Well, the theory that some SBD gunner credits must be discarded because the USAAF had a gunner over claiming problem had the effect of forcing me to go back and double check some the data. In the course of that, I, with apologies to all, (mea culpa) discovered that I'd been done in by the spread sheet sort while my eyes were crossed. Please note the following revised numbers for pilots versus rear gunner credits.
Despite the USN statistical study showing 116 credits for USN SBDs, carrier-based and land-based combined, I can still, as my previous post reported, find no more than 96 actual shoot down credits. And as in my earlier post, from testing out the various permutations, I believe that the difference (20) lies in either counting probables as actual credits or shared credits as whole credits or some combination of the two.
Double-checking the numbers gives a revised break down of the results, thusly:
Carrier-based pilots: 60.5 / 8.0 / 4.0
Carrier-based gunners: 32.5 / 7.0 /13.0
Land-based pilots: 0.0 / 1.0 / 0.0
Land-based gunners: 3.0 /0.0 / 0.0
Total pilots: 60.5 / 9.0 / 4.0
Total gunners: 35.5 / 7.0 / 13.0
Total USN SBD: 96.0 / 16.0 / 17.0
Rather than the previously reported 57.3% of SBD credits going to rear gunners, the correct percentage is 37.0%. My apologies to all and my regrets for any confusion that may have caused.
My point is the AAF bombers of all theaters had widely exaggerated claims of fighters being shot down. The SBD crews would have been no different.
So, you seem to want to discount some indeterminate number of gunners' claims based, I presume, on the issue of over claiming by AAF bomber gunners, and I also presume you are focusing primarily on the ETO where the problem was apparently endemic. I'd point out that the revelations on AAF gunner over claiming were nothing new, were obvious at the time to those keeping the counts, and was really only merely verified with the examination of actual Luftwaffe loss returns.
Further I'd suggest to you that when there's a box of 16 to 20 bombers lumbering along, surrounded by 10 other boxes of similar numbers, and some brave soul goes blasting down through three or four of these boxes and some 35 to 40 gunners start blazing away in turn, you are going to get a lot of claims. You apparently have little appreciation for the differences in action between the ETO and PTO. Formations, especially naval were small. See my previous on scouting and bombing doctrine (which, I fear you either did not read or simply ignored as it doesn't fit your mindset). The air war in the PTO, from a naval aviation standpoint was totally different than that of the ETO and to attempt to draw conclusions on one based on the other is IMO a waste of time. Perhaps you may wish to look somewhat deeper into the subject.
But, if you are so sure that credits to Navy SBD gunners are so inflated (all 35.5 of them from 7 Dec 1941 through 20 June 1944), tell me, exactly which ones do you propose we discard?
7-Dec-41; 0825; ARM1/c Miller; VS-6; 1 A6M; Barbers Point, TH
1-Feb-42; btwn 0705 0720; Sea1/c Snowden; VS-6; 1 A5M; Roi
1-Feb-42; btwn 0705 0720; AMM3/c Clark; VS-6; 1 A5M; Roi
1-Feb-42; btwn 0705 0720; ARM1/c Georgiou; VB-6; 1 A5M; Taroa
20-Feb-42; btwn 1640 1715; ARM1/c Rountree; VS-2; 0.5 G4M; 2S,157E 300 mi NE of Rabaul
7-May-42; 0745; Cdr Schindler (TF-16 staff); VS-5; 1 A5M; Shoho strike, Coral Sea
7-May-42; btwn 1110 1120; ARM3/c Liska; VS-2; 2 A6M; Shoho strike, Coral Sea
8-May-42; btwn 1114 1140; ARM3/c Liska; VS-2; 1 A6M; Coral Sea, TF17-Anti VT patrol
4-Jun-42; 1020; AMM3/c Chochalousek; VS-6; 1 A6M; Midway, near Japanese carriers
4-Jun-42; 1020; AMM2/c Adkins; VS-6; 0.5 A6M; Midway, near Japanese carriers
4-Jun-42; 1658; AOM2/c Bassett; VB-3; 1 A6M; 31-40N, 179-10W Midway area
7-Aug-42; 1320; AMM2/c Caruthers; VS-5; 1 A6M; About 5 mi SW of Tulagi
20-Aug-42; 1315; ARM1/c Yanick; VS-71; 0.5 H6K; 10S, 163E; 60 mi NE of Guadalcanal
24-Aug-42; 1620; ARM2/c Dobson; VS-3; 0.5 A6M; 06S, 161E, 100 mi NE of Santa Isabel
24-Aug-42; 1620; ARM3/c Godfrey; VB-3; 1 D3A; Ryujo Strike
3-Oct-42; 1535; ARM2/c Farrell; VS-3; 1 A6M; 08S, 157E; 70 mi W of Pohnpei
3-Oct-42; 1725; ARM3/c Gunter; VS-3; 1 E8N; 08S, 157E; 70 mi W of Pohnpei
26-Oct-42; 1125; ARM3/c Berthold; VB-8; 0.5 D3A; Santa Cruz at Hornet
26-Oct-42; 1125; ARM3/c Lineawever; VB-8; 0.5 D3A; Santa Cruz at Hornet
26-Oct-42; 1125; ARM1/c Martz; VB-8; 0.5 D3A; Santa Cruz at Hornet
26-Oct-42; 1125; ARM1/c Martz; VB-8; 0.5 D3A; Santa Cruz at Hornet
26-Oct-42; 1125; ARM3/c McLean; VB-8; 0.5 B5N; Santa Cruz at Hornet
14-Nov-42; btwn 0845 1115; ARM3/c Moore; VS-10; 1 A6M2-N; NE of Russel
14-Nov-42; 1615; ARM2/c Colley; VS-10; 1 A6M; NW of Russel
14-Nov-42; 1615; ARM2/c Colley; VS-10; 1 A6M; NW of Russel
14-Nov-42; 1700; ACRM Gardner; VB-10; 1 A6M; near Guadalcanal
14-Nov-42; 1700; AMM1/c Schindele; VB-10; 1 A6M; near Guadalcanal
17-Jul-43; 0932; ARM1/c Brunetti; VB-11; 1 A6M; Kahili area
17-Jul-43; 0932; ARM2/c Seneker; VB-11; 1 A6M; Kahili area
17-Jul-43; 0940; AOM3/c Steed; VB-11; 1 A6M; Kahili area
5-Nov-43; 1030; ARM2/c Day; VB-11; 0.333 A6M; over Rabaul
5-Nov-43; 1030; ARM1/c Wells; VB-11; 0.333 A6M; over Rabaul
5-Nov-43; 1030; ACRM Wilson; VB-11; 0.333 A6M; over Rabaul
11-Nov-43; 0917; AMM2/c Wilson; VB-9; 1 A6M; St George's Channel
11-Nov-43; 0917; ARM3/c Shaffer; VB-9; 1 A6M; St George's Channel
4-Dec-43; 0805; ACRM Stafford; VB-16; 1 A6M; within 5 mi of Roi
4-Dec-43; 0805; ARM2/c Lynch; VB-16; 1 A6M; within 5 mi of Roi
4-Dec-43; 0805; ARM1/c Baxter; VB-16; 1 A6M; within 5 mi of Roi
4-Dec-43; 0805; ARM3/c Landaker, Jr; VB-16; 1 A6M; within 5 mi of Roi
20-Jun-44; btwn 1848 1915; ARM2/c Hisler; VB-16; 1 A6M; 15N, 133E, over Japanese Fleet
20-Jun-44; btwn 1848 1915; ARM2/c Maggio; VB-16; 0.333 A6M; 15N, 133E, over Japanese Fleet
20-Jun-44; btwn 1848 1915; ARM1/c McElhiney; VB-16; 0.333 A6M; 15N, 133E, over Japanese Fleet
20-Jun-44; btwn 1848 1915; ARM2/c LeMay; VB-16; 0.333 A6M; 15N, 133E, over Japanese Fleet
You pick. You decide which ones to discard and then provide the factual basis to make that determination.
Personally, I'm not particularly in the business of debunking anyone's claims. Where that sort of conversation usually leads is to claims of one side being garbage and the other as pure as the driven snow. Usually goes something like:
"My guy, Ottohad Stehdenbed, shot down 153 Klingons without a doubt. But your guy, Sammy Snowflake? There is absolutely no way he ever shot down 95 Romulins, ever, end of story, period. Maybe 15 if he was lucky; anymore is just wishful thinking."
"Oh yeah? Stehdenbed got 153? Bull! If he shot at it he claimed it, and everyone knows it. And Snowflake? Everyone knows he gave claims to other members of his squadron, so he actually shot down more than 95 Romulins."
"Oh sure, and where's your proof?"
. . . volume starts to go up . . .
"Proof, I don't need no stinkin' proof. I just know this and so does everyone else. Where's your proof?"
. . . volume still increasing . . .
"Don't have or need any, but Snowflake simply couldn't have done what he claimed and everyone knows that all of Stehdenbed's claims were observed by someone, so they're real!
At this point the conversation degenerates into name calling and finger pointing. Ever wonder just who "everyone" is?
Well, I don't go there and I don't entertain such discussions. The bad news is, that for the most part, there are no Japanese records, at least none available in English, that I've been able to find that would tend to disprove any of these SBD claims (and it's not as though I haven't looked and I know most of folks who have worked hard on this very subject). In fact you might note that the famous shoot down of Sakai by a mixed group of VS-6 and VB-6 rear gunners does not appear on this list . . . and they were sure that he was well and truly shot down (though they had no clue as to his identity). And, though unequivocally unwilling to discuss further the subject of who's claims are valid and who's are not, from what I have read, I suspect you might be rather disappointed with the results of comparing Japanese claims to US actual losses. You could start by just looking at the actual SBD losses reported here and comparing that to whatever Japanese claims you can find.
USN and USMC combat losses are reported in "US Naval Aviation Combat Statistics – World War II," published by OpNav in 1946. You also might want to look at the "USAAF Statistical Digest for World War Two," though the information there is not as clearly laid out as the USN study, it's all there if you know how to ferret it out. A fairly thorough background in statistics and in the subject at hand are also extremely helpful. Though my undergrad degree is in history, my master's is in business; statistics, of a government nature, is what I do for a living. I grew up in the brown shoe navy (when airplanes were still blue and naval leadership was not an oxymoron). I don't study the European theater; I don't care, it may have well have been on the other side of the universe for all I care. My sole historical interest is WWII naval aviation, has been since I was an undergrad, lo, those 35 years ago. So, at the risk of being accused of tooting my own horn, there is, perhaps, a grasp the data, the operational realties, and the story they tell that you may not possess. And confining ones reading to the popular histories, slick magazines and the Internet won't do it for you. Frankly, comparing the air operations in the ETO to the PTO is comparing night to day. There is no comparison. I deal in numbers. If you can't show me a number, or at least an analytical approach to deriving a number, then all your short shrift of the 'could haves', 'couldn't haves', 'should haves', and 'shouldn't haves' doesn't count.
Regards,
Rich