and FW 190 series on the expectation that they would not need them. They got lucky in that the 190D turned out as well as it did and gave them a viable fighter to the end of the war.

I believe the cost-to-benefit ratio of the V-1 was too high, along with same for the V-2, Me 163, Me 262, Me 264, and at least the Tiger tank. The Germans would have been better off concentrating on the Fw 190 series and making actual improvements to the Bf 109 family than what really happened (V-2, Me163, Me 262, Me 264, Hs 132, Tiger tank, etc.). They literally pissed away major portions of scarce resources on projects that contributed NOTHING to the war effort, and didn't even seem to THINK about logistics on the Russian Front and other places. They also never had strategic bombing airframes at all. The closest they came was the Me 264 and He 277, and they dropped Me 264 after making viable airframes. Had they built the He 277 instead of the He 177, they might again have had a viable strategic bomber.

While I am in agreement with most of your selections, I believe the Me 262 had merit as did the Tiger tank. Without the Me 262, there were no next generation fighters. I believe the Me 109 series was at the limit of its development with the K series and the FW 190 was getting pretty close to its limit as well and there wasn't much after that until you got to the Me 262. The "fighter rationalization" selection of the 190D, I believe was a recognition of the immediate needs you are describing but one has to wonder how long the stretched 190 was going to work if the war went several more years.
As for the Tiger, I don't see why it was such a bad idea. The Panther was certainly a better tank all around when things were finally sorted out, but it also came later than the Tiger and the next step down would have been Panzer IV and Panzer III, both of which were at the limits of their designs and not superior to their competition. The Panther also had much weaker armour anywhere but from the front.
I don't believe the Germans felt they needed a strategic bomber force for the kind of war they were expecting to fight. The Soviets also did not develop a strategic bomber force or much of anything other than short ranged tactical and ground support aircraft at the time.

Something always seemed to make them turn away from the path that would have helped make a difference to the outcome of the war. I really wonder if we know the full story, or if they were massively infiltrated by people chosen to bring Hitler down by getting close and offering very bad advice. Wildly successful infiltrators that are not uncovered during the operation are very rarely exposed after the fact, at least by competent agencies.

There is a very interesting book called "The German Generals Talk" by a fellow named Blumentritt. In it he gives reasons for the many poor decisions that were made by those in command. My take from this book was that for the most part, although the highest ranking officers in the German military were about the same age as those of other nations, they did not have the same experience in command as their Allied equivalents. Taking Goering and Udet as examples: was there anything in their background that would have given them the necessary experience to direct the creation, organization and operation of an entire Air Force? Both were certainly good pilots, but prior military experience as a Squadron Command is hardly enough. Same applies to the old friends brought in by Goering.
No need at all to feed a person bad advice when he is so inexperienced that he cannot make good decisions.

- Ivan.

 

[Shortround6]

The Tiger I wasn't really a bad idea. It was never intended as a general issue tank. They did tend to over complicate it but the British, French, Russian and American Armies were all fooling around with large, heavy special purpose tanks at about the same time (or within a few years) and the Tiger was one of the better Heavy tanks of the war as just about all of them suffered from mobility problems of several kinds, short range and difficulty being recovered. This is very general as I am comparing/including the French Char B1 and Russian KV (and predecessors) through to the American M-26. so there is a 5 year or more span for things to ebb and flow a bit.
The Panther was a more literal replacement for the MK III and MK IV and as such was perhaps too big and expensive?
The Tiger II was a different story, using the same engine as the 45-56 ton tanks in a 75 ton tank is a breakdown waiting to happen with very little patience.

The Germans did have a strategic bomber. It just wasn't 4 engine and was bit dated. The He 111 was ever bit a strategic bomber as the Wellington except the the Germans only grudgeling improved it during/after the BoB as they waited for the next Vundar bomber (and waited..........and waited...........and waited.......and.......) .
The British built over 3800 Wellingtons with 1675hp Hercules engines. He 111s with high powered engines were built in handfuls by comparison.

 

[parsifal]

Tiger was unquestionably a backward step for the resilience of german armoured formations. Whilst individually these vehicles were peerless engineering marvels, well protected and requiring an inordinate expenditure of resources to deal with the, their individual unit costs, on a real basis, was such that they contributed to the dilution of strength for each of the panzer formations. Tiger was never an easy tank to build, never an easy tank to use and limited in several areas (notably range and mobility) that damned it to mediocrity throughout its career.

Cost is the first demerit of the tank. There will always be massive disagreements as to the final unit cost of the tiger. Suffice it to say it was exorbitant. Massively so….some sources suggest that at least 30 T-34s could be had for the same cost as a single Tiger I. Tigers are known to have an exchange rate of about 10:1 in battle, but those odds shortened considerably if total losses are compared. Many tigers were lost to mechanical breakdowns running out of fuel as the hordes of T-3s simply bypassed them.

The second limitation affecting the Tiger was its very limited range….may 87 miles maximum. As suggested above, this led to many tigers simply being abandoned after running out of fuel and severely limited the type in any offensive roles

The third constraint affecting the type was its distinct lack of mobility. It had difficulty crossing may bridges, it suffered heavy losses in boggy terrain, it was never great in rough terrain

Other adverse issues was its slow turret traverse

The tiger was probably one of the best heavy tanks of the war, but was not suited to the impoverished german Army 1942-45. There were definite penalties to numbers as a result of the tigers introduction. Moreover, whilst everyone was toying with the concept of a super heavy tank they fell out of favour after the war almost immediately in favour of the "main battle tank" which favoured an all round compromise between the often competing demands of protection, firepower and mobility. Whilst heavy tanks might concentrate on one or two of these facets at the expense of the other(s), this was found to be less than ideal after the war. Tiger was no exception to that.

 

[GrauGeist]

Let's stop and think for a moment, about how big of a waste Germany's next generation of fighters, bombers and tank, etc. would have been *IF* they had the industrial base, raw materials, resources AND weren't being bombed day and night.

I see a great deal of speculation about how their rockets and jets were a waste and how they should have stuck to five or six year old fighters to defend their nation instead of looking for alternatives.

Sorry, but that's bullsh*t. They were involved in a total war and in such a situation, you use whatever means you have on hand to try and defeat the enemy.

The U.S. had jets, the U.S. had television-controlled drones, the U.S. had dozens of one-off prototype fighters and such, yet I don't see anybody stating that the U.S. was "wasting resources" on these projects.

Germany had Jets, the U.S. had Jets, Britain had Jets, Japan had Jets - so out of all these, only Germany was wasting resources?
Germany flew the first jet-powered aircraft. Germany had the world's first combat jet. Germany was the only one who actually fielded jets in battle.
So in retrospect, had the German high command dedicated their resources when the jet program was first proposed to them in the late 30's, they would have had a fighter, a heavy fighter, a bomber and a dive-bomber at their disposal while they still held European proper.

The only thing wasted, was an opportunity.

 

[parsifal]

The new technologies were a waste an it is not bullsh*t to condemn them for it. The new technologies were years away from coming to fruition and would have suffered massive delays and poor serviceability rates as indeed they did historically as the inevitable kinks were ironed out. these 'kinks" extended to the poor rates of output at least in AFV production

the crisis which germany faced after her defeat in front of Moscow and a little later in the Caucasus at the time of halders dismissal was immediate and serious , hitler is documented as acknowledging this, and if had at least a dim idea of the crisis, so much moreso should have the rest of the Nazi leadership. but all of them allowed their arrogance to cloud their judgement. the sad thing is that in 1941 total defeat for germany was still possible to avoid total defeat. There was still time to snatch a draw from total defeat but some reality needed to be fed into the German perspective. nowhere was this more true than in the choices in force structure .

militarily, in thumbnail, before Moscow, the germans needed to pull up for winter. they needed to prepare for the coming winter. They needed to give ground whilst they still possessed the mobility to do so.

In 1942, about the last thing they needed was another poorly thought out offensive fought with inadequate resources, perhaps some spoiling attacks, whilst defensive lines and adequate reserves and stockpiles were built up. above all else, the adoption of a static line would have allowed the germans the opportunity to somewhat normalise their logistics. had the germans concentrated all their efforts on existing technologies, the densities of materiel at the front would have been far greater then they were historically, whereas Russian advantages would have continued to suffer acute problems with experience. manpower, drained at the rate of 40000 per week with a replacement rate of 10000 per week, whilst ever germany opted for expensive offensives would have stabilised as well. A dug in, well supplied, rested, well equipped with normalised manning levels, could easily have blunted the soviet counteroffensive, and stood a good chance of forcing the Russians to the peace table, at least for a while . without Russia, the germans stood a reasonable chance of blunting the allied offensives as well, especially if the shattered Italians could be rebuilt.

its a long shot. im the first to acknowledge that. But shooting for the impossible, including re-equipment with untied and problematic new technologies was about the worst choice they could have made. other nations, like the Russians realised that in 1942 and made do with "stretching" existing hardware. both the british and US were similar. US procurement was particualalry mindful of the need for standardisation