RAN carrier program and earlier RAAF expansion

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OK, would you take a 15k ton cruiser killer armed with 9.2" guns? Also, forbidden in treaties from '21 to '39. Cruisers needed to be 8" or smaller guns/10k tons std or less; Battleship between 17.5k and 35k tons and 10" to 14" guns with some grandfathering.

Australia doesn't need battleships of 72,000 t displacement; waaay out of context... Dunno why that was even mentioned! Not sure what you are specifying I do here, but hypothetically, Cockatoo could have built any contemporary British cruiser size warships in its yards and if it had to, I'm sure it could have, but in the context of what Australia feels it needs.
 
:)

I know even less - but regards our lack of financial assistance to the Singapore 'fortress'- was it because we were actually trying to build our navy?
Malaya should have been turned over to the Australians to defend, with a Gurkha Regiment for good measure. Send the Indians to North Africa and and all the Australians to Malaya. AIUI in 1941 Australia had five combat infantry divisions, plus four militia/reserve/training division.

Based in Australia (1 combat, 4 militia/training):
1st Division
2nd, militia/reserve
3rd, militia/reserve
4th, militia/reserve
5th, militia/training

Overseas (4 combat divisions):
6th, located in North Africa
7th, located in North Africa
8th, located in Malaya
9th, located in North Africa

Throw in a brigade or two of Gurkhas plus some Royal Artillery and the IJA will have a fight on its hands. And this is not to disparage the Indian troops or their commander Lt. Gen. Heath, those lads held the IJA back against massive odds. But a single Australian command, without Percival would have benefits - for starters Australia had demanded that Churchill make Singapore a priority, so you know the Australians will focus here. I'd bring the RAN back too from the Atlantic and Mediterranean - I'm surprised Australian didn't demand the RAN, as tiny as it was (2xCA, 4xCL, 8xDD), and its three infantry divisions be sent to Singapore once Japan took FIC in Sept 1940.
 
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I was picking biggest heaviest ship in WWII.

OK, would you take a 15k ton cruiser killer armed with 9.2" guns? Also, forbidden in treaties from '21 to '39. Cruisers needed to be 8" or smaller guns/10k tons std or less; Battleship between 17.5k and 35k tons and 10" to 14" guns with some grandfathering.
Do a Japan like the Mogamis et al and put 6" turrets on the mega cruiser and then when the treaties expire swap in the ready made 9.2" guns.

IIRC, the British 9.2 L50 gun was well regarded, though per that link the earlier L47 was better, and there may be stocks of shells.
 
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If it wasn't brought up, in 1935 the UK was a signatory to the London Treaty, and included in their quota was the Commonwealth. A carrier for Australia would apply to the RN tonnage allocation.
 
If it wasn't brought up, in 1935 the UK was a signatory to the London Treaty, and included in their quota was the Commonwealth. A carrier for Australia would apply to the RN tonnage allocation.
After a combined 120,000 dead fighting for Britain in France and Gallipoli under shoddy leadership, I'm surprised the Canadians and Australians didn't tell Britain in 1935 to shove it, you don't speak for us anymore. Then Australia follows Portugal's example and in 1935 approaches the Italians to buy four Calvi-class submarines. Alternatively the Dutch may offer to sell some subs. As for naval aviation, Australia needs to find a source for carriers or seaplane carriers.
 
After a combined 120,000 dead fighting for Britain in France and Gallipoli under shoddy leadership, I'm surprised the Canadians and Australians didn't tell Britain in 1935 to shove it, you don't speak for us anymore. Then Australia follows Portugal's example and in 1935 approaches the Italians to buy four Calvi-class submarines. Alternatively the Dutch may offer to sell some subs. As for naval aviation, Australia needs to find a source for carriers or seaplane carriers.

Perhaps the Empire Scheme had something to do with that decision? Economic favoritism was a big thing then in many countries. The protectionism practiced by all is why the Depression lasted so long, but right or wrong it had an effect on the development of policy. Did they have a standing in 1935 to tell the Empire to get bent? That's an honest question, and not a challenge.

My sense is that Australia as a country didn't feel its oats until after the nation fought with distinction in North Africa, providing some of the best troops there, holding Tobruk for what, nine months? That's when they felt like they could talk back to the mother country, I think. They'd earned sweat equity at that point.
 
After a combined 120,000 dead fighting for Britain in France and Gallipoli under shoddy leadership, I'm surprised the Canadians and Australians didn't tell Britain in 1935 to shove it, you don't speak for us anymore. Then Australia follows Portugal's example and in 1935 approaches the Italians to buy four Calvi-class submarines. Alternatively the Dutch may offer to sell some subs. As for naval aviation, Australia needs to find a source for carriers or seaplane carriers.
Gallipoli was a result of the Australian officers and other ranks ignoring their orders to make sure the secured the high ground immediately after landing. Instead they stayed on the beach until the Turks had time to move hundreds of troops and secure the high ground thus enabling them to successfully defend themselves.
 
Gallipoli was a result of the Australian officers and other ranks ignoring their orders to make sure the secured the high ground immediately after landing. Instead they stayed on the beach until the Turks had time to move hundreds of troops and secure the high ground thus enabling them to successfully defend themselves.
Therer is plenty of blame to go round . The idea of forcing the straights by naval power alone was an extremely poor. The history of ships vs forts has generally ended in the forts favor. All it did was give the Turks time to prepare for the land assault. A combined assault at the very beginning would likely have succeeded.
 
My sense is that Australia as a country didn't feel its oats until after the nation fought with distinction in North Africa, providing some of the best troops there, holding Tobruk for what, nine months? That's when they felt like they could talk back to the mother country, I think. They'd earned sweat equity at that point.
Excellent points.

Imagine if five Australian divisions, supported by an expanded RAN and RAAF instead led the CW and Imperial troops in holding Malaya. Historians would be marvelling at that even today.
 
If Australia declares semi-independence or at least implements a stay home policy for it's troops/navy/air force then who pays for the equipment?

Did Australia pay for the tanks, artillery and other weapons used in North Africa?
Who is going to pay for the expanded RAN and RAAF?
Australia was hard pressed to pay for the ships they did have.
Only few fighter squadrons in the desert air force were RAAF squadrons.
 
Excellent points.

Maybe, or maybe not. I was hoping one of the Aussies here would chime in so I could get some feedback on how wrong or right my guess might be, by someone more steeped in their history. I mean, I know Gallipoli was a big growing point for them, and I know Curtin was pretty stiff with Churchill too in 1941. I await being corrected by those better in the know, so they may have already started feeling their independent nationality earlier than I'm guessing here.

Imagine if five Australian divisions, supported by an expanded RAN and RAAF instead led the CW and Imperial troops in holding Malaya. Historians would be marvelling at that even today.

I have no doubt the Japanese would have gotten one hell of a surprise, even if the Diggers didn't have air support. Everything I've read indicates they were fighters par excellence who didn't shy away from a scrap.
 
I have no doubt the Japanese would have gotten one hell of a surprise, even if the Diggers didn't have air support. Everything I've read indicates they were fighters par excellence who didn't shy away from a scrap.
Even Eisenhower and Montgomery would have done little better in Malaysia*.

The problem isn't the ability of the troops to fight the problem is getting materiel to the troops to fight with.

The port of Singapore had the ability to transport ~10k tons/day of supplies off the docks. The civilian population needed about 2k of that, the 60,000 troops needed about 500 tons per 10k troops prewar (docks didn't run 24 hours/day at capacity). The rail lines out of Singapore have the ability to transport ~5k tons to Kuala Lumpur or about a 1/4 of that to Penang or Kelantan (inverse squared relationship double distance, 1/4, triple, 1/9th etc). Of that over 1k tons is committed to supplying the RAF. There are only a couple single lane paved road running the length on the peninsula and they are going to be clogged with refugees making them next to useless for transporting materiel.

A division (10k troops) needs 750 tons of materiel daily when in combat, roops in SAP had nothing like Red Ball Express. For reference Red Ball Express needed a truck for every 2.5 tons of materiel delivered 300 km from Cherbourg to Chartres. Singapore to Penang or Kelantan is over 700km. Solve the logistics and you stand a hope of saving Malaysia.

Sending additional troops from India/Australia had the effect of tying Percival even tighter to Singapore - he couldn't get the supplies to feed the troops/civilians he had. How do you get more supplies off the ships - Australians weren't sent to Singapore to be longshoremen; Indian troops reset being asked to lift and toke for the "white men". But British troops are the only ones listening to what high command wants them to in the field.

Percival sent his best troops up the peninsula, but he knew he could barely support a battalion (1k troops), no hope of a brigade (5k troops). Yes, the troops on the ground saw it as a failure of high command, but they always see the failure of logistics that way.

p.s. If you put the diggers in beside the historic India troops in '40-41, the Japanese might be seen as liberators. Unfortunately, neither set of Commonwealth troops were known for their tolerance and tact when dealing with the other (especially without a 3rd party opponent).

*Ike and Monty might have done better because they could tell Australia and India to keep additional troops out of Malaysia. Ike had the advantage on Europe that his unruly commander was in same army as he was so there was no politics involved.

Hard to blame Dominions: India and especially Australia wanted fighting to happen in Malaysia having seen the damage done to France in WWI.
 
Even Eisenhower and Montgomery would have done little better in Malaysia*.

The problem isn't the ability of the troops to fight the problem is getting materiel to the troops to fight with.

The port of Singapore had the ability to transport ~10k tons/day of supplies off the docks. The civilian population needed about 2k of that, the 60,000 troops needed about 500 tons per 10k troops prewar (docks didn't run 24 hours/day at capacity). The rail lines out of Singapore have the ability to transport ~5k tons to Kuala Lumpur or about a 1/4 of that to Penang or Kelantan (inverse squared relationship double distance, 1/4, triple, 1/9th etc). Of that over 1k tons is committed to supplying the RAF. There are only a couple single lane paved road running the length on the peninsula and they are going to be clogged with refugees making them next to useless for transporting materiel.

A division (10k troops) needs 750 tons of materiel daily when in combat, roops in SAP had nothing like Red Ball Express. For reference Red Ball Express needed a truck for every 2.5 tons of materiel delivered 300 km from Cherbourg to Chartres. Singapore to Penang or Kelantan is over 700km. Solve the logistics and you stand a hope of saving Malaysia.

Sending additional troops from India/Australia had the effect of tying Percival even tighter to Singapore - he couldn't get the supplies to feed the troops/civilians he had. How do you get more supplies off the ships - Australians weren't sent to Singapore to be longshoremen; Indian troops reset being asked to lift and toke for the "white men". But British troops are the only ones listening to what high command wants them to in the field.

Percival sent his best troops up the peninsula, but he knew he could barely support a battalion (1k troops), no hope of a brigade (5k troops). Yes, the troops on the ground saw it as a failure of high command, but they always see the failure of logistics that way.

p.s. If you put the diggers in beside the historic India troops in '40-41, the Japanese might be seen as liberators. Unfortunately, neither set of Commonwealth troops were known for their tolerance and tact when dealing with the other (especially without a 3rd party opponent).

*Ike and Monty might have done better because they could tell Australia and India to keep additional troops out of Malaysia. Ike had the advantage on Europe that his unruly commander was in same army as he was so there was no politics involved.

Hard to blame Dominions: India and especially Australia wanted fighting to happen in Malaysia having seen the damage done to France in WWI.

Thanks for taking the time to compose that post, Don. That's a lot to chew on, and I'm appreciative.
 
Thanks for taking the time to compose that post, Don. That's a lot to chew on, and I'm appreciative.
I figured I owed the Admiral an apology for derailing his RAN CV thread.

I have had the opportunity through work to visit Singapore and Penang, so have put 1st hand "boots on the ground".

I would want Australia to build coastal craft - maybe up to Steam Gun Boats and Sverige class defense ship - make Japanese supply lines as long as Allied by preventing landing all down the coast and the enemy now has a logistic problem (and its probably greater).
 
I figured I owed the Admiral an apology for derailing his RAN CV thread.

I have had the opportunity through work to visit Singapore and Penang, so have put 1st hand "boots on the ground".

I would want Australia to build coastal craft - maybe up to Steam Gun Boats and Sverige class defense ship - make Japanese supply lines as long as Allied by preventing landing all down the coast and the enemy now has a logistic problem (and its probably greater).
No worries, I love a good tangential yet-relevant chat, all good stuff.

I think we've burned through the RAN CV discussion, but what of increasing the RAAF? Surely the Aussies could have said to Britain or the USA, for the next shipment of sheep and macadamia nuts how about you pay us in aircraft?
 
Australian troops had a very good relationship with Indian troops which started when they were side by side at Gallipoli. This continued at the siege of Tobruk
so it is doubtful that they would not have still fought well together in Malaya or anywhere else.

Australia sending al it's AIF troops to Malaya would have left only Militia troops for defence and for New Guinea. That would not have been an option.

As I posted before Australian governments did nothing towards strategic defence in the interwar years which came home to roost in WWII.

Even Curtin was to blame for this as he actively fought against defence spending.
 
Which, from a RAAF perspective bothers me, since there were several airfields in PNG and the Solomons that could have been made into RAAF forward bases.

Would the non-fortification of Pacific holdings have applied to the Aussies (under the rubric of the Brits)? I think Britain was limited by the non-fortification clause as well, but that's a hazy memory and nothing more.
 
Would the non-fortification of Pacific holdings have applied to the Aussies (under the rubric of the Brits)? I think Britain was limited by the non-fortification clause as well, but that's a hazy memory and nothing more.
Probably, but an airfield isn't a fortification, even though it can be teaming with combat aircraft.
 

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