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Probably, but an airfield isn't a fortification, even though it can be teaming with combat aircraft.
I think we've burned through the RAN CV discussion, but what of increasing the RAAF? Surely the Aussies could have said to Britain or the USA, for the next shipment of sheep and macadamia nuts how about you pay us in aircraft?
The Army didn't like French Hawk 75 orders as they feared their own P-36 deliveries would be delayed in 1939.
Again we have to look at the timing.Even a Buffalo would have been better than a Wirrayway, but I guess even Buffs were in high demand from what was basically a sweatshop.
IDK about Eisenhower and Montgomery, but given the historically available troops and supply chain issues more could have been done. Once Japan takes FIC in Sept 1940 it is clear that her next move is Malaya, likely through Thailand and by sea from FIC. So, for starters in autumn 1940 begin to turn Malaya into a modern day Lines of Torres Vedras, with line upon of defensive works and leaving scorched earth in front of each.Even Eisenhower and Montgomery would have done little better in Malaysia*.
The problem isn't the ability of the troops to fight the problem is getting materiel to the troops to fight with.
IDK, but when the Japanese occupied Singapore they found tons of ready mix concrete ready to build fortifications, but never used because Shelton-Thomas didn't want to offend the rubber planters. But forget about holding Singapore, if Malaya falls Singapore falls. The Japanese might have gone around any fortifications, but that's a poor reason not to make any.re "turn Malaya into a modern day Lines of Torres Vedras, with line upon of defensive works and leaving scorched earth in front of each."
Would that have been possible? Malaya is a large place with lots of coastlines. The Aussi could maybe have built fortifications in the city areas, but even if they could in other areas it probably would not have done any good (I think). THE PROBLEM (I think) would be that the Japanese would simply bypass the fortifications and strong points, the way they did for the rest of the early offensive against the Commonwealth and American forces. After that you have a bunch of isolated fortifications, very soon to be without supply. I maybe wrong but I do not think there was enough Commonwealth manpower available.
It might have helped Singapore and some other built-up areas hold out longer. The Singapore issue been discussed before, and I do not know if anything seriously effective would have been practical unless the UK started the build-up significantly sooner.
You're missing the problem: Lines of Torres Vedras only works when you control the sea - which RN did very well during Napoleonic wars. But from day 1 of the battle for Singapore and Malaysia, the Japanese were landing at 4 or 5 places down the coast. Defensive works don't work very well when the enemy is behind them. Use of shipping to bring reinforcements/supplies to right where the fighting was meant the IJA didn't have the problems which Allies did.IDK about Eisenhower and Montgomery, but given the historically available troops and supply chain issues more could have been done. Once Japan takes FIC in Sept 1940 it is clear that her next move is Malaya, likely through Thailand and by sea from FIC. So, for starters in autumn 1940 begin to turn Malaya into a modern day Lines of Torres Vedras, with line upon of defensive works and leaving scorched earth in front of each.
Again we have to look at the timing.
The US ordered 54 F2A-1 Buffaloes and got the first one in June of 1939. One year after the contract was placed. After taking 11 they allowed the rest to be sent/sold to Finland and thus started the Buffalo saga
1938.........................1 built........................................prototype.
1939......................11 built for the USN
1940.......................42 built for the USN and 124 exported, 44 to Finland/40 for Belgium ( most wound up in Britain) and 40 For Britian
1941....................108 built for the USN and 201 exported, mixed between British and Dutch (D.E.I.) orders
1942.....................1 built for the USN and 21 for export, 20 of these were a 2nd Dutch order, 17 of which wound up with the RAAF.
When does Australia try to slot in their order/s?
Brewster did lease a hanger at the Newark airport of 217,000sq ft in May of 1940, in June of 1940 they purchased an eight story ex Ford plant across from the original Brewster Factory in Long Island CIty. this added 482,000sq ft even if not ideal for aircraft work.
Brewster only got the order for 108 F2A-3 aircraft because Grumman could not build F4Fs fast enough.
American did not wait until Dec 7th to get it's industry going but there was also not a lot of surplus space and workers hanging about ready to turn out aircraft in 1938-39-40 either. It took 1939-40 and 41 to get things going, production roughly tripled each year.
Ships like SGB would be able to do MAJOR damage to the barges the Japanese were moving supplies with.
In 1940 the US built just about 1685 fighters of 12 different families,Right, and Brewster was a taco-truck amongst nice sit-downs.
Given how easy it would seem a first rate power like Britain to conceive the idea it comes as a surprise that the Brits did not have MTGB, a combination of the MGB and the MTB until the Fairmile D Type appeared in 1943. In fact, Britain didn't have a MTB (motor torpedo boat) until the late 1930s, with the prototype being launched in 1937. Until then the smallest fast torpedo vessels were steam-powered torpedo-boat destroyers, which would need a more complex shipyard to construct in the quantities needed for Malaya.If I remember correctly, wasn't there some contemporaneous thinking about this?
Why would RN want a MTB or TB - something that would make all the cruisers and battleships ships, that they have had the British taxpayers spend literally spend millions of £ on, obsolete?Given how easy it would seem a first rate power like Britain to conceive the idea it comes as a surprise that the Brits did not have MTGB, a combination of the MGB and the MTB until the Fairmile D Type appeared in 1943. In fact, Britain didn't have a MTB (motor torpedo boat) until the late 1930s, with the prototype being launched in 1937. Until then the smallest fast torpedo vessels were steam-powered torpedo-boat destroyers, which would need a more complex shipyard to construct in the quantities needed for Malaya.
Regardless, give Malaya a hundred locally assembled MGBs and MTBs and the IJA will have trouble reaching the beaches.
Given how easy it would seem a first rate power like Britain to conceive the idea it comes as a surprise that the Brits did not have MTGB, a combination of the MGB and the MTB until the Fairmile D Type appeared in 1943. In fact, Britain didn't have a MTB (motor torpedo boat) until the late 1930s, with the prototype being launched in 1937. Until then the smallest fast torpedo vessels were steam-powered torpedo-boat destroyers, which would need a more complex shipyard to construct in the quantities needed for Malaya.
Regardless, give Malaya a hundred locally assembled MGBs and MTBs and the IJA will have trouble reaching the beaches.
In fact, Britain didn't have a MTB (motor torpedo boat) until the late 1930s, with the prototype being launched in 1937.
Jeune Ecole, n'est'ce pas?Why would RN want a MTB or TB - something that would make all the cruisers and battleships ships, that they have had the British taxpayers spend literally spend millions of £ on, obsolete?
Maybe the RN thought their area of responsibility extended more than a few score of miles offshore?Why would RN want a MTB or TB - something that would make all the cruisers and battleships ships, that they have had the British taxpayers spend literally spend millions of £ on, obsolete?
Oui, Monsieur. L'utilisation de bateaux plus petits et plus nombreux.Jeune Ecole, n'est'ce pas?