Significance of the Battle of Midway

I feel guilty in supplying what ifs instead of Parsifal's excellent analysis of what actually happened but finding what ifs to change the outcome is particularly easy for Midway.

If we want a simple alternate history change to alter the outcome of Midway in favour of the Japanese, what if during or after the war games, someone realises that the Kido Butai shouldn't have to launch two strikes at Midway because the Kido Butai's aircraft are the tip of the Japanese spear. Thus a last minute rearrangement of the IJN forces sends Kondo's battleships and cruisers, Kongo, Hiei, Atago, Chokai, Myoko and Haguro, with Yura and some destroyers, to sail with the Kido Butai. It is an easy change to make as both started from Hashirajima. However, Yamamoto's main body will now have to take a more southerly course to cover the invasion fleet and perhaps Zuiho will sail with Yamamoto.

The idea is that Kondo increases speed and races ahead of the Kido Butai before the first wave is launched to attack Midway at 0430 from 240 miles away. Kondo can probably manage 26 knots over the morning keeping his force together. Thus about 1200, he should be able to open fire on Midway. Thus there will be no possible need for a second strike against Midway from the Kido Butai and no need to waste time swapping bombs and torpedoes.

The change may also bring the Kido Butai better luck because at around 1000, McClusky will be somewhere south of the Kido Butai and may happen to see the distant wakes of Kondo ships racing towards Midway. If he does, he will almost certainly investigate. He may waste so much time and fuel veering to the South that he has to attack Kondo. In fact Kondo may also be attacked by many poorly trained air crews from Midway itself during the morning as he will be the first ships that they encounter.

its difficult to be realistic about japanese tactical alternatives, because we have the priceless advantage of perfect hindsight. We know that the japanese codes had been compromised. We know that there were three, not two carriers waiting for the Japanese. We know that the USN had already outflanked the KB even before the battle had commenced.

Any attempts at reconsidering what might be done needs to allow for these underlying points. Still there are some glaring weaknesses to the japanese plan that really cry out for change, and sadly for them, could have been changed if only the Japanese had not been so far into their own PR. All of the things I mention here, were, at some time in the planning, considered by the Japanese, which makes their final plan all the more incomprehensible.

The over dispersal and overall complexity of the plan is an obvious flaw. The diversion of the support carriers, Junyo, Ryujo, and Zuiho is another. Given the importance of the operation, the insistence on breaking up Zuikakus air group is illogical. That could have waited until after the operation, and the cobination of Junyo, Zuiho Rujo and Zuikaku at around 80% strength, to caver the main and occupatiuon forces would have made it very difficult for the Americans

The assault in the Far North should have been abandoned, and all the support carriers redirected to provide a second TF to support CarDiv 1 and 2, not in the same TF, but covering the Battlewagons and the invasion forces. Some additional troops should have been allocated to the operation. Reduction of Midways defences should have been left up to the bombardment forces. Cardiv 1 and 2 should not have been so far forward, and they should in any case have operated as two separate division, perhaps 20-40 miles apart. The bait should have been the ships that were best able to take the punishment, the Yamato, and Kondo classes (incidentally the battlecruisers had a rated top speed of 30 knots, not 26). Cardiv1 and 2 should have been given just one purpose, instead of three. That purpose should have been to find and then destroy any US surface naval forces, with priority to be the enemy carriers. That was the very reason for the operation, but it was lost in the other flotsam that was introduced into the plan. The Japanese rode into the valley of death with their eyes off the ball

All of these alternatives were considered, but Japanese over-confidence really threw out any possibility of sanity being put into the plan. The Japanese had convinced themselves that there was nothing to fear from the Americans, they could easily defeat them and could take risks to do it. It was the misplaced over confidence more than anything that defeated the Japanese.

If these measures had been adopted the USN code breakers would have known about it. The best reaction for the USN to such a concentrated effort would be not to show up at all, which i think is what they would have done

The over dispersal and overall complexity of the plan is an obvious flaw. The diversion of the support carriers, Junyo, Ryujo, and Zuiho is another. Given the importance of the operation, the insistence on breaking up Zuikakus air group is illogical. That could have waited until after the operation, and the cobination of Junyo, Zuiho Rujo and Zuikaku at around 80% strength, to caver the main and occupatiuon forces would have made it very difficult for the Americans

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THis would have been more simple than their over elaborate plan. They seemed to be thinking "We'll hide our battleships until the Americans commit their forces". I'm wondering if Yammamoto was anticipating a response from Pearl that included the 4-5 slow battleship available?

Actually, do that would have made it tough for the Americans. Combine the carriers with the slow BB's - to slow to chase or run. Would have been a sitting duck for the Japanese. Though since the US had their codes, they had the initiative, not he Japanese. By initiative I mean the ability to determine who and where and when combat occurs.

If these measures had been adopted the USN code breakers would have known about it. The best reaction for the USN to such a concentrated effort would be not to show up at all, which i think is what they would have done

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I agree. Midway had little strategic significance, not enough to risk the fleet for.

Garyt said:

I agree. Midway had little strategic significance, not enough to risk the fleet for.

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Midway : "
In the initial plans for Midway, it was proposed to develop it as a base for one patrol squadron of seaplanes. Subsequently, became a major submarine base, a major air station for both land- and seaplanes, and a fueling and repair base for ships.t became a major submarine base, a major air station for both land- and seaplanes, and a fueling and repair base for ships,,,

In 1938, Navy funds to the extent of $1,100,000 were made available to the Army for harbor and channel improvements. The Army was to dredge a channel through the southern reef between Sand and Eastern Islands, scoop out a seaplane basin, and dredge a channel 30 feet deep and 300 feet wide to a proposed submarine basin and an anchorage for small ships. A turning basin was to be provided adjacent to the submarine basin, northeast of Sand Island, and a breakwater was to be built. The Army completed this work in 1940."

I think a major ship, submarine and air-station hundreds if not a thousand miles closer to Hawaii, and only 1,500 miles from Hawaii is of major significance by military standards.
The one thing too many peoples conjecture here has every thing pretty much staying the same even if the U.S. had lost Midway, that is impossible no matter how one sees thing even with 20-20 hindsight.

As I also stated before, it would be foolish to ignore how this would have affected the political scene in the U.S. where the war was being run.
For Washington to report a second major defeat in less than a year, and third out an out defeat, would have been devastating.
Had Midway fallen there would have been no blockade of Wake Island or attacks from Midway.

For Washington to report a second major defeat in less than a year, and third out an out defeat, would have been devastating.
Had Midway fallen there would have been no blockade of Wake Island or attacks from Midway.

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My point is that if he US decided not to engage the Japanese at Midway as Parsifal suggests, that would make sense. It would not be a "second major defeat", merely the taking of a small atoll without the Navy fighting it.

In the initial plans for Midway, it was proposed to develop it as a base for one patrol squadron of seaplanes. Subsequently, became a major submarine base, a major air station for both land- and seaplanes, and a fueling and repair base for ships.t became a major submarine base, a major air station for both land- and seaplanes, and a fueling and repair base for ships,,,

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These were plans, by the time of the invasion Midway was not a major base, certainly no one capable of being a major surface fleet port. And the Japanese moved slower at building up bases than the US for certain. Could it have been built into a major base within a year? I doubt the US would allow that, and between the Japanese extended merchant shipping problems and other logistical problems, it would be really tough. I'd think the US subs would feast of the efforts to support Midway.

Garyt said:

My point is that if he US decided not to engage the Japanese at Midway as Parsifal suggests, that would make sense. It would not be a "second major defeat", merely the taking of a small atoll without the Navy fighting it. ----Either they would abandon it totally or leave the occupants to survive the misery the survivors at Wake Island did.
That is worse than a military defeat it is out-and-out retreat which is defeat no matter how one looks at it.

1943: 98 American civilian contractors on Wake Island

October 7th, 2008 Headsman

On this date in 1943, after Japanese-occupied Wake Island was subjected to a withering bombardment from the United States Navy, garrison commander Shigematsu Sakaibara ordered the summary execution of 98 American prisoners of war.


These were plans, by the time of the invasion Midway was not a major base, certainly no one capable of being a major surface fleet port. And the Japanese moved slower at building up bases than the US for certain. Could it have been built into a major base within a year? I doubt the US would allow that, ---- Having not been able to keep Midway, just how would they stop the Japanese. In this scenario the Japanese carriers are not on the bottom.
If Parsifal is going to postulate that Midway was not important even if the U.S. lost it, then all the U.S. gains after Midway are null and void, including the blockade of Wake, which means it would be a fully operating basse, which was 64 percent complete when Japan invaded, able to help support Midway.---- and between the Japanese extended merchant shipping problems and other logistical problems, it would be really tough. I'd think the US subs would feast of the efforts to support Midway.

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According to the Navy Dept. Library the air base was finished before the war started including barracks and the 1st hospital.
It took the Navy one year to enlarge/finish the submarine base from start of the war including time spent just working on defense.
New maintenance crews were rotated in, in October of 1943.
There were improvements after that but major work was done by mid-1943.

New maintenance crews were rotated in, in October of 1943.
There were improvements after that but major work was done by mid-1943.

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OK, as a US base, mid-late 1943 it could have been more relevant.

In Japanese hands I'd say you would have to double the time if not more to get to there. Actually, double the time might be right, but things change, such as bases in that area not being needed at least to that extent.

But take a look at how slow the Japanese were to rebuild installations such as airfields during the Guadacanal campaign vs the Americans once an airfield was bombed for instance. Or take a look at how long repairs on a ship might take for the US vs. Japan.

So if the Japanese take Midway, they would not be able to have the installation that the US was looking to build completed until mid-late 44. Or more likely, plans would have required that the resources the Japanese were putting towards Midway would now be needed elsewhere.

parsifal said:

In regards to Coral Sea losses, operational aircraft is a different number to losses. Aircraft often would return , be declared non-operational, repaired overnight and ready the next day.

At battle's end heading back to Japan (via Rabaul then Truk), Zuikaku has operational 13 dive-bombers, 8 torpedo planes, and 24 fighters. Non-operational were 1 fighter, 4 dive-bombers, and 2 attack planes. Thus in the two days, Zujikaku had lost 1 fighter, 8 dive-bombers, and 14 attack planes. Of these, the crew had been lost from 1 fighter, 4 dive-bombers, and 9 attack planes. Aircrew losses for Zuikaku amounted to 23 airframes and 14 aircrews. There is some doubt as to whether 9 Zekes were flown in after the battle, from Inouyes command at Rabaul, but I find that difficult to reconcile. There is no record of such transfer from Rabauls daily situation reports of any such transfer, neither is there any record of such a transfer from Truk. maybe they were transferred from the Shokaku survivors, but I tend to think this is a bogus claim.

Aircraft listed as shot down in Coral Sea, frequently turn up as having made it back to the carriers. Clearly they are not shot down, just damaged. Some are damaged beyond repair, as the 23 lost airframes for Zuikaku clearly show, but also clearly, the claims made for aircraft shot down by the USN for the Coral Sea are pretty clearly not correct.

For the Shokaku, losses are more obscure, and records incomplete, but she is known to have retained at least 9 aircraft on her decks at the conclusion of the battle. I think there were more. In regard to the losses in the night strike, this is again something misreported in American sources. 1430 CarDiv 5 launched to make a bold and risky nightfall attack on the reported American carriers. Admirals Takagi and Hara had made the decision in an effort to regain initiative, and selected their most night flying skilled pilots to participate. Sacrificing fighter cover (the Zeros aboard were not suited for night-flying escort) the 12 dive-bombers and 15 torpedo planes gamely fly to the very limits of their operational radius and well after twilight, only to find nothing and have to start back. Ironically, they had overflown TF 17, and ran into its CAP. Several are shot down, and even more amazingly, about six come within minutes of actually landing by mistake on YORKTOWN, only to spooked by gunfire at the last moment. To aid their return, Admiral Hara courageously orders CarDiv 5's searchlights switched on to give the planes a chance to land safely. But some are running out of fuel even then, and eleven crash on or near the deck or are damaged while landing. Only six of the strike lands intact and remain operational. however, this does not mean that 21 were shot down as is often reported. Losses as near as I ascertain if the landing accidents are excluded amount to about 6 aircraft. 4 were believed lost in the return flight. That might mean as few as 2 are destroyed over the US carriers.

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Apologize for the delay, it took me a while to put this together… Lots of interesting info in your post. Some I had not seen, can you share the source?

Regarding Coral Sea, I think our respective talleys of IJN a/c losses are becoming in greater agreement if I do a more careful accounting using Lundstrom who states he uses both USN IJN sources. As to disparity in USN VF claims at CS (and nominally confirmed by IJN sources), I think Lundstrom does a reasonable job of reporting these although he occasionally goes awry in his force disposition numbers. In any event, I don't consider so called 'confirmed' numbers as necessarily exact but are instead probably 'best guess estimates' made in absence of other information as seen below. Coral Sea is especially difficult because lighting/weather and perhaps the loss of the participant carrier's.

On May 7, he describes the admittedly courageous but star-crossed IJN unescorted twilight raid of 27 A/C (12 VB 15 VT) as running afoul of a CAP of 30 F4F over TF-17. USN VF CAP Claims amounted to 8 A/C destroyed (6 VF, 1VB and 1 VT) There were no IJN VF present so this seems to be a systematic misidentification by Lexington's VF-2 of B5N KATES in the dusk engagement. In any event, he reports that only 18 of the 27 A/C originally launched are recovered aboard IJN flight decks. Differing from the number you quote. One battle-damaged VT flown by its observer (its pilot being KIA) is reported to have ditched near its carrier. Unlikely as it may seem and very unusual in WW2 air combat, the claims appear to be in reasonably good correspondence with actual IJN losses given type misidentification. I expect a good portion of the claimed a/c were perhaps made redundantly on merely damaged A/C that subsequently ditched upon making their way back to their carriers or perhaps some A/C simply became lost in the dark. The mission was sufficiently dangerous to warrant such an outcome. In any event:

Total USN claims on May 7: 8 A/C

Total 'confirmed' IJN twilight-strike losses on May 7: 9 A/C (8 VT 1 VB)

Total IJN losses from all causes on May 7: 12 A/C (2 VB 10 VT)

On May 8, Lundstrom talleys claims of 20 F4Fs defending Task Force 17 as: 10 VF, 4 VB 1 VT (total: 15 A/C) while the 23 USN VSB Anti Torpedoplane Patrol (ATP) claimed: 6 VF, 1 VB, 10 VT!

USN CAP and ATP claims on May 8 thus appear to have totaled 32 A/C

IJN sources seem to confirm that VF probably downed: 3 VB and 1 VT (Total: 4 A/C) whereas USN VSB apparently accounted for 1 VB 3 VT (Total: 4 A/C)

Lundstrom estimates AAA downed 1 VB 3 VT

Thus the number of IJN aircraft likely to have been downed by all USN TF-17 defenders on May 8 appears to have totaled ~12 A/C.

Three additional kills (one of which went to young Lt (jg) Bill Leonard) were recorded by the returning USN strike groups bringing the total IJN A/C lost during the May 8 battle to 15. (8 to Cap ATP, 4 to AAA and 3 to returning strike a/c.)

Lundstrom states that on May 8, 2 IJN CAP VF were lost to USN VF escort. Seven A/C ditched near the Zuikaku and a dozen battle-damaged A/C were jettisoned over the side. One CAP VF one VB each apparently cracked up on attempting to land on damaged Shokaku, subsequent disposition unknown. He also states that his research concluded that 22 (plus the 2 downed IJN Cap to make 24) aircraft were missing or ditched on May 8. Add that to the dozen lost May 7 and the dozen jettisoned overboard and we have ~48 A/C casualties during the battle from all causes. IJN's Fifth CarDiv starts with 121 A/C (109 operational) on May 6. 48 of these are destroyed one way or another and at least 7 and perhaps 9 are unavailable being stranded on Shokaku. Thus I expect the IJN air group was reduced by ~55-57 A/C. On May 9, of the remaining A/C on Zuikaku as you pointed out there are 45 operational including 24 VF, 13 VB and 8 VT. Seems like there were perhaps another 20 nonoperational a/c distributed between the two IJN carriers.

The source of attrition during a battle is, in my view, unimportant as to whether it's an operational loss or occurs in combat. An a/c stranded on its carrier due to battle damage to either is combat ineffective until it can be repaired or transferred to a usable runway. Any such loss affects combat readiness at the end of the day. At day's end, the Yorktown had operational: 13 VF, 29 VSB 8 VT (total: 50 A/C). The IJN apparently had an edge in VF for providing both CAP and Escort but retained a relatively anemic strike capacity while the Yorktown could just about defend itself with the VF on hand but had a relatively robust strike component in its VSB units. This relatively small disparity was despite the loss of the 34 airframes that went down with the Lex (30 of which were categorized as operational).

Later for a discussion of the claims and losses during the two air battles over the Yorktown. It seems a very different circumstance especially regarding what is known due to the existence of witness testimony on both sides.

Late edit removed a pointless sentence comparing the numbers of operational a/c remaining on opposing CVs.

parsifal said:

The best reaction for the USN to such a concentrated effort would be not to show up at all, which i think is what they would have done

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What do you think the Japanese would have done had that happened that way?

I honestly dont know, but I seriously doubt any move on Hawaii.

It gets down to this. The USN needed a drawn out attritional battle, drawn out over months or years, to suck out all the reserve the Japanese might have. It got that at Guadacanal, but it needed some freed up manouver room to do that which is what midway gave them. Just how much manouver space they needed, well thats open to debate.

The Japanese were seeking a climactic showdown, and needed a one sided victory to shut the TO down. That last bit the japanese didnt see....they wanted a decisive battle to force the Americans to negotiate, but that was never going to happen. If they had won the battle, the Americans still would not surrender, from there, its an open question as to what happens next.

Performance of the USN CAP at Midway (First Battle vs. Hiryu VB Strike ):

Some stage setting 'initial conditions' pertaining to the first IJN Strike wave and the Yorktown's CAP response beginning the air battle to defend Yorktown.

The 18 Kanbaku in the first wave arrive for all practical purposes unescorted. The remaining 4 escorts from an original group of 6 have been distracted (in uncharacteristic fashion) and their entry to battle is delayed due to their chasing returning SBDs, perhaps looking for some payback.

The USN defenders are arguably the best led and most experienced group of USN Pilots and FDO team in the PTO at this stage of the war. VF-3 pilots are veterans of the Bouganville interception making O'Hare a legend. The VF-42 contingent are veterans of the Coral Sea battle. Half the 6 Yorktown CAP making the initial interception consists will become aces.

The dozen VF-3/42 CAP replacements will be the first to meet the enemy are launched and all in the air by 1150 and probably making a relatively leisurely climb to assigned patrol-altitude as they begin to join up by section and division. The join- up will not be completed and the CAP will enter the battle individually or in sections.

The first IJN wave is detected at about 1152 at 32 miles distance by Yorktown's Radar. The Radar operator, Bennett (using an A-Scope!) immediately discerns that the bogeys are climbing and presumably in the absence of an IFF response are enemy A/C. At 1152, the FDO, former VF-42 squadron CO, Oscar Pederson, directs half of the newly launched CAP to intercept. At 1158, Pederson directs the remaining CAP to the intercept and identifies the Bogies' altitude as 10,000 feet and climbing. At this point, the CAP is climbing BttW.

30 Miles NW of Yorktown, Enterprise FDO Dow (another experienced and capable director) has kept 8 VF-8 F4Fs at 20,000' and 8 VF-6 Wildcats at 10,000'. At 1158 he begins to position the Hi-CAP, fortuitously nearer the Yorktown than is TF-16, to intercept. Dow positioned the Lo-Cap to block any approach to his own TF.
At 1200, VF-3/42 Division leader Brassfield, climbing more steeply and now at 8K' and about 15 miles from Yorktown reports 18 IJN VB approaching TF-17 some miles distant. He continues to climb while maneuvering to achieve a favorable intercept geometry.

As Brassfield passes 10k' he spies the two leading F4Fs attack from below the VALs to no effect. These two a/c begin a climbing turn to a future tail-chase intercept position. A third pilot, aggressive (future double Ace) Scott McCuskey just manages to achieve a co-altitude intercept and claims the first VAL as he swings through the two IJN formations (two V of Vs, one leading, one trailing) firing at numerous targets with no certain results. Gibbs follows McCusky and claims a VAL. The two leading F4F's in the tail chase claim one each with damage to two others. Brassfield's first target jettison's his bomb and retreats. He then claims three VALs in a detailed account. At 1202, cruiser Astoria lookouts, nearest to the aerial fight report 18 VB about 15-20 miles distant. They report six a/c hitting the water shortly after. At least 10 VALs are claimed during this initial fight, and apparently 6 are pretty certainly downed as no USN a/c are lost in this phase of the battle which apparently sees the destruction of a third of the attacking force. if there had been no further actions, this intercept would appear to have been quite effective. A seventh VAL was claimed by McCusky to have exploded unseen in the clouds.

The surviving VALs apparently began to approach their target individually from different points of the compass to ensure an effective attack. However, this also extended the duration of their approach and provided more time for interceptions.

The Yorktown's tardy second CAP division had reached 18k' in the interim but could inflict no damage during their brief fight except for claiming three Zero escorts and a probably 4th.

Hornet's VF-8 HiCAP arrived in time to claim two VALs and three Zeroes.

Observers on the Yorktown report beginning at 1209, being attacked by 7 VALs with AAA accounting for two one of whose bomb hit with 5 others escaping undamaged after scoring two hits. Apparently the strike leader had jettisoned his bomb in a fight with Brassfield and was orbiting TF-17 to observe strike results. His destruction was claimed by VF-6 pilots arriving on the scene after the bombs had dropped. Brassfield claimed another VB orbiting a ditched Yorktown TBD after the battle.

Total USN VF Claims amounted to: 16 of the 18 VALs present with 8 probable, and 6 Zeros with 3 probable for the four actually present in the battle. AAA accounted for two VB. Based on claims alone, no IJN a/c escaped the battle.
Lundstrom estimates 11 VB and 3 VF were destroyed by the USN CAP and 2 fell to AAA. perhaps one or two may have survived the battle and returned to Hiryu, too damaged to fly again. However, every source I have read claims that only 5 VB returned to Hiryu as did only one of the 4 escorting A6Ms. Two other escorts had aborted earlier with one of these ditching before reaching Hiryu.

Interesting, Old Crow.

It to me shows that intercepting dive bombers can indeed be effective - but the further away from the task force the better of course, and being at the right altitude is huge.

Garyt said:

Interesting, Old Crow.

It to me shows that intercepting dive bombers can indeed be effective - but the further away from the task force the better of course, and being at the right altitude is huge.

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It certainly can be but requires a solid well trained and organized Fighter direction capability to do it. That of the USN, with the help of its british allies was slowly improving, but was spotty throughout 1942. The successful Midway interception of the Hiryu VB seems to me to be more the exception than the rule and may have owed much to the participants and unusual circumstances (tardy VB escorts). At Santa Cruz the Hornet's VF-72 intercept appeared to be well done but its success was limited by the combination of good escort performance and the limitations of the F4F… RCAFson's suggestion that it would have been smart for the USN to incorporate Sea Hurricane IIs into a USN air group until the arrival of F6F and F4U has some merit, IMHO.

By 1944, with the introduction of the F6F and F4U, the air defense of the carrier task force approached impermeability until IJ introduced massed Kamikazi assault tactics, essentially overwhelming USN CAP defenses with biologically-guided cruise missiles. In the post war decades, the threatening spectre of Soviet cruise missile armadas was somewhat analogous.

With respect to altitude and distance, the introduction of the F6F and F4U mitigated the climb performance deficiency of the F4F. Putting RADAR and FD teams aboard Pickett destroyers to improve detection range seems to have begun in 1943 but apparently didn't really mature and come into widespread implementation until late 1944 in response to the Kamikaze threat.

The Pacific War Online Encyclopedia: Destroyers (DD)

At the end of the war, the first Airborne early warning Radar picket had been developed using a modified TBF.

The Pacific War Online Encyclopedia: Cadillac

parsifal said:

I honestly dont know, but I seriously doubt any move on Hawaii.

It gets down to this. The USN needed a drawn out attritional battle, drawn out over months or years, to suck out all the reserve the Japanese might have. It got that at Guadacanal, but it needed some freed up manouver room to do that which is what midway gave them. Just how much manouver space they needed, well thats open to debate.

The Japanese were seeking a climactic showdown, and needed a one sided victory to shut the TO down. That last bit the japanese didnt see....they wanted a decisive battle to force the Americans to negotiate, but that was never going to happen. If they had won the battle, the Americans still would not surrender, from there, its an open question as to what happens next.

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I'm thinking of all those forces they brought to the dance only to then get stood up by their date. I'd think they'd have had to have taken the initiative and come after us at Pearl. Let me just lay it out for your scrutiny. Supposing they remain, how long are they going to last? Supposing they await reinforcements, that only gives us more time to heal our wounds and build up, too. Supposing they turn back just the main force. That main force was there to deliver the knockout punch after their striking force engaged us. Turn it back, they not only weaken their plan, but, overall, their Midway defenses. Going off on a six-day sail to our West Coast or Panama, we're hot on their tail, we're not going to let them do that. Maybe that's how and where they ultimately draw us out? That could be, as well, I suppose. Just racking my little brain, girls. Help me out.

Performance of the USN CAP at Midway (Second Battle vs Hiryu VT Strike ):

Hiryu CAG Tomonaga collected 10 Kates and 6 Escort Zeroes for an attack on the USN carriers. This number included his own damaged Kate, he stubbornly courageously refused to relinquish to a junior pilot.

Any residual doubt as to the skill of IJN aircrew after the extraordinary demonstration of dive bombing that scored three significant hits and two damaging misses that left Yorktown dead in the water, would be dispelled by their performance during the second strike.

As one might expect at this stage of the war, CAP coverage for Yorktown seems to have degraded a bit and become somewhat more disorganized after the Hiryu's first strike disabled the Yorktown.

Most engaged VF sought fuel and ammo on Enterprise Hornet, leaving a small CAP to protect the stricken ship. Also, the USN seems to have been caught by the requirement to recover her returning strike A/C before fully restoring the TF-17 CAP.

At 1225, Hornet launched a division of 5 or 6 F4F to protect TF-17. It patroled at 12,000' but unknowingly went NORDO and so it wasn't operating under FDO control! One FDO controlled section of the VF-8 HICAP sent by Dow patrolled at 18k' until its fuel was nearly exhausted.

At 1253, Enterprise was able to launch 8 VF as TF-16 relief CAP.

At 1253 Hornet launched an additional 3 F4Fs to reinforce TF-16's CAP,

Between 1251 and 1304, Hornet recovered 6 Yorktown CAP VF along with the surviving 3 F4Fs of one of the two VF-8 divisions sent to defend Yorktown. Actually only 6 of the 8 fighters in the two divisions ever received Dow's directions and responded accordingly. Radios and radio reception appear to have been a chronic FD problem .

At about the same time, Enterprise took aboard the other 6 of the VF-3/42 CAP defenders of Yorktown.

At 1340, the irrepressible McCusky launched leading a composite division that included 3 VF-6 pilots as a new TF-17 CAP. A section of VF-3 fighters followed McCusky and relieved the VF-8 contingent one of which ditched due to fuel starvation.

Stranded on Yorktown while she was DitW were Thach's escort A/C recovered prior the IJN VB attack and the her morning CAP. Anticipating the ship might be able to get under weigh, Thach arranged for deck crews to fuel and arm 8 additional F4Fs, in that eventuality, readying them for immediate launch if Yorktown was able to obtain an adequate wind over the deck. At 1400, Yorktown began to get moving and by about 1430 she was steaming at ~20 knots.

However, at 1427, CA Pensacola detected bogies at 45 miles. At 1429, Yorktown's FDO Peterson sent McCusky to intercept at 10k'. However, thru a miscue, the division was directed in a slightly wrong direction and they missed the Hiryu's 10 Kates and their escort of 6 Zeroes. However in directing the VF-3 section he got it right and they intercepted the raid.

At 1430 the Yorktown's own RADAR picked up the bogies at 33 miles. '

Dow sent 8 F4F at high altitude from TF-16's standing CAP as TF-17 CAP reinforcements and retained 7 fighters in reserve.

There were 30 F4F's (in various stages of being serviced) sitting on the flight decks of the other two carriers but would not become available for 20 minutes.

At 1436, McCusky's division was informed it had missed the intercept at 20-25 miles distant and was instructed to return.
At 1438, the VF-3 section under Bill Woolen radioed "Tally ho!" the two fighters destroyed one Kate in Tomonaga's 1st Chutai before they were both dispatched by the escorting Zeroes.

Just prior to 1440, the Thach's 8 F4F had not completed fueling before lines were purged. However, being only partially fueled they were able to launch in the light wind over the deck.

At 1440, Thach launched followed by Rich's dad, Bill Leonard and the remaining 6 others at less than 15 second intervals!

The initial Wildcats engaged the onrushing Kates at effectively point blank range in the midst of the screen so AAA may have played a role in what transpired next.
Thach shot down the lead a/c, Tomonaga's truncated Chutai of 4 Kates. Leonard flamed the next. He is reported to have said he was sure it was his bullets and not that of the USN AAA since most of that had been aimed at him!
Adams claimed the third Kate while the fourth Kate in the 1st Chutai escaped. Three Kates dropped their fish but no hits were recorded.

The fifth VF-3 pilot to launch, Barnes, encountered the 5 Kates of the 2nd Chutai led by Hoshimoto Toshio, approaching in an attempt to execute a classic anvil attack. Barnes was beset by two of Hashimoto's escorts and could not score. He did well to merely survive, aided by the sudden appearance of the misdirected McCusky who set one of the escorts afire. McCusky's wingman claimed the other escort. Hashimoto was witness to the two kills as well as a fight with two other of his escorts. This mele was a classic of the Pacific war on a level with the Pug Southerland vs Saburu Sakai over Guadalcanal. However, the outcome was a bit more favorable to the USN on this occasion.

In the meantime, the fight had momentarily freed the remaining 5 Kates for their runs. They soon ran afoul of a few of Thach's recently launched F4F's who were unable to down any Kates before they dropped their fish. Two of which scored on Yorktown. So far 6 Kates (one from the first Chutai and five from the 2nd Chutai had apparently survived the struggle but, in making its exit, the lone survivor of the first, ran into a division of VF-6 fighters that destroyed it. Despite being harassed by elements of the USN CAP during their retreat, five Kates and four escorting Zeroes returned to the Hiryu. Hashimoto bore witness to the events. He survived the war and apparently became an ally while serving as a Vice Admiral in the JMSDF (SS, pg. 316). Most histories of the battle state that Hiryu was preparing a strike consisting of 5 Kanbaku and 5 Kanko but Hashimoto's testimony in SS suggests 4 of the these were nonoperational so perhaps there were spares aboard the Hiryu?

USN Claims for the second air battle are 12 VT (3 Probable) and 4 VF (3 probable). This compares with IJN losses to all causes: 5 VT and 2 VF.

VBF-13 said:

I'm thinking of all those forces they brought to the dance only to then get stood up by their date. I'd think they'd have had to have taken the initiative and come after us at Pearl. .

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Who was going to make that decision? An invasion of Hawaii was strongly favoured by yammamoto, and his staff, and the general intent seems to have been to use a blockade of Pearl as some sort of bargaining chip at the expected peace talks, but apart from that, outright invasion had been vetoed by the army, and their agreement would have been needed to undertake the invasion. moreover it was also an operation also expressly refused by the Admiralty....Yammamotos boss.

He would have faced a court martial and disgrace if he had tried to pull it off. He needed to go back to the Imperial Council and get specific authorisation if he wanted to do that. Thats a possibility, but not as an immediate flow on from the operation. To give you a parrallel, in 1944, the USN favoured an invasion of Formosa over Luzon. Mac wanted to return to the PI as promised. Eventually he played dirty pool, went the president and overruled the Navy. What do you think might happen to nimitz if he decided to take Mac to Formosa anyway....things miliatry just dont work that way, not even for the japanese.

Quite apart from that the MI operation simply lacked the necessary troops to get anywhere in the main island groups.They had 5500 embarked, they already estimated they needed 45000 to invade. Further, for amphibious invasions, you just cant up and change targets like that. The invasion of Normandy....the detailed stuff, took nearly 7 months to prepare, even the japanese cant just switch targets a few days or hours before the event. Amphibious operations are highly structured and rigid operations. you have a preset plan and you pretty much are stuck with it. one of the great achievements of the US Marines, unsung and unnappreciated today, is that they developed techniques, still used today, that gave them a great deal of flexibility in being able to adjust landing plans and committment of reserves and the like. this allowed them to react very flexibly to changing tactical situations on the beach, and why everyone still thinks they are the best at what they do.

Let me just lay it out for your scrutiny. Supposing they remain, how long are they going to last? Supposing they await reinforcements, that only gives us more time to heal our wounds and build up, too.

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Its not so much what was rational, we know now that the US was never going to negotiate with the japanese. Its what the japanese hoped would happen, and flow on from a successful operation. As i pointed out a few posts agao, Midway as a plan was very much a compromise, that really please no one, and had virtually no chance of success in the strategic sense. The Japanese were quite adept at self delusion i can assure you.

What they hoped for in midway was the decisive battle, in which the USN was to be dealt a heavy defeat, and the USA thereby forced to the peace table.That was the ultimate goal of the MI operation. If the USN had declined outright battle, the target selection was designed to put the USN over a barrel anyway. The idea was to maintain surveillance of the only major forward anchorage in the pacific (or at least thats what the japanese assumed...In fact major fleet bases were being developed at Noumea, Brisbane and Auckland....not as big as Pearl, but still substantial). The general idea was that every time the Pacific Fleet moved into or out of pearl, the japanese would know. it was meant to be a dagger at the USNs throat. I doubt it would work that way. There has also been speculation that the incoming shipping....70 transports a month just to feed the population, would be targetted in a blockade operation.

None of this is relaistic, and the Japanese dont appear to have even considered how they might hold the island, but it was the general idea....force the USN into a fight it could not win, or attrition it by permanently placing it at a disadavanatge by knowing its wherabouts in advance.

Supposing they turn back just the main force. That main force was there to deliver the knockout punch after their striking force engaged us. Turn it back, they not only weaken their plan, but, overall, their Midway defenses. Going off on a six-day sail to our West Coast or Panama, we're hot on their tail, we're not going to let them do that. Maybe that's how and where they ultimately draw us out? That could be, as well, I suppose. Just racking my little brain, girls. Help me out

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This is too much japanese think for me. the japanese were wont to trying to second guess their opponents thinking all the time...offering sacrifices...thinking "if we do this, then he will do that". But there are no real indications that Yammaoto had a deper penetration rtaid than he already had undertaken. Its always a possibility, but some Japanese officers of flag rank already had cold feet about going this far.

My own opinion is that after a couple of months of trying to build the base, and trying to keep supplies going to Midway, the Japanese would have cut their losses, and abandoned the atoll. As a forward base it was untenable for them. The allies would have begun their attrition campaign, somewhere, and the japanese would have relised they needed to prepre for a long drawn out war. An early return to China might have been explored earlier, and/or the early invasion of India. This is all sheer speculation however. Factrs are we cant be sure about what might have happened. But further advance to hawaii seems most unlikely to me.

Correction: in a prior post (this thread, #205) , I mentioned a CV vs CV model that I attributed to Keegan's Price of Admiralty. That was incorrect. the model was actually presented in Fleet Tactics by retired Captain and Naval Aviator, Wayne P. Hughes Jr. (1986). Upon reviewing it, I believe it has certain flaws of simplicity but may at least be a start for discussing possible outcomes of unsymetric force confrontations we have been hypothesizing. My bottom line for any of these confrontations is that the Midway example is the least likely outcome and was itself pretty savagely fought with considerable loss to both sides despite the USN victory. One very interesting outcome of this "best case" scenario is the fact that, while the Yorktown was lost, damage to her sisters air wings was more than compensated by integrating the many refugees (VSB VF) from the damaged Yorktown's air group. Hiryu benefited in a somewhat similar manner, especially benefitting from reinforcement to her VF by the many orphaned morning CAP. If the IJN had Radar FD to augment the Zeroes performance advantage, it is possible that she might have survived the battle. Thus we may consider the USN as having a distinct survival advantage even with FD in its infancy and with the rather sub-par F4F-4 interceptor.

It is also worth considering in the outcomes of these early CV battles that a sunk CV was the exception not the rule, for both Navies. Even after two bombs and torpedo hits, Lexington was able steam under her own power and to briefly conduct flight operations. She was ultimately done in by flaws in her design, made manifest by the damage inflicted. Likewise, the immobile Yorktown was being salvaged even after three bombs and at least two torpedo hits when she was only sunk by addition of two submarine launched torpedoes in nominally USN controlled waters. Shokaku took three 1,000 lb bomb hits at Coral Sea and escaped under her own power. Later, at Santa Cruz, she took 4 such hits and once again escaped under her own power. On two Occasions, Enterprise took a number of somewhat smaller, semi-AP HE hits, and was able to escape. Even Hornet pummeled by three 250 kg bombs, two torpedoes and two suicide a/c, was not sunk. In each case involving the loss of a USN carrier, the role of the IJN's type 91 aerial torpedo was paramount in disabling the USN CV in contested waters, forcing a subsequent scuttling.

By the time of Santa Cruz, the IJN had radar early warning mounted on the Shokaku (September 1942) and the possibility of a Midway like outcome for either side had diminished substantially.

Whatever the odds, based on carrier numbers, All CV vs CV battles produced significant casualties on both sides, with the more vulnerable IJN A/C generally being in somewhat worse shape at battle's conclusion.

Also, even though the effect is obscured by events, the location of the battle may play a significant role in the results measured in surviving flight decks.

If it takes place in ocean territory covered by robust land-based air coverage, the chances for a damaged carrier's survival probably increase.

I think it matters that at Midway, Nimitz charge to his admirals was the famous "calculated risk" guidance statement. At Santa Cruz, Halsey's guidance was "Attack! Attack!" I am stirred by such aggressive, unambiguous direction and resolve, but was it the best move? The USN had, with Button (Espiritu Santu) and Cactus (Henderson Field) available A/Fs from which to stage strike and search a/c or even relay Carrier strikes. Yet, TF-16 17 responding to Halsey's command, advanced to over 500 miles distance from Button (ES) and over 400 miles distance from Cactus (HF). Land based air at Button was typically searching the area and striking at targets within 500 miles of the air base so, in hindsight, this appears to be an extremely risky move to make with the two remaining precious flight decks.

In comparison, at Midway, TF-16 17 remained within 200 nm of the island airbase during the battle. Mutual support was difficult even at that relatively close range but the base did serve as a divert as well as fulfilling its role as an unsinkable carrier.

So, I believe where the battle is fought becomes another factor in its potential outcome.

"All CV vs CV battles produced significant casualties on both sides".

Not true after 1942. US supremacy in aircraft, early warning, C&C of the CAP all contributed to less losses on the American side and increasing bad outcomes for the Japanese. Look at the results of the Mariana's battles in June 1944.

syscom3 said:

"All CV vs CV battles produced significant casualties on both sides".

Not true after 1942. US supremacy in aircraft, early warning, C&C of the CAP all contributed to less losses on the American side and increasing bad outcomes for the Japanese. Look at the results of the Mariana's battles in June 1944.

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Yes, you are of course correct. I was thinking of those occurring in 1942 but should have specified.

Even during Santa cruz you can start to see that visible loss of proficiency by the japanese. they were well and truly on the way out by then