Significance of the Battle of Midway

[Garyt]

Midway did offer one or two minor advnatages to the Japanese, but the real draw was that it was hoped the USN would come out and fight for it. The Japanese were hoping for total annhilation of the pacific fleet, not just its carriers

Yeah, Midway was merely bait for that "decisive battle" the Japanese were looking for. It's clear the way the fleet was deployed that this was to be the case, the Yamato, Nagato and Mutsu, the 3 most capable IJN battleships at that time coming up after the landing force, because they were expecting the battle with the US fleet to start after that time. A little to complicated of a plan but the real problem was the code was cracked and the US carriers ambushed the Japanese carrier strike force.

But thinking about it, the only way the IJN might have had success in the Pacific war IMO would have been to have such a decisive engagement, and to win it in a decisive fashion.

And I'm not talking about merely the carrier vs. carrier part, but a decisive engagement with opposing surface fleets. I think the US at the Battle of Midway, were it to be a surface fleet actions would have had 4-5 older battleships available, the newer 4 BB's of the North Carolina and South Dakota classes not ready until later in 1942.

Perhaps if the Japanese would have been able to force a surface engagement per their plans (this would require their code not being broken), I'd think they would have been able to do very well, particularily with the 3 Heavier Battleships present at this engagement. The Japanese torps would have fared a lot better than the US ones as well.

 

[Garyt]

duplicate post

 

[Garyt]

Postulate for the masses just how you, the strategic arm of IJN, would cause any disruption to US initiatives by taking Midway?

I'd think there would be a few minor advantages. Another station for sub re-fueling, replentishment, a more forward base for seaplane re fueling, perhaps the ability to keep a better eye on the American fleet. Not suggesting a frequent flyover of Pearl, but an airbase closer to Pearl that would be more of a warning for Central Pacific operations.

IF there was a substantial air presence on Midway, and IF they were able to keep supplied, this could also be a base that could exert a presence again in the mid Pacific. Though I think it would fall easier than Tarawa. Japanese best bet would be if they could arrive at an attempted US invasion of Midway prior to the US fleet getting there. This way there could be some co-ordination between the land based air and the Japanese carriers, tho these type of attacks did not always co-ordinate the best anyway.

 

[drgondog]

GaryT - look at Wake Island as closest possible point to provide air transport with small payload to Midway and ask yourself if that is even possible. Next look at how many assets IJN must dedicate to TRY to prevent an assault on Wake Is when staged from Pearl Harbor. Then ask yourself how to build a port at Wake to stage cargo, and build assets on Wake to service the airfield to build up an airpower presence - then reflect on the mission you would expect for Midway presence?

Interdiction to supply chain to Australia? with what type aircraft? Submarine base? Impossible to get subs inside the atoll - impossible to re-supply them and really impossible to defend Wake from US... so, why bother other than use an attack to draw out US Fleet for Midway Battle on June 2?

Take a look at the shallow water/atoll surrounding Midway and ask yourself a.) how you would build up Wake and b.) why?

As to 'co-ordinate' a defense of Midway with IJN air/fleet resources.. How, unless you place on station a substantial portion of the IJN fleet in Midway waters which could react within two days of intelligence warning from submarine or very long range recon from Midway? What could be better for US submarines roaming from Pearl harbor to set up only 1200 miles away rather than travelling to Java, Philippines and Japan to look for targets?

 

[VBF-13]

Postulate for the masses just how you, the strategic arm of IJN, would cause any disruption to US initiatives by taking Midway?

What about going right from there to Pearl? They had the horses for it.

 

[syscom3]

What about going right from there to Pearl? They had the horses for it.

So by sending Betty's on 2600 mile (round trip) missions into the waiting arms of Wildcats, P40s, and Lightnings is going to end good for the IJN aircrews?

 

[RpR]

Take a look at the shallow water/atoll surrounding Midway and ask yourself a.) how you would build up Wake and b.) why?

Here is some fecal debris from

'The Navy Department Library'

Midway

In the initial plans for Midway, it was proposed to develop it as a base for one patrol squadron of seaplanes. Subsequently, it became a major submarine base, a major air station for both land- and seaplanes, and a fueling and repair base for ships.

Midway is a coral atoll situated in almost the exact center of the North Pacific Ocean. Hemmed in by jutting coral reefs enclosing about 28 square miles of shallow lagoon, the two islands of Sand and Eastern, collectively known as Midway, lie 300 miles north and 900 miles west of Honolulu. Sand Island, the larger, measures about a mile and a half long by a mile wide, and was originally capped by a hill rising 42 feet above sea level. Eastern Island, triangular in shape and flat, measured a mile and a quarter long by three quarters of a mile wide.

In 1938, Navy funds to the extent of $1,100,000 were made available to the Army for harbor and channel improvements. The Army was to dredge a channel through the southern reef between Sand and Eastern Islands, scoop out a seaplane basin, and dredge a channel 30 feet deep and 300 feet wide to a proposed submarine basin and an anchorage for small ships. A turning basin was to be provided adjacent to the submarine basin, northeast of Sand Island, and a breakwater was to be built. The Army completed this work in 1940.

I am sure you know better though.

 

[VBF-13]

So by sending Betty's on 2600 mile (round trip) missions into the waiting arms of Wildcats, P40s, and Lightnings is going to end good for the IJN aircrews?

Midway was a cinch. They were already having their mail forwarded to there. And look at the battleships they brought to the dance in the main force, which wasn't even the striking force. They weren't contemplating just awaiting a carrier battle, not when they brought everything they had in the barn. They were planning on their two other big carriers, too, but for the fact of one of them having been badly hit, and the other one having lost its air group. They were bringing in their two best air groups, the cream of their crop, to this dance. At Coral Sea, they stood off the best we had to a draw, with only a mediocre air group. I know what the historians say, but in the aftermath, they leave a big, gaping hole. If the Japanese were planning on going for Pearl, they had the battleships in the main force to do it, but they needed Midway off their back. I'm saying, fill in that big, gaping hole with, Pearl was still the jugular, and they brought too much to Midway, way too much, for just a carrier dance. That's why that main force turned back, too, it was useless after the striking force was finished off.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

I consider my propensity to engage in "what if " scenarios, to be a deep personal flaw, yet I also find them irresistible.
IMHO, this thread's devolution into wild blue-sky speculation is a perfect example of its pitfalls and allure.

Any scenario projection that doesn't take into account real logistics capability and intelligence is IMO fundamentally based on fantasy. Order of battle robustness is almost the least important aspect of warfare (clearly an overstatement so don't jump all over me! ) Because the US possessed superior intel on IJN intentions and force dispositions, it could concentrate the forces it had on hand to greatest effect. The quality of air crew and aircraft notwithstanding, the forces arrayed by either side were about equal (four CV air wings vs four CV air wings), except for three elements that provided tangible and potential edges to the US in the event of a less than acceptable outcome and an IJN attempt to land on Midway. Those were, the PBY's to provide long-range search (and limited night attack), B-17s from Oahu to provide long range strike on surface targets, and of course the concentration of submarines in the Midway area. Also influencing post-Midway decisions of both sides is the overlay of national military attitudes which include a fatal mutual contempt/conceit for each opponent's abilities. (e.g. the USN's largely racist attitudes and belief in the inferiority of the IJN equipment and personal and an analogous IJ cultural belief in the inherent inferiority of western fighting ability and spirit.)

Given that, by Nimitz personal guidance, an even-exchange of Carriers was not an acceptable outcome, a two-to-one CV exchange would NOT have been a tactical defeat, it would likely have been considered a catastrophe. Forget the possible loss of Midway, that was almost beside the point. Minimum standard of victory was at least an exchange of one for two CVs.

To quote Nimitz: "In carrying out the task assigned....you will be governed by the principle of calculated risk, which you will interpret to mean the avoidance of exposure of your force to attack by superior enemy forces without prospect of inflicting, as a result of such exposure, greater damage to the enemy"

So, there seems to be multiple possible alternate outcomes of the battle that might be in play here:

1. What is the scenario for a tactical defeat which would be defined by an exchange of one for one.
2. What is the scenario for a tactical catastrophic defeat which would be defined by an exchange of two for one, or worse and currently being discussed.
3. The consequences of the loss of Midway itself and also currently being discussed.

In the discussion, does the USN lose the services of the air wing personnel from the lost carrier? Considering how often the USN airman from lost CVs were redeployed to operate from land bases in SoPac and that Midway was 'unsinkable', it is likely there would be refugees based there making it that much more difficult a nut to crack. Midway was in fact a temporary refuge for a fair number of Hornet SBDs.

Actually the outcome of the Midway battle did lose the USN the immediate use of two CVs. Hornet performed so badly at Midway it was apparently deemed to be in need of training and so would not be available for the next operation: Watchtower.

Seems to me, that both sides regarded Midway as relatively secondary importance compared to destruction of its opponent's fleet units. Why? Because both sides recognized the point on which the Pacific war turned was the isolation of Australia. The USN CVs were the forces that could disrupt IJN progress to that end and IJN CVs a primary implement for successfully securing that objective. if you reduce the USN by 2 CVs which will be replaced by Sara, Wasp and possibly Ranger, Post Midway, Watchtower HAS to proceed because its delay threatens at least the longevity of the war. It was all about logistics.

 

[parsifal]

The Japanese were very undecided as to what they needed to do. This is discussed at some length in Shattered Sword. The options did include a direct invasion of Hawaii, but that along with other plans at various times after 1941 were all rejected. The Japanese between January 1942 and the end of March 1942 proposed a withering number of different options, none of them realistic and all of them quite beyond the real capabilities of japan. The options seriously considered by the Japanese included

1) Yammamoto favoured a direct assault on Oahu, and he and his staff had been strongly in favour of that option since before the war. but they could not get the support of the senior naval staff, and more importantly the Army simply ruled it out as untenable. For once the Army were more realistic in determining that that shipping would not be sufficient to take and hold the islands. They grossly under-estimated the troop numbers needed to take the islands....45000 men, when the defenders numbered 70000 in combat troops alone.

1) A direct invasion of Australia - vetoed by the Army as being too costly in manpower and excessive in the demands of shipping. Combined fleet was moderately opposed to the concept,

2) A reduced option to take the northern part of Australia received lukewarm support from the Army, some support by the Combined fleet, but was shot down by the Japanese Admiralty. I forget the exact reasoning, but I think it was to do with the basic untenable nature of a "half conquest"

3) The South Pacific option, whereby Japan moved to capture islands as far away as fiji and Samoa, to isolate Australia, was supported the Admiralty and the Army, but rejected by Combined fleet, because it would be unlikely to draw the USN out for the all important "decisive battle". The Army and the Admiralty acquiesced to this, though it was not really fully abandoned until the latter part of Guadacanal.

4) An attack into India as that also took in the capture of Madagascar, to link up with the Germans and Italians. The army was half persuaded by the lure of a revolt in India being the main source of manpower. It was war-gamed in April 1942, with bad outcomes. on this occasion the results were accepted by both the Army and Navy staffs. An invasion of India was never shelved though, and in fact was the centre piece of the Army's 1944 campaign under Mutaguchi. A significant naval involvement was again finally still born by Yammamotos opposition. He felt (correctly in my view) that a distraction to the Indian Ocean for the Navy would give the American opportunity to recover and counterattack

5) Relinquish the initiative and go over the defensive, return some air groups to the training schools, and see the decisive battle as the Americans began their counteroffensive, expected in 1944-5in the marshalls and or the Marianas. Nagano strongly favoured this approach and almost had the argument in the bag. Yammaoto strongly opposed such "defeatist" attitude, and worked tirelessly to discredit it. Nagano and Yammamoto hated each other, so more than a little, the debate was personal and bitter. This option almost won the day however, except that in April the USN delivered the Doolittle raid, which sent the Japanese high command loopy over concerns for the emperors personal safety.

6) For the above reason (the Doolittle raid), Yammamoto was able to establish that the Nagano plan was dangerous to the emperor, and given all the other possibilities had been rejected or deferred for one reason or another came up with the Midway plan (actually the planning was already well under way by the April raid) . there were two permutations considered initially, the capture of the island of Palmyra and secondly the capture of Midway. midway was chosen because there were more facilities alreary built on the island, and this would place the security of Oahu at risk as it would allow almost imediate surveillance to begin.

Midway was never viewed with a great deal of enthusiasm by anybody, even Yammamoto, but it was a pplan forward, and it compromised for all the people and players involved. as a plan it was a half meassure and a compromise, and likle all such compromises, unlikley to succeed in any of its objectives.

Shattered Sword, in its appraisal of the Midway victory, reluctantly dabbles briefly in the possibilities and implications arising from an alternate history. It rules out the possibility of an assault on Oahu as never a serious proposition for the Japanese, rules out an allied invasion of Gudacanal (but in reaching that conclusion fails to take into account the RAAF and Australian Army at all, and assumes the loss of all three USA carriers on that "what if". It discount the ability of a Japanese victory, of any magnitude at midway as having any significant long term effects on the outcome of the war, though it does acknowledge the possibility of the war extending into 1946. it also discounts the old chestnut of the significant impact on Japanese aircrew, but does point out that the replacement hulls for the IJN were never quite the equals in terms of quality as those in CarDiv 1 and 2, lost at Midway. Points out the loss of "corporate knowledge" with an estimated 40% of the skilled mechanics and technical staff associated with Japanese Carrier Aviation lost in a single stroke.

Midway was not the "battle that saved America". It did not "save Hawaii". It did not "save Australia". Iy had no effect on the ETO, or any of the other super powers that people are attempting to ascribe to it. It defeated a major effort of the Japanese, and showed to the world, that the Japanese were not invincible, and this was going to be a long war, which the US was certain to win. It exposed glaring weknesses in the Japanese air arm, and thje fracture lines in the Japanese high command. Avoiding a total, one sided defeat allowed the USN to consider an early rather than later attack elsewhere.

 

[VBF-13]

Any scenario projection that doesn't take into account real logistics capability and intelligence is IMO fundamentally based on fantasy.

While the intelligence suggested the Japanese were going for Midway, Emmons, who, like many others, understood little of Rochefort's work, knew the Japanese had the capability to go for Hawaii. His bombers go under CINCPAC control, in effect, leaving him with nothing at Hawaii, he, not Nimitz, takes the blast from the War Department for that. Midway was intelligence winning out over capability.

 

[parsifal]

So, there seems to be multiple possible alternate outcomes of the battle that might be in play here:

1. What is the scenario for a tactical defeat which would be defined by an exchange of one for one.
2. What is the scenario for a tactical catastrophic defeat which would be defined by an exchange of two for one, or worse and currently being discussed.
3. The consequences of the loss of Midway itself and also currently being discussed.

This, in its obvious simplicity, is an elegant and succint way of defining the propblem.

In relation to your point 1, I assume you are saying a 1 for 1 exchange rate is an American tactical defeat. If ther was an Ozawa, rather than a Nagumo in charge, it is conceivable that Akagi might have avoided the initial carnage. With two carriers surviving to opening rounds, the Japanese counterattack may well have caused the loss or incapacitation of two US carriers, and from there a withdrawal by the USN rather than a further exposure to more attacks. Its all conjecture of course, but the nature of the Japanese air airm is that it would derive more from its attacking stance, not that it would minimise losses. a more air minded fleet commander such as Ozawa, may have seen the IJN more aware of its surroundings. Ozawa never was caught short by his searches in the same way as Nagumo was.

So, the most likley (IMO) tactical scenario is the loss of two carriers for two carriers, or tywo IJN for one USN carrier lost and one damaged, a withdrawal by the USN and then loss of the atoll to the surface attack.

In relation to your point 2, a loss of two US carriers for one IJN carrier is lengthening the odds considerably, but I still see this as a strategic US victory. It depends on the aircrew losses for the Japanese really. Say Enterprise survives, that means, if the assault on Guadacanal is delayed by one month, the makes their landings with Saratoga, Wasp, and the big E. If Torch is delayed by a month, you can add Ranger, Chenango, Suwannee and Santee to the available carriers. In this scenario, the Japanese victory has gained them one months freedom of action (maybe a bit more, or a bit less) , but not a great deal else. again the real issue are what the aircrew losses for the japanese are, not the number of carriers they lose.

There is a permutation of this scenario, and that is that the Japanese discover the USN, destroy it, and lose no carriers and no significant numbers of aircrew. this is THE nightmare scenario, the one likley to lead to major changes in the history timeline. 3 US carriers, plus a lot of surface warships, to say under 100 Japanese aircrew lost. That would have been an earth shattering, history changing result

in relation to your point 3, Midway offered some real advantages to whover controlled it, but not earth shattering. it was always about the fleets and the losses either side might suffer one way ofr the other in my opinion

 

[syscom3]

The Japanese had zero capability of going for Peal Harbor. Their attack in the first place succeeded because they had complete surprise at every level. Not so after Dec 8th 1941. Any attack after that date would be a disaster for them.

 

[parsifal]

why caveat just pearl harbour? all of the studies undertaken by the Japanese (not the most objective of militarys staffs I might add) showed serious problems for all the further exapansions they were considering.

Some have argued that the Japanese might have embarked on some form of blockade against the Hawaii supply lines. There were an average of 70 shiiping movements per month between the west coast and Hawaii . a tempting target, but how vulnerable in reality were these supply lines. At the beginning of the war the Japanese had attempted attempted a Ub-boat camapign off the coast of California with conspicuous lack of success. About 40000 tons was sunk, with a number of submarines lost. Despite several months of effort, this poor excahange rate neer really improved. only after the Japanese moved to other hunting grounds were they able to get a decent return for the sub forces.

They could have intercepted convoys with their carriers, reducing Pearl to a sort of "Malta in the Pacific". i think this might have yielded some temporary good results, but this was no war winning strategy, and certainly did not justify capture of Midway of itself, since the US would be doing exactly the same to the japanese re-supply efforts to Midway.

In retrospect, ,Nagano was absolutley right. The Japanese had achieved their territotial objectives, and now had to rest, fortify and prepare as best they could for the inevitabloe American riposte. I see great opportunities for some significant delaying actionsby the Japanese. Say, the Americans atttack Tarawa, with 6 or 7 flatops in support as they did, in late 1943. They are met by 6 japanese carriers, plus the 500 or so aircraft based in the Marshalls. Difference is, in the training of the Japanese aircrew. These guys are better trained and better supplied than historical. It becomes a very nasty situation very quickly without thinking too much about it....

 

[BiffF15]

Parsifal,

Thanks for delving so deep in the Pacific war for us (or me). My question is who recognized, and when, that the Allies were getting the upper hand? It seems so easy in retrospect looking back through the lens of history that it should have been obvious, however that could just be projection on my part.

Cheers,
Biff

 

[kettbo]

some very interesting and thoughtful comments here

 

[parsifal]

Parsifal,

Thanks for delving so deep in the Pacific war for us (or me). My question is who recognized, and when, that the Allies were getting the upper hand? It seems so easy in retrospect looking back through the lens of history that it should have been obvious, however that could just be projection on my part.

Cheers,
Biff

Japanese showed a remarkable ability not to face the truth until well into the war. having said that, there are enormous exceptions here and there, as various individuals came to grips with the enormity of the challenge facing Japan.

Im not sure who exactly first realized what was happening, but a good start is Yammamoto himself. he was against war with the US from before the war. once at war, he dived in at the deep end, and was a passionate beliver in taking the fight right up to the Americans.

Others in the Japanese Admiralty were also aware of the fragility of the Japanese position. At the top of the list for me was admiral Nagano, Yammamotos arch rival. After the initial offensive, he was against further expansion. not a defeatist as claimed by Yammamoto. He simply was probably more aware of japanese limitations than most of his colleagues. He advocated a dfensive posture after May 1942. I think the capture of Port Moresby was a necaessary further step, but after that, Japan was well advised to pull up and consolidate gains.

It was not until after Phil Sea that the majority of the Japanese leadership began to accept they were facing defeat. It led to the resignation of Tojo, and from that point on, increasingly conciliatory Japanese governments seeking a way out of the war. Even then, there were significant elements opposed to any peace deal.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

This, in its obvious simplicity, is an elegant and succint way of defining the propblem.

Thanks but probably too simplistic (see below).

In relation to your point 1, I assume you are saying a 1 for 1 exchange rate is an American tactical defeat.

Yep, that's what I am saying. That's how I interpret Nimitz's guidance statement.

If ther was an Ozawa, rather than a Nagumo in charge, it is conceivable that Akagi might have avoided the initial carnage. With two carriers surviving to opening rounds, the Japanese counterattack may well have caused the loss or incapacitation of two US carriers, and from there a withdrawal by the USN rather than a further exposure to more attacks. Its all conjecture of course, but the nature of the Japanese air airm is that it would derive more from its attacking stance, not that it would minimise losses. a more air minded fleet commander such as Ozawa, may have seen the IJN more aware of its surroundings. Ozawa never was caught short by his searches in the same way as Nagumo was.

Ozawa was clearly a smarter cookie than Nagumo but based on your original compelling case for A/C and air crew replacement issues, I believe even that may not make that much difference. Historically, we have the IJN launching half its available a/c for the raid on Midway. In the face of very strong Escort, the relatively week Island CAP destroys or renders inop about 10% of the attacking A/C (with heaviest losses to Hiryu's VT complement). Let's try to keep to the historic events as much as possible and just work within the decisions made at the time as opposed to random altering of events.

Let's say that, upon the Tone search plane's sighting of a USN surface force, Nagumo preempts Yamaguichi's later suggestion to launch all the available reserve a/c immediately. According to SS, an immediate launch would constitute a strike comprising no more than about 30VT and 34VB and between 12 to 24 VF as escort. There remained 58 VF from which to draw both CAP and Escort. If you assign 24 of the air group VF to escort, you are left with 11 from the CV Air Group and the 21 A6Ms of the 6th Air Group, intended for basing at Midway. A stronger escort will no doubt mean trouble for the USN at their CVs, but also reduces by about half the actual CAP protecting the IJN CV especially during the early USN CV-Based VT and subsequent USN VB attacks so the the chances for damage to the IJN CVs may increase, while losses among USN VT and VB are probably reduced. A toe-to-toe fight between the USN and IJN CVs is likely to be a bloody affair. I expect it will follow the course of the other three CV battles in '42 with heavy IJN aircrew and aircraft losses, sufficient to reduce their effectiveness even if the USN suffers losses and is forced to retire. Protecting the USN CVs will be a CAP comprised of something like two thirds or more of the 56 VF not used as escort. A pitched battle over the CVs of both navies may actually have been more costly than what occurred historically; especially to IJN aircrews if it follows the course of other CV vs CV battles in '42. I think the big difference in outcome would be the preservation of IJN flight decks for future repair and use. However, from what you have said, the increased loss of experienced aircrew and the difficulty in procuring replacement a/c means the repaired IJN flat tops are actually less effective in stopping the USN's operations in SoPac while Watch tower proceeds on schedule with pretty much the CVs historically used.

So, the most likley (IMO) tactical scenario is the loss of two carriers for two carriers, or tywo IJN for one USN carrier lost and one damaged, a withdrawal by the USN and then loss of the atoll to the surface attack.

I think the most likely scenario is two US CVs lost (sunk) with at least damage to three IJN CVs putting them out of the fight. But numbers of flight decks don't reveal the whole story as you have pointed out.

We have the example of Enterprise at Santa Cruz to show recovery of ~100 a/c on just one Yorktown class CV was feasible with a nearby airbase for overflow divert. So under what appear to be 'optimal IJN circumstances' we have a potential outcome with an operational loss of at least three IJN CVs (not necessarily sunk but forced to retire) vs probably two USN CVs sunk. In terms of air groups, instead of the historic USN numerical aircrew A/C losses equivalent to two CV Air Groups we have instead a loss of about 2.5 AGs with perhaps half an air group (A probable dozen VB and dozen VF formerly CV a/c emplaced at Midway). Perhaps even more of the remaining USN CV-based AG A/C would be based at Midway when the remaining US CV necessarily retreats to PH. it seems to me that once landing operations were commenced, the B-17's effectiveness improves significantly. While only little more than a dozen B-17s were employed at Midway, there were roughly 50 total that could be staged from Oahu. I believe it would be the first time in the Pacific war that such massed heavy bomber attack were mounted. I just don't see Midway falling to an IJN assault with only one operational CV to provide air support. The addition of Zuiho might help a little but her complement was a bit short on A6Ms.

In relation to your point 2, a loss of two US carriers for one IJN carrier is lengthening the odds considerably, but I still see this as a strategic US victory. It depends on the aircrew losses for the Japanese really. Say Enterprise survives, that means, if the assault on Guadacanal is delayed by one month, the makes their landings with Saratoga, Wasp, and the big E. If Torch is delayed by a month, you can add Ranger, Chenango, Suwannee and Santee to the available carriers. In this scenario, the Japanese victory has gained them one months freedom of action (maybe a bit more, or a bit less) , but not a great deal else. again the real issue are what the aircrew losses for the japanese are, not the number of carriers they lose.

I agree, even in the event of a poorer trade but also believe that making good USN A/C and air crew losses would allow the historic schedule to be retained. Sara arrived at Pearl with replacement air crew and carrying 107 replacement a/c on June 6. June 11 Wasp entered the Pacific. I think your point about aircrew losses being more important than flight decks is spot on.

There is a permutation of this scenario, and that is that the Japanese discover the USN, destroy it, and lose no carriers and no significant numbers of aircrew. this is THE nightmare scenario, the one likley to lead to major changes in the history timeline. 3 US carriers, plus a lot of surface warships, to say under 100 Japanese aircrew lost. That would have been an earth shattering, history changing result

That is indeed a nightmare scenario for the USN. I just have a hard time believing that the navy that sets the trap is likely to be surprised but I suppose its possible.

in relation to your point 3, Midway offered some real advantages to whover controlled it, but not earth shattering. it was always about the fleets and the losses either side might suffer one way ofr the other in my opinion

I think it certainly offered some advantages to the USN. I am not sure the IJN could have enjoyed the same ones. The idea of projecting power from Midway to prevent a USN southern or central Pacific advance seems geographically impossible. The US counterpart to the ribbon defense started due south--west of Hawaii at Johnston Island and continued from there South west to Palmyra Island and on to Fiji. Johnston Island is almost 1,000 miles from Midway. I believe typical IJN air search umbrella radius was 600 miles. Palmyra was almost 2,000 miles from Midway.

Late edits:
Removed redundant 'search' from Tone reference.
Replaced 'follow' with 'preempts' before Yamaguchi
rearranged text so that sentence formerly reading '...IJN aircrew aircraft and losses..." now reads: '...IJN aircrew and aircraft losses...'
Added date of Sara's arrival at PH.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Oops, meant South East to Palmyra

 

[gjs238]

Actually the outcome of the Midway battle did lose the USN the immediate use of two CVs. Hornet performed so badly at Midway it was apparently deemed to be in need of training and so would not be available for the next operation: Watchtower.

5) Relinquish the initiative and go over the defensive, return some air groups to the training schools, and see the decisive battle as the Americans began their counteroffensive, expected in 1944-5in the marshalls and or the Marianas. Nagano strongly favoured this approach and almost had the argument in the bag. Yammaoto strongly opposed such "defeatist" attitude, and worked tirelessly to discredit it. Nagano and Yammamoto hated each other, so more than a little, the debate was personal and bitter. This option almost won the day however, except that in April the USN delivered the Doolittle raid, which sent the Japanese high command loopy over concerns for the emperors personal safety.

6) For the above reason (the Doolittle raid), Yammamoto was able to establish that the Nagano plan was dangerous to the emperor, and given all the other possibilities had been rejected or deferred for one reason or another came up with the Midway plan (actually the planning was already well under way by the April raid) . there were two permutations considered initially, the capture of the island of Palmyra and secondly the capture of Midway. midway was chosen because there were more facilities alreary built on the island, and this would place the security of Oahu at risk as it would allow almost imediate surveillance to begin.

Yet more ramifications of the Doolittle Raid

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/ww2-general/doolittle-raid-short-long-term-ramifications-40319.html