Significance of the Battle of Midway

[syscom3]

Ultimately, the most significant thing about Midway is the loss of four carriers. They were irreplaceable, and the Japanese never recovered from that body blow. The US could have lost all three at the battle, yet only a year later, they would be getting a fleet carrier every month.

 

[parsifal]

Sys, thats probably where you and i diverge. The loss of the four carriers was a remarkable achievement by the USN, and an undeniable victory for them with real benefits conferered on the USN. It was also an enormous deflation to IJN confidence. However, the loss of the carriers was far less important to Japanese capability than might be supposed. Even before midway, Japanese pilot standards were falling, and they were unable to make good pilot losses even in relatively low loss periods. Akagi for example went to war with a complement of just under 80a/c embarked, by the time of the battle this was down to 63 and still falling. somewhere, ive read the Navy was projecting further falls to an air complement of around 50 aircraft by late Septemeber. this was one of the reasons they wanted to write down the US carriers in a decisive battle....they needed to rest and replace their own losses. But as you say, this was never going to happen.

The IJN fought the remaining carrier battles of 1942, more or less with the survivors of Midway CAGs. They didnt win, but they did fight the USN to the point of exhaustion. Trouble was, they also fought themselves to that same point. from that situation, the USN rapidly recovered, but the IJN could only repleneish at a very limited rate, and with pilots of fairly low quality. Twice in 1943 their CAGs were again committed, as land based elements, and twice these hastily trained aircrews were decimated by the increasingly competent US air forces. It was relentless, and from a Japanese persepective tragic.

By Phil Sea, the Japanese had largely recovered carrier numbers, and fielded a good number of carriers, that again were underutilized in terms of carrying capacity. having four additional carriers might help in the sense of spreading losses out better, but it could hardly affect pilot replacement rates. Ozawas 1st Mobile Fleet would still have gone into battle with about 450 a/c, filled with pilots that were just cannon fodder regardless of the outcome of Midway. Conversely, if the japanese had won their battle, and destroyed all three US carriers in June 1942, the US would have gone to battle in June 1944 with 160 less aircraft than they did. Carrier capacity was the limiting factor for the USN in 1944, not so the IJN.

 

[BiffF15]

Gents,
Thanks for the lessons! I'm learning that facts have to be delved into, layer by layer, to get "the maximum learning points".
Cheers,
Biff

 

[Garyt]

Sys, thats probably where you and i diverge. The loss of the four carriers was a remarkable achievement by the USN, and an undeniable victory for them with real benefits conferered on the USN. It was also an enormous deflation to IJN confidence. However, the loss of the carriers was far less important to Japanese capability than might be supposed.

I'd agree, Parsifal. Had the Japanese "won" at Midway (we'll say took the island, knocked out 2 US carriers at a cost of one of their own), they would have had a increasingly hard time of keeping the carriers full. As Parsifal mentioned, they were already understaffed in planes/pilots at Midway. With some air to air losses at Midway they would be in trouble.

 

[RpR]

Sys, thats probably where you and i diverge. The loss of the four carriers was a remarkable achievement by the USN, and an undeniable victory for them with real benefits conferered on the USN. It was also an enormous deflation to IJN confidence. However, the loss of the carriers was far less important to Japanese capability than might be supposed. Even before midway, Japanese pilot standards were falling, and they were unable to make good pilot losses even in relatively low loss periods. Akagi for example went to war with a complement of just under 80a/c embarked, by the time of the battle this was down to 63 and still falling. somewhere, ive read the Navy was projecting further falls to an air complement of around 50 aircraft by late Septemeber. this was one of the reasons they wanted to write down the US carriers in a decisive battle....they needed to rest and replace their own losses. But as you say, this was never going to happen.

The IJN fought the remaining carrier battles of 1942, more or less with the survivors of Midway CAGs. They didnt win, but they did fight the USN to the point of exhaustion. Trouble was, they also fought themselves to that same point. from that situation, the USN rapidly recovered, but the IJN could only repleneish at a very limited rate, and with pilots of fairly low quality. Twice in 1943 their CAGs were again committed, as land based elements, and twice these hastily trained aircrews were decimated by the increasingly competent US air forces. It was relentless, and from a Japanese persepective tragic.

By Phil Sea, the Japanese had largely recovered carrier numbers, and fielded a good number of carriers, that again were underutilized in terms of carrying capacity. having four additional carriers might help in the sense of spreading losses out better, but it could hardly affect pilot replacement rates. Ozawas 1st Mobile Fleet would still have gone into battle with about 450 a/c, filled with pilots that were just cannon fodder regardless of the outcome of Midway. Conversely, if the japanese had won their battle, and destroyed all three US carriers in June 1942, the US would have gone to battle in June 1944 with 160 less aircraft than they did. Carrier capacity was the limiting factor for the USN in 1944, not so the IJN.

You seem to be ignoring the other factors that would have changed.

Had Midway Islands been captured by the Japanese A: The U.S. would have had to retake the Islands, B: The Aleutian campaign would not have petered out as the Japanese then would have had a base from which it could have assisted the Aleutians Campaign for rearming while being able to fly reconnaissance missions of what the U.S. fleet was doing from Midway Island.
Plus assuming the Japanese had only lost one carrier and the U.S. two or more, he U.S. would have had what would have amounted to a full-on three front war, not just deadly harassment because the Japanese would have had the U.S. trying to decide where the Japanese were going to strike from next.

As I said in another post, the U.S. response would have massive in rearming but having suffered two serious defeats so early in the war while considering how fiercely as the Japanese fought, it would have made the war far more costly and bloody and longer than it was.
At the same time Germany would have been fully aware that the U.S. was suffering off of its West Coast and may not be able to give as much support to Europe as it wanted to.
Now that might have made Hitler act even more foolish than he did but one simply does not know.

 

[parsifal]

You seem to be ignoring the other factors that would have changed.

Had Midway Islands been captured by the Japanese
A: The U.S. would have had to retake the Islands,

Yes, agreed, or at least neutralize it. however for the japanese to take, hold and maintain Midway, there would have been yet another hole in the dwindling bucket of plenty for the japanese. This would be particualalry true of their merchant shipping and air assets. As they did in the far noth, the Japanese would almost certainly have abandoned these forward positions.

B: The Aleutian campaign would not have petered out as the Japanese then would have had a base from which it could have assisted the Aleutians Campaign for rearming while being able to fly reconnaissance missions of what the U.S. fleet was doing from Midway Island.

Midway offered no support to the far north. It was much too far away for it to ever to be abale to provide any kind of support.

The islands taken by the Japanese were completely untenable, as they eventually realized. With no adequate port facilities, they required major efforts for re-supply, were of no value in terms of projecting air or seapowe, and were just an enormous prison camp for the Japanese really. There was no advantage Adak or Attu to the further advancement into Alaskan terrioties for the japanese, and midway offered even less benefit.

Similar issues surround Midway. It could offer an airfield and flying boat facilities at least, but it was no port, and no re-supply capability, at least for the technology available to the Japanese. Because of the topography of the Atoll, it was very exposed and easy to damage.

Both the Aleutions and midway were strategic blind alleys for the Japanese. And worse, a net drain on their very limited resources. In no way, except for the fact they could keep tabs on the Pacific Fleet should it be construed that Midway would offer much advantage to the Japanese if taken

Plus assuming the Japanese had only lost one carrier and the U.S. two or more, he U.S. would have had what would have amounted to a full-on three front war, not just deadly harassment because the Japanese would have had the U.S. trying to decide where the Japanese were going to strike from next.

This I agree with, more or less. A one sided victory for the japanese exposes the allied position across the pacific.

however, it is highly unlikley that the Japanese could capitaliseon this advantage, and in fact further advanaces by them was about the worst thing they could have done. Their shipping capacities were already stretched past breaking point, and any lengthening of the supply lines is only going to make their logistics even worse, and their defences even weaker. There weas no posibility for the japanese to further expand, though they wanted to. They were deluding themselves when they thought or spoke of the "2nd Operational Phase". The best they could have done, if they had won at midway, was use the time to rebuild their shattered airgroups, rectify the faults in their training regime, fortify their forward positions, and try and improve the construction of shipping. This was not gong to win them the war, but it might have strung things out for a bit. I dont believe this outcome was realisitic, but the Japanese as the war moved into its latter phases, consoled themeselves by believing that a high rate of attrition might induce the Americans to the peace table. It was a forlorn hope, but a more relaistic appraisal, than continuing expansion.

As I said in another post, the U.S. response would have massive in rearming but having suffered two serious defeats so early in the war while considering how fiercely as the Japanese fought, it would have made the war far more costly and bloody and longer than it was.

Yes, but it doesnt do that by conquering Midway or the Aleutions, and it doesnt lengthen the war by lengthening its supply lines.

At the same time Germany would have been fully aware that the U.S. was suffering off of its West Coast and may not be able to give as much support to Europe as it wanted to.

There is zero basis to make this claim. The germans thought from the start that Japan would pre-occupy the Americans whilst they (the germans) cleaned up in Europe. A victory at midway would simply bring to realization what the Nazis were already relying on as actually happening. No change in strategy for Europe. as it was, Uncle Ernie was already hoarding Landing Craft, shipping and transferring far too many Destroyers to the pacific, in breach of his givernments prior commitments to concentrate on Germany First.

Now that might have made Hitler act even more foolish than he did but one simply does not know.

I agree that we cant be sure, but the chances or likleihood of Midway haviing any effect in the ETO are so low as to be discounted

 

[Garyt]

Had Midway Islands been captured by the Japanese
A: The U.S. would have had to retake the Islands,

I'd say the may have to take Midway as part of an island hopping campaign, or depending on their path they could bypass. But they could have picked when to attack, Midway was not really a base and posed no real threat.

As far as carriers go, assuming a 2 carrier loss, the US would still have 1 of the Midway carriers, the Saratoga, Wasp, and Ranger, barring any "borrowed" carriers from the British. The US carriers would have been able to carry 354 planes. This compares to Kido Butai's normal complement of 345 planes, if the Hiryu was taken out.

This is until the Essex arrives around the end of 1942.

 

[RpR]

however, it is highly unlikly that the Japanese could capitalize on this advantage, and in fact further advances by them was about the worst thing they could have done. Their shipping capacities were already stretched past breaking point, and any lengthening of the supply lines is only going to make their logistics even worse, and their defenses even weaker. There was no possibility for the Japanese to further expand, though they wanted to. They were deluding themselves when they thought or spoke of the "2nd Operational Phase". The best they could have done, if they had won at midway, was use the time to rebuild their shattered air groups, rectify the faults in their training regime, fortify their forward positions, and try and improve the construction of shipping. This was not gong to win them the war, but it might have strung things out for a bit. I don't believe this outcome was realistic, but the Japanese as the war moved into its latter phases, consoled them selves by believing that a high rate of attrition might induce the Americans to the peace table. It was a forlorn hope, but a more realistic appraisal, than continuing expansion. ---- You are ignoring what would then have been fact that all that happened after the Battle of Midway would have changed, totally.

The U.S. would not have engaged in a major campaign for months at a minimum and probably closer to a year.
The Japanese would not have had the pressure on them they did when they failed at Midway so all ideas based on how the Japanese were stretched would have been totally different as they would have had the tactical advantage across the Pacific.

The war in China-Burma would have gone differently as Japan rather than licking its wounds would have still been in full attack mode.

The Aleutians are hundreds of miles closer to the Midway Atoll than they are to Japan 1,700 miles verses 2,000.
It was 2,600 miles from Midway to Japan
In a war that is a huge difference in time in transit and supplies could have easily gone to Alaska first then to Midway or the other way around.
Either way it formed a triangle and the U.S. would have had to find out how to recon and defend much less attack another front that did not exist when Midway did not fall.

While Japan would have eventually faced a greater variety of aircraft developed just for the Pacific, so would the U.S. have been facing a larger variety of aircraft developed to defend Japan's interest.

The U.S. was able to send and keep battleships and lessor carriers in the Atlantic because they were not needed else where, with the loss of Midway, and several carriers, that would have changed drastically.
Germany was no threat to U.S. territory but Japan was.
As it was Japan did not leave Alaska till mid-1943, with its tactical advantage they would have stayed longer and U.S. citizens would have been worried in the Northern West Coast and real unhappy that the Japanese were still on U.S. territory.
My father, who did not go because of his very high blood pressure, doctors said he might live to be seventy, said people at home were more than a little annoyed at their miseries brought on by the war by 1944.
Do not ever forget the political issues at play during the war. Not every one loved Roosevelt as much as historians want to to say they did.

In the actual time scale, the U.S. government had a populace that was tired of spending money on the war.
Had they lost at Midway, the cost would have been far higher and I doubt Roosevelt would have been reelected the last time, as it was under his fourth term that the U.S. was desperate enough to send the boys who raised the flag on Okinawa out to raise funds from an increasingly impatient populace.
Had Midway fallen they would not have been that close at the time of his fourth campaign, assuming he was still president.

 

[RpR]

I'd say the may have to take Midway as part of an island hopping campaign, or depending on their path they could bypass. But they could have picked when to attack, Midway was not really a base and posed no real threat.

As Midway was an airbase that could send aircraft out to attack, how would the U.S. have gone around.
That would have forced U.S. forces into areas totally predictable.
Midway is 1,500 miles from Hawaii, so you are saying that the U.S. could simply ignore the extra 1,500 miles any resupply ship would have had to avoid or transverse to supply the Navy ships.

Even without losing Midway the U.S. did not simply ignore the Japanese in the Aleutians so to say they would simply ignore Japanese on Midway is unrealistic.
Your rhetoric is based on the attitudes and realities of what actually happened.
Had Midway fallen that is completely inapplicable.

 

[Garyt]

The war in China-Burma would have gone differently as Japan rather than licking its wounds would have still been in full attack mode.

This could be possible, I am not familiar enough with this theatre of the war to come to an educated conclusion though. The other question would be the Japanese may still be in "attack mode" , but does this make a Japanese victory in this theatre any more feasible?

While Japan would have eventually faced a greater variety of aircraft developed just for the Pacific, so would the U.S. have been facing a larger variety of aircraft developed to defend Japan's interest.

I'm assuming you are saying with a larger defensive perimeter, Japanese industry would have a better chance of producing quality aircraft and pilots in the numbers needed? Perhaps because the B-29's will have a tougher time of reaching the Japanese mainland?

I do not think so. The Japanese were facing an oil/fuel crisis from the beginning of the war. The US submarine program decimated Japanese shipping and caused that shortage to be much worse. The sub program also severely impacted the Japanese production efforts in many other ways as well.

NOthing you mention curtails the US sub program. Perhaps if the Japanese quickly developed a western style convoy system, had more destroyers and destroyers dedicated to fighting US subs, dedicated some escort type carriers to convoy escort, and improved their anti-sub capabilities (such as hedgehop type depth charge launchers, accoustic homing torpedoes that can be air or surface launched for a start), they might have been able to stave off the economic losses from the Allied subs.

But this is a far different issue than just winning at Midway.

 

[Garyt]

As Midway was an airbase that could send aircraft out to attack, how would the U.S. have gone around.

Pretty simple. Use a more southern approach as proposed by Hector Bywater in his book about the 1925 Pacific War. The US "Orange Plan" of 1934 was a more Northernly route, as this is ptretty well what was used.

As it was Japan did not leave Alaska till mid-1943, with its tactical advantage they would have stayed longer and U.S. citizens would have been worried in the Northern West Coast and real unhappy that the Japanese were still on U.S. territory.
My father, who did not go because of his very high blood pressure, doctors said he might live to be seventy, said people at home were more than a little annoyed at their miseries brought on by the war by 1944.
Do not ever forget the political issues at play during the war. Not every one loved Roosevelt as much as historian to to say they did.

In the actual time scale, the U.S. government had a populace that was tired of spending money on the war.
Had they lost at Midway, the cost would have been far higher and I doubt Roosevelt would have been reelected the last time, as it was under his fourth term that the U.S. was desperate enough to send the boys who raised the flag on Okinawa out to raise funds from an increasingly impatient populace.
Had Midway fallen they would not have been that close at the time of his fourth campaign, assuming he was still president.

Sounds like you are looking at the US suing for peace because they were unhappy with the war, much as the Japanese had hoped. I don't think this would be the case - the attack on Pearl Harbor I think served to focus the US on winning a longer war. If this were to happen, it would have made the US far more less resolute than Germany, Russia, England or Japan, all nations who were bombed by the opposition and had a lot higher casualties per citizen than the US.

This would be make the US even less resolute than the Italians in regards to winning WW2

At least the Italians were bombed, had foreign invaders on their soil and were part of a war effort that seemed to be destined to failure before they "quit".

 

[RpR]

Pretty simple. Use a more southern approach as proposed by Hector Bywater in his book about the 1925 Pacific War. The US "Orange Plan" of 1934 was a more Northernly route, as this is pretty well what was used. ---- Go South and go through the Marshall Islands which were already lost?

"The Japanese forces occupied the Gilbert Islands 3 days after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. As a provided token defense of Tarawa, they built a seaplane base on Makin and dispersed troops along the coastlines of the atolls to monitor the Allied forces movement in the South Pacific.[1] Following Carlson's Raiders diversionary Makin Island raid of August 1942, the Japanese command was made aware of the vulnerability and strategic significance of the Gilbert Islands.[2] The largest and most strategically important islands of the Gilberts was Tarawa. Fortifications were quickly built up by the Japanese starting in March 1943 with nearly 5,000 troops stationed abroad. An additional 3,000 Special Naval Landing Force and base force troops and 940 naval construction units were supplemented by 1,247 laborers."





Sounds like you are looking at the US suing for peace because they were unhappy with the war, much as the Japanese had hoped. I don't think this would be the case - the attack on Pearl Harbor I think served to focus the US on winning a longer war. If this were to happen, it would have made the US far more less resolute than Germany, Russia, England or Japan, all nations who were bombed by the opposition and had a lot higher casualties per citizen than the US. ---- No I have not said or implied that.
The U.S. would still have won but it would cost far more in time, money, and lives.

Some are trying to brush off how important the Midway Atoll was because of how the war turned out; what was going on in military equipment prototyping despite of the U.S. winning from Midway on, shows just how uncertain the U.S. still was.
Had Midway fell the war would have been a totally different animal than it became with the successful defense of Midway.

The political scene back home would have been far different also if Midway had fallen.

``

 

[cherry blossom]

I don't know if I am repeating points that have already been made earlier, but it seems to me that a different result of the Battle of Midway would produce a significantly different WW2 which would still end in a Japanese surrender around 15th August 1945.

The first point is that a Japanese naval victory would prevent a Guadalcanal invasion during 1942 and also probably prevent an Australian counter attack in New Guinea until well into 1943. Unfortunately, we need to have the results of the Japanese attempt to take Midway in order to predict further.

If we assume that the landing fails, then we may assume that the Japanese become reluctant to launch further landings of their own. Then both sides spend the second half of 1942 building fortifications. Eventually, the USN launches its attacks on the Gilberts and Marshalls more or less on schedule. The fighting is significantly more violent because the IJN has not lost most of their trained aircrews. The American radar is better than off Guadalcanal and the IJN may not know the implications of radar at night which they had learnt from bitter experience by late 1943. However, the USN may not have discovered the range and speed of IJN torpedoes. America still wins in the Marshalls and goes on from there to win more or less as in our history.

There seem to be a few interesting changes. Firstly, we might expect the Democrats to do worse in the November 1942 elections. Secondly, MacArthur will have great difficulty explaining how he is winning the war when his front is likely to remain static. His skills in managing the press will really need to be exceptional to avoid being forgotten. It is quite possible that the USN will go for Okinawa before the Philippines. Thus we may have a different Last Shogun (who?) and perhaps different policies. Thirdly, Japanese submarines may remain in the Indian Ocean in late 1942. They may even sink the Shermans used by Montgomery to win at El-Alamein. Again nothing really changes, except that Montgomery is less prominent and perhaps Britain has fewer illusions of its role in winning WW2.

The situation if the Japanese take Midway could be rather different because Japan could launch further attacks. They would wear themselves out faster than in the above version but probably no faster than they did at Guadalcanal. However, it does open up the question of whether some of the forces used for Torch would be sent to the Pacific to stop their attempt to cut the supply line to Australia. However, the naval forces for Torch were overwhelming and the land forces limited by transport rather than availability.

There is an intermediate best case for Japan where they just take Midway with the loss of almost all their soldiers. Then perhaps the Army say no more invasions and both IJA and IJN are really convinced that islands can be turned into fortresses. One advantage for Japan is that most submarines operating against Japan took on fuel at Midway, so the submarine campaign is slightly slowed until Midway is recaptured.

 

[drgondog]

You seem to be ignoring the other factors that would have changed.

Had Midway Islands been captured by the Japanese A: The U.S. would have had to retake the Islands, B: The Aleutian campaign would not have petered out as the Japanese then would have had a base from which it could have assisted the Aleutians Campaign for rearming while being able to fly reconnaissance missions of what the U.S. fleet was doing from Midway Island.

Pure speculation - not grounded in facts concerning Japan's ability to a.) support occupation of Midway, and b.) ditto Attu and Kiska. Japan had zero ability to project meaningful forces into Alaska or mainland US - even if they disconnected from China which is equally ludicrous. IMO the question confronting Japan Imperial Command had they been able to occupy Midway is "what price are we willing to pay to hold it" and for how long. Yamamoto hoped to force US to sue for peace, a hope he knew to be very slim even if Japan had reached further to (attempt) to take Oahu and facilities there.

Plus assuming the Japanese had only lost one carrier and the U.S. two or more, he U.S. would have had what would have amounted to a full-on three front war, not just deadly harassment because the Japanese would have had the U.S. trying to decide where the Japanese were going to strike from next.

The prime objectives were to protect and secure Hawaii/Midway while destroying the Japanese fleet, coupled with protecting Australia from occupation. Both were important from standpoint of our own logistics network. There is no scenario under which that IJN fleet could have taken Oahu prior to US build up of airpower and land forces - enough in June-August timeframe to start getting the naval assets from the shipyards before Japan could hope to put up an invasion force capable of taking Hawaii. Once established re-taking Midway would not have been a problem.

As I said in another post, the U.S. response would have massive in rearming but having suffered two serious defeats so early in the war while considering how fiercely as the Japanese fought, it would have made the war far more costly and bloody and longer than it was.

True for being longer to get to Guadalcanal - on the other hand Japan's question still would be 'how much do we want to pay to take and hold Midway" versus "where should we dig in and protect"? Under any circumstances the US Sub fleet was the Achilles heel for any adventure that the Japanese could contemplate holding and re-supplying.

At the same time Germany would have been fully aware that the U.S. was suffering off of its West Coast and may not be able to give as much support to Europe as it wanted to.
Now that might have made Hitler act even more foolish than he did but one simply does not know.

Germany was fully committed to the death struggle he was engaged in with USSR and had no resources to spare. The Brits already had Rommel on the run - delaying our introduction was not strategically critical. Our involvement was primarily to prevent Rommel from extracting from Africa and start 'blooding our troops as a necessary first step before invasion of Europe". The 8th AF at that time was a figment of his Intelligence arm and he was contemptuous of our ability to fight anyway...Had the Atlantic fleet been shifted in part to re-take Midway it would have addressed very carefully because of the U-Boat threat to UK.

In addition, Roosevelt's likely reaction would have been to tell Marshall and King to 'handle it' - there would be no change to the Atlantic fleet priority to protect the convoys to Russia and UK. What might have changed would be a slowdown of assets to USSR until Hawaii was 100% secure.

Japan was mired in China with no 'victory' in sight other than occupation of the coastal cities, they had just taken the Philippines', were headed towards India and Australia - but had nowhere near the assets or population to support consolidation and protection of their conquests. As Yamamoto said "I can run wild for six months, but we have to force US to sue for peace or we will be overwhelmed". Even defeating the US Carrier fleet at Midway would not have given him the space he needed to consolidate gains in a war of attrition.

Last point - we weren't really awed by the Japanese willingness to fight and die and claw and scratch for every foot - because that knowledge just became somewhat visible during the bloody battle at Guadalcanal starting several months later. Java and the Philippines' were just anecdotal to the US leaders as we were fighting remotely without much awareness of the force structures involved...

 

[Garyt]

Go South and go through the Marshall Islands which were already lost?

The island hopping campaign is designed to find the best route through Japanese held territory to facilitate their defeat. Perhaps if Midway was held by the Japanese a southerly route would make more sense - perhaps not, I am not 100% sure of the logistics involved. Look at the following link for the southern route

http://www.clashofarms.com/files/Bywater's_War_(Historicon_2012).pdf

Apparently this was a route under consideration as well in the 1940's. It bypasses the Gilberts and the Marshalls, at least initially, and calls for an earlier assault upon Truk. The US would have needed at least a few of the Essex class available to start on this route, so I wouldn't have expected something like this to be undertaken until mid-late '43, unless something significant happened in the meantime regarding a balance of strength.

The U.S. would still have won but it would cost far more in time, money, and lives.

I fully agree with what you are stating here. If the US took the course starting thru Midway it would have required more time. Barring any other engagements in the meantime, I think the US would have waited until they at least had 3 Essex class carriers available. With the carriers I mentioned above this would have been a strike force of 600+ planes, better than a 1.5 to ratio over what remained of Kido Butai.

 

[parsifal]

The U.S. would not have engaged in a major campaign for months at a minimum and probably closer to a year.
The Japanese would not have had the pressure on them they did when they failed at Midway so all ideas based on how the Japanese were stretched would have been totally different as they would have had the tactical advantage across the Pacific.

There is no evidence to support that claim at all. There is some evidence in reverse actually. At the end of guadacanal, there were no operational US carriers , except for the escort carriers, in the SW Pac. The Japanese still had 3, possibly 5. They had aircraft sufficient to put two to sea. made absolutly no difference tyo either the campigns in New Guinea, or in the Solomons.

By the end of 1942, the allies had approximately 1500 aircraft in the TO, the majority RAAF, compared to about 200 japanese aircraft. In terms of ground Troops, the Allies could call upon roughly 16 divisions or equivalent, to 4-5 deployed in the pacific. In terms of Destroyers, the USN outnumbered the IJN by about 4:1. major warships was even worse. Even with an additional 3 carriers, and say an additional 150 aircraft , the Japanese are in no position to alter who has the initiative, and whether the Allies would maintain the pressure on them. Some additional shipping resources would be needed, to get the vast quantities of troops, aircraft and ships into action, because above anything, carriers reduced logistic problems for the allies, but these could have been found (with some difficulty) if the need arose.

There is zero chance of a victorious IJN at Midway, with say two or three additional carriers, having any significant effect on the pace or scale of operations growing and being mounted against the japanese. In that middle phase of the war, carriers were not as important as when the USN (and before that the Japanese) were on a mobile offensive. During the latter part of 1942 through 1943, neither side was really engaged in that sort of attack, until tarawa.

The war in China-Burma would have gone differently as Japan rather than licking its wounds would have still been in full attack mode.

it already was. Like the pacific, the biggest single inhibitor to offensive action in the CBI was supply. By 1944 , the japanese had partially solved the supply issues in Burma, by the construction of the rail link to thailand, and in China, by a wholesale reduction of stockpiles in Manchuria. this enabled them to launch major offensives in both theatres, so much so, that by mid 1945 the china TO was all but written off by the Joint Chiefs. In Burma, the offensive was defeated, and eventually the allies launched their counterattck.

There is nothing contained in a japanese victory at midway that would make one bit of difference to these events half a world away. For a start, both TO wewre army responsibilities, there were was virtually no Navy input at all. Sewcondly, Japanese hesitancy had nothing to do with a lack of confidence, or a lack of carriers in those TOs.


The Aleutians are hundreds of miles closer to the Midway Atoll than they are to Japan 1,700 miles verses 2,000.
It was 2,600 miles from Midway to Japan
In a war that is a huge difference in time in transit and supplies could have easily gone to Alaska first then to Midway or the other way around.
Either way it formed a triangle and the U.S. would have had to find out how to recon and defend much less attack another front that did not exist when Midway did not fall.

While Japan would have eventually faced a greater variety of aircraft developed just for the Pacific, so would the U.S. have been facing a larger variety of aircraft developed to defend Japan's interest.

A victory at Midway would have had no effect on the aircraft development for either side. Your assumption is that a victory at midway would in some way delay the allied counterattack. but carriers would not have that effect at all., or at worst, maybe for a week or two.....

The U.S. was able to send and keep battleships and lessor carriers in the Atlantic because they were not needed else where, with the loss of Midway, and several carriers, that would have changed drastically.

Which ships specifically? Ranger remained in the Atlantic. At the time of PH it was being used for training. One or two of the South Dakotas were in the Atlantic, mostly rectifying faults as they worked up. The slower battleships were of no reall use in the pacific, except as bombardment platforms. From memory there were about 5 cruisers left in the Atlantic as at June 1942, and about 40 destroyers. There is no evidecne to support any notion that there would be large scale redployments of ships as you claim. There were, as yet no escort carriers, except the Long island, and that was working in the pacific as a ferry

Germany was no threat to U.S. territory but Japan was.
As it was Japan did not leave Alaska till mid-1943, with its tactical advantage they would have stayed longer and U.S. citizens would have been worried in the Northern

The Germany first strategy was developed, specifically because of the fact that whereas japoan posed no threat to the security of continental US, Japan did not, or rather, was a far lesser threat. The islands taken by the Japanese posed no benefit to the Japanese, and no threat to the US for that matter. Dutch Harbour was of some value, but not worth the effort to take it. Japan itself never seriously considered themselves capable of invading the HI, much less the pacific seabord of the US. the US. this is just total pie in the sky stuff Im afraid.

West Coast and real unhappy that the Japanese were still on U.S. territory.
My father, who did not go because of his very high blood pressure, doctors said he might live to be seventy, said people at home were more than a little annoyed at their miseries brought on by the war by 1944.
Do not ever forget the political issues at play during the war. Not every one loved Roosevelt as much as historians want to to say they did.

Okay, so some folks wer unhappy. with all due respect to your dad, my suggestion is that he needed to suck it up. There were countries allover the world at that time suffering a lot more than a little indignity or some vague concerns about security

In the actual time scale, the U.S. government had a populace that was tired of spending money on the war.
Had they lost at Midway, the cost would have been far higher and I doubt Roosevelt would have been reelected the last time, as it was under his fourth term that the U.S. was desperate enough to send the boys who raised the flag on Okinawa out to raise funds from an increasingly impatient populace.
Had Midway fallen they would not have been that close at the time of his fourth campaign, assuming he was still president.

With respect, but poppycock. After Pearl Harbour, the US entered the war with a great sense of outrage a national mood that would stop at nothing short of total annihilation of Japan. Several times during the wart, beginning with right after Midway, Japan put tentaive peace feelers out, that were didmiossed as out of hand by the administration.

Japan in her later war strategy was counting on US war weariness to save them, and achieve what they had always aimed for, a negotiated peace. One victory was not going to achieve that. The Japanese would have needed to defeat the US comprehensively stretching over many year for any sort of war weariness to have an effect, and this was simply never going to happen, and certainly one victory was not going to alter that dynamic at all

 

[RpR]

There is no evidence to support that claim at all. There is some evidence in reverse actually. At the end of guadacanal, there were no operational US carriers , except for the escort carriers, in the SW Pac. The Japanese still had 3, possibly 5. They had aircraft sufficient to put two to sea. made absolutly no difference tyo either the campigns in New Guinea, or in the Solomons.

Good grief, that makes no sense.

A: there is not evidence for ANYTHING about what would have happened had Midway fallen.
This is ALL one hundred percent conjecture!

B: You are using what happened two months AFTER the attack on Midway was repulsed for what MIGHT have happened if Japan had taken Midway.
That is more than just a bit illogical.
Had the scenarios given here happened the U.S. could not have launched the Guadalcanal campaign or any you mentioned with the Japanese sitting on Midway and able to use the refueling station there for their submarines.

it already was. Like the pacific, the biggest single inhibitor to offensive action in the CBI was supply. By 1944 , the japanese had partially solved the supply issues in Burma, by the construction of the rail link to thailand, and in China, by a wholesale reduction of stockpiles in Manchuria. this enabled them to launch major offensives in both theatres, so much so, that by mid 1945 the china TO was all but written off by the Joint Chiefs. In Burma, the offensive was defeated, and eventually the allies launched their counterattck.

There is nothing contained in a japanese victory at midway that would make one bit of difference to these events half a world away.

Hmmm, you are again using what happened after Midway WAS NOT TAKEN by the Japanese as proof of what would or would not have happened had MIDWAY FALLEN to the Japanese.

IF MIDWAY HAD FALLEN, ALL THAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED AFTER THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY MEANS NOTHING!

 

[parsifal]

A: there is not evidence for ANYTHING about what would have happened had Midway fallen.
This is ALL one hundred percent conjecture!

i agree that there is no evidence, but there are probabilities and possibilities and there there is downright fantasy. Midway would have no effect on what happened in the south pacific, much less burma or China. Youve assumed that Midway has this mystical ofensive capability that it simply does not, and would not, possess if captured by the japanese.The Japanese had no plans to give it ofensive capability,. moreover, Midway whilst in US hands gave no great advantage to the US.

Sure, if midway was in Japanese hands, they would derive some recon advantages that hgave them advanced warning of USN fleet movements, but if anything, this would mean US ships would spend more time away from Hawaii rather than more.

Moreovcer, having a few extra carriers for Japan makes little or no difference to their capacity to exploit anything in the south pacific.

As far as inhibibiting US offensive operations, hardly. Therer were upwards of 500 aircraft staioned in the PI (maybe more) immediately after Midway, and two reinforced Army Divisions. There were about another 500 in the South pacific, and at least 3 division already, supporting the Australians. There was a marine Division in New Zealand, getting ready for Watchtower. There were already 11 Australian Divisions in Australia, and more than 1000 aircraft. How much difference would two carriers and 150 a/c make to that overall situation. none.

B: You are using what happened two months AFTER the attack on Midway was repulsed for what MIGHT have happened if Japan had taken Midway.
That is more than just a bit illogical.

no. incorrect. im using the situation where the USA found itself without carriers, but still able to launch offensive moves or maintain offensive move, without the need for carriers.

After Midway, the US used two carriers , Saratoga and Enterprise. They still retained two carriers in the PI for just the reasons you are mentioning, one carrier was in refit.

At eastern Solomons, the US thre 3 carriers into battle, which left considerable carier strength uncommitted. at Santa Cruz they still had three carriers, only a minority of these carriers were Midway veterans.

If they had had one less carriers, they could still undertake these operations without too much difficulty. if they lose two additional carriers, it slows them down, they would need to build bases at Ndeni and Sabta Cruz firstm but stil do-able. The Japanese still are not in a position to do much in response. and the Japanese o

Had the scenarios given here happened the U.S. could not have launched the Guadalcanal campaign or any you mentioned with the Japanese sitting on Midway and able to use the refueling station there for their submarine

s.


The Americans were not responsible for any offensives pother than Guadacanal, until the end of 1942. there is no evidence they would abandon totally Watchtower, or some permutation of watchtower with the a loss at midway, though it does depend on how bad the loss is. As to whether the Japanese would develop Midway for submarines, they had no pplans for such development, and, unlike the US sub forces, no need.Japanese submirineds were based at truk or Kure, and had the range to reach any point in the pacific from their, as well as any part of the Indian Ocean as well. They had huge range advantages over US submarines, one of the feww advantages that they did enjoy.

Hmmm, you are again using what happened after Midway WAS NOT TAKEN by the Japanese as proof of what would or would not have happened had MIDWAY FALLEN to the Japanese.

IF MIDWAY HAD FALLEN, ALL THAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED AFTER THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY MEANS NOTHING!

Midway simply has no conceivable effect on the way the Japanese Army, the Australian Armed forces, the Chinese armed forces or the Indian Army will react. It has no conceivable effect on shippinhg availability other than to open up another drain for the japanese.

Sure i am extrapolating, because the occupation never happened, but Im basing what I say on logical extrapolation, not on rather unlikley developments from the battle.

 

[drgondog]

Good grief, that makes no sense.

A: there is not evidence for ANYTHING about what would have happened had Midway fallen.
This is ALL one hundred percent conjecture!

Initiated by your speculation which led Parsifal to outline the facts that confronted Japan in June 1942 - even if they had defeated the US fleet.

B: You are using what happened two months AFTER the attack on Midway was repulsed for what MIGHT have happened if Japan had taken Midway.
That is more than just a bit illogical.

Seek examples of illogical thinking in your own posts.

Had the scenarios given here happened the U.S. could not have launched the Guadalcanal campaign or any you mentioned with the Japanese sitting on Midway and able to use the refueling station there for their submarines.

LOL - explain for the masses just how a.) the Japanese were going to transport diesel/torpedo/food to Midway, b.) they would create a 'refueling station' for submarines when the Japanese by their own admission was going to find it tough to get landing craft over the atoll to invade, c.) the ships would survive a gauntlet of US Fleet Boats sinking their supply ships (and submarines) trying to get to Midway?

Hmmm, you are again using what happened after Midway WAS NOT TAKEN by the Japanese as proof of what would or would not have happened had MIDWAY FALLEN to the Japanese.

IF MIDWAY HAD FALLEN, ALL THAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED AFTER THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY MEANS NOTHING!

All the fecal matter dumped into the conversation that Parsiful responded to was to add facts to rebut your conjecture...Google Midway and take a close look. It has zero strategic value if the Japanese can't build and maintain a supply chain that can't be intervened by assets at Pearl.

Postulate for the masses just how you, the strategic arm of IJN, would cause any disruption to US initiatives by taking Midway?

 

[parsifal]

Time for me to vacate the drivers seat on this for a while, but, in answer to your rhetorical question, Midway did offer one or two minor advnatages to the Japanese, but the real draw was that it was hoped the USN would come out and fight for it. The Japanese were hoping for total annhilation of the pacific fleet, not just its carriers. if, by some miracle that happened, then the allies were in trouble. but that was never going to happen. Its plausible that the IJN might have won a tactical victory but this does not materiely affect the rest of the TO in any way like is being suggested. The Japanese were being stretched on the wrack irrespective of what was happening in the Central Pacific. Trying to argue that one or two carriers one way of the other is like saying that Carriers in the ETO would have destroyed the LW, or similar. its just not going to happen