Poor Strategic Decisions in Aviation Development

that's not quite my argument, my argument is that none of the aircraft could have stopped the advance so why manufacture an aircraft just to not achieve a great deal more than what you've already got, you might as well use what you've already got because you still wont stop the advance, the RAF needed fighter aircraft and they knew it, as much production should've gone into fighters as possible not on aircraft that wouldn't get much further than the ones you've already got?

the lancaster kicks ass said:

that's not quite my argument, my argument is that none of the aircraft could have stopped the advance so why manufacture an aircraft just to not achieve a great deal more than what you've already got, you might as well use what you've already got because you still wont stop the advance, the RAF needed fighter aircraft and they knew it, as much production should've gone into fighters as possible not on aircraft that wouldn't get much further than the ones you've already got?

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There are only two reasons that I can come up with: -

a) They would have achieved more and at least slowed the Germans a bit more
b) A lot of aircrew lives would have been saved if Skuas had been in numbers rather than Battles.

slowed the germans down at what cost? the more skuas you produce the less spitfires and hurricanes are produced, so eventually the Germans arrive at Dunquirke a week later, you wont make up the deficit of lost fighters in a week.........

the lancaster kicks ass said:

slowed the germans down at what cost? the more skuas you produce the less spitfires and hurricanes are produced, so eventually the Germans arrive at Dunquirke a week later, you wont make up the deficit of lost fighters in a week.........

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Lanc, you seem to have a fighter fixation. We are talking about GA planes and my argument all along has been if we had built fewer (or preferably no) Battles which were useless and had replaced them with Skua's. The RAF would have achieved more at less cost. That was the Strategic Error in my view.

Some RAF ones:

Decision not to produce the Spitfire Mk III, which would of significantly ameloeriated the performance advantage the LW possesed during the 'Focke Wulf summer'. Had the Mk III been produced it would of been significantly faster, longer ranged and better armed then the Mk V.

Decision to abandon the concept of a support bomber/stroke fighter, and hence not to produce the Hawker Henley as a bomber and not procure the Gloster F.9/37 for development . The Henley was some 60 mph faster, more manouverable and more survivable than Faiery Battle, and would of worked much better as a close support bomber. The Gloster F.9/37 would of given the RAF an alternative to the Whirlwind as a twin engine, single seat fighter, particularly good below 15,000 feet. The F.9 would of been a very capable strike fighter until the Mossie came along.


Decision to allow Rolls Royce to kill development of the Peregrine engine, effectively ending the Whirlwind programme at the Mk I with just 144 airframes produced, denying the RAF an effective single seat escort fighter until 1944.

FAA policy of a dedicated crew of two for fighters, essentially neutering the performance of the Faiery Fulmary and Firefly, making them some 1000 lbs overweight.

It's not Lanc's fixation that's the problem! It was the RAF's fixation with the 'bomber', while ignoring the training navigation aids to hit the target. Probably as a result of the legacy of Trenchard, it confused 'Independence' i.e. a separate service with independent action - army co-operation was seen as 'artillery spotting' rather than battlefield support.
Early RAF rearmament was constrained by the 'pacifist lobby' - it was thought that there would be international restrictions on the weight of a Bomber. Hence the Hampden's curious design, the possible restrictions were ignored for the Wellington.
The Battle was initially well thought of - in comparison with the biplane it replaced, trouble was it was produced for too long. No the Fairey shadow factories could have been converted to Hurricane production, leaving Hawker space to make the Henley for the RAF, and a version to supplant the Skua with the FAA.
It's a pity none of the canard designs (Armstrong Whitworth Boulton Paul) for the Ground Attack specification (in service Jan '44) armed with a mixture of 20mm 40mm canon didn't get an order!
Other thoughts - why was 'Bomber' Harris so pig-headed regarding pathfinders - was proved wrong? If Portal had dismissed him over his insistence in attacking 'German morale' rather than the targets as per the Pointblank directive - what then who ?

For me it is the Germans not making the He-280 with the He-006 me I would have killed the Me 163.
The Germans not putting the MG 213c 20 mm or 30mm in to production.
Not putting the BMW 802 in to production.
Not letting Lockheed put the RR merlin or Griffon in the P38.