How good is this book? Just wondering after reading this review....
Since my rule is "de proximo tuo, aut bene aut nihil", I hate writing negative reviews. This is particularly true in a case like this, where the Authors have been - and still are - so fundamental in my erudition. I felt nevertheless obliged to write this unpleasant review, after reading so many laudatory ones which apparently ignore what could (and should) have been better done to easily write the true "definitive" book that every aviation enthusiast waits for.
The major faults of this work are that it does not take into account all the known combats of the campaign, that it ignores many useful details and that it is crammed with (chiefly) minor yet annoying errors which spoil an otherwise unique book (nothing so vast and ambitious has been attempted so far). Of course, the Authors could have decided to select only the most significant facts: this would have been reasonable, had they explained the criteria of their choice. On the contrary, the reader can't understand why he doesn't find actions which have been thoroughly described not only in primary sources (that the Authors could have perhaps overlooked) but even in recent books published in English (which seem more accurate in their respective, if sectoral, fields). Being particularly keen on the Italian Regia Aeronautica, I refer to Slongo and Gustavsson's Desert Prelude 1940-41: Early Clashes (2010) and Desert Prelude 2: "Operation Compass" (White Series) (2011), concerning the first 8 months of air war in North Africa, and to Michele Palermo's North Africa Air Battles, November-December, 1941 (2011), concerning Operation Crusader. These important books are not mentioned in the bibliography and seem to have not been consulted, even though the name of Slongo appears among the acknowledged people. Moreover, little use (if any) has been apparently done of No 51 Repair Salvage Unit and 103 Maintenance Unit diaries, which could have otherwise much helped in discovering the true fate of many Commonwealth aircraft actually shot down in combat but not listed as such in their respective Squadron Operation Record Books.
The following is meant to be a by no means complete list of errata, but only an exemplification of what I found missing or wrong, when randomly comparing the narrative of this book with a primary source as Air Historical Branch, Air Ministry, "R.A.F. Narrative (First Draft), The Middle East Campaigns, Volume I, Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939 to June 1941", and with said "Desert Prelude" and "North Africa Air Battles".
Page 11, "Royal Air Force Middle East [] fielded just 29 squadrons equipped with around 300 aircraft". I scratch my head, since in the aforementioned AHB's official narrative (page 177, Annex) I read: "In July [1940] the total strength of the operational aircraft under his [Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Middle East, Air Marshal Longmore] command, excluding units of the South African Air Force in Kenya, was approximately as follows: Fighters [], 160; Army Co-operation [], 45; Medium Bombers [], 260; Heavy or Transport Bombers [], 35; Flying Boats [], 10; [TOTAL], 510".
Page 17, the Breda 65 was not "armed with four 12.7 mm", but with two 12.7 mm plus two 7.7 mm.
Page 24, 12 June 1940, "a direct hit on the elderly cruiser San Giorgio. The vessel caught fire". Even the AHB's Narrative had been more cautious about that hit: "A large ship believed to be the old cruiser San Giorgio was set on fire" (p. 35). In fact the ship survived the 4.52-5.02 hr attack unscathed, as every history of the famous cruiser explains.
Page 28, 21 June 1940, no mention of the action of Balbo in person, which, much in future Rommel's style, jumped down his personal SM.79, ordered to attack the Morris armoured car which was menacing the airstrip, captured it, climbed on the turret to address his soldiers and brought back to Tobruk in his plane the PoW's he had just made (Slongo, page 45).
Page 29, 25-27 June 1940. Four lines for three days of operations. Unless he owns Desert Prelude (I, pp. 50-51), the reader misses: the action by four CR.32s in the Amseat area and the British bombing of Tobruk on the 25th; the loss of one of the two SM.82s supplying Cufra, and the leaflets dropping mission by a SM.79 on the 26th; the SM.79s action in Sollum area, the Ba.65s attack in the Sidi Omar area, and the bombing on Sidi Barrani and Buq-Buq by 20 SM.79s on the 27th.
Page 39, 25 July 1940 (and p. 41, 1 August 1940), it was not Gladiator N5783 to be lost, but Gladiators N5768 and L9046 (see Gustavsson and Slongo's Gladiator vs CR.42 Falco 1940-41: 47 (Duel), page 48.).
Pag. 40, 28 July 1940, "in the absence of any RAF claims for such an aircraft [Ro.37bis], it is assumed that this too fell to ground fire". No: Lysander L4719 reported the destruction on the ground of two aircraft and the machine-gunning of the crew (Desert Prelude, I, 88.).
Page 76, 13 november 1940, Wikipedia would have sufficed to ascertain that the Italian raid on Alexandria hit the destroyer Decoy (sent to Malta for repairs which lasted until 1 February 1941).
Page 82, at the start of December 1940 "202 Group [] provided a total of 48 fighters and 116 bombers". Unconvincing. According to the "Order of Battle Egypt/Libya - November 30th, 1940 [actually 8 December]", in AHB's Narrative (Appendix VI), No. 202 Group had: 36 Hurricanes in establishment plus 10 in reserve; 24 Gladiators I.E. plus 8 I.R.; 48 Blenheims I.E. plus 24 I.R.; 20 Lysanders I.E. plus 8 I.R.; 6 Gauntlets I.E.. H.Q. RAF M.E. had: 16 Wellingtons I.E. plus 4 I.R.; 8 Bombays I.E. plus 2 I.R.. No 274 Squadron had 16 Hurricanes I.E. plus 4 I.R.. No. 201 Group had 6 Sunderlands I.E. plus 0 I.R.; 3 Wellingtons I.E. plus 1 I.R.. Total is 76 fighters I.E. plus 22 I.R. and 75 two-engine bombers I.E. plus 31 I.R. According to AHB, Appendix XIX, serviceable in the M.E. (Mediterranean excluded) on 1st December were: 35 Hurricanes, 36 Gladiators, 41 Blenheims, 33 Wellingtons, 27 Lysanders, 9 Bombays, 8 Valentias, 5 Gauntlets.
Page 95, 14 December 1940, a missed occasion to emend an old error. Contrary to what has been often written (allegedly 50 CR.42s), the carnage of the Blenheims was in fact caused by only 11 biplanes: in Desert Prelude (II, 59-60) the reader even finds how many rounds each fighter fired.
Page 129, "During the period from 1 January-15 March, actual deliveries of aircraft to Egypt and Sudan had been as follows: [] Hurricanes 0". Zero? According to AHB's Narrative, p. 186, "During January the air situation improved with the arrival in Egypt of 23 Blenheims, 50 Hurricanes and 3 Wellingtons", "Fifty Hurricanes had arrived in January, bringing the total arrivals to 137" (p. 187), "The position at the end of March was in fact none too promising from the Middle East point of view. Only 19 Hurricanes had arrived since the end of January" (p. 189). According to Playfair, "Arrivals of Reinforcement Aircraft in the Middle East (including those for Malta) by all Routes", The Mediterranean and Middle East Volume II, HMSO, 1956, Appendix 7, p. 361, the figures for the Hurricanes had been 44 in January, 30 in February, 13 in March (all of them via Takoradi).
Page 284, 1 November 1941, the action fought between 174 Sq. RST (recce) and No 18 and 107 Sqn. is missing. It is significant that a single SM.79, escorting a freighter and a torpedo boat, hindered the bombing by 6 Blenheims, saved both ships and, acting as a heavy fighter, damaged at least two bombers (see Palermo's book, page 25).
Page 301, 11 November 1941, the second attack was carried out by No 12 (not 21) SAAF Sqn., the "Bf 109s" were in fact one G.50 of 360 Sq., whose pilot (ten. Caracciolo Carafa) slightly damaged 3 Marylands firing all 600 rounds and was hit in the propeller hub by return fire (Palermo, 51).
Page 307, 15 November 1941, missing are: 5 damaged Blenheims of No 113 Sqn., one Ju.88 force landed in the desert and later recovered, all Ju.88s admitted damaged by fighters (Palermo, 57).
Page 315, 20 November 1941, the some 18 Italian and German Stukas were escorted by 19 (forgotten) G.50s of 155 Gr. (T.Col. Bianchi) as close cover; ten. Galfetti even claimed hits on a fighter at which he fired 150 rounds (Palermo, 75,79).
Page 319, 21 November 1941, 3 Mc.200s of 373 Sq. met some Wellingtons, and cap. Radini claimed one probable (Palermo, 85).
Page 376, 9 December 1941, the attack by 4 MC.202s of 17° Gruppo against 6 Marylands of No 12 SAAF Sqn. is missing. The Italians fired 800 rounds and two Marylands were admittedly slightly damaged (Palermo, 229).
Chapter 12 is another part of the book full of gaps. Not only many British night raids on Italian-held Libyan cities are not listed (see, just as one example, the first week of December 1941), but no description of the results is given. On the contrary, it would have sufficed to look at the War Diary of Italian Supreme HQ (a monumental, 18-tome edition published since 1986 by the Historical Branch of Italian Army) to easily find recorded every air attack, with (if any) AA claims, description of ships, aircraft and buildings destroyed or damaged, and the number of victims and casualties (civilians and military, Italians and Libyans).
Page 506, 23 December 1941, "Blenheim claimed shot down into the sea 30 miles off [Tripoli]. No aircraft of this type was reported lost in this area by the RAF". Really? According to a certain Shores (Malta: The Hurricane Years 1940-41 - Hardcover series (7101), p. 354) it was Maryland BS766 of No 69 Sqn, which crash-landed without survivors: "The observer's log book was recovered from the wreck and this indicated that the Maryland had been intercepted and damaged by fighters".