RAN carrier program and earlier RAAF expansion

[Thumpalumpacus]

Probably, but an airfield isn't a fortification, even though it can be teaming with combat aircraft.

It's true that "fortifications" doesn't seem to have been defined by the treaty. You're probably right that they weren't considered as such. I'd have to read more about the matter.

 

[Shortround6]

I think we've burned through the RAN CV discussion, but what of increasing the RAAF? Surely the Aussies could have said to Britain or the USA, for the next shipment of sheep and macadamia nuts how about you pay us in aircraft?

The question is when?
The next question is what kind?

The US had very little in the way of suitable aircraft in 1938-39 or even 1940. Both in quantity and quality.

A lot of designs being worked on and a lot of factories doubling or quadrupling in floor space, especially in 1940.

The Dutch got the last of their Martin 166 bombers in March of 1940 (or May of 1939? accounts differ)

Early Dutch Versions had 750hp engines, last ones had 1050hp engines.
Dutch had six squadrons in the Dutch East Indies.
US aircraft makers wanted cash, at least up until March of 1941, not sheep or macadamia nuts.

While a number of "test" B-25s were completed in 1940 the US Army didn't accept the "first" B-25 for squadron US until Feb 1941 and these early aircraft had no power turrets. One .30 cal gun out a hatch in the top of the plane, one in the nose and one out the belly hatch or out the side windows (same gun) and a .50 in the tail operated by a gunner laying on his stomach.

Only other American "bombers" in production in 1938-39-40 are the Lockheed Hudson, The B-18, the B-17 (in small numbers) and the Martin Marylander. The Early Douglas DB-7/A-20 doesn't have enough range. The types that would be released for export are even smaller.

The Army didn't like French Hawk 75 orders as they feared their own P-36 deliveries would be delayed in 1939.

 

[SaparotRob]

Could Australia have licensed built the Fire Puffin?

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

The Army didn't like French Hawk 75 orders as they feared their own P-36 deliveries would be delayed in 1939.

Even a Buffalo would have been better than a Wirrayway, but I guess even Buffs were in high demand from what was basically a sweatshop.

 

[WARSPITER]

Supply for such bases would have been the main problem.

With the distances involved requiring sea transport it becomes a problem of protection of the transport lanes as much as the bases themselves.

The Australian Maritime Workers Union was far from helpful during the war as they were actively working for the advancement of communism
in Australia. From troops being sent to Milne Bay with insufficient shells for artillery due to the union demanding 'danger money' for loading ships
right through to US troops firing on them in Adelaide (I think) as they were deliberately dropping crates with aircraft engines (US ? ) onto the dock
to smash them. All in all pretty close to traitorous as far as I am concerned.

The next problem was other Soviet sympathisers within the armed forces and Government. These 'spies' actively sent information to Moscow about
troop movements, logistics, operational plans and so forth. Moscow then sent this info on to Tokyo. The aim being to help Japan to fight on for
longer which would tie up more US and British troops in the Pacific / Asia region for a longer period. This in turn would allow the USSR to take more
of Eastern Europe which they duly did.

This was also the reason for the formation of ASIO - Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation to try to weed these people out.

 

[Shortround6]

Even a Buffalo would have been better than a Wirrayway, but I guess even Buffs were in high demand from what was basically a sweatshop.

Again we have to look at the timing.
The US ordered 54 F2A-1 Buffaloes and got the first one in June of 1939. One year after the contract was placed. After taking 11 they allowed the rest to be sent/sold to Finland and thus started the Buffalo saga

1938.........................1 built........................................prototype.
1939......................11 built for the USN
1940.......................42 built for the USN and 124 exported, 44 to Finland/40 for Belgium ( most wound up in Britain) and 40 For Britian
1941....................108 built for the USN and 201 exported, mixed between British and Dutch (D.E.I.) orders
1942.....................1 built for the USN and 21 for export, 20 of these were a 2nd Dutch order, 17 of which wound up with the RAAF.

When does Australia try to slot in their order/s?

Brewster did lease a hanger at the Newark airport of 217,000sq ft in May of 1940, in June of 1940 they purchased an eight story ex Ford plant across from the original Brewster Factory in Long Island CIty. this added 482,000sq ft even if not ideal for aircraft work.

Brewster only got the order for 108 F2A-3 aircraft because Grumman could not build F4Fs fast enough.

American did not wait until Dec 7th to get it's industry going but there was also not a lot of surplus space and workers hanging about ready to turn out aircraft in 1938-39-40 either. It took 1939-40 and 41 to get things going, production roughly tripled each year.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Even Eisenhower and Montgomery would have done little better in Malaysia*.

The problem isn't the ability of the troops to fight the problem is getting materiel to the troops to fight with.

IDK about Eisenhower and Montgomery, but given the historically available troops and supply chain issues more could have been done. Once Japan takes FIC in Sept 1940 it is clear that her next move is Malaya, likely through Thailand and by sea from FIC. So, for starters in autumn 1940 begin to turn Malaya into a modern day Lines of Torres Vedras, with line upon of defensive works and leaving scorched earth in front of each.

 

[ThomasP]

re "turn Malaya into a modern day Lines of Torres Vedras, with line upon of defensive works and leaving scorched earth in front of each."

Would that have been possible? Malaya is a large place with lots of coastlines. The Aussi could maybe have built fortifications in the city areas, but even if they could in other areas it probably would not have done any good (I think). THE PROBLEM (I think) would be that the Japanese would simply bypass the fortifications and strong points, the way they did for the rest of the early offensive against the Commonwealth and American forces. After that you have a bunch of isolated fortifications, very soon to be without supply. I maybe wrong but I do not think there was enough Commonwealth manpower available.

It might have helped Singapore and some other built-up areas hold out longer. The Singapore issue been discussed before, and I do not know if anything seriously effective would have been practical unless the UK started the build-up significantly sooner.

 

[Admiral Beez]

re "turn Malaya into a modern day Lines of Torres Vedras, with line upon of defensive works and leaving scorched earth in front of each."

Would that have been possible? Malaya is a large place with lots of coastlines. The Aussi could maybe have built fortifications in the city areas, but even if they could in other areas it probably would not have done any good (I think). THE PROBLEM (I think) would be that the Japanese would simply bypass the fortifications and strong points, the way they did for the rest of the early offensive against the Commonwealth and American forces. After that you have a bunch of isolated fortifications, very soon to be without supply. I maybe wrong but I do not think there was enough Commonwealth manpower available.

It might have helped Singapore and some other built-up areas hold out longer. The Singapore issue been discussed before, and I do not know if anything seriously effective would have been practical unless the UK started the build-up significantly sooner.

IDK, but when the Japanese occupied Singapore they found tons of ready mix concrete ready to build fortifications, but never used because Shelton-Thomas didn't want to offend the rubber planters. But forget about holding Singapore, if Malaya falls Singapore falls. The Japanese might have gone around any fortifications, but that's a poor reason not to make any.

 

[don4331]

IDK about Eisenhower and Montgomery, but given the historically available troops and supply chain issues more could have been done. Once Japan takes FIC in Sept 1940 it is clear that her next move is Malaya, likely through Thailand and by sea from FIC. So, for starters in autumn 1940 begin to turn Malaya into a modern day Lines of Torres Vedras, with line upon of defensive works and leaving scorched earth in front of each.

You're missing the problem: Lines of Torres Vedras only works when you control the sea - which RN did very well during Napoleonic wars. But from day 1 of the battle for Singapore and Malaysia, the Japanese were landing at 4 or 5 places down the coast. Defensive works don't work very well when the enemy is behind them. Use of shipping to bring reinforcements/supplies to right where the fighting was meant the IJA didn't have the problems which Allies did.

Which is why I suggest a bunch of coastal craft - if Japanese are having to travel all the way down the same road from Thailand (and don't have any rail at all), they quickly have the same logistics issues.

And Japanese don't have time/reserves - when IJA arrived in Singapore, a lot thought they were surrendering as all they had left were the rounds in their rifle.

Ships like SGB would be able to do MAJOR damage to the barges the Japanese were moving supplies with. And if IJN bring destroyers and cruisers into the coast, then your dive bombers can do to them what Stukas were doing to RN off Malta.

I don't disagree that allies could have been better with jungle warfare, but 1st you have to make things as hard for the enemy to fight as it is for you.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Again we have to look at the timing.
The US ordered 54 F2A-1 Buffaloes and got the first one in June of 1939. One year after the contract was placed. After taking 11 they allowed the rest to be sent/sold to Finland and thus started the Buffalo saga

1938.........................1 built........................................prototype.
1939......................11 built for the USN
1940.......................42 built for the USN and 124 exported, 44 to Finland/40 for Belgium ( most wound up in Britain) and 40 For Britian
1941....................108 built for the USN and 201 exported, mixed between British and Dutch (D.E.I.) orders
1942.....................1 built for the USN and 21 for export, 20 of these were a 2nd Dutch order, 17 of which wound up with the RAAF.

When does Australia try to slot in their order/s?

Brewster did lease a hanger at the Newark airport of 217,000sq ft in May of 1940, in June of 1940 they purchased an eight story ex Ford plant across from the original Brewster Factory in Long Island CIty. this added 482,000sq ft even if not ideal for aircraft work.

Brewster only got the order for 108 F2A-3 aircraft because Grumman could not build F4Fs fast enough.

American did not wait until Dec 7th to get it's industry going but there was also not a lot of surplus space and workers hanging about ready to turn out aircraft in 1938-39-40 either. It took 1939-40 and 41 to get things going, production roughly tripled each year.

Right, and Brewster was a taco-truck amongst nice sit-downs.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Ships like SGB would be able to do MAJOR damage to the barges the Japanese were moving supplies with.

If I remember correctly, wasn't there some contemporaneous thinking about this?

 

[Shortround6]

Right, and Brewster was a taco-truck amongst nice sit-downs.

In 1940 the US built just about 1685 fighters of 12 different families,
1287 of them were by Curtiss.
4th place was by Grumman with 103 planes and 5th place was by Seversky with 102 planes (P-35s, P-43 are separate, all two of them) your sources may differ and I am not going to argue over 1 or 2 planes

Point is in 1940 and even into 1941 there wasn't a whole lot of "extra" aircraft the Australians could "order", I do believe they had already ordered some Hudson's.
Unless somebody (like England) gives up their places in the production queues.
Anything ordered in 1939 would be pretty much useless in Jan 1942.

Prying some Hurricanes out of the British would probably have been the best bet for fighters.

 

[Admiral Beez]

If I remember correctly, wasn't there some contemporaneous thinking about this?

Given how easy it would seem a first rate power like Britain to conceive the idea it comes as a surprise that the Brits did not have MTGB, a combination of the MGB and the MTB until the Fairmile D Type appeared in 1943. In fact, Britain didn't have a MTB (motor torpedo boat) until the late 1930s, with the prototype being launched in 1937. Until then the smallest fast torpedo vessels were steam-powered torpedo-boat destroyers, which would need a more complex shipyard to construct in the quantities needed for Malaya.

Regardless, give Malaya a hundred locally assembled MGBs and MTBs and the IJA will have trouble reaching the beaches.

 

[don4331]

Given how easy it would seem a first rate power like Britain to conceive the idea it comes as a surprise that the Brits did not have MTGB, a combination of the MGB and the MTB until the Fairmile D Type appeared in 1943. In fact, Britain didn't have a MTB (motor torpedo boat) until the late 1930s, with the prototype being launched in 1937. Until then the smallest fast torpedo vessels were steam-powered torpedo-boat destroyers, which would need a more complex shipyard to construct in the quantities needed for Malaya.

Regardless, give Malaya a hundred locally assembled MGBs and MTBs and the IJA will have trouble reaching the beaches.

Why would RN want a MTB or TB - something that would make all the cruisers and battleships ships, that they have had the British taxpayers spend literally spend millions of £ on, obsolete?

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Given how easy it would seem a first rate power like Britain to conceive the idea it comes as a surprise that the Brits did not have MTGB, a combination of the MGB and the MTB until the Fairmile D Type appeared in 1943. In fact, Britain didn't have a MTB (motor torpedo boat) until the late 1930s, with the prototype being launched in 1937. Until then the smallest fast torpedo vessels were steam-powered torpedo-boat destroyers, which would need a more complex shipyard to construct in the quantities needed for Malaya.

Regardless, give Malaya a hundred locally assembled MGBs and MTBs and the IJA will have trouble reaching the beaches.

I seem to remember the Commonwealth forces sticking guns on some local boats in order to stanch the beach-hopping -- unsuccessfully, obvs. I'll have to dig more, it was a long time ago that I read this, and no longer remember which book it was, much less still own it.

 

[Shortround6]

In fact, Britain didn't have a MTB (motor torpedo boat) until the late 1930s, with the prototype being launched in 1937.

Actually they had them in 1916-17 and used them to some effect against the Russians in 1919.

Granted this one has depth charges but the torpedoes were discharged over the stern.

Dozens were built, but their light hulls and high powered light engines did not stand up well in peacetime service. Since they could be built rapidly and cheaply when needed (no 2-3 year building time) they were allowed to fade away between the wars, coming back in the 1930s when things started looking bad again.
One problem was getting the high powered engines they needed without impacting aircraft production. Some British MTBs of 1939-40 used Italian engines until that supply was cut off when Italy declared war against France.

Britain had exported small numbers of MTBs during the 30s. British Power Boat got the Admiralty to order some boats in 1935-36 the 60ft series and 19 (?) were built, two flotillas at Malta and one at Hong Kong when the war started, These use 3 Napier Lion engines.

Until they could get bigger hulls and engines of over 1000hp each (and using three of them) a combination MTB/MGB was not considered workable. The Boats could not carry more than a few machine guns AND torpedoes.
They also needed weapons suitable for their situation.
3pdr semi automatic guns were not going to work on the MTB hulls. The motion is too quick.
They needed automatic cannon. And for large guns they need power mountings.

 

[SaparotRob]

Why would RN want a MTB or TB - something that would make all the cruisers and battleships ships, that they have had the British taxpayers spend literally spend millions of £ on, obsolete?

Jeune Ecole, n'est'ce pas?

 

[Shortround6]

Why would RN want a MTB or TB - something that would make all the cruisers and battleships ships, that they have had the British taxpayers spend literally spend millions of £ on, obsolete?

Maybe the RN thought their area of responsibility extended more than a few score of miles offshore?

You know, 72ft MGBs escorting convoys to Russia

 

[don4331]

Jeune Ecole, n'est'ce pas?

Oui, Monsieur. L'utilisation de bateaux plus petits et plus nombreux.

Or in English (with some additional description): small, heavily armed vessels to combat battleships, and the use of commerce raiders to cripple the trade of the rival nation.

Italians still make some fantastic engines for power boats - http://www.crmmotori.ithttp://www.crmmotori.it a W-18 diesel of 2,400hp weighing only 2100kg.

Steam Gun Boat was the initial answer to combination MTB/MGB, but they need to be build from similar component in same yard as would be building destroyer.

Local boats issue was they were only p!ssing in the ocean, some small successes but they weren't purpose built craft with multiple guns and torpedoes that could make major damage.