Of course, you have to remember that the numbers I'm reporting are taken from the actual reports of the action. They are, therefore, somewhat on the high side. I am not, however, in the business of second-guessing the combat observations of the folks on the scene from sixty-one years later. I like the "feel" of the original data and almost invariable defer to the reports from the scene. If I can put a date, timeframe, name, squadron, location and combat result for each aircraft reported as shot down, probably shot down, or damaged, then that is good enough for me.
That being said, here's quick reference a compilation of action in the Marianas between 11 June 1944 and 30 June 1944. The results of action by USN carrier aircraft were as follows (Figures do not include action around Iwo Jima on 16 June or 24 June 1944):
Carriers in Action:
CV: 7
CVL: 8
CVE: 11
Action Sorties: 8,202
Tons of Bombs on Targets: 2,282
Enemy Aircraft Engaged: 1,393
Enemy Aircraft Destroyed, Air: 704
Enemy Aircraft Probably Destroyed, Air: 102
Enemy Aircraft Damaged, Air: 68
Enemy Aircraft Destroyed, Ground: 135
Aircraft Losses to Enemy AAA: 101
Aircraft Losses to Enemy Aircraft: 41
Aircraft Losses to Operational Causes: 120
Specifically for the 19 June – 20 June 1944 period, US carrier plane losses were in the range of
19 June –
Aircraft Losses to Enemy Action: 23
Aircraft Losses to Operational Causes: 6
20 June –
Aircraft Losses to Enemy Action: 17
Aircraft Losses to Operational Causes: 79
But, how did Japanese pilots LEARN to counter US air superiority? I meant Kamikazi was used to destroy ships, Japanese airmen must learned to how to maintain their control of air, right? Zeros maybe now outclassed by Hellcats, but proper tactics maybe still useful.
Simple answer, they didn't. As far as the Japanese being able to adapt A6M tactics in order to deal with the threat posed by US technology and training, they, frankly did not have a lot to work with nor did they have time to do so. In the Marianas, their average pilot had about three months experience, outside their flight training program. In contrast, the average USN aviator had about two years flying experience and about 300 hours in type (oddly enough, less than what one finds for some USN VF squadrons at the beginning of the war). With the losses suffered in this battle, the result was that the next crop of flight school graduates became their front line pilots, with next to no experience, facing the increasingly experienced Americans. So, it wasn't just a matter of the quality of the aircraft, but the quality of wresting the optimal performance out of the aircraft, something that only comes from training and experience. The Japanese had little time for training and almost no time to build on experience. The operational tempo was speeding up. The invasion of Saipan was scheduled originally for November 1944. It happened in June. By October, US forces would be in the Philippines. At the end of that month, the next crop of IJN carrier aviators would be launched from their carriers and instructed to land ashore; their training was incomplete and most could not land back aboard a carrier. This, of course, left the IJN carriers in their sacrificial mode for the action off Cape Enango, no planes to defend themselves, no planes with which to launch their own strikes. And so it went. The Japanese were faced with a continuing downward spiral. Pilot losses meant shortened training cycles to make up the losses. Lack of fuel meant less flight training time, both in primary training and once they got to their units. Increased pressures from US forces meant more losses to make up with still less training and still less fuel since the US submarines were snuffing out the Japanese tankers one by one. By the end of the war, in the summer of 1945, US carrier aircraft could, and did, roam almost at will over the Japanese home islands. The Japanese could see the writing on the wall, the Americans were coming and their intent was to finish it once and for all. The Japanese had some 9000 to 13000 planes (estimates vary) of all types left in their inventory. They had fuel for two or maybe three sorties each. Pilot experience, overall, was next to nothing. Other than for a very few extremely specialized fighter squadrons (like, maybe, two) there was no fuel to be wasted chasing around after US raiders. And even in those special squadrons, where what was left of the cream of the Japanese experience pool was concentrated, scrambling against the F6Fs and F4Us roaming the countryside meant a quick hit an run attack, in and out, before they turned on you and swarmed like a pack of mad blue dogs. And those experienced aviators, like every other resource essential to the Japanese, began a slow process of being winkled out one by one . . . there was just so many times one could tempt fate. There was no turn and burn dog fights of the early days, that took time and the longer one was exposed, the more USN fighters showed in for a piece of the action. Overall, this was another losing proposition. For the rest, it was disperse the planes and keep them de-fueled and hidden. USN photo planes were coming back with photos showing aircraft hidden as much as 5 miles from the nearest airfield. And the ACIO folks on the carriers were taking those photos and assigning the destruction of individual planes, one by one. In those last 45 days of the war, in 13 combat mission days, pilots from TF-38 destroyed some 1100 plus planes on the ground versus 124 in the air; and 53 of those air-to-air credits were shot down between 13 August and 15 August. Returning strike pilots noted in the same time period that they were seeing more of the planes attacked on the ground catching fire and burning. This meant that at some fields dispersed aircraft were being fueled and, presumably, readied for some action. Whatever that was, the surrender put a stop to it. For the most part, though, the Japanese air forces, army and navy, were biding their time and waiting for the anticipated arrival of the American invasion fleet. At which point, they still had thousands of airplanes could still fly, and enough pilots, with enough training to get off the ground and head in the general direction of the American ships, to man them. Landing was not a required skill. In the end, there was a pool of at least 10000 pilots who did not have the dubious opportunity to attempt to crash into an American ship. Would some have them have gotten through first the fighter screens and then the AAA fire? Most certainly, and if it was only 5%, then that's 500 planes. And if only half of them actually hit a ship, that's 250 hits. Moreover, the Japanese had learned their lesson; the target was to be transports, not warships. Not a very attractive outcome for all concerned, Japanese or American, and, fortunately, one way or the other, in the end, avoided.
Rich