Operation Bodenplatte: how would you do it?

[TheMustangRider]

As already pointed out, it would had been wise to inform the AAA crews.

 

[SoD Stitch]

i would as everyone tell the AA to not shoot the heck out of them and maybe get a group of 262 fighter bombers and then take out aircraft on the ground

The 262 was not a very good a/c for attacking ground targets; it was much too fast to make an accurate strafing attack, and if the 262 slowed down to make aiming easier, it became prey to AAA and defending fighters. It also was more prone to FOD at lower altitudes, much more so than the prop jobs. I would keep the 262's up high, either defending the ground attack a/c, or going after the strategic bombers, and let the 190 A-8's bomb strafe the Allied airbases.

 

[Colin1]

The 262 was not a very good a/c for attacking ground targets... ...I would keep the 262's up high, either defending the ground attack a/c...

I can only find two reports of encounters with Me262s
One passed in front of a flight of Canadian Spitfires in the Lingen area as it headed east from their position for Wessel at about 1800ft. One of the Canadians got in behind it and scored a hit on its tail. He followed it into cloud and lost it but found an Fw190 - head-on; it too disappeared.

The second found another flight of Canadians and came at their Spitfires head-on. It fired, everyone fired back and although no-one saw any strikes, as the Me262 went past it began to stream smoke. The Canadians turned and went hard after it but the jet still easily outpaced their Spitfires and made off.

The Canadians reported this one as 'definite American markings on its sides with crosses on wings and swastika, in the American style'.

I've no idea how to interpret that other than the jet was, for whatever reason, wearing American markings; as for crosses and swastika being 'in the American style' I wasn't aware the Americans had a style for crosses and swastika.

 

[Erich]

you guys need a copy of Hikkoi pubs Bodenplatte by R. Putz and J. Manhro for the true story behind the whole vent on 1-1-45. It is the ultimate book on the tragedy

 

[Erich]

back to KG 51 had 24 Me 262's serviceable while only 3 flew on this op. no losses reported by KG 51. their actions were worthless to the cause of the JG's.

reality checek :

271 Bf 109/Fw 190's lost
65 Bf 109/Fw 190s damaged

9 Ju 88 nf's lost
4 Ju 88 nf's damaged

143 pilots KIA or MIA
70 pilots taken as POW
21 pilots wounded

allied losses in total

232 destroyed and 156 damaged. 15 Allied a/c were shot down in aerial combat, while 10 others were damaged as a result of aerial engagement.

 

[HoHun]

Hi Njaco,

>I'm reading "To Win the Winter Sky" and it states that by the time of Wacht Am Rhein, Galland's plan was changed by Dietrich Peltz who was placed in command of fighter operations.

Hm, very telling bit of information. Peltz was a bomber general, and Bodenplatte is an expression of the kind of static offensive approach that was typical for the Luftwaffe's bomber arm (as well as for Hitler). Destruction of an enemy air force in the ground had been successful early in the war - extremely successful against the Soviet Union -, but in a 1944 context, the attrition aspects of such an attack should have been expected to be rather unfavourable. A fighter general probably would have understood this more easily than a bomber general ... but of course Hitler would not have understood, and so this might not have made much of a difference.

Thanks for pointing out Peltz' role - I hadn't been aware of that!

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[tomo pauk]

So this may be a key point perhaps: the destruction og the planes on the ground is much more painfull at the begining of a war then it is at war's full swing, since at the begining the production is at pretty low level.

 

[model299]

The Germans did not have a lot of Me-262's, due to the fact that Hitler wanted them converted to fighter bombers. The 262's would be better off going after the bombers, and not to get into a dogfight with their more maneuverable adversarys.

It would seem to me that converting the 262s to fighter bombers wasn't the problem with the Schwalbs, (I mean, after all, what does it take to slap a couple of hard points under the wings?) it was the reliability problems (AND availability problems.) with the engines due to the fact that Germany didn't have access to decent metals toward the end of the war.

I also think that this was a fool's errand at this point of the conflict.

 

[Colin1]

Galland's original proposal was to attack bomber streams en masse, not necessarily airfields. It was changed by Peltz

Njaco
I'm not sure it was changed by Peltz per se
I get the impression it was changed by circumstances.

On 16Dec44 the Germans struck through the Ardennes, Montgomery had actually planned a thrust of his own but von Rundstedt simply beat him to it. On the first day of the German offensive, the Luftwaffe put up over 500 a/c but momentum was lost when the weather clamped down.
On 23Dec44 the weather changed allowing 2 TAF to support the Americans (who were taking the brunt of the thrust) denying the Germans Malmedy and Bastogne and leaving them only St Vith as an MSR. The German advance faltered and stopped.

The Luftwaffe High Command, in conjunction with planning for the Ardennes, had been carefully husbanding their fighter strength. Goring had devised a plan to hit Allied air forces with 'one mighty blow', this scheduled for as early as Oct44. It was to comprise at least 2,000 fighters and would have been the largest air battle of the war.
Galland had the entire fighter arm in the west ready for action by Nov44, a total of 3,000 fighters; all they needed was suitable weather in which to unleash them.

It was as a result of the faltering of the Ardennes offensive that things began to unravel. The fighter reserve was called into action to restart the German momentum. Galland's hand was forced by the situation but he nonetheless left 2 fighter groups in Germany when ordered to send his force west in Dec44.
Directly due to the fighting before, during and immediately after Christmas 44 the fighter strength was eroded, a/c were lost, unserviceability of a/c rose and the fighting potential of Galland's reserve was watered down considerably.

One such incident:

About two weeks before the end of 1944 the Luftwaffe launched a fighter sweep over our forward airfields but unfortunately for them nearly all the squadrons on those airfields had just got airborne and one of my squadrons was on its way back from a visit to Osnabruck. The Hun caught a real packet including those who fled, running into the returning Tempests. 122 Wing had a tally of eleven that day, with other wings also scoring highly.

Wing Commander J B Wray OC 122 Wing

To continue support for the Ardennes offensive, another plan was drawn up. The remaining fighter strength was gathered for an attack on Allied air forces in Belgium and Holland. The task of planning the assault was handed to GeneralMajor Dietrich Peltz, commander of II Jagdkorps.

Peltz was 30 years old, holder of the Knight's Cross with Oak Leaves and Swords. He began his flying career as a Stuka pilot in Poland and France and on Ju88s against England and the Soviet Union. He was an outstanding leader, his ability gaining him high rank and experience in every German theatre of operations. He had successfully attacked Allied air power before - on the ground. He was now asked to repeat this success, on their home airfields.

He outlined his plan to his air commanders and Geschwaderkommodeuren of all western-based JGs on 15Dec44 in Altenkirchen, the plan comprised 10 major JGs attacking 16 Allied airfields in Belgium and Holland and a base in France, at Metz.

3 codewords were assigned under Bodenplatte
i. Varus - followed by a number, would confirm the operation was to go ahead, along with the date
ii. Teutonicus - would confirm the first signal and give permission to brief all pilots
iii. Hermann - would give the actual time of attack

10 days later, as the weather turned, so did the Americans luck, the 8th AF re-opened operations, forcing the Luftwaffe's hand in defence. In Dec44, the Luftwaffe lost 535 pilots killed, missing or taken prisoner with nearly 200 more wounded.
The loss of a/c was a disaster for Bodenplatte and some of the German leaders were convinced it was enough to cancel the operation. On 31Dec44, codeword 'Varus 1.1.45' was received, closely followed by 'Teutonicus'. There followed some very hurried organising by Luftwaffe ground staff getting a/c serviceable, units getting pilots briefed.
Codeword 'Hermann' was received with the attack time of 0920hrs.

My own opinion is that Bodenplatte was ill-conceived and ill-judged in light of its recent-up-to-H_hour losses; Peltz was handed a 'sticky wicket' and made the best of a bad job.

 

[Erich]

and the NJG's were already in place, interesting to note the attacks were led by Ju 88G-1 and G-6 crews with superior navigational skills but yet not familiar with the surroundings covered in snow got lost as well as units like JG 4 which did not catch up to their Ju 88G pathfinder A/C and attacked bogus Allied fields and got hammered as the result. the 2 Galland type defense JG's were JG 300 and JG 301 which never left their fields to take on the US 8th and 15th AF getting slaughtered in due process ............

 

[lesofprimus]

Bodenplatte was a huge waste of resources for such a small gain.... Too many experten and leaders went down, and the Luftwaffe never recovered...

I agree with Erich, they should have pooled the resources, set up a diversion and gone after the 8th AF and Bomber Command in England...

 

[Njaco]

Njaco
I'm not sure it was changed by Peltz per se
I get the impression it was changed by circumstances.....
Peltz was 30 years old, holder of the Knight's Cross with Oak Leaves and Swords. He began his flying career as a Stuka pilot in Poland and France and on Ju88s against England and the Soviet Union. He was an outstanding leader, his ability gaining him high rank and experience in every German theatre of operations. He had successfully attacked Allied air power before - on the ground. He was now asked to repeat this success, on their home airfields......He outlined his plan to his air commanders and Geschwaderkommodeuren of all western-based JGs on 15Dec44 in Altenkirchen, the plan comprised 10 major JGs attacking 16 Allied airfields in Belgium and Holland and a base in France, at Metz. ....My own opinion is that Bodenplatte was ill-conceived and ill-judged in light of its recent-up-to-H_hour losses; Peltz was handed a 'sticky wicket' and made the best of a bad job.

I agree but at that time I also believe they (Goering) were looking for any way to get Galland out of the picture. Its also telling that Hitler thought so highly of the LW at that time that he wanted to wait until the weather was horrible before launching Wacht Am Rhein! Maybe with Peltz, who handled the "Little Blitz", Goering thought there might be more success than Galland.