Myth of Combat Aircraft destroying tanks

[Njaco]

Rudel's claims will always be suspect and discussed just as any other ace will be. You will find overclaiming at almost every aspect , incident and time during the war. Its common.

The thing I'm trying to figure out is this: is the premise of this thread such that FBs had almost no part in securing the Allies a victory? It just seems to me that someone is saying "Nope, never happened, just a myth", regarding the part played by FBs.

Was not the Falaise Pocket - regardless of the actual count - won by the attacking FBs? Was not the Bulge won by the Allies once the weather cleared, because FBs disrupted supply?

 

[michaelmaltby]

"... Was not the Falaise Pocket - regardless of the actual count - won by the attacking FBs? Was not the Bulge won by the Allies once the weather cleared, because FBs disrupted supply?"

Yes. In both cases the constant presence of the "Jabos" was totally demoralizing. Flaming tanker trucks, wrecked vehicles, dead horses everywhere. The stench was terrible.

And whether or not RAF Hurricanes killed Rommel's tanks - they made dam sure his troops didn't get any water.

MM

 

[Gixxerman]

In 'Spearhead For Blitzkrieg' (based on the US Historical Research Division's report post-war) an analysis of what actually happened to inform US tactics etc for any new conflict - in particular looking at the German experience fighting the Russians; they say that over-claiming by Allied aircrews in the Battle of the Falaise Gap and 'The Bulge' in 1944 were exaggerated by more than 10 - 1.
This was based on examining the wrecks.
They say that the bombs and rockets used by the Allied fighter-bombers were powerful enough to destroy tanks, if they hit them, but that in truth these weapons were not accurate enough to score many hits.
They conclude that (without information to the contrary on the Eastern Front) German claims also probably suffered a similar degree of over-claiming.

 

[parsifal]

Its absolutely true that very few tanks were destroyed outright by aircraft attacks. Its also true that aircraft attacks did not destroy much in the way of soft skinned vehicles, though some of the accounts of units like Lehr panzer Division in its advance to normandy suggests otherwise.

It should also be added that very few personnel casualties can be attributed to airpower.

And it can even be claimed that the numbers of ships, and shipping, lost to airpower was relatively modest, compared to the losses from other sources, like U-Boats. For the RN, the majority of its losses were at the hands of U-Boats, and surface units, rather than by enemy aircraft.

Postwar studies show that during the war, a maximum of approximately 5% of casualties can be attributed to direct airstrikes. the overwhelming killer in land battles was, and remains traditional tube artillery. During WWII it has been estimated that more than 60% of casualties and losses were attributed to the artillery arm.

Interestingly, the same can be said about tanks as can be said about aircraft....less than 5% of losses to an enemy force can be attributed to tanks, and tanks cannot hold ground, and are pretty hopeless in built up areas to boot. Tanks dont even do the majority of the killing of enemy tanks....that remains the preserve of the lowly Infantry formations and their anti-tanks defences. In 1944, for example, the russians lost 19000 tanks, of which 13000 are believed to have fallen victime to to Infantry formations.

So does that mean, by extension that modern armies can enter battles, with the hope of victory, with just artillery, or just Infantry???? Not a chance. Tanks, aircraft, radios, and a whole bunch or supposedly useless pieces of hardware are critical to success on the battlefieldbecause they are what are known as force multipliers......they make the job for the Infantry and the Artillery much easier, and less costly.


The impact of airpower in the 1944 battles was not so much to kill enemy units, rather firstly to deny airspace to the enemy, and therby deny them the ability to recoinaiter and undertake counterstrike operations. Secondly airpower acted to deny mobility to the enemy, to pin them and prevent them from applying sufficient force at the maximum concentration to achieve the objectives that were needed. In this role they were critical, particulalry for the allies, who would have been unable to achieve victory at normandy without the benefit of airpower.

 

[michaelmaltby]

In fairness, Parsifal, there are air-only operations that were both cost-effective (in terms of losses) and full of shock-and-awe. I'm thinking Pearl Harbor, Toranto, the sinking of Repulse and Prince of Wales, etc.

These could only have been done, the way they were done, and they were deadly.

Chairs,

MM

 

[parsifal]

Yes, I agree, but these operations were not the bread and butter of naval actions. The war at sea was not won by a single battle, although some, like Taranto and Midway come close to that mantra. Far more damage was done, against the japanese (for example) by the tireless small scale operations in places like the solomons, and of course by the USNs submarines, than was ever done by the fast carrier forces. Does that make the fast carriers unnecessary. no way....

 

[buffnut453]

Parsifal,

I agree with much of what you say but war is more complex that simple attrition. For example, an air strike may delay the advance of reinforcements whose presence on the battlefield would swing the battle in favour of the adversary. Thus hard figures about outright destruction are often misleading in terms of the impact of air power on a battle or campaign.

Cheers,
Mark

 

[The Basket]

From what Ive read...a tank can be repaired or refurbished. Even if damaged and with dead crew.

So a tank loss maybe is a tank that cannot be towed back to be fixed...due to the enemy having control of the battlefield.

 

[riacrato]

critical thinking,

Nice post, good job putting down the sources.

Question to you: You mentioned the 37mm armed Ju 87 G. There is some good footage available of this weapon being employed against soviet tanks: It was surprising for me to see how accurate the system was, there were almost no misses. Though the footage might be hand-picked of course.
Nevertheless it is very hard to say if the tank attacked was really knocked out, or if the shot penetrated at all. I have seen sources saying the gun could NOT penetrate T-34 frontal or side hull armor and thus, the claims by Ju 87 G units were probably also extremely exaggerated.
With regards to Normandy: I have a book that claims P-47 units would fire against the concrete ground surrounding tanks and eventually the bullets would ricochet from the ground and penetrate the "soft belly" of the Tigers and Panthers... So yeah there's a lot of myths about this in popular literature.

 

[JoeB]

critical thinking,

Excellent posts. One reason for the heavy overclaiming was probably that any disabled vehicle would have been attacked again and again by subsequent ground attack aircraft. I believe that this was found to be the case in Korea, where similar overclaiming occurred.

In surveys after the initial phase of the Korea War, ie after the North Koreans had been been defeated, before the Chinese entered, tanks were relatively seldom used by the Communists after that, 102 tanks were credited to a/c by USAF wreck survey teams. Claims of tanks destroyed by a/c in the same period have been given as 1,134 (Simon Dunston, Armour in Korea), but both the destroyed tank total and claims could be re-examined. Anyway the general situation of claiming accuracy was similar to WWII, and not comparable to aerial claim accuracy (captured NK reports show the much smaller US claims against NK Yak-9/11's and Il-10's in the opening weeks of the war were largely accurate).

However also similar to WWII, once large scale UN air operations really got going, and found periods of favorable weather (the war opened in the rainy season in Korea) around the second week of July 1950, it became increasingly difficult for NK tanks to travel or operate in any numbers in daylight. Also, NK prisoners from the armored units testified that soft skin support vehicles for the tank units (maintenance, fuel trucks etc, even besides general motor transport) were quickly destroyed in that period. Thereafter the NK armored force had a much smaller effect on the war, in contrast to its very significant effect from June 25 to around July 10.

In terms of accounts that are slanted in favor of a particular type of weapon, the slant in Korean War accounts tends to be that the appearance of UN medium tanks from late July neutralized the T-34 threat. It had really been greatly reduced already by UN air power. Just because the actual numbers of tanks destroyed claimed by a/c were greatly exaggerated doesn't mean that's not true: two different things. Likewise the often emphasized introduction of the 3.5" bazooka around July 20 did result in kills of T-34's and helped reduce the psychological impact of NK armor superiority among infantry. But again the NK tank ops seen in the major Battle of Taejon, where 3.5" was first used, and where US still didn't employ medium tanks, were smaller scale and more circumspect than earlier NK tank ops...because of relentless air attacks against any significant concentration of T-34's spotted in daylight, and compromised logistical support from destruction of so many NK trucks. That battle was won by NK infantry, and all later NK successes, on and off through September, were mainly due to their infantry.

Joe

 

[renrich]

I think Michael Maltby put his finger on it. Those Jabos in the Falaise Pocket were pure hell on the horses. Probably the fact is that the Jabos were pretty effective against trucks and lightly armored vehicles and the carcasses of the vehicles(not the horses) were an impediment to the movement of tanks on the roads, especially if the going off road was bad.

This thread reminds me that we, all of whom have strong interest in airplanes, argue and discuss ad nauseum over fighter aircraft and which one was the best at knocking down bombers or which is best at protecting bombers and so forth and so on. Actually most of the reason for having fighters is to protect one's bombers or to shoot down the other guy's bombers. But guess what? If the stats show in the ETO what they show by the USN in the PTO, the lowly gun, the Triple A, the gun on the ground which has been around for around 1000 years shot down a lot more bombers and fighters than those fancy modern fighters that first begin to evolve in 1903. My guess is that the gun on the ground or in another vehicle destroyed a heckuva lot more tanks than the fancy and fabled fighter bomber also.

 

[steve51]

JoeB,

Informative post. There seems to be no doubt that, once established, UN air operations virtually precluded Communist movement during the day. Also, vehicle loss at night to B-26 aircraft was not insignificant. At least during the Korean War, ground attack was very effective and needed.

 

[parsifal]

Over claims aren't deliberate, well not usually, but also, arguing that airpower was not effective is also oversimplifying the equation. Neither is the claim that the 17pdr was the most effective tank killer. Airpower was still probably the most effective tank killer, but not directly. Look at how many tanks, particularly in Normandy and northern France were abandoned due to breakdowns or fuel shortages and a lesser number where the crews were killed or injured due to concussion effects from various sources. its a lot....more than 50% of overall losses in fact.

One should also consider the effects of pinning and loss of mobility that an intensive application of airpower acting as a constant umbrella over a battlefield can bring. These conferred significant benefits on the side being supported .

 

[GregP]

Halting a tank may or may not be destroying it, but will ALWAYS result in a claim.

If you STOP one and it doesn't move again while you are around, what ELSE aree you supposed to assume?

That you missed? After it was immobile, was it effective? If it WAS, it was moving and/or shooting. Stationay targets are just that, targets. It it doesn't shoot anything because it is playing "dead," then it is effectively dead, at least until it is mobile and functional again.

 

[Shortround6]

A number of ground combat units learned to their cost that a tank wasn't "dead" unless you saw the crew bail out or it was on fire. Too many tanks came "back to life" and killed their unit members to assume otherwise. This lead to the practice of firing follow up shots into an already hit tank until one of those two results was achieved.

 

[thedab]

what I can find so far of RN ships lost in ww2 is 61 to surface ships,56 to subs,77 to aircraft,and 54 to mines
of those lost to surface ships,only 9 was lost to gunfire.

this is something i'm now looking in to.

 

[Glider]

That sort of number (9 for gunfire) wouldn't be unexpected.The Germans and Italians didn't sink much, subs and aircraft did a lot of damage, and after some initial success the Japanese didn't do that much damage.
Whats interesting is how much damage was done by the RN to the Axis forces.

 

[thedab]

That sort of number (9 for gunfire) wouldn't be unexpected.The Germans and Italians didn't sink much, subs and aircraft did a lot of damage, and after some initial success the Japanese didn't do that much damage.
Whats interesting is how much damage was done by the RN to the Axis forces.

that don't include the small stuff,i.e.MBT

 

[Glider]

Of course not but even here RN MTB?MGB losses to gunfire were not huge, compared to what they sank.

 

[stona]

The type of vessel sunk by air attack is important. For example 55 of the 77 Royal Naval vessels that succumbed to air attack were destroyers, another dozen were cruisers, throw in a few submarines etc and only one carrier and two capital ships succumbed to air attack. Their sinking, or sinkings like them, were such a rare occurrence that I bet most members here could name those three ships, the only three major units sunk from the air during the entire war, off the top of their heads.
As early as a February 1941 report the RN had established that destroyers and "trawlers/auxiliaries" were the two classes most vulnerable to air attack. In that report a successful attack was gauged as one during which the ships were hit, not necessarily sunk.
Submarines were more deadly to large ships. Someone once said that the best way to sink a ship was to let water in. Torpedoes were better than bombs for this and, generally, submarines could deliver them better than aircraft. Bombs are MUCH cheaper and more readily available, this too had an effect on how aircraft were armed in an anti shipping role.
Statistics always need context.
Cheers
Steve