P-51 tank busters?

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Been looking up a bunch of this stuff. The score for the IIDs must have been much higher.

I have a report on 6 Squadron claims March 10 to April 8th 1943:



Also here is one of (perhaps their best) day in action (February 10th):


It is thought that this was the first time that an armoured force was turned back solely by air action - I don't know if that's true but Coningham, Montgomery and Leclerc (who's position was about to be attacked) all sent their praise to 6 Squadron for this action.

On the subject of accuracy, I'll truncate it but - 6 Squadron training stated that a 50% hit standard was expected from new pilots before going on operations and that fully trained, experienced pilots achieved 75% hits in deliberate practice shoots. It was noted that this high standard of accuracy was rapidly lost when not on tank-busting operations (eg; switching to defensive Hurricane IIc duties) or even when on operations too long and in need of refresher training.

Also I would note that the Hurricane IId was used in the ETO - but only at night against trains and lighter surface vessels off the coast.


EDIT:
On this issue of claims - I just found a simple summary in a 6 Squadron pilot biography:

Egypt: 45 tanks destroyed
Libya Tunisia: 46 tanks destroyed
 
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I think my figure of around 40 came from ORS on the ground assessments rather than squadron claims, but since I can't find the source I can't be certain. Let's not forget that later, in Normandy, Typhoon pilots claimed 100 armoured vehicles destroyed for every 1 they actually destroyed according to their own (2nd TAF) ORS

Their claims for accuracy are also a lot more optimistic than the RAF's own trials.

The IID was a decent tank destroyer, given a relatively soft target and limited AA fire. In the Far East it proved its worth even late in the war. At Imphal in June 1944 No 20 Squadron engaged 12 Japanese tanks and destroyed them all for the loss of 1 Hurricane. As late as 13th February 1945 the same squadron found and engaged 13 Japanese tanks around the village of Paunggadaw, again destroying them all, as confirmed by British troops on the ground.
The RAF ORS (Air Command South East Asia) produced a report on the effectiveness of the IID against Japanese tanks (AIR 37/1236) which is very complimentary about the ability of the type to destroy Japanese armour.

Cheers

Steve
 
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stona said:
Their claims for accuracy are also a lot more optimistic than the RAF's own trials.
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I'd be willing to bet that the time and effort 6 Squadron put into getting a 50% to 75% hit standard was a lot greater than whatever unit briefly trialed the Hurrie IId.
 

I have just read that the heavy cannon armed mosquitos would start at 5,000 ft and descend in a 30 degree dive opening up at 1,800 yards which left the plane very vulnerable and I suppose any cross wind or turbulence would screw everything up. one shot per second means it would be hard walk the shots on target The RAF quickly stopped using them against shipping and U Boats in favour of rockets. Tanks in Northern France were frequently "dug in" in forests or villages, not easy to spot from 5,000 ft
 

RPs were far less accurate than the the 57mm cannon. And there were fewer of them - only 8 on a Mosquito or Typhoon, and they were often (always?) all fired in one go. Which would also make it difficult to correct aim.
 
mexchiwa said:
Would the Mustamg have been any more of a tank killer in Korea? Israel in 48?
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Not sure. But 77 sqn (RAAF), 91 wing based in Japan used P-51s almost exclusively for air support after the introduction of Chinese MiG-15s. When the units converted to Meteor F8s in '51, for a short while the new type was employed in the air superiority role until it was quickly realized the Meteor just wasnt competitive in this role. At that point the new type also reverted to CAS the same as the P-51 it replaced.

In all, 91 wing and the FAA Sea Fury FB11s are credited with destroying something like 2-3000 bunkers and about 60 AFVs. JoeB, another member of this forum, claims that not one heavy tank was knocked out by allied tacair in that time. Certainly destroying tanks from the air is an incredibly difficult task, but Joes claims dont stack up with post war RAAF survey teams that found evidence of at least 7 of the 60 tanks claimed as destroyed actually being destroyed.
 
Legitimate tank killers after WWII (Ju 87 and IL2 being the only two that achieved consistent results) may boil down to A-10 although precision munitions do expand the domain to attack helicopters, RPV's and conventional fighters. Then if the targets are lit up, even JDAMs have the requisite capability - so maybe the B-52 and B-1 and B-2 can be considered as such.
 
wuzak said:
RPs were far less accurate than the the 57mm cannon. And there were fewer of them - only 8 on a Mosquito or Typhoon, and they were often (always?) all fired in one go. Which would also make it difficult to correct aim.
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The RAF stopped using the cannon in favour of rockets for anti shipping. Granted the accuracy was less but so were the losses. I think it was a weapon whose draw backs were only realised when it went into service. The tsetse had to have other mosquitos to suppress flak. I think the 57mm would only work against an enemy who did what you wanted and didnt fire back.
 
wuzak said:
RPs were far less accurate than the the 57mm cannon.
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You can say that again.
Typhoon pilots, in trials, firing all eight rockets in a salvo had about a 4% chance of hitting a target the size of a German tank. The average distance of the mean point of impact (MPI) from the aiming point was 62.5 yards. This figure could only become worse when pilots flew on operations against camouflaged and difficult to find targets protected by anti aircraft fire.
Accuracy improved slightly, the average MPI being only 43 yards from the aiming point, with the introduction in late 1944 of a modified Mk.IID gyroscopic gun sight which allowed for wind, target movement and importantly the initial gravity drop of the rockets.
Cheers
Steve
 

The effect was more on the crews than the tanks from what I have read.
 
pbehn said:
The effect was more on the crews than the tanks from what I have read.
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Attacks by rocket firing aircraft definitely had a disproportionate psychological effect on the victims. As tank busters rocket firing aircraft were not particularly effective, but many inexperienced crews abandoned their vehicles.

The US 9th AF hardly used rockets at all and then on P-47s. This means that a P-51 tank buster in WW2 would be a fighter bomber and though I don't have figures to hand for bombs dropped by the P-51, figures for comparable aircraft, like the Spitfire, would not lead one to believe that it would have been effective at all.
The average radial error for bombs dropped in the period October 1944-April 1945 by fighter bombers of the RAF 2nd TAF was 158 yards. Only 50% of the bombs fell within 130 yards of the target.

Cheers

Steve
 
I doubt it was even 4%, as you suggest. At 4% probability, that would mean that every 25 sorties flown against an AFV would be roughly one tank destroyed. I doubt it. Soft targets wouldnt even achieve that success rate. I dont have the figures, but as Lehr was moving into position during one of Monty's pushes, what was the sortie rate to kill ratio for all vehicles.

Dupuy estimates that sir support is lucky to account for even 5% of overall casualties for an army enagaged in battle. It has risen post war to maybe 10% in the modern age.

You could get a rough idea of direct attacks on formations by comparing that to the heavy raids conducted by the USA just before the Cobra breakouts. Again, not properly researched but how many US bombers were used in that famous raid. Losses were roughly 2000 men froim Lehr and all 17 remaining tanks Ive read.

But I would challenge the notion of the accuracy/effectiveness of dedicated tank buster a/c like the Ju87G. One attack Ive read about claimed 53 of 117 Soviet tanks destroyed during an engagement during Kursk. More than 50 a/c committed to the attack, attacking in shuttles all day, losses about 12 a/c. Soviet records show nothing like that was achieved. The bde in question lost 3 tanks in those attacks, but was pinned for a while.

Am I saying direct attacks were not worth it. Not at all. I believe the german accounts that say the air attacks on theitr formations debilitated and demoralised them. If nothing else, it robbed them of freedom of manouvre. Air support if effective has been quantified by people like the Dupuy institute of decreasing the effectiveness of the the fpf factors (basically a measure of their effectiveness in combat) of formations subjected to sustained air attack by the order of 50%. Thats well worth the effeort in my book.
 
Greyman said:
I'd be willing to bet that the time and effort 6 Squadron put into getting a 50% to 75% hit standard was a lot greater than whatever unit briefly trialed the Hurrie IId.
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More on accuracy:

 
Lehr's experiences at St Lo offer some insight as to the effectiveness of airpower if used at saturation levels...

On July 2, Panzer Lehr was ordered to pull out of Tilly-sur-Seules and head west to provide support to the divisions resisting the American advance near Saint-Lo. The area around Saint-Lo consists of small fields with high ancient hedgerows and sunken lanes, known as bocage. The bocage made it extremely difficult for armor to maneuver and provided superb defensive positions to the infantry on either side of the battle, but is also gave opportunities to hide armour from air attack. On reaching this location, the division found itself up against the U.S. 83rd Infantry Division. After several holding battles, Panzer Lehr attacked towards Pont-Hebert, which it captured and held against several American counter-attacks.

On July 11, Panzer Lehr attacked towards the village of Le Desert, deep in the bocage. M10 Tank destroyers and Allied air attacks destroyed 20 tanks; the division's remaining tanks withdrew over the Vire Canal to relative safety.

Lehr had already suffered pretty heavily but from this point, in particular, the division began to fall apart as rear echelons of the division had to be thrown into the fray. Air powe became a deciding factor as it hit the formation with increasing ferocity and efficiency, Allied air power began to have a direct impact on Lehr. Air power was at its most effective when it was used in conjunction with friendly ground operations. It worked best as a pinning force, allowing ground based forces to encircle then destroy in detail the german forces being subjected to such attacks.

Over the next two weeks, the division fought a defensive battle of attrition against the numerically superior Allied forces. On July 19, Saint-Lo fell to the Americans. Six days later, the Americans launched Operation Cobra, their breakout from the Normandy lodgment. The operation was preceded by a massive aerial bombardment by over 1,500 allied bombers. Panzer Lehr was directly in the path of attack, and the division suffered about 1,000 casualties during this bombardment, estimated to be a 50% casualty rate. After the bombing run, the Panzer Lehr came under massed artillery fire of approx. 1000 pieces of artillery of different calibres. After these bombardments, the U.S. 1st Infantry Division attacked the Lehr Panzers, along with 238 Shermans from the 2nd and 3rd U.S. Armoured Divisions. Lehr by this point was a spent formation, unable to effectively resist.

The seriously depleted Panzer Lehr could not hope to halt the allied assaults against it, and so, on August 5 after a fighting withdrawal, it was ordered back to Alençon for rest and refitting. Two battle groups, dubbed Kampfgruppe von Hauser and Kampfgruppe Ritgen were formed from the remaining battle-ready men and tanks (about 500 men and no more than 17 tanks) and these units remained in combat and operated side by side with German Fallschirmjägers. Later, when Kampfgruppe Hauser pulled back towards Fontainebleau to rest and refit, division commander Bayerlein ordered the rest of the division to follow. The division was subsequently called back to Germany for rest and refitting.

Within seven months of its formation, the division was reduced to a combat-ineffective unit with no remaining tanks. At one point in September, it consisted only of a panzer grenadier battalion of company strength, an engineer company, six 105-mm. howitzers, five tanks, a recon platoon, and an Alarmbataillon (emergency alert battalion) of about 200 men recruited from stragglers and soldiers on furlough in Trier. After spending a month refitting in the Saar, the division was moved to Paderborn. There it received 72 tanks, 21 assault guns and replacements, something to compensate the losses suffered in Normandy. But the losses to its support echelons had been so severe that the division never recovered its former combat efficiency. this was the application of air superiority at its most deadly.
 
Was the Vickers S gun perhaps underutilized? The potency of a single hit would obviously be much lower than rockets (let alone a 57 mm shell), but would the overall performance trade-offs have net advantages? (accuracy, ammunition capacity, rate of fire, weight and/or drag compared to the heavy 57 mm gun or rockets+rails) That goes for putting a pair of 40 mm cannon in the Mosquito or under the Typboon or Tempest. (and at least in the Mossie's case, the belt feed mechanism might have been practical)

With the railless mountings on late-war American fighters, there's a greater advantage to rockets (I'm not sure of the earlier American tube mounted arrangement was much better than the British rails either), but that wasn't the case for the british. (and the American 37 mm M4 was less powerful than the Vicker's S, if somewhat lighter and the M10 variant a bit faster firing and using a more conventional disintegrating link belt) There was also the high velocity M9 autocannon but that didn't see airborne service for one reason or another. (too large and heave for the P-63 but it seems like the A-20, A-26, or P-38 could have handled it) The Vickers S might have adopted the high velocity littlejohn AP projectile had it stayed in service longer, so potentially some additional anti-armor capability there too.
 
I don't think it was underutilized.

RP were much superior when you factor in how inflexible the 'S' gun was in terms of

1) the types of targets it could engage
2) the specialized aircraft on which it was mounted

This is kind of rolled into point 1, but the vulnerability of a standard 'S' gun attack is far higher than a standard RP attack. RPs were much safer, much more flexible, much more destructive, and -discovered by accident- much more potent psychologically against the enemy.
 
4% chance of hitting a tank comes from Price, but I don't have his source.

The niftily entitled 'ORS 2nd TAF/No.2 ORS 21st Army Group joint report No. 3 (1945)' paints a more realistic picture of what happened operationally rather than in trials. It calculated that to have a 50% chance of hitting a German tank (it quotes a Panther) 140 rockets, equivalent to 18 sorties, were required.

Rockets may not have been effective in destroying armour or other pin point targets, but they could be devastating against larger targets, columns of soft skinned vehicles and troop concentrations. The same ORS report concluded that only 24 rockets (3 sorties) were required for a 50% chance of destroying an 'army hut' for example.

There are many reports of the morale effect of air attacks on defending German units, not just by rocket, strafing could have a similar effect. One report from the US 9th Infantry Division in Normandy sums this up. "Every time we have an air mission the rate of surrender goes up"

Cheers

Steve
 
Didnt this become a point of argument about cause and effect between Airforce and Army commanders. The Airforce commanders becoming increasingly convinced that without air support the army didnt press on, a sort of chicken and egg situation.
 
It did between the RAF and British Army. It had been a bone of contention since before the war. The RAF in particular resented being asked to do what it considered the Army's job for it.

I think it was less of an issue, at least operationally, for the Americans as they weren't dealing with two separate and independent services. Nonetheless, at a higher level, Spaatz did not want his strategic air forces subordinated to AEAF control, and therefore to Army operations, as this would compromise the fight for an independent US air force that was well underway by 1944. Zuckerman noted a conversation to this end in his journal.

Cheers

Steve
 
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