Questions about B-29 operational range, VVS, VVS intercept capability if Operation Unthinkable happen.

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Don't forget, if this fantasy conflict continued just after V-E day, or maybe later after V-J day, most of our assembly lines would continue producing materials, including the B-32.
or accelerate the introduction of the B-36 or B35 (Woo Hoo!!)? Then the USAAF would have the stand off capability to launch attacks from Iceland, Greenland and Alaska where they would be immune from Soviet retaliation.
 
I'm not sure about Iran - I think the Soviets would have huge logistical difficulties there with Allied air superiority, but Baku can be bombed from Iraq as well. And even from Egypt, if I'm not mistaken.

Iran is a fine natural ground-defense line for the Soviets. High mountains hem in the Persian-Soviet border for the most part.

Baku is reachable from Teheran for bombers but it is not an ideal basing point for several reasons. Basra or Habbaniya would likely be better for the task, or perhaps even Crete?
 
French and British were planning to bomb from Damascus and Mosul in 1940
 
or accelerate the introduction of the B-36 or B35 (Woo Hoo!!)? Then the USAAF would have the stand off capability to launch attacks from Iceland, Greenland and Alaska where they would be immune from Soviet retaliation.
B-35 - this was to be produced by Martin. In 1944 there were all sorts of development and production delays. Production contract for first 100 was cancelled in May 1944 after it became clear the first deliveries would be in 1947. Dec 1944, USAAF decided XB-35 & YB-35 should be produced as test airframes only. XB-35 flew in June 1946 & June 1947. Most of the YB-35 were scrapped before flight. 3 converted as various jet powered YB-49 prototypes.

B-36 - again development in WW2 was much delayed due to Consolidated's big commitment to B-24 programme and then the development of the B-32. The original Nov 1941 contract for 2 XB-36 called for delivery of the first in May 1944. It was finally rolled out of the factory in Sept 1945 but didn't fly until Aug 1946. It flew with 110" single mainwheels and there were only 3 airfields in the USA capable of taking its weight so amongst other things the undercarriage needed redesigned just to make the monster useable. It had many early developmental problems, in both the airframe & engines.

The initial July 1943 production contract was for only 100 (later reduced to 95) but it survived the late 1945 contract cull.

The first of 22 production B-36A didn't fly until Aug 1947 and even then it was without armament, had a limited max TOW, and had an effective range of only 6,500-7,000 miles with a 10,000lb bomb load. It was June 1948 before these entered service with the 7th BW at Carswell AFB, just across the runway from the factory.

The first version that SAC considered operationally capable was the B-26B, the first of which didn't fly until July 1948 and the last in Sept 1950. These 73 aircraft completed the initial 95 aircraft order from 1943.

To get either of the aircraft into production much sooner requires some other sacrifice in WW2 as well as speeding up Post war development schedules for airframe, engines and defensive armament.
 
I include Iran because it's another potential frontline with strategic targets for adversaries on both sides of the line. USSR would try to seize or destroy the petroleum industry in the south or at least push the Allies as far from the Caspian Sea as possible. Probably, there would be a race for Tehran at the start of hostilities since both armies were located outside of it, the Soviets in the north, the British - in the south and southwest.
 
I think we sometimes lose sight about how large the USSR was. Berlin to Magnitogorsk is around 2000 miles, no easy feat for long range bombing in 1945. Its 1400 miles or so from Tehran, no easy feat either especially when considering terrain.

I think we also need to be critical of when such a conflict would start and by whom. The most likely time for the USSR to initiate hostilities would be between VE and VJ Day. Most likely in the late summer when western Allies would have moved significant resources to the Pacific for the invasion of Japan. This assumes that the USSR would have been able to hide the build up of forces prior to hostilities. Hostilities in regions such as northern Iran are unlikely in my opinion. What would be the objective? The Soviet Union did not feel threatened by the Iranians the way they did by the West. If the USSR could see an easy victory in Europe, they might take it. For the western Allies and really the US, such a conflict would be most likely to happen after the fall of Japan and before the USSR possessed the atomic bomb. Let's say, 1948 to allow for consolidation of Europe and the Pacific. The US is also more likely to conduct campaigns in more peripheral locations given the strength of its navy and better access to the oceans.
 
Couple of points.

Soviets
At Yalta in Feb 1945 Stalin had agreed to enter the war against Japan 3 months after the end of the war in Europe. In April the Soviets gave the required one years notice that they would not be renewing the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact. They then began the movement of troops from Europe to the Far East theatre in May, immediately following the German surrender. The Soviet assault in the Far East began on 9 Aug 1945 with operations continuing until just before the Japanese signed the surrender agreement in Tokyo Bay.

So exactly when does Stalin change his mind? If he is intending to invade Western Europe he needs those troops sent East. So plenty of opportunity for Allied intelligence to suspect something was up.

Magic Carpet
It was the end of June 1945 before Magic Carpet Europe got underway with the initial movements being units earmarked for Operation Coronet, the planned invasion of Honshu, Japan in March 1946. 13th Armoured Div moved July, 20th Armoured in Aug.

IIRC it was bomber units from 15th AF that were the first to head for home. The only units planned for the Pacific were some medium bomber groups and fighter groups. They were still in Europe until after the Japanee surrender.
 
To get either of the aircraft into production much sooner requires some other sacrifice in WW2 as well as speeding up Post war development schedules for airframe, engines and defensive armament.
Like cancellation of the B-32 program and curtailing Consolidated's B-24 production? Consolidated wasn't the only B-24 producer. I'm familiar with the historical development of the B-35 and B-36, but this is a "What If" page. Earlier development and production of either the B-35 or B-36 would be a matter of different priorities. There were no major technical issues that couldn't be overcome preventing earlier development of the B-36. If political and military disagreement between the western allies and the Soviet Union had been much worse before the end of the war, the need for a heavy bomber that could strike deep into Soviet territory from "safe" allied bases may emerge as a top priority. Resources could have been shifted to accelerate the B-36 program to the point it could have been fielded several years earlier than it was.
 
It might be a "what if" but it shows how far back you need to set the starting point and the extent of the changes you need to make to get your desired B-35 & B-36 in significant numbers in a 1945/46 timescale. Changes not only at Consolidated but at P&W who need to put a lot more effort into the R-4360 instead of the R-2800 for all those P-47, F6F, F4U, B-26 etc etc that fought in the second half of WW2.
 

Any Soviet offensive driving south would have to flow through the same mountains in northern Iran. Getting to Abadan or Bushehr from Teheran is going to be another 400-600 miles of tanking through pretty inhospitable country -- mountains again(!) on the way to Abadan, or open desert with little infrastructure on the way to Shiraz.

I think the Allies would have the nose in a race to Teheran, as they already had the railroad and roadnet built (slight as it was) that was being used in 1943 on to send Lend-Lease to the USSR. No more LL to USSR from there, but with a supply-net already in place for the Allies, is going to matter. I don't know how dense the road/rail network was that the Soviets had in that region at that time, but I suspect it wasn't great.

They're going to have to come into northeast Iran unless they like attacking through heavily-forested mountains. Northeastern Iran would be easier, but still has tough terrain and I'm not sure how much rail support an invading Soviet army could rely upon.
 
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The Western Allies would also have to interdict the Lend-Lease convoys.
The WAllies wouldn't have to interdict Lend-Lease convoys. All they would have to do would be to order them to turn around and go home. The escorts were mostly RN and USN so the Soviet Navy wouldn't be able to force them on to Soviet ports. The only interdicting would be against the unarmed Soviet freighters in the North Pacific.
 
I think the air war would start with fighter bombers, light bombers ans medium bombers attacking tactical targets in Germany. The B-17, B-24s, Lancasters and Halifax's attacking strategic targets in Eastern Europe by day and night. As B-29s became available, they would do deep penetration raids against political and strategic targets in the European and Asian Soviet Union. Allied fighters would quickly own the airspace over the battlefields eliminating the ability of Soviet tac air to influence thec Soviet offensive into Germany and Western Europe.
The Soviets were already operating at the end of a long and vulnerable supply line in Germany.
 
Le May took the raids against Japan to low altitude at night because the jet stream made high altitude accurate bombing futile and the Japanese night air defenses were essentially worthless. I doubt the Soviet defenses would be even as "good" as the Japanese ones.
 

Psst -- I think Rob was joking.

Also, we wouldn't need to interdict those North Pacific freighters, because they were coming from America. We'd just impound them in the PNW ports once Unthinkable was executed. Those already at sea, sure, sink them. It's not like we're short of subs, or anything.
 
Keep in mind, that penetration into Soviet held Eastern Europe and Russia proper would have to be at higher altitudes, as the Red Airforce was ill-equipped for high altitude operation.

Unless the bombers had a solid escort, the La-7s and Yak-9s would maul them.
 
re
Probably, there would be a race for Tehran at the start of hostilities since both armies were located outside of it, the Soviets in the north, the British - in the south and southwest.
FWIW the US had 25,000 - 30,000 troops in Iran from late-1943 through early-45. The core of the logistics, engineering, and railroad units, were specialized troops, but the majority of the troops were non-specialized troops drawn from infantry and motor transport units.

There is a pretty good history of the USMIM (U.S. Military Iranian Mission), IISC (Iran-Iraq Service Command), and PGSC (Persian Gulf Service Command), in the official History of the United States Army series, but I do not think it is available online. A brief description of the British involvement followed by a summary of the US involvement can be found here:

"US Army TS Transportation 3: Chapter 9: The Persian Corridor"

Note that the above description is a relative clean summary and does not cover (for the most part) the worst behavior of the Allies in Iran and Iraq.

As an interesting side note, for many years after the war and through the 1990s (at least) there was a definite attempt to keep knowledge of the history of the WWII US involvement in Iran and Iraq, as well as knowledge of the US involvement after the war, from the citizenry of the US. Presumably because those in power felt it would not play well to the US citizenry when the image the US government and US oil industry were trying to sell to the public was of a benevolent US facing dastardly and ungrateful Iranian and Iraqi regimes/peoples who could not possibly have any reason to dislike the US.

In a 2003 survey, it was found that less than 0.2% of the US adult population, and only about 1.5% of the population who were adults during WWII, were aware that the US had been involved in the invasion of Iran and Iraq during WWII.
 
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