Galland's original proposal was to attack bomber streams en masse, not necessarily airfields. It was changed by Peltz
Njaco
I'm not sure it was changed by Peltz per se
I get the impression it was changed by circumstances.
On 16Dec44 the Germans struck through the Ardennes, Montgomery had actually planned a thrust of his own but von Rundstedt simply beat him to it. On the first day of the German offensive, the Luftwaffe put up over 500 a/c but momentum was lost when the weather clamped down.
On 23Dec44 the weather changed allowing 2 TAF to support the Americans (who were taking the brunt of the thrust) denying the Germans Malmedy and Bastogne and leaving them only St Vith as an MSR. The German advance faltered and stopped.
The Luftwaffe High Command, in conjunction with planning for the Ardennes, had been carefully husbanding their fighter strength. Goring had devised a plan to hit Allied air forces with 'one mighty blow', this scheduled for as early as Oct44. It was to comprise at least 2,000 fighters and would have been the largest air battle of the war.
Galland had the entire fighter arm in the west ready for action by Nov44, a total of 3,000 fighters; all they needed was suitable weather in which to unleash them.
It was as a result of the faltering of the Ardennes offensive that things began to unravel. The fighter reserve was called into action to restart the German momentum. Galland's hand was forced by the situation but he nonetheless left 2 fighter groups in Germany when ordered to send his force west in Dec44.
Directly due to the fighting before, during and immediately after Christmas 44 the fighter strength was eroded, a/c were lost, unserviceability of a/c rose and the fighting potential of Galland's reserve was watered down considerably.
One such incident:
About two weeks before the end of 1944 the Luftwaffe launched a fighter sweep over our forward airfields but unfortunately for them nearly all the squadrons on those airfields had just got airborne and one of my squadrons was on its way back from a visit to Osnabruck. The Hun caught a real packet including those who fled, running into the returning Tempests. 122 Wing had a tally of eleven that day, with other wings also scoring highly.
Wing Commander J B Wray OC 122 Wing
To continue support for the Ardennes offensive, another plan was drawn up. The remaining fighter strength was gathered for an attack on Allied air forces in Belgium and Holland. The task of planning the assault was handed to GeneralMajor Dietrich Peltz, commander of II Jagdkorps.
Peltz was 30 years old, holder of the Knight's Cross with Oak Leaves and Swords. He began his flying career as a Stuka pilot in Poland and France and on Ju88s against England and the Soviet Union. He was an outstanding leader, his ability gaining him high rank and experience in every German theatre of operations. He had successfully attacked Allied air power before - on the ground. He was now asked to repeat this success, on their home airfields.
He outlined his plan to his air commanders and Geschwaderkommodeuren of all western-based JGs on 15Dec44 in Altenkirchen, the plan comprised 10 major JGs attacking 16 Allied airfields in Belgium and Holland and a base in France, at Metz.
3 codewords were assigned under Bodenplatte
i. Varus - followed by a number, would confirm the operation was to go ahead, along with the date
ii. Teutonicus - would confirm the first signal and give permission to brief all pilots
iii. Hermann - would give the actual time of attack
10 days later, as the weather turned, so did the Americans luck, the 8th AF re-opened operations, forcing the Luftwaffe's hand in defence. In Dec44, the Luftwaffe lost 535 pilots killed, missing or taken prisoner with nearly 200 more wounded.
The loss of a/c was a disaster for Bodenplatte and some of the German leaders were convinced it was enough to cancel the operation. On 31Dec44, codeword 'Varus 1.1.45' was received, closely followed by 'Teutonicus'. There followed some very hurried organising by Luftwaffe ground staff getting a/c serviceable, units getting pilots briefed.
Codeword 'Hermann' was received with the attack time of 0920hrs.
My own opinion is that Bodenplatte was ill-conceived and ill-judged in light of its recent-up-to-H_hour losses; Peltz was handed a 'sticky wicket' and made the best of a bad job.