Eh? Given that the biggest ship ever built in Australia was 18,200 tonnes displacement and launched in 1984, I suspect an expectation such as this was a little bit of a stretch, to be honest...
RAN carrier program and earlier RAAF expansion
- Thread starter Admiral Beez
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Eh? Given that the biggest ship ever built in Australia was 18,200 tonnes displacement and launched in 1984, I suspect an expectation such as this was a little bit of a stretch, to be honest...
To be fair, HMAS Australia was past her prime by then and was next to useless, but the idea of a conversion is a novel one, but how long would it have taken and by the time it was finished, how up-to-date would it have been? Despite the small number of naval vessels built at Cockatoo between the wars, the dockyard built a large number of civilian vessels and the main dry docks played host to many ships requiring service, but, indulging this little fantasy, work on converting Australia into a carrier would presumably have taken place in the Sutherland Dock, which many years later was to host the carrier Melbourne when it lost its bow after colliding with the destroyer HMAS Voyager. Melbourne remained in dock for some time owing to workers striking.
The Sutherland Dock today.
Ah yes, the Kitthawk
Indeed, Australia's first P-40s arrived by sea in February 1942, New Zealand's in April and both countries were on board regarding Lend-Lease. Diplomatically, New Zealand was keen to align itself closer to the US and got a reputation for it, with British ambassadors in Washington suggesting that perhaps the dominion become a US colony! Curtin rubbed a few people up the wrong way, Churchill wasn't very fond of him either.Garden Island, huh, were you in the navy? Went to the wee heritage centre there, which is real interesting.
MiTasol
1st Lieutenant
MiTasol
1st Lieutenant
DunnoWas it written in America?
Everyone here is much smarter and knows that Australia is that little country next to Germany and Austria is that big island in the south pacific that is almost as large as the contiguous United States (US 8,080,464 sq km, Aus 7,688,287 sq km) and has 5 states bigger than Texas.
Or is it the other way around?? I never can remember.
Shortround6
Major General
For reasoning behind post #58 see feasibility of keeping WW I battleships around for WW II.
I have added a new post at the end.
I have added a new post at the end.
- Thread starter
- #70
Admiral Beez
Major
Gents, what about RAAF base expansion outside of Australia? There are several existing airfields in PNG and the Solomons that could be expanded. The latter is British territory, so let's get London to pay a share. In PNG, by the early 1930s Lae Airfield could take large aircraft. A Lae Gallery
Justification would be the ability to operate single engine and twin engined combat aircraft between Singapore and Australia. PNG is too far east, so Lae doesn't work, but airfields there and the Solomons would serve as a buffer against attacks on northern Oz. As for the Aus to Singapore defence line, airfields could be constructed on Christmas Island,
Justification would be the ability to operate single engine and twin engined combat aircraft between Singapore and Australia. PNG is too far east, so Lae doesn't work, but airfields there and the Solomons would serve as a buffer against attacks on northern Oz. As for the Aus to Singapore defence line, airfields could be constructed on Christmas Island,
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At this stage it may well be time to dispel the fallacy of Britain's abandonment of Australia. To the contrary, as early as 1919 Admiral Jellicoe in conjunction with the
then Deputy Prime Minister of Australia, William Watt, formulated an Imperial strategy for defence which would see a British Pacific fleet based in two parts, Singapore
and yes - Sydney.
Britain offered to pay 75% of all costs with New Zealand giving 5% and Australia 20%. Australia declined the offer. A reserve base, again at Sydney was proposed. Again
Australia declined.
Britain asked that Australia and New zealand helped finance capital ships to be built for Singapore. Australia declined. Britain asked that Australia and New Zealand help
finance the building of the base in Singapore. New Zealand agreed - Australia declined. Troops were asked for to help garrison Singapore - Australia declined.
Australian governments from then on actually used Singapore as an excuse to sit on their hands as the faraway bastion would be there if needed, therefore there was
no need to bother - a base they had not funded with ships they had not funded. Complacency is probably a mild term to use for this.
Australia also reduced the defence budget over time to a piddling 1%. 3 to 5% would have funded a major upgrade all round and would have helped to have a decent
base in Australia (Sydney) along with far better air assets. This would have been very useful in 1942. Due to politics it didn't exist when needed even though Britain
had offered to fund 3/4 of it.
The Imperial defence requirements were ignored by Australia - these included that each nation provide for it's local defence.
The lack of capability to respond to Japanese attacks in 1942 falls squarely on successive Australian governments, not Britain.
The fall of Singapore was inevitable under the circumstances - Churchill had already suggested that Singapore be evacuated which Curtin (Prime Minister of Australia
at the time) called a betrayal - this was only said to cover the fact that Singapore was still being used as an excuse for inactivity. The loss of British and Empire troops
at Singapore was not as some would say - Britains fault alone.
Next we come to the fact that Britains policy was that they were willing to abandon even the Middle East should Australia be genuinely threatened. All British shipping
going around Africa to the middle east was to be ready at any stage to divert to Australia should the threat arise.
Britain had also promised to move a large portion of the RAN to the Indian Ocean within 6 months of a real threat manifesting itself. This occurred in April 1942 and
included five battleships, three aircraft carriers, seven cruisers and sixteen destroyers, at the time the largest allied naval fleet in any theatre. To do this the Mediterranean
was basically emptied which allowed Africa Corps and Italian forces to build up and move as far as El Alamein. The result was that the line from Britain to Australia was
kept open and Japan ended up with it's own two front ocean war which it could not win.
The fallacy of abandonment and betrayal has been kept alive over the years again by politicians to be trotted out whenever they have some other problem they wish to
mask.
When it comes down to it Britain made sound offers which were rejected while at the same time Australia failed to grasp the significance or the need for a local defence
strategy.
With this in mind any talk of what could have been must be tempered with the fact that the main decision maker in all this - Australia - was going to make damn sure it
didn't.
then Deputy Prime Minister of Australia, William Watt, formulated an Imperial strategy for defence which would see a British Pacific fleet based in two parts, Singapore
and yes - Sydney.
Britain offered to pay 75% of all costs with New Zealand giving 5% and Australia 20%. Australia declined the offer. A reserve base, again at Sydney was proposed. Again
Australia declined.
Britain asked that Australia and New zealand helped finance capital ships to be built for Singapore. Australia declined. Britain asked that Australia and New Zealand help
finance the building of the base in Singapore. New Zealand agreed - Australia declined. Troops were asked for to help garrison Singapore - Australia declined.
Australian governments from then on actually used Singapore as an excuse to sit on their hands as the faraway bastion would be there if needed, therefore there was
no need to bother - a base they had not funded with ships they had not funded. Complacency is probably a mild term to use for this.
Australia also reduced the defence budget over time to a piddling 1%. 3 to 5% would have funded a major upgrade all round and would have helped to have a decent
base in Australia (Sydney) along with far better air assets. This would have been very useful in 1942. Due to politics it didn't exist when needed even though Britain
had offered to fund 3/4 of it.
The Imperial defence requirements were ignored by Australia - these included that each nation provide for it's local defence.
The lack of capability to respond to Japanese attacks in 1942 falls squarely on successive Australian governments, not Britain.
The fall of Singapore was inevitable under the circumstances - Churchill had already suggested that Singapore be evacuated which Curtin (Prime Minister of Australia
at the time) called a betrayal - this was only said to cover the fact that Singapore was still being used as an excuse for inactivity. The loss of British and Empire troops
at Singapore was not as some would say - Britains fault alone.
Next we come to the fact that Britains policy was that they were willing to abandon even the Middle East should Australia be genuinely threatened. All British shipping
going around Africa to the middle east was to be ready at any stage to divert to Australia should the threat arise.
Britain had also promised to move a large portion of the RAN to the Indian Ocean within 6 months of a real threat manifesting itself. This occurred in April 1942 and
included five battleships, three aircraft carriers, seven cruisers and sixteen destroyers, at the time the largest allied naval fleet in any theatre. To do this the Mediterranean
was basically emptied which allowed Africa Corps and Italian forces to build up and move as far as El Alamein. The result was that the line from Britain to Australia was
kept open and Japan ended up with it's own two front ocean war which it could not win.
The fallacy of abandonment and betrayal has been kept alive over the years again by politicians to be trotted out whenever they have some other problem they wish to
mask.
When it comes down to it Britain made sound offers which were rejected while at the same time Australia failed to grasp the significance or the need for a local defence
strategy.
With this in mind any talk of what could have been must be tempered with the fact that the main decision maker in all this - Australia - was going to make damn sure it
didn't.
Hi
Reference the actual RAAF expansion, in 1936 the Australian Government decided to develop the RAAF along the lines drawn up by the Salmond Report (MRAF Sir John Salmond) of 1928, it had not been implemented before because of the 'Depression'. So no earlier rearmament appears to have been financially viable. It was announced in March 1938 that a 3 year plan would raise first line strength to 12 squadrons with 198 aircraft (raised to 212 aircraft after Munich). This has to be compared with the South African Governments decision in 1934 to raise their air arm's strength to 250 aircraft by 1937. In their case it included building Hawker aircraft under licence, Hawker Hartbees, 4 built in Britain (1935) and 65 built in Pretoria which started to enter service in 1938 (53 were available at the outbreak of WW2). South Africa appears to have been quicker to expand than Australia.
On the Wirraway it is interesting to note that the RAF ordered them, as trainers, during 1940 agreeing to take all the aircraft that could be produced over RAAF requirements, initially 245 to be delivered by the end of 1942, increased in October 1940 to 300 for 1943 delivery. These would have been without engines as Australia could not build engines at the same rate as airframes, the British would have bought engines from the USA. Lend-Lease meant this did not happen. The RAF did however later finance the Wirraways to be used by the Empire Air Training Scheme in Australia.
Mike
Reference the actual RAAF expansion, in 1936 the Australian Government decided to develop the RAAF along the lines drawn up by the Salmond Report (MRAF Sir John Salmond) of 1928, it had not been implemented before because of the 'Depression'. So no earlier rearmament appears to have been financially viable. It was announced in March 1938 that a 3 year plan would raise first line strength to 12 squadrons with 198 aircraft (raised to 212 aircraft after Munich). This has to be compared with the South African Governments decision in 1934 to raise their air arm's strength to 250 aircraft by 1937. In their case it included building Hawker aircraft under licence, Hawker Hartbees, 4 built in Britain (1935) and 65 built in Pretoria which started to enter service in 1938 (53 were available at the outbreak of WW2). South Africa appears to have been quicker to expand than Australia.
On the Wirraway it is interesting to note that the RAF ordered them, as trainers, during 1940 agreeing to take all the aircraft that could be produced over RAAF requirements, initially 245 to be delivered by the end of 1942, increased in October 1940 to 300 for 1943 delivery. These would have been without engines as Australia could not build engines at the same rate as airframes, the British would have bought engines from the USA. Lend-Lease meant this did not happen. The RAF did however later finance the Wirraways to be used by the Empire Air Training Scheme in Australia.
Mike
Hi
Really? Here are illustrations pressed ribs used in the late 1920s and 1930s on Fairey IIIF, Gordon and Seal:
From 'Metal Aircraft Construction' by M Langley, Pitman 1937.
Fairey IIIF wing in production, from 'Fairey IIIF, Interwar Military Workhorse' by Philip Jarrett.
There were all sorts of rib designs in use, indeed more than one 'type' were used on individual aircraft type of all nationalities. The Spitfire also used 'pressed ribs' in the outer mainplanes and also tail plane and fin.
From 'Aero Engineering' part work (1930s), Volume II.
I believe Hawker and other companies also used 'pressed' parts, Hurricane wings below:
From 'Aeronautical Engineering' Ed. R A Beaumont during WW2.
US types certainly used a mixture of ribs, eg. Boeing, Curtiss, Grumman, Consolidated etc. as did German, Russian, French, Japanese companies.
So I think the statement is very simplistic as methods used depended on what the 'engineer' wanted the structure to 'do'. By the way there were various different rib designs in WW1 as well. There were certainly different rib types around when I undertook my airframe apprenticeship in the early 1970s.
Mike
MiTasol
1st Lieutenant
You are right of course.
What I should have said was like Supermarine used on the Spitfire and Mk I Hurricane as those are the aircraft I have worked on - same construction as Stranraer and A6M. Note the diagonal braces in the Hurricane wing are not ribs but do have webs -- that is intrinsic with that style of construction. The ribs were still built up of multiple components riveted together.
Of all the many US ww2 combat aircraft I have worked on only the PBY had built up ribs. Everything else starting with the C-33 and NA-16 derivatives had pressed metal ribs. Many of the light aircraft like the L-3 and N3N had built up ribs though but they were all low G aircraft.
I like you reference books and will have to add them to my collection.
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- Thread starter
- #75
Admiral Beez
Major
These are the exact examples I want to reverse in this what if scenario. I want Australia to accept and agree to an earlier and expanded rearmament.
So, if we make this happen, what does Australian defence look like in 1939-1941?
MiTasol
1st Lieutenant
To make that happen for air capabilities you need a massive change of political thinking and an equally large change in RAAF thinking.
Several industrialists like Essington Lewis and Lawrence Hartnet were trying to produce these changes by hiring Wackett (an ex RAAF engineering officer) and funding his, and some RAAF officers, research mission, and by creating Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation. By and large both the RAAF and Government were asleep at the wheel.
For the RAN you will have to get comment from others as I have never had an interest in RAN history.
Several industrialists like Essington Lewis and Lawrence Hartnet were trying to produce these changes by hiring Wackett (an ex RAAF engineering officer) and funding his, and some RAAF officers, research mission, and by creating Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation. By and large both the RAAF and Government were asleep at the wheel.
For the RAN you will have to get comment from others as I have never had an interest in RAN history.
Sadly Admiral, with the benefit of hindsight, with a Japanese invasion in late 1941/early 1942, the same thing would happen to this garrison as what did to Singapore and the repercussions would have been enormous. Following an invasion, the Japanese would have less expenditure on resources as a base was already there...
Prior to the war, it might have looked appealing, but the Aussie government had neither the interest or the resources to build new foreign military bases.
Warspiter's informative post advises us that Australia was not keen on contributing to regional security as much as it perhaps could have, with New Zealand particularly feeling vulnerable, although by the outbreak of WW2, in the New Zealand government there was an expressed opinion that Japan would not seek the resources she needed in that country, nonetheless, Australia's attitude was puzzling and, as you are hypothesising, had the polis thought differently, perhaps these things might have been acted on, but Britain was less enthusiastic on spending defence money on far-flung territories between the wars, too, so to what extent British help could be guaranteed is a moot point.
I know even less - but regards our lack of financial assistance to the Singapore 'fortress'- was it because we were actually trying to build our navy?
That Australia would get her own navy was inevitable and there were many schemes prior to the Great War about regional defence, most of which angled toward an independent force in the Pacific regions, either based in Hong Kong or Australia, but the British Admiralty, surprisingly (or not) was not initially in favour of the idea, but caved with the idea of gift dreadnoughts for the dominions, proposed by both the Australian and New Zealand governments independently, there was a suggestion that Canada should also join in to pressure the Admiralty into action... Despite Australia getting her own navy the Admiralty was still keen on maintaining central control and the quality of the vessels sent to New Zealand, the small P class light cruisers were woefully inadequate, but formed the basis of the Kiwi fleet; HMS Philomel, as ineffective as it was as a fighting ship became the namesake for the RNZN's primary base at Devonport, Auckland.
don4331
Senior Airman
I was picking
OK, would you take a 15k ton cruiser killer armed with 9.2" guns? Also, forbidden in treaties from '21 to '39. Cruisers needed to be 8" or smaller guns/10k tons std or less; Battleship between 17.5k and 35k tons and 10" to 14" guns with some grandfathering.
