Saburo Sakai Zero vs Bf-109

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Geez, I'm not THAT old! ;) We have one of the last surviving flyable Zeros in the museum where I volunteer. We also have an unflyable one. I have helped to do some minor work on that bird in the past. It took three of us about an hour to get the damn engine cowling and prop spinner back on after it was removed. Not because we didn;t know how, but because the parts are all customer fit. It has to be in the exact position or the screw don't line up. There are about 40 screws just holding on the prop spinner!

The cowling is a 2 piece unit with turnbuckle style screws that hold it on each side. There is barely any room to get a wrench in there to tighten them, so it is a slow and tedious process to get them tight and get it even. there are butterfly type covers that go after that that are all also custom fit, so you have to know where each on came from or keep trying until they all fit just right.

Bottom line, it was a HUGE pain in the arse and enough to convince me that I will stay on the museum side, giving presentations, tours and keeping my hands clean and my knuckles un-bloodied! The other guys can get dirty and bust their knuckles.

But I admire those guys and the work they do produces soem great results, as below.
 

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the Japanese were familiar with the 109 and they didn't like it
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Among other concerns, I'd suggest that the IJN wasn't interested in the Me-109 simply because it wasn't carrier capable. What would be the point of adopting an airframe in need of extensive modification (read: time, energy, and resources) when they were developing perfectly acceptable (for their concept of aerial warfare, at least) carrier monoplane fighters, beginning with the A5M, much less the A6M.

I'd also suggest that the Germans, had they had the opportunity to do so, would have taken one look at the A6M and ask some pretty sharp questions: Where's the pilot armor? Where's the self sealing fuel tanks? Where's the ignition dampening for the radio? What do you mean only 60 rounds of 20mm? They probably, and rightly, would have concluded that here was a plane that was designed to defeat late 1930's biplanes in individual combat, combining the low speed maneuverability of a biplane into a high speed monoplane airframe.

The A6M, then, was faster and more maneuverable than most of the biplane fighters in service anywhere in the world. That it was also a fine monoplane fighter all by itself was just an added benefit. There were, though, planes under development at the time the A6M entered combat that were going to be faster and perform better than the A6M, the XF4U come to mind. Further, the A6M design was such that improved variants were only able to achieve marginal improvement and always at a cost to the one or more of the A6Ms other feature, for example, the A6M3 was a little faster than the A6M2, but only had, what, 75% of the A6M2's range and was less maneuverable. Later editions, better engines, more armament, more ammunition, more armor, same problems, reduced range, reduced maneuverability. I have a source who flew both the A6M2 and the A6M5 who says the A6M2 was much more responsive than the A6M5, though he thinks both were sweet to fly. The A6M, for the most part, only marginally outclassed it start of the war adversaries. Most of it's advantage came from a couple of factors; at the micro level, the advantage was allied fighter pilots getting sucked into low speed turning contests that they were sure to lose, and at the macro level there was the ability of the Kuido Butai to put a lot of fighters in the air and simply overwhelm the local opposition by weight of numbers.

The effect of these factors becomes plain when you look at those instances where they did not occur. A classic example is the Battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942. Forces were somewhat evenly matched. Where the USN F4F fighter pilots played the A6M game they got chewed up. Where they played the USN game, the A6Ms. if not equally gnawed, were at least unable to inflict the drubbings they had been administering up to that point. In fact, against the F4F, in the first year of the war, A6Ms were never able to achieve and exchange ratio better than about 1.1:1. Hardly what one would expect from it's reputation. And it can't all be explained by the Thach Weave either. Squadrons did not start to seriously use that tactic until the late fall of 1942, towards the end of that first year. Kind of makes you wonder about all this great combat experience the IJN pilots supposedly brought to the table, but that's another subject and you don't want to get me started down that road.

I'd also suggest that one might wish to look into operational doctrine and practices. How a plane performs is certainly important, but how it is employed is more important. The A6M (which I'd also point out was not in combat service at the time of the BoB and kind of makes the whole question somewhat silly) was the result of design specifications drawn up by the IJN and was heavily influenced by the IJN fighter pilot ethos. This was the way of the warrior and leaned way over into the realm of one on one combat a' la WWI. IJN tactics and doctrine were, possibly, the penultimate evolution of WWI biplane fighter tactics and, in my estimation, to an extent ignored the realities of combat in the modern high speed monoplane fighter in favor of some idealized aerial dance of death. This can be evidenced in ways ranging from their general preference for the low speed individual turn and burn combat to their persistence in maintaining the biplane based three plane section, nine plane division formations into 1944. As soon as an adversary refuses to play the low speed tag game, the A6M loses much of it's popular, and IMO misplaced, superiority. As soon as the lone-wolf, one at a time mentality bangs up with a doctrine of disciplined team tactics, using modern formations and concepts that play to the monoplane's strengths, then the whole platter of sushi goes out with the trash.

The A6M was designed for a totally different kind of war than the average German fighter pilot was trained to fight. It's design was driven by the psychology of its users. I don't think the Germans, not being Japanese, nor reaching into the Samurai culture for their role models, would have been happy with it at all.

Just my opinion(s).

Rich
 
Detail analysis.

I do also found odd that despite the Japanese engineers's porposal for more powerful engines to cope with increasing armour and arments, Navy refused it. And it was not until 1945 did Navy finally allowed the Zero Design engineer Eitaro Sano to equip much powerful Mitsubishi MK8P Kinsei 62 fourteen cylinder air-cooled radial 1560 hp. The model was know as A6M8. But it was too late, despite an order as many as 6300 machines from Navy, none of them was delivered.
 
did you forget about the Bf109T
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No, I didn't.

A. The Japanese never examined the 109T.

B. The 109T design did nothing to improve on the basic 109E. Same problem one usually faces when converting a land-based plane for carrier work . . . not quite as good as a plane designed from the get-go to be carrier based. You just wind up adding a lot of extra hardware and reinforcing that needs to be carried around on the original frame. By the time the Germans got around to the 109T, the 109E was already old. I alluded to the problem above. Such a conversion was not worth the Japanese (or the Germans, for that matter) time and effort.

Rich
 
How did later Zero pilots learn to counter the threats from Hellcats or P-38?

I meant its unbelieveable that over 300 Zeros lost in The Great Marianas Turkey Shoot, how did that happen? I dont think its purely due to Hellcat's air superiority...........how about the Zero pilots? how did they deal with fast planes?
 
Actually, what the USN carrier pilots reported destroying between 19 and 20 June 1944 was more like 283 A6M types (284 if you count 1 A6M2-N float fighter) and then also, 58 D4Y, 31 Ki-61, 30 B6N, 23 D3A, 19 B5N, 15 E13A, 4 G4M, 1 Ki-57, and 1 unidentified VB type.

For June 19th,
F6Fs were credited with 413-60-23:
A6M - 252-36-17
B5N - 14-1-1
B6N - 28-1-2
D3A - 20-8-1
D4Y - 57-6-0
E13A - 8-0-0
G4M - 1-0-0
Ki-44 - 0-1-0
Ki-57 - 1-0-0
Ki-61 - 31-7-2
Unidentified VB type - 1-0-0

FM-2s were credited with 4-0-0:
A6M - 3-0-0
B5N - 1-0-0

SB2Cs were credited with 5-0-1 (all by pilots):
B5N - 2-0-0
D4Y - 1-0-1
E13A - 1-0-0
G4M - 1-0-0

TBM credits were
A6M - 1-1-0 (pilots)
A6M - 0-1-0 (gunners)

Total for the day was 423-62-24 broken down as
A6M - 256-38-17
B5N - 17-1-1
B6N - 28-1-2
D3A - 20-8-1
D4Y - 58-6-1
E13A - 9-0-0
G4M - 2-0-0
Ki-44 - 0-1-0
Ki-57 - 1-0-0
Ki-61 - 31-7-2
Unidentified VB Type - 1-0-0


For June 20th,
F6Fs were credited with 36-8-7:
A6M - 23-8-6
B5N - 2-0-0
B6N - 1-0-0
D3A - 3-0-1
E13A - 5-0-0
G4M - 2-0-0

SB2Cs were credited with 4-2-17
A6M - 0-0-2 (pilots)
A6M - 2-2-14 (gunners)
A6M2-N - 1-0-0 (gunner)
D3A - 0-0-1 (gunner)
E13A - 1-0-0 (pilot)

TBMs were credited with 3-0-7
A6M - 1-0-0 (pilot)
A6M - 1-0-7 (gunners)
B6N - 1-0-0 (pilot)

Total for the day was 43-10-31 broken down as
A6M - 27-10-29
A6M2-N - 1-0-0
B5N - 2-0-0
B6N - 2-0-0
D3A - 3-0-2
E13A - 6-0-0
G4M - 2-0-0

You should bear in mind that these Japanese aviators were, for the most part, a second generation. The first generation took a hit at Midway, but, for the most part, was chewed up in the Solomons. The Japanese air groups in the Marianas were essentially green, not only in combat experience, but in overall flight time. The men who could have taught them to survive were already dead.

Rich
 
:shock: Man, thats record is amazing!

But, how did Japanese pilots LEARN to counter US air superiority? I meant Kamikazi was used to destroy ships, Japanese airmen must learned to how to maintain their control of air, right? Zeros maybe now outclassed by Hellcats, but proper tactics maybe still useful.
 
I think it is kills, damaged and probables, in that order. So it would be 413 kills, 60 damaged and 23 probable kills. Rich could probably clarify that and hopefully define the terms. Would damaged mean a few hits were observed, but the plane got out of sight before it was seen to crash, or is it the plane had to show visible signs of damage (smoke, missing pieces)? What is the difference between damaged and probable?
 
Formula is: Shot down - Probables - Damaged

in that order. Shot down is confirmed usually with a witness or with gun camera film. Probable is smoking and/or with obvious heavy and probably fatal damage, but no one sees it auger in. Damaged is fired on and reasonably assured of hits, but manages to evade or is otherwise lost from view and has an unknown fate.

Rich
 
Of course, you have to remember that the numbers I'm reporting are taken from the actual reports of the action. They are, therefore, somewhat on the high side. I am not, however, in the business of second-guessing the combat observations of the folks on the scene from sixty-one years later. I like the "feel" of the original data and almost invariable defer to the reports from the scene. If I can put a date, timeframe, name, squadron, location and combat result for each aircraft reported as shot down, probably shot down, or damaged, then that is good enough for me.

That being said, here's quick reference a compilation of action in the Marianas between 11 June 1944 and 30 June 1944. The results of action by USN carrier aircraft were as follows (Figures do not include action around Iwo Jima on 16 June or 24 June 1944):

Carriers in Action:
CV: 7
CVL: 8
CVE: 11
Action Sorties: 8,202
Tons of Bombs on Targets: 2,282
Enemy Aircraft Engaged: 1,393
Enemy Aircraft Destroyed, Air: 704
Enemy Aircraft Probably Destroyed, Air: 102
Enemy Aircraft Damaged, Air: 68
Enemy Aircraft Destroyed, Ground: 135
Aircraft Losses to Enemy AAA: 101
Aircraft Losses to Enemy Aircraft: 41
Aircraft Losses to Operational Causes: 120

Specifically for the 19 June – 20 June 1944 period, US carrier plane losses were in the range of

19 June –
Aircraft Losses to Enemy Action: 23
Aircraft Losses to Operational Causes: 6

20 June –
Aircraft Losses to Enemy Action: 17
Aircraft Losses to Operational Causes: 79



But, how did Japanese pilots LEARN to counter US air superiority? I meant Kamikazi was used to destroy ships, Japanese airmen must learned to how to maintain their control of air, right? Zeros maybe now outclassed by Hellcats, but proper tactics maybe still useful.
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Simple answer, they didn't. As far as the Japanese being able to adapt A6M tactics in order to deal with the threat posed by US technology and training, they, frankly did not have a lot to work with nor did they have time to do so. In the Marianas, their average pilot had about three months experience, outside their flight training program. In contrast, the average USN aviator had about two years flying experience and about 300 hours in type (oddly enough, less than what one finds for some USN VF squadrons at the beginning of the war). With the losses suffered in this battle, the result was that the next crop of flight school graduates became their front line pilots, with next to no experience, facing the increasingly experienced Americans. So, it wasn't just a matter of the quality of the aircraft, but the quality of wresting the optimal performance out of the aircraft, something that only comes from training and experience. The Japanese had little time for training and almost no time to build on experience. The operational tempo was speeding up. The invasion of Saipan was scheduled originally for November 1944. It happened in June. By October, US forces would be in the Philippines. At the end of that month, the next crop of IJN carrier aviators would be launched from their carriers and instructed to land ashore; their training was incomplete and most could not land back aboard a carrier. This, of course, left the IJN carriers in their sacrificial mode for the action off Cape Enango, no planes to defend themselves, no planes with which to launch their own strikes. And so it went. The Japanese were faced with a continuing downward spiral. Pilot losses meant shortened training cycles to make up the losses. Lack of fuel meant less flight training time, both in primary training and once they got to their units. Increased pressures from US forces meant more losses to make up with still less training and still less fuel since the US submarines were snuffing out the Japanese tankers one by one. By the end of the war, in the summer of 1945, US carrier aircraft could, and did, roam almost at will over the Japanese home islands. The Japanese could see the writing on the wall, the Americans were coming and their intent was to finish it once and for all. The Japanese had some 9000 to 13000 planes (estimates vary) of all types left in their inventory. They had fuel for two or maybe three sorties each. Pilot experience, overall, was next to nothing. Other than for a very few extremely specialized fighter squadrons (like, maybe, two) there was no fuel to be wasted chasing around after US raiders. And even in those special squadrons, where what was left of the cream of the Japanese experience pool was concentrated, scrambling against the F6Fs and F4Us roaming the countryside meant a quick hit an run attack, in and out, before they turned on you and swarmed like a pack of mad blue dogs. And those experienced aviators, like every other resource essential to the Japanese, began a slow process of being winkled out one by one . . . there was just so many times one could tempt fate. There was no turn and burn dog fights of the early days, that took time and the longer one was exposed, the more USN fighters showed in for a piece of the action. Overall, this was another losing proposition. For the rest, it was disperse the planes and keep them de-fueled and hidden. USN photo planes were coming back with photos showing aircraft hidden as much as 5 miles from the nearest airfield. And the ACIO folks on the carriers were taking those photos and assigning the destruction of individual planes, one by one. In those last 45 days of the war, in 13 combat mission days, pilots from TF-38 destroyed some 1100 plus planes on the ground versus 124 in the air; and 53 of those air-to-air credits were shot down between 13 August and 15 August. Returning strike pilots noted in the same time period that they were seeing more of the planes attacked on the ground catching fire and burning. This meant that at some fields dispersed aircraft were being fueled and, presumably, readied for some action. Whatever that was, the surrender put a stop to it. For the most part, though, the Japanese air forces, army and navy, were biding their time and waiting for the anticipated arrival of the American invasion fleet. At which point, they still had thousands of airplanes could still fly, and enough pilots, with enough training to get off the ground and head in the general direction of the American ships, to man them. Landing was not a required skill. In the end, there was a pool of at least 10000 pilots who did not have the dubious opportunity to attempt to crash into an American ship. Would some have them have gotten through first the fighter screens and then the AAA fire? Most certainly, and if it was only 5%, then that's 500 planes. And if only half of them actually hit a ship, that's 250 hits. Moreover, the Japanese had learned their lesson; the target was to be transports, not warships. Not a very attractive outcome for all concerned, Japanese or American, and, fortunately, one way or the other, in the end, avoided.



Rich
 
Nice writeup, Rich. I had the opportunity to chat with Don McMillan, who was one of the Avenger pilots that put a fish into the Zuikaku during the Battle of the Leyte Gulf (one of the several in that "battle"). To hear him talk about the run is a real treat.

He started his run facing the carrier broadside. As he was jinking in towards the Zuikaku, it turned into him. He ended up putting his torpedo into the bow of it and levelled out right beside the Zuikaku, running along the side. He said it was so close he could have almost reached out and touched it! He received the Navy Cross for his actions during the Leyte Gulf operations.
 
The only advantage the zero had over the 109 was range. A 109E could turn just as well as a Zero. Yes the range would have been more effective in the Battle of Britain but a 109 would have held up easier against the Spits and Hurricanes then a flimsy Zero. She may have had range but she was not very well armed nor was she well armored and as she was shown in the Pacific she would have been cut to pieces by the RAF.

As was stated before about the 109T. The Japs had already evaluated the 109 by the time the T came out and even if they had not they would not have taken it for the simple fact that the undercarraige on the 109T would have made for very dangerous landings. I would not have wanted to land one on a carrier.

An interesting thing though is that the Japanese accepted some Fw-190's to evaluate them and even though it was superior to the Zero, I wonder why they did not take it.
 
at a guess because they couldn't produce their own and germany couldn't supply them or something like that??
 
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