Significance of the Battle of Midway

[parsifal]

hi oldcrow

most certainly the only way the Japanese can win any sort of meaningful victory is if they could somehow pull off a totally one sided victory over the USN. If they did that, then the offensive potential of the allies, not just the Americans, in the whole PTO is lost with the battle, for a considerable period. If those conditions are achieved, then it also gives time to the Japanese to make good their losses and fortify, and perhaps even undertake to odd minor attack or two.

If the USN lost say three, carriers, say 2 or three cruisers, and say 8 Destroyers, their surviving aviators escaping to Midway only to be captured when the island falls, then everything changes. Everything ive said about the Japanese being unable to achieve victory no longer would hold true, because they would have achieved the impossible.

This was precisely what the Japanese were seeking, but it was a pipe dream, an unobtainable goal, well, at least with the plan they had.

in my view that is the only circumstance that the Japanese could have achieved a meaningful war changing victory. Even then I dont think the Japanese could avoid defeat, it would just take a lot longer.

But anything else is just not going to cut it for them. And achieving a one sided victory like that is just implausible IMO

 

[oldcrowcv63]

...achieving a one sided victory like that is just implausible IMO

Yep, I agree. Midway was an 'incredible victory' not so much because the allies won, but because it was so ridiculously one sided. I don't think anyone on either side really expected or could have imagined that outcome.

A similarly lopsided IJN victory was even more incredible than that of the USN's.

 

[parsifal]

Let's say that, upon the Tone search plane's sighting of a USN surface force, Nagumo preempts Yamaguichi's later suggestion to launch all the available reserve a/c immediately. According to SS, an immediate launch would constitute a strike comprising no more than about 30VT and 34VB and between 12 to 24 VF as escort. There remained 58 VF from which to draw both CAP and Escort. If you assign 24 of the air group VF to escort, you are left with 11 from the CV Air Group and the 21 A6Ms of the 6th Air Group, intended for basing at Midway. A stronger escort will no doubt mean trouble for the USN at their CVs, but also reduces by about half the actual CAP protecting the IJN CV especially during the early USN CV-Based VT and subsequent USN VB attacks so the the chances for damage to the IJN CVs may increase, while losses among USN VT and VB are probably reduced. A toe-to-toe fight between the USN and IJN CVs is likely to be a bloody affair. I expect it will follow the course of the other three CV battles in '42 with heavy IJN aircrew and aircraft losses, sufficient to reduce their effectiveness even if the USN suffers losses and is forced to retire. Protecting the USN CVs will be a CAP comprised of something like two thirds or more of the 56 VF not used as escort. A pitched battle over the CVs of both navies may actually have been more costly than what occurred historically; especially to IJN aircrews if it follows the course of other CV vs CV battles in '42. I think the big difference in outcome would be the preservation of IJN flight decks for future repair and use. However, from what you have said, the increased loss of experienced aircrew and the difficulty in procuring replacement a/c means the repaired IJN flat tops are actually less effective in stopping the USN's operations in SoPac while Watch tower proceeds on schedule with pretty much the CVs historically used.

34VT +30Vt + say 16 VF is a very hefty attack. During Coral Sea the strike that caused the loss of Lex consisted of 23 VB, 16 VT (2 were shot down or failed to locate target) escorted by 14 VF. they were picked up at 80 miles by Lex's radar, and all CAP was promptly scrambled. There were a total of 45 US VFs available of which at least 22 were on or over the carriers for CAP, but only 8 were airborne, and these were reinforced by a further nine F4Fs. in desperation the US threw in 23 SBDs as emergency CAP. There are wildly overestimated claims made on the Japanese losses. The Divebombers came in from 17K, the Kates attacked at deck level. The 8 standing CAP were short of fuel,and for the emergency CAP, only 2 F4Fs got to height in time. However the combination of the Flak and the SBDs were effective in protecting Yorktown. The Japanese, as one might expect, split into two groups, 9 Kates attacked the Yorktown, 6 attacked the Lex (dont know what happened to the last Kate), D3As split their attentions more or less equally.

From that committment of force the Japanese made no torp hits on the Yorktown, 2 hits on the Lex. there were three bomb hits on the lex and 1 hit on the yorktown.

American sources claim over twenty japanaese aircraft shot down in these attacks, but Japanese sources show 12 aircaft lost in these attacks.

We dont know how effective CAP against a n early strike at midway might have been. Certainbly at Santa Cruz and Eastern Sooomons it was deadly, and it was also quite effective at Midway I believe, but it really gets down to the luck of the draw, except if you have really well diciplined fighter controllers, and fighters that are listening and in position. The Coral Sea experience showed that didnt always happen.

At Coral Sea, the USN suffered 6 hits from 24 launches/bomb releases (roughly). Thats about a hit ratio of 25% for CarDiv 5. A similar midway attack would see 64 launches. We dont know how many shoot downs the CAP would achieve, but if in proportion to Coral Sea, might be 15-25 shoot downs. in this Midway scenario, we should assume 20 a/c lost to CAP and Flak, leaving an estimated 44 likely launches or releases. CarDiv 1 and 2 were better trained than CarDiv5 but how much difference that might make im not sure. Enterprise was better trained than any other CAG, but Hornet was a lot less well trained. Id guess CarDiv 1 and 2 to be around 35% hit rate, but thats very open to debate.

On that basis, you would expect the early Japanese strike to achieve 14-20 hits. Thats enough to sink two, possibly three carriers, given the DC effectiveness of 1942. but we dont know a lot of things. The effectiveness of the CAP, and whewther the hits are evenly distributed are the most obvious unknowns.

.

 

[Garyt]

On that basis, you would expect the early Japanese strike to achieve 14-20 hits. Thats enough to sink two, possibly three carriers, given the DC effectiveness of 1942. but we dont know a lot of things. The effectiveness of the CAP, and whewther the hits are evenly distributed are the most obvious unknowns.

Another thing as well - fighting off the Japanese attacks would have made it rather impossible for the US to launch it's own strikes, much like the problem the Japanese faced. After such an attack, the US would be lucky to launch a full carrier load of planes as a strike. And this would be against the top Japanese pilots, who would have had a better chance to interdict this strike effectively. IMO, the US is lucky to take out one Japanese carrier with a retaliatory strike, and that launching US carrier is also then lost.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

I believe it's John Keegan in Price of Admiralty who reduces CV vs CV warfare and probable outcomes to its elemental parts. IIRC, He asserts with some validity that, Carrier forces need to devote one AG to sink a CV. So with his reasoning two CV AGs should nominally be able to destroy two carriers with chance playing a more or less greater role in achieving better results. At Midway the USN destroyed three CVs with three air groups engaged. In an optimistic IJN favorable scenario there are four IJN CVs able to launch an immediate strike with half their strike A/C. So with this calculus, I expect fleet average to be destruction of two USN CVs. Just for argument's sake.

As to CAP performance at Midway. The only CAP truly engaged did extremely well and set a standard for the rest of 1942. Roughly a dozen VF-42/3 F4F-4s used in two separate sorties destroyed ~21 IJN a/c (11 VB, 3 VF and 5 VT and 2 VF) out of a total of 28 VB VT protected by 12 VF escort. That's 21 of the 40 A/C in the strike or over 50% losses. (my estimate of 2/3rds below is probably over optimistic from USN standpoint.)

The USN VF squadron pilots were pretty much combat vets with practiced FD control some having been at Coral Sea and others with the Lex during the Bouganville raid. Enterprise was also experienced, not quite so much individually as Yorktown's VF, but operating as a unit for a longer period.
I'd expect a similar performance from Enterprise VF-6 with probably similar numbers of A/C engaged. Hornet's VF-8 is simply an unknown. It apparently ceased to exist for all practical purposes after Midway. Based on such lousy-goosey or back of the envelope (BOTEC) estimates I'd say the chances were that IJN attackers could lose half to 2/3rds of their initial strike on the USN carriers. But that's totally speculative and losses could perhaps be much less given a stronger and better handled IJN escort component.

I think it's safe to say the battle would be pretty bloody for both sides.

Late edit: Had to go back to First Team to revise upward the talley of USN CAP-downed IJN strike a/c.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Another thing as well - fighting off the Japanese attacks would have made it rather impossible for the US to launch it's own strikes, much like the problem the Japanese faced. After such an attack, the US would be lucky to launch a full carrier load of planes as a strike. And this would be against the top Japanese pilots, who would have had a better chance to interdict this strike effectively. IMO, the US is lucky to take out one Japanese carrier with a retaliatory strike, and that launching US carrier is also then lost.

Gary, the timing is off for this to be an issue. The IJN strike wouldn't have arrived at the USN units until their decks were long cleared. We are really down to two well prepared navies duking it out in comparable conditions of preparedness with the actual forces available to fight the battle.

Unless of course the IJN breaks the US codes and knows its headed into a trap and springs its own with a./c arriving overhead between about 7 and 9 AM. But the USN has RADAR which IJN does not at this stage and USN decks can be cleared and conditions made safe.

 

[VBF-13]

The Japanese had zero capability of going for Peal Harbor. Their attack in the first place succeeded because they had complete surprise at every level. Not so after Dec 8th 1941. Any attack after that date would be a disaster for them.

Where on Earth did you get that from? Certainly, not from here:

"Carried away by the mounting excitement, it was hard for the insiders at CINCPAC to realize that some people were still dubious about the whole business. On May 16 or 17 Nimitz received a letter from General Emmons saying he appreciated the intelligence, but felt he ought to point something out. The estimates were based on enemy intentions rather than capabilities. It was safer to plan in terms of capabilities, and the Japanese were certainly capable of attacking Hawaii."
-Incredible Victory, Copyright 1967 by Walter Lord

Yep, I agree. Midway was an 'incredible victory'...

Now there's a coincidence!

 

[oldcrowcv63]

-Incredible Victory, Copyright 1967 by Walter Lord Now there's a coincidence!

Nope, no coincidence at all!

Lord's IV was the first Midway book I read before I joined haze gray and under weigh.

Before that, I had built Monogram models of both the SBD and TBF (Grumman ancestor to the A-6 Intruder). Fell in love with Naval Air from that point on… Civil Air Patrol wants me to wear air force blue… The mere thought gives me hives.

 

[Garyt]

Gary, the timing is off for this to be an issue. The IJN strike wouldn't have arrived at the USN units until their decks were long cleared.

True, had the Tone's scout plane been launched on time both strikes (Japanese and US) would be launching at the same time. Yammamoto's orders were to keep a reserve armed for anti-shipping strikes, it seems Yammamoto feared enemy carriers more than Midway land based air, and he was correct in this fear. Nagumo decided to countermand these orders however.

The difference though is that the Japanese carriers may not have been as vulnerable as they were at Midway. They would have just landed the wave that struck Midway. Their former reserve would have been off decks and headed towards the opposing carriers.

Hard to say what would have happened, but I'd think maybe 2 Japanese carriers would have been lost, or possibly 1 depending upon what would be happening on the hangar decks. The Japanese had no radar, but it was having armed and fueled planes on the hangar decks which made them as vulnerable as they were. Look at the Shokaku and Zuikaku at Coral Sea and in the Guadacanal campaign - they were not nearly as vulnerable. The 4 carriers at Midway were all struck at the perfectly wrong time, and for the Akagi the exact wrong place (the Bomb destroyed her water main as well as landing among the armed and arming planes on the hangar deck- this bomb for all intensive purposes sunk her, the only direct it, though a near miss damaged her rudder as well).

 

[VBF-13]

Nope, no coincidence at all!

Lord's IV was the first Midway book I read before I joined haze gray and under weigh.

Before that, I had built Monogram models of both the SBD and TBF (Grumman ancestor to the A-6 Intruder). Fell in love with Naval Air from that point on… Civil Air Patrol wants me to wear air force blue… The mere thought gives me hives.

There we go, now we're cooking!

 

[buffnut453]

Nope, no coincidence at all!

Lord's IV was the first Midway book I read before I joined haze gray and under weigh.

Before that, I had built Monogram models of both the SBD and TBF (Grumman ancestor to the A-6 Intruder). Fell in love with Naval Air from that point on… Civil Air Patrol wants me to wear air force blue… The mere thought gives me hives.

Funny 'cos the mere thought of Navy blue makes me break out in hives.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

It seems like we seldom consider the opposite side of the issue. The IJN carriers might very well have have been in the process of arming and refueling the morning strike aircraft when hit by the USN attack with likely similar results.

The air battle over the IJN CVs was also bloody with 14 of the 41 IJN VF Cap lost just during the USN CV-Based attack. One or more VF had been lost earlier countering the attack by the Island's Marines and composite VT unit.

Considering the size of the strike group sent against Kido Butai (125 strike a/c with 26 escorts) the USN could legitimately have expected some significant results. However, the USN performance was subject to fate and circumstance as well as a substantial number of miscues and outright mistakes. In a non-comprehensive list:

- If Midway's CO Simard sends at least some of its long-legged F2A's as escorts for the island's morning attacks perhaps some hits are scored and the plumes of smoke from the fires created provide a navigational beacon for the CV a/c to home in on. The rookie-Marine's SBD glide bomb attack was a near thing with a few near misses coming within 50 yards of the Hiryu..
- If CHAG Ring had not lead his 34 SBDs on a wild goose chase across the northern Pacific but instead had taken the same course as VT leader Waldron, it's conceivable that Hiryu would have been destroyed along with her sisters and Yorktown survives the battle.
- If somebody had been smart enough to order all a/c to use a common strike frequency, VF-6's errant Gray and his 9 companions orbiting at 22,0000 ft above Kido Butai, might have been alerted to VT-8's attack and descended from their perch to cover the attack and there might have been other squadron survivors besides Ensign Gay.
- Yet VT-6's Lindsey did send a distress call on their common freq to Gray's escorts but it wasn't received. Had it been received perhaps their own disaster might have been mitigated.
- Had McClusky's assignment of targets been heard understood, more of the VS squadron's SBDs would have come down on Akagi. Even on an individual pilot bases, this error seems particularly egregious as VS-6 was not AFAIK, a rookie unit.
- if the electronics on Leslie's VB-3 SBDs is not fried, more bombs are likely to land on Soryu.

Of these Simard's decision and that of Ring seems the most important and potential game changers in the battle's outcome. if Midway was indeed an unsinkable carrier, and its striking arm consisting of essentially a Carrier Air Wing that included about 25 VMF, 27 VMSB, 10 VT, then like the CVs it could be expected to assign at least 8 to 10 VMF to escort duty.

 

[Garyt]

- If Midway's CO Simard sends at least some of its long-legged F2A's as escorts for the island's morning attacks perhaps some hits are scored and the plumes of smoke from the fires created provide a navigational beacon for the CV a/c to home in on. The rookie-Marine's SBD glide bomb attack was a near thing with a few near misses coming within 50 yards of the Hiryu..
- If CHAG Ring had not lead his 34 SBDs on a wild goose chase across the northern Pacific but instead had taken the same course as VT leader Waldron, it's conceivable that Hiryu would have been destroyed along with her sisters and Yorktown survives the battle.
- If somebody had been smart enough to order all a/c to use a common strike frequency, VF-6's errant Gray and his 9 companions orbiting at 22,0000 ft above Kido Butai, might have been alerted to VT-8's attack and descended from their perch to cover the attack and there might have been other squadron survivors besides Ensign Gay.
- Yet VT-6's Lindsey did send a distress call on their common freq to Gray's escorts but it wasn't received. Had it been received perhaps their own disaster might have been mitigated.
- Had McClusky's assignment of targets been heard understood, more of the VS squadron's SBDs would have come down on Akagi. Even on an individual pilot bases, this error seems particularly egregious as VS-6 was not AFAIK, a rookie unit.
- if the electronics on Leslie's VB-3 SBDs is not fried, more bombs are likely to land on Soryu.

And if Waldron had followed Ring, neither flight would have attacked the carriers. And more planes on the Akagi are not going to sink it twice.

There are a ton of "what if's" that could go the Japanese way as well. What if the carriers were struck when planes were not being readied? What if the US did not break the code and the Japanese plan went well and the US carriers were ambushed instead? Had the Japanese taken Midway, they could at least put a force of float planes there by the time the American TF's responded. What if the Japanese CAP showed better discipline and kept a force at higher altitude to intercept the Dive Bombers? What if either the Shokaku or Zuikaku had been available? Best chance would be to assign the Shokaku's air teams to the Zuikaku. What if the Yammamoto decided not to divide his forces, and sent the light carriers on the Aleutian strike with the main carrier striking force? What If Kido Butai had awaited a refit to bring its plane complement up to the standard numbers, instead of sending the carriers out with about 80% of their normal complement? And one thing that is often overlooked, the planes of Kido Butai, even the functional ones would well have used a refit, or some major maintenance to bring their performance up to standards.

I think really one issue is really being looked at as a potential "Story changer". That is the Tone scout plane not having technical difficulties that morning.

 

[syscom3]

Where on Earth did you get that from? Certainly, not from here:

You said it "What about going right from there to Pearl? They had the horses for it.".

The IJN had zero capability of launching nothing more than a night time nuisance raid on Pearl Harbor, if and only if, they captured Midway.

And the "if" part of taking the atoll is an extreme long shot on their part.

 

[parsifal]

As to CAP performance at Midway. The only CAP truly engaged did extremely well and set a standard for the rest of 1942. Roughly a dozen VF-42/3 F4F-4s used in two separate sorties destroyed ~21 IJN a/c (11 VB, 3 VF and 5 VT and 2 VF) out of a total of 28 VB VT protected by 12 VF escort. That's 21 of the 40 A/C in the strike or over 50% losses. (my estimate of 2/3rds below is probably over optimistic from USN standpoint.)

Do you know if these numbers are claims or confirmed. Im at work so i cant really confirm or deny at the moment, but the numbers do seem high to me.

At Coral Sea, the VFs claimed over 40 aircraft splashed in the main strike. Didnt happen. more like 12 were lost tot he CAP. the oft quoted figure of 80 aircraft lost in that battle, includes aircraft that went down with Shoho, search planes shot down, aircraft lost on the deck when Cardiv 5 was hit, aircraft sent out on search that failed to return, aircraft simply pushed over the side to make room for additional aircraft returning. 80, in itself is inconsistent with what few Japanese records there are. The USN pilots had their advantages, but like everybody, they have to bend over and take their medicine as far as overclaiming.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Wow, the work load is heavy here:

And if Waldron had followed Ring, neither flight would have attacked the carriers. And more planes on the Akagi are not going to sink it twice.

Was just thinking about the prospects for additional damage to Akagi, if one 'fatal' bomb hit is not delivered while Akagi is rearming (Yikes! another what if!)

There are a ton of "what if's" that could go the Japanese way as well.

No doubt about that but I believe some of these in your list are answerable…

- What if the carriers were struck when planes were not being readied?

Seems like with the dual task goal (island invasion and USN fleet confrontation), that likelihood is very small, especially without radar warning available. That was the shared dilemma of USN carrier force leaders supporting the Guadalcanal invasion. They were anxious to avoid a Midway-like reversal.

- What if the US did not break the code and the Japanese plan went well and the US carriers were ambushed instead? Had the Japanese taken Midway, they could at least put a force of float planes there by the time the American TF's responded.

You mean the USN CVs were ambushed in their attempt to retake Midway after IJN occupation? Without the example of Midway would USN leadership recognize the dilemma of a dual mission (support an invasion and bring the IJN to battle)… interesting question.

- What if the Japanese CAP showed better discipline and kept a force at higher altitude to intercept the Dive Bombers?

That is the most answerable 'what if.' It's not just altitude. VSB units were notorious at stalking their intended targets from whatever point of the compass provided most advantageous approach. Without Radar Fighter Direction, the IJN was nearly helpless to prevent successful dive bombing attacks. Even with FD, USN CAP had a difficult time forestalling DB attacks. In 1942, The DB's essentially always got thru in every CV vs CV battle. The reputation of the VAL as a ship killer and the SBD as "Slow But Deadly" were both well earned! Didn't seem to matter what the A6Ms did they were just not going to stop the SBDs. When the IJN finally got Radar late in 42, they used it to prepare their ships for attack, purging fuel lines and shoving ordnance overboard but they never developed an effective FD capability (Thanks you GB RN) . It's a myth that the sacrifice of USN VT TBDs provided the clear path for the SBDs. They contributed in other substantial ways but that wasn't one.

- What if either the Shokaku or Zuikaku had been available? Best chance would be to assign the Shokaku's air teams to the Zuikaku.

In that case seems likely that the Lexington is also available. At the close of the Coral Sea battle, Zuikaku recovered 46 a/c of both groups as follows: 8 VF, 12 VB 4 VT of her own group and 9 VF, 7 VB and 6 VT of Shokaku's. After recovery, deck crews pushed overboard, wrecked 3 VF, 4 VB 5 VT. Later in the day, Zuikaku reported as operational the following: 24 VF, 9 VB, 6 VT… for a total of 39 A/C. For all practical purposes, there was no Shokaku Air Group to transfer to Zuikaku or even a combination of the two amounting to an air group. Both had been seriously depleted by operational losses and fighting during the two-day battle. By Comparison, Zuikaku and Sara both arrived at the front at about the same time. (to Wake island vicinity for Zuikaku and PH for Sara) Zui had its usual depleted air wing which was becoming the norm for the IJN while Sara arrived with an air wing and replacements totally 107 A/C for the other two CVs. Normally a USN would comfortably operate about 72 A/C, with spares hung from the hangar overhead. This is the evidence to validate what I believe Parsifal has been saying… IJN and industrial Japan itself just wasn't prepared for a long war of attrition.

- What if the Yammamoto decided not to divide his forces, and sent the light carriers on the Aleutian strike with the main carrier striking force?

That makes for an interesting twist.

- What If Kido Butai had awaited a refit to bring its plane complement up to the standard numbers, instead of sending the carriers out with about 80% of their normal complement? And one thing that is often overlooked, the planes of Kido Butai, even the functional ones would well have used a refit, or some major maintenance to bring their performance up to standards.

Then we have a 5 or 6 IJN CV vs 5 USN CV scenario. IMHO, time delays do not generally work in favor of the IJN.

I think really one issue is really being looked at as a potential "Story changer". That is the Tone scout plane not having technical difficulties that morning.

And of course the decision to ignore the initial warning it provided at 0728 until a positive CV was identified at 0820. A delay of almost an hour, during which Nagumo effectively dug Kido Butai a deeper grave. JMO...

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Do you know if these numbers are claims or confirmed. Im at work so i cant really confirm or deny at the moment, but the numbers do seem high to me.

At Coral Sea, the VFs claimed over 40 aircraft splashed in the main strike. Didnt happen. more like 12 were lost tot he CAP. the oft quoted figure of 80 aircraft lost in that battle, includes aircraft that went down with Shoho, search planes shot down, aircraft lost on the deck when Cardiv 5 was hit, aircraft sent out on search that failed to return, aircraft simply pushed over the side to make room for additional aircraft returning. 80, in itself is inconsistent with what few Japanese records there are. The USN pilots had their advantages, but like everybody, they have to bend over and take their medicine as far as overclaiming.

At work? Shame on you (and me) Pars… You are correct that VF pilots over claimed but these appear to be confirmed by IJN sources but also include operational losses not necessarily combat. (almost all data from Lundstrom's First Team.) However, At Coral sea most folk forget the slaughter Op-losses of the IJN May 7 twilight raid on TF 17 and don't consider it in the total for May 8. At Midway, confirmation is provided by many sources quoting the composition of the last Hiryu strike of the day as consisting of 5 VB, 5 VT and 6 VF escort. That's all they had left, except for a substantial CAP force overhead Hiryu. You can check the Coral Sea losses by examining the operational report of Zuikaku at battle's end. She reported only 39 a/c operational. That's down from their original 120+ a/c. So, for practical purposes the IJN essentially lost roughly 80 a/c by battle's end. By May 9, Takagi had brought into operation 5 more a/c for a total of 45 A/C. By 15 May, Yorktown reported 55 a/c operational (of the total of 69 recovered) including refugees from Lex. At Pearl, she received an air wing Larger than she possessed at Coral Sea! That's what you've been saying isn't it? That the IJN just couldn't make up material or personnel losses. These numbers strongly support that contention.

 

[VBF-13]

You said it "What about going right from there to Pearl? They had the horses for it.".

The IJN had zero capability of launching nothing more than a night time nuisance raid on Pearl Harbor, if and only if, they captured Midway.

And the "if" part of taking the atoll is an extreme long shot on their part.

The Japanese thought Midway was in the bag. There was no "if" about that. As far as their going to Pearl from Midway, they'd have had Midway off their back. As far as Nagumo coming straight across to Pearl, instead, as Emmons and others had speculated he might, that was a threat to be respected, given the capabilities of that force, and even the big brains at CINCPAC knew it.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Should have added that "the last Hiryu strike of the day" was only planned and obviously never flown.

 

[parsifal]

In regards to Coral Sea losses, operational aircraft is a different number to losses. Aircraft often would return , be declared non-operational, repaired overnight and ready the next day.

At battle's end heading back to Japan (via Rabaul then Truk), Zuikaku has operational 13 dive-bombers, 8 torpedo planes, and 24 fighters. Non-operational were 1 fighter, 4 dive-bombers, and 2 attack planes. Thus in the two days, Zujikaku had lost 1 fighter, 8 dive-bombers, and 14 attack planes. Of these, the crew had been lost from 1 fighter, 4 dive-bombers, and 9 attack planes. Aircrew losses for Zuikaku amounted to 23 airframes and 14 aircrews. There is some doubt as to whether 9 Zekes were flown in after the battle, from Inouyes command at Rabaul, but I find that difficult to reconcile. There is no record of such transfer from Rabauls daily situation reports of any such transfer, neither is there any record of such a transfer from Truk. maybe they were transferred from the Shokaku survivors, but I tend to think this is a bogus claim.

Aircraft listed as shot down in Coral Sea, frequently turn up as having made it back to the carriers. Clearly they are not shot down, just damaged. Some are damaged beyond repair, as the 23 lost airframes for Zuikaku clearly show, but also clearly, the claims made for aircraft shot down by the USN for the Coral Sea are pretty clearly not correct.

Though operational and battle loss figures vary slightly among the sources for Coral Sea, fortunately they all agree in the detail of most interest to historians: how many aircraft remained to Zuikaku on 9 May. . This is the important factor for examining the question of why she was omitted in the Midway Operation. Though Shokaku apparently had 2 dive-bombers and 3 attack planes still aboard after her bomb damage, the Japanese were loath to transfer away from the Shokau which had suffered far more heavily. in terms of airframe losses. Thus officially, both carrier's air groups were considered damaged and lacking after Coral Sea and were besides scheduled to be further diluted. Zuikakus air group was needed to reconstitiute Shakaus and also establish Hiyos air group .

Note that the pre-Coral Sea plans to transfers aviators of CarDiv 5 to other bases or carriers coupled with the lack of adequate ready replacement aircraft for Coral Sea losses was the main reason CarDiv 5 was not pressed to participate in the Midway Operation. No doubt this sentiment to proceed with the scheduled transfers was strengthened by the May 14 message sent to Combined Fleet that CarDiv 5's losses and that Zuikaku had lost 40% of her airframes precluded that carrier's ready use. 40% of 63 is 25 aircraft, incidentally. At the time it was apparently felt that the addition of Zuikaku as a "one division ship" with weakened air complement was redundant and would raise more logistical and tactical problems than it would solve. Only hindsight makes it seem obviously a wrong decision.(The Japanese apparently did not think so even in hindsight, for well after Midway. When a similar situation obtained after the Santa Cruz battle, the same choice was made and an opportunity to reinforce Zuikaku's weakened air group with Hiyo's was not taken and she was instead sent home on November 4, 1942 two days after Shokaku, thus missing the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal in November.) As it was, Zuikaku was on May 25 allocated to the latter June phase of the projected Aluetians Operations should she be required.

For the Shokaku, losses are more obscure, and records incomplete, but she is known to have retained at least 9 aircraft on her decks at the conclusion of the battle. I think there were more. In regard to the losses in the night strike, this is again something misreported in American sources. 1430 CarDiv 5 launched to make a bold and risky nightfall attack on the reported American carriers. Admirals Takagi and Hara had made the decision in an effort to regain initiative, and selected their most night flying skilled pilots to participate. Sacrificing fighter cover (the Zeros aboard were not suited for night-flying escort) the 12 dive-bombers and 15 torpedo planes gamely fly to the very limits of their operational radius and well after twilight, only to find nothing and have to start back. Ironically, they had overflown TF 17, and ran into its CAP. Several are shot down, and even more amazingly, about six come within minutes of actually landing by mistake on YORKTOWN, only to spooked by gunfire at the last moment. To aid their return, Admiral Hara courageously orders CarDiv 5's searchlights switched on to give the planes a chance to land safely. But some are running out of fuel even then, and eleven crash on or near the deck or are damaged while landing. Only six of the strike lands intact and remain operational. however, this does not mean that 21 were shot down as is often reported. Losses as near as I ascertain if the landing accidents are excluded amount to about 6 aircraft. 4 were believed lost in the return flight. That might mean as few as 2 are destroyed over the US carriers

I dont know enouigh about the Midway operation to make any similar conclusions , and though i cant prove it, im willing to bet the farm that many of the so called losses over the US Task Force are in fact damaged aborts. the problem we have here is that many of the logs and records for the Japanese ships including, I believe the Hiryus, were simply lost, even before the japanese final report could be made. all we have in the main are the unsubstantiated claims by the US pilots themelves, and these simply are not accurate, as the Coral Sea stuff does show.

Whilst this may look or appear as contradicting what Im saying about the japanese being absolutely enslaved to thir loss rates, in fact it is very consistent with it. people are apt to accept the claimed losses as gospel, and therefore proof that the heart was ripped out of the Kido Butai by these horrendous losses. whilst i agree that the heart was ripped out, it didnt take near the losses that are claimed to do that. People simply dont realize how few replacements were being received, and just how sensitive to losses the japanese airgroups actually were.