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In some ways similar to our own navy before NATOPS. Every squadron and every air group had their own tactics, procedures, and communications protocols, which had to be learned and relearned with every transfer. But at least in USN, these transfers were frequent enough to engender a certain amount of mental flexibility. Not so in the Japanese system, where crewmembers tended to stay with the same ship/air wing/squadron indefinitely. Given the lack of electronic communication, and the use of signals, being on the same page would be crucial to tactical success.It's unbelievable to me how they would leave their most modern carrier (close enough) and Shokaku's planes and veteran crews behind because the they never trained together.
Well, they were only up against two American carriers, weren't they? And not very competent ones either, right? Four vs two, that oughta do!It may have been "victory disease" or a monumental case of chutzpah in thinking THEY DIDN'T EVEN NEED Carrier Division 5.
I know, right?Well, they were only up against two American carriers, weren't they? And not very competent ones either, right? Four vs two, that oughta do!
The sides blowing out of HIJMS Shokaku and Zuikaku were probably design flaws as the IJN built armored hangars. The unarmored American hangars with a wooden flight deck on top could be easily opened up and ventilate or ditch munitions quickly when there are fumes or smoke.Possibly the "weakness" of Shokaku and Zuikaku saved them as their sides blew out when hit (a "flaw" that also apparently saved US carriers from fatal damage), Akagi and Kaga (based off British Battlecruisers) died very easily. But i'm way beyond my knowledge here
P.S. fun fact, the picture of late war Japanese graveyard planes above, probably post surrender pile ups, contains many 13.2mm nose gun Zero's (larger vertical ejection port vs more horizontal small ejection port for 7.7mm). (fun fact #2, Zero changed from 0.30" to 0.50" almost same time as Spifire did mid'44!)
Purely from a war nerd viewpoint its disappointing the original 6 fleet IJN carriers didn't get to fight together again.
Every naval battle since time immemorial has been a battle of the damage control parties. Not as glamorous as battering rams, 32 pounder cannons, and dive bombers, but frequently the decisive element.Hmmm. This just occurred to me. Could The Battle of Midway have been the battle of the damage control parties?
Sun Tzu say: "Half-assed leader bring half-assed force to battle, get full-ass kicking!"I know, right?
Isn't it basic War 101 to be there the firstest with the mostest? You know, shock and awe?
Ya got that right.Every naval battle since time immemorial has been a battle of the damage control parties. Not as glamorous as battering rams, 32 pounder cannons, and dive bombers, but frequently the decisive element.
Agreed. The IJN should have waited to begin their Midway plan until all six were ready. Shōkaku was repaired and returned to service July 14, 1942. Zuikaku was undamaged and just needed to replenish its CAG. For god sake's Yamamoto, just wait six weeks.Purely from a war nerd viewpoint its disappointing the original 6 fleet IJN carriers didn't get to fight together again.
Well, they were only up against two American carriers, weren't they? And not very competent ones either, right? Four vs two, that oughta do!
Thank you jetcal1. I have always been of the opinion USN damage control has been the major "trick up its sleeve" against all comers. It's why U.S.S. Yorktown CV-5, won the Battle of Midway. Yes, I said it!
It's one of the many reasons why I hold U.S.S. Yorktown with the same regard as H.M.S. Warspite does for our "cousins". Captain Buckmaster, as the story goes, listened to one of his ratings about damage control equipment. The fog nozzle was developed (I don't know how true that is). I have read the Captain was instrumental in damage control procedures, such as emptying fuel lines and filling them with co2.
Yorktown took part in various early raids and her crews were definitely the first team. She struck the enemy and was struck. Her crew got her going and absorbed the second attack sparing U.S.S. Enterprise and U.S.S. Hornet. And then she struck again. Her planes with the the Enterprise groups. This was the catastrophe of leaving Zuikaku at home for the IJN.
Hmmm. This just occurred to me. Could The Battle of Midway have been the battle of the damage control parties?
Yup. Read that too. Exercise in collective self delusion.According to Shattered Sword they kept losing so the umpires got involved to make Admiral Yamato happy.
Can you elaborate on what the "American" side was doing that was rejected? Was it close to what the USN actually did?According to Shattered Sword they kept losing so the umpires got involved to make Admiral Yamato happy.
In one gaming session, it was just about the exact same tactics that the Americans actually used, less one American flattop.Can you elaborate on what the "American" side was doing that was rejected? Was it close to what the USN actually did?
Can you elaborate on what the "American" side was doing that was rejected? Was it close to what the USN actually did?
And in more than one case the "American" forces sortied from Pearl Harbor sooner than decreed by Yamamoto's timeline.In one gaming session, it was just about the exact same tactics that the Americans actually used, less one American flattop.
We abhor uncertainties, haven't the patience for halfway measures, and are addicted to extremes, it seems. AND PROUD OF IT!
Here's how the RAF linies (ground personnel) left their Buffalos. Stripped of everything to keep others in the air.
Well, at Coral Sea and Midway our DC performed better than the Japanese.We probably weren't significantly different from any other Navy until after the battle for the Solomons. We learned a lot off of Guadalcanal.