Significance of the Battle of Midway

[parsifal]

as far as I understand the author's arguments, the Japanese did have experience, doctrine, training and hardware for amphibious operations, not for amphibious assaut. The Japanese used to land troops on unopposed (or lightly defended) beaches then attack. The only amphibious assaut was against Wake and was not a success.

I know that SS makes that claim, but it is an erroneous claim. The best source in English that I can think of is Gordon Rottmans "Japanese Army in WWII - Conquest In the Pacific It gives a bit of a run down of Japanese opposed landings and their arrangements for handling them. The first opposed landings in the modern era that they undertook were in 1936-7. It states in the book " the IJAs amphibious doctrine against defended targets was well developed long before the attack on Pearl Harbour. A great deal of experience had been acquired in the war in China, where numerous large and small scale landings, some heavily opposed, had been undertaken. The most significant operations were undertaken near Hanzhou, of approximately divisional size, in 1937".

Rottman goes on to point out that during the numerous landing operations in China, the Navy and Army worked out a detailed doctrine of inter service co-operation, despite the legendary rivalry between the two services. This included details operational plans, ship to shore communication and bombardment plans. recon and r3e-supply. It is simply untrue to say that the Japanese were not capable of undertaking opposed landings. They did so many times during the war.

What is true, is that wherever possible, they sought to avoid such opposed landings, but that is a whole world away from them being unable to carry them out. The undertook complex opposed landings in the PI, off Malaya, in Borneo, New Guinea Java, Wake Guam, Rabaul to name the more important ones. They were not capable of pulling off a Iwo style landing, but Midway in 1942 was no Iwo. More similar really to Rabaul. Wake is certainly not the only example of opposed landings undertaken by the Japanese, it was the only unsuccessful one ( until Milne Bay), and it finished up being successful anyway, with the Japanese returning a few days later after the initial reverses with reinforcements.

Compared to the Allies in 1944, the Japanese had failed to progress their doctrine, and had been made obsolete by allied developments in amphibious warfare. But in 1942, the Japanese were at the peak of their game, and were considerably more advanced in their levels of equipment, technique and expertise. Against the Midway Garrison, a not particularly well trained garrison, I dont believe the Japanese would have been stopped. They had faced better more comprehensive defences when assaulting Rabaul and Java, and had had not too much difficulty. I dont believe the greenhorn American defenders would have lasted very long at all to be honest.

One important detail that is worth noting is that japanese opposed landings were almost always undertaken at night, whereas most allied opposed landings were undertaken in the half light of dawn. allied timing allowed them to make landings that were much larger....they could maintain better C&C with daylight. Japanese landings were necessarily smaller scaled, but also tended to be more sharp, intense affairs, with direct NGS being provided right on the spot. If the assault was effctively contained, it usually collapased and failed. This happened at Wake and Milne Bay, and this is a reflection of the overall weakness of the Japanese technique, but the claim that they did not know how to undetyake an opposed landing, is just spurious bunkum Im afraid.

I understand the lack of doctrine, training, etc. for naval gunfire support as lack of communications between the troops on the beach and the supporting ships. I may be mistaken but I don't think there was teams in IJA or SNLF capable of directing naval gunfire.

This is a fundamental misunderstanding. Japanese ship to shore co-operation in 1942 was the best in the world at this sort of thing. Comapred to the allies in 1944, there is some merit to this claim, but against the allies in 1942, it is simply untrue. japanese cop-eration, doctrine and experience in amphibious warfare was without equal in 1942.

Last, the authors point some difficulties for the Japanese such as the lack of room to maneuver and escape the defenders firepower, lack of antitank weapons to face the platoon of light tanks.

I dont know how they could make such emphatic claims to be honest. The man responsible for planning the Japanese amphibious landing on Midway Atoll was Commander Yasumi Toyama. Toyama planned a simultaneous attack on Sand and Eastern Islands from the southern side of the atoll where the two islands were close to the reef. The Japanese landing force would number about 5,000, and would be spearheaded by two elite assault units - Minoru Ota's 2nd Combined Special Naval Landing Force numbering about three thousand marines, and the Army's Ichiki Detachment which numbered about two thousand men and was commanded by Colonel Kiyonao Ichiki.

Ota's marines would land on Sand Island, and Colonel Ichiki's troops would land on Eastern Island. Both landings would require flat-bottomed landing boats. it would have been very difficult, though not impossible for the FMF forces to move or reinforce positions after the japanese landings began

The US OOB included

Sixth Marine Defense Battalion (reinforced), Fleet Marine Force
Col. Harold D. Shannon, USMC
Reinforcing Units

2d Raider Battalion, Company "C" (Sand Island)
2d Raider Battalion, Company "D" (Eastern Island)
Antiaircraft and Special Weapons personnel, Third Defense Battalion
22d and 23rd Provisional Infantry Companies

Thus, at the points of intended attack, the US would have two companies of raider battalions, plus, probably a few odds and sods, against basically two regiments of japanese assault troops


There was a squadron of Light Tanks included in this force. Overall, about 2500 men were stationed on the island, but less than 2000 were front line combatants.

The Japanese assault forces were built around the Ichiki detachment and the 2Maizuru SNLF. Both had been reinforced, well trained and went into battle with extensive AT assets attached. Even the 70mm Bn guns were given a limited AT capability. There were about 5500 attackers, of which over 4000 can be considered frontline combat troops.

 

[Shortround6]

Thank you Parsifal. I am learning a lot.

I would note that the Japanese had a 20mm AT that they adopted in 1937, how wide spread it was I don't know: Modern Firearms - Type 97

The Type 11 infantry gun: Type 11 37 mm Infantry Gun - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
A close relative of the French 37mm gun but it was replaced by the Type 94 Anti-tank gun : Type 94 37 mm Anti-Tank Gun - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia which should have been available in the summer of 1942 although the 47mm AT gun may not have been.

The M3A1 tanks may have been vulnerable from the sides.

 

[buffnut453]

Parsifal,

Thanks for your informative post. Once again, I find myself agreeing with you!

Your comment "What is true, is that wherever possible, they sought to avoid such opposed landings" made me smile because that type of thinking is as ingrained in my brain after 20 years in the military as I'm sure it is in yours. It encapsulates the whole point of manoeuvrist warfare - you attack where your enemy is weakest not where he's strongest. To criticize the Japanese for not undertaking opposed landings is rather like complaining that Japanese fighter pilots didn't fly in a straight line to make it easy for our chaps!

I stand by my statement that, in late 1941, Japan had the most developed amphibious capability of any of the major combatants. That the Allies rapidly overtook the Japanese should not diminish some of the ground-breaking developments they implemented.

 

[parsifal]

thanks guys, feel free of course to pull me up when you see something you dont agree with.

its inter4sting rereading SS, one of the most interesting bits was the japanese view on why they were defeated. Nagano looked into the defeat and came up with a number of key points, the over concentration of carriers into one group, the failure to get the recons off earlier (not just the tones single late starter, Nagano believed the recons should have been launched about an hour earlier. The over complexity of the plan was rightly criticised, and excessive hubris of the navy also mentioned. There was some doubt about security, but this wasnt really explored by the chief of the navy. Ugaki mentions it his diary, in particular the security of their radio traffic. I dont know if or where that led to anything, but the JN25 code was changed after the battle, something that was meant to happen at the beginning of May.

The poor DC of the carriers was recognized, and as carriers entered refit, some steps were initiated to rectify. Shokaku was fitted with CO2 flood lines to suppress fire, and fire curtains were deplyed inside the hagars. watertight integrity drills were much improved, such that Shokaku, when she went into battle again in the Solomons, was able to take and withstand damage that would probably have sunk her had she been at midway. The japanese broke up their carriers into smaller defensive groups and increased the size of the fighter squadrons on the carriers . they stopped short of adding a second full squadron of fighjters, such as the USN did, no doubt because of the limited wing folding ability of the Zeke.

Most importantly the japanese recognized the value of radar in defence, and they began to work better ways of using this technology. at Santa Cruz, the defensive efforts of the IJN was much better than it had been at Midway. The Japanese also accelarated and prioritised the construction of the new AA destroyers that fulfilled similar function to the Atlanta Class CLAAs.

 

[Francis marliere]

Parsifal,

apparently, we don't agree on the term "opposed landing". IMHO, the Japanese did not make amphibious assault against strong defense in WWII, except at Wake. The landings in Malaya, PI, Dutch East Indies or Rabaul were not "assaults" because the defenses were very weak. I may be mistaken, but I think that at Rabaul the tiny garrison flew away in the jungle even before the landing (and it was the best thing to do). I don't know the Japanese landing near Chuanshakou very well, but whar I understand is that the odds were clearly in favor of the Japanese. With respects to Chinese soldiers who could be individually courageous, they usuallly suffered from bad (or lack of) equipement, training, doctrine, morale and leadership and were not as good as their Japanese counterparts. Landing at Midway would be quite another story.

There was no room to maneuver in Midway and the landing would be a brutal assault on heavily mined beaches against a powerfull and determined foe. As far as I understand things a succesfull amphibious assault needs a ratio of 3/1 plus heavy air and NGFS support to be succesfull. I am not convincted that the Japanese had both.

You wrote " Japanese ship to shore co-operation in 1942 was the best in the world". You may be right, or wrong since you do not support your claims with any evidence. I may be wrong but I am inclined to think that once the landing begins it would be difficult for the ships to engage targets on the shore without hitting their own troops, because of the proximity of both camps and the lack of advanced liaison teams as the allied had late in the war. That is also true for air support. The Japanse may have the best training and doctrine at the time but I guess it's not enough. See how things went wrong at Tarawa because the US still lacked experience.

You wrote that the japanese had 5.000 troops and the marines 2.500, of whom 2.000 combattants. First, that makes a ratio of 2.5/1, not 3/1. Then, no offense, Parsifal, but as far as I know, every marines is a rifleman, and the guys assigned to second line duties proved at Guadalcanal and Attu that they had the guts and skills of true combattants. They should not, IMHO, be treated as second rate soldiers. That makes a 2/1 ratio if everything works well.

And everything may not work well. The invasion fleet could take loses from submarines, air and PT attacks. As you know, the IJN was incredibly bad in ASW and AAW and losing an AP (with hundreds of soldiers and landing crafts) would be a real risk. The progressive loss of landing craft during the operation due to battle damage, mechanical failures, groundings, etc. may slow the arrival of reinforcements and supply to the point that the Japanese would enjoy no numerical superiority at the point of contact (or the marines outnumber their enemy). I would had that the Japanese planned the operation with bad intelligence (they thought there were 750 marines on the islands) and may not direct the battle very well.

All that make me think that the battle would not as easy as you think for the Japanese. That does not mean that they, as SS say, had no chances at all, but I am not convincted that the odds are good for one camp or another.

Best regards,

Francis Marliere

 

[buffnut453]

Francis,

I suggest you read about the landings at Kota Bharu. Those landings were fiercely opposed by the 8th Indian Brigade under Brigadier Key. Indeed, he made several attempts to close the initial breach that the Japanese created. The Wikipedia summary, while not 100% accurate, provides a decent overview. I don't see how "heavy casualties" and Tsuji's quote about "The enemy pillboxes, which were well prepared, reacted violently with such heavy force that our men lying on the beach, half in and half out of the water could not raise their heads" can align with an unopposed landing.

Cheers,
B-N

 

[parsifal]

Part I of my reply

apparently, we don't agree on the term "opposed landing". IMHO, the Japanese did not make amphibious assault against strong defense in WWII, except at Wake.

As Buffnut says, you need to do some research before saying things like that. Sure, in the context of an Iwo, or saipan, these operations were fairly weak, but the context of what had gone before it, and even for some time after 1942, the japanese amphibious techniques were against the toughest defences encountered to that point of the war for amphib assaults

The landings in Malaya, PI, Dutch East Indies or Rabaul were not "assaults" because the defenses were very weak.

but in each example mentioned, the assaults that were delivered were against enemies more experienced, better equipped and more numerous than the defences that existed at Midway at that time. US armed forces on the ground were extremely weak, and quite unready for ground combat. Three months later, and then you may have a point, but not in June 1942

As Buffnut state, you are mistaken. in the case of Rabaul, ther are some very interesting comparisons that can be made. The harbour defences at rabaul were superior to the shore based defences at Midway, the ratio of troops about the same, and the frontages actually smaller. The Australians were experienced troops, but were simply unable to withstand the assault.

The 1,400-strong Australian Army garrison in New Britain—known as Lark Force—was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John Scanlan. It included 716 frontline Australian Imperial Force (AIF) soldiers in the shape of the 2/22nd Battalion, deployed from March 1941 as fears of war with Japan increased. The force also included personnel from a local Militia unit, the New Guinea Volunteer Rifles (NGVR), a coastal defence battery, an anti-aircraft battery, an anti-tank battery and a detachment of the 2/10th Field Ambulance. The defenders included a commando unit, the 130-strong 2/1st Independent Company.

The main tasks of the garrison were protection of Vunakanau, the main Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) airfield near Rabaul, and the nearby flying boat anchorage in Simpson Harbour, which were important for the surveillance of Japanese movements in the region. However, the RAAF contingent, under Wing Commander John Lerew, had little offensive capability, with 10 lightly armed CAC Wirraway training aircraft and four Lockheed Hudson light bombers from No. 24 Squadron.The assault for the Japanese was made difficult be=cause there really was only one point that the assault could be undertaken, and the Australians were ready and well dug in

Following the capture of Guam, the South Seas Force, under Major General Tomitaro Horii, was tasked with capturing Kavieng and Rabaul, as part of "Operation R". A brigade group based on the 55th Division, its main combat units were the 144th Infantry Regiment, which consisted of a headquarters unit, three infantry battalions, an artillery company, signals unit, and a munitions squad, as well as a few platoons from the 55th Cavalry Regiment, a battalion from the 55th Mountain Artillery Regiment and a company from the 55th Engineer Regiment. On 14 January, the force embarked at Truk as part of a naval task force, which consisted of two aircraft carriers—Kaga and Akagi—seven cruisers, 14 destroyers, and numerous smaller vessels and submarines under the command of Vice Admiral Shigeyoshi Inoue.

Starting on 4 January 1942, Rabaul came under attack by large numbers of Japanese carrier-based aircraft. After the odds facing the Australians mounted significantly, Lerew signalled RAAF HQ in Melbourne with the Latin motto "Nos Morituri Te Salutamus" ("we who are about to die salute you"), the phrase uttered by gladiators in ancient Rome before entering combat. On 20 January, over 100 Japanese aircraft attacked in multiple waves. Eight Wirraways attacked and in the ensuing fighting three RAAF planes were shot down, two crash-landed, and another was damaged. Six of Australian aircrew were killed in action and five wounded. One of the attacking Japanese bombers was shot down by anti-aircraft fire. As a result of the intense air attacks, Australian coastal artillery at the harbour entrance was was destroyed and Australian infantry were withdrawn from these positions, to the harbour itself. to make the last stand in Rabaul itself. The following day, an RAAF Catalina flying boat crew located the invasion fleet off Kavieng, and its crew managed to send a signal before being shot down.

As the Australian ground troops took up positions along the western shore of Blanche Bay where they prepared to meet the landing,the remaining RAAF elements, consisting of two Wirraways and one Hudson, were withdrawn to Lae (this is probably the withdrawal you refer to) . Once the aircraft had departed with a number of wounded, the Australians destroyed the airfield. The bombing continued around Rabaul on 22 January and early that morning a Japanese force of between 2,000 and 3500 troops landed just off New Ireland and waded ashore in deep water filled with dangerous mudpools. The 2/1st Independent Company had been dispersed around the island and the Japanese took the main town of Kavieng without opposition; after a sharp fight around the airfield the commandos fell back towards the Sook River. That night, the invasion fleet approached Rabaul and well before dawn on 23 January, the South Seas Force entered Simpson Harbour and a force of around 3500 troops, mainly from the 144th Infantry Regiment, commanded by Colonel Masao Kusunose, began to land on New Britain.

A series of desperate actions followed on the beaches, with the Australians heavily pinned by the accurate close range fire delivered by the supporting destroyers near the beaches around Simpson Harbour, Keravia Bay and Raluana Point. The Australians attempted to turn back the attack by mounting strong counterattacks, but these were broken up by the IJN support group. The 3rd Battalion, 144th Infantry Regiment, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Kuwada Ishiro, was held up at Vulcan Beach (but did get ashore) by a mixed company of Australians from the 2/22nd and the NGVR, but elsewhere the other two battalions of the South Seas Force were able to land at unguarded locations and began moving inland. Within hours, Lakunai airfield had been captured by the Japanese force, and Scanlan ordered "every man for himself", and Australian soldiers and civilians split into small groups, up to company size, and retreated through the jungle, moving along the north and south coasts. During the fighting on 23 January, the Australians lost 38 killed and over 160 wounded, whilst Japanese casualties amounted to 16 killed and 59 wounded. Hardly the results of an unopposed landing, and for the Japanese, hardly a casualty list suggesting a force incapable of attacking a defended target by sea.

Attached is a photo taken from the Pacific War website, showing the Midway oil storage tanks ablaze after being hit on the 4 June. In view is the main command centre near the airfield. note the above ground communications, and that most structures are in fact tents. this is not evidence of a well fortified or prepared position. This phot should have been attached to part II of my reply....

 

[parsifal]

Part II of my reply

I may be mistaken, but I think that at Rabaul the tiny garrison flew away in the jungle even before the landing (and it was the best thing to do).

Incorrect. see above. it was a short, sharp fight, at closer odds than was the case for Midway,

I don't know the Japanese landing near Chuanshakou very well, but whar I understand is that the odds were clearly in favor of the Japanese.

As would be the case for Midway. The invasion points would be defended by two companies, against two full reinforced regiments....roughly 5500 men to 300

With respects to Chinese soldiers who could be individually courageous, they usuallly suffered from bad (or lack of) equipement, training, doctrine, morale and leadership and were not as good as their Japanese counterparts. Landing at Midway would be quite another story.

Not true in 1937 when the first landings took place in China. Chinas regular army was German trained, and better equipped than the marines on Midway. its an army squandered admittedly, but it initially was better equipped than the japanese.

However for the Americans in the early months of WWII, there were serious training and equipment issues, and a distinct lack of experience. the Americans rectified this issue as quickly as they could, and learnt real fast, but this would not apply to an isolated garrison in a fight that might last a few hours or days at best.

There was no room to maneuver in Midway and the landing would be a brutal assault on heavily mined beaches against a powerfull and determined foe. As far as I understand things a succesful amphibious assault needs a ratio of 3/1 plus heavy air and NGFS support to be succesfull. I am not convincted that the Japanese had both.

This cuts both ways, and in fact works against the marine defenders worse than it does the attacking forces. Once the IJN hove to the atoll, there would be no real movement possible , but the Japanese would have some freedom of movement, and would be attacking a concentrated point....5000 men attacking 300.

On the state of the defences at Midway, one US author states:

"Although Midway now appeared to bristle with defensive firepower, none of the gun emplacements or machine-gun bunkers were "hardened" with reinforced concrete. The large calibre gun emplacements, machine-gun bunkers, command posts, communication facilities, and underground sleeping quarters had all been simply dug out of the sand. The seacoast guns and anti-aircraft guns were protected against strafing, and air and off-shore naval bombardment only by sandbag walls. The machine-gun bunkers, command posts, and underground sleeping quarters were protected by sandbags and roofing comprised of slabs of wood supporting thick layers of sand.

The beaches were guarded against amphibious landings by machine-gun bunkers with overlapping fields of fire, but Sand and Eastern Islands were too small to provide defence in depth behind the beach defences. If a Japanese amphibious landing force breached the line of beach defences, there was little to stop them pouring more troops through that gap".

There were no mines, and no significant hardening of the beach defences. The southern route which was the planned MLA for the Japanese was particularly vulnerable

An idea of the vulnerability of the atoll to bombardment can be found in the accounts of the bombardments carried out in December, as part of the Pearl harbour attacks.


"Despite having more than 3 hours warning, the Japanese caused considerable damage, with just two destroyers, firing for a total firing time of 16 minutes. The Japanese destroyers commenced their firing run at 2135 ( ceased firing for about 7 minutes after the first salvoes and then recommenced) , moving in a north-easterly direction up the long axis of Sand Island. The seaplane hangar was hit, and the communications tower and shack destroyed in the first salvo and the resulting flames illuminated fresh targets for the Japanese. Ashore, some confusion reigned. Telephone lines were knocked out or jammed, and it was not until 2148 that Lieutenant Colonel Shannon was given permission to engage the enemy with his Marine shore batteries.

At 2153, orders were received by the Marine searchlight batteries to illuminate the Japanese ships. One Japanese destroyer was immediately illuminated under the guns of Battery A, but the 5-inch guns of this battery had been rendered ineffectual by an earlier salvo that had disrupted firing data and fire command communications. It is doubtful whether any incident on this night demonstrated more clearly the extreme vulnerability of the gun emplacements on Midway to damage from flat trajectory naval bombardment.

At this point only Battery D, located on the south-eastern shore of Sand Island, was able to bring its 3-inch anti-aircraft guns to bear on the Japanese destroyers. The destroyers were now close enough to the reef for Captain Jean H. Buckner to see the Japanese Navy battle flag flying from the foremast of the lead destroyer. Buckner ordered his gunners to fire. Battery D was then joined by the 5-inch guns of Battery B on Eastern Island. By 2158, as Marine fire intensified and became better coordinated, the Japanese destroyers ceased firing and withdrew under cover of their own smoke screen.

The very skilful Japanese night attack caused serious damage to the seaplane hangar, and damaged the power house and other buildings on Sand Island. The 6th Defense Battalion lost two killed and ten wounded. The Naval Air Station lost two killed.

This first Japanese attack on Midway provided the Marines with a foretaste of the well-honed night warfare skills of the Imperial Japanese Navy, and its willingness to carry out important naval activities during the hours of darkness". This quot3e is from the US "Naval Historical Centre" website.

You wrote " Japanese ship to shore co-operation in 1942 was the best in the world". You may be right, or wrong since you do not support your claims with any evidence. I may be wrong but I am inclined to think that once the landing begins it would be difficult for the ships to engage targets on the shore without hitting their own troops, because of the proximity of both camps and the lack of advanced liaison teams as the allied had late in the war. That is also true for air support. The Japanse may have the best training and doctrine at the time but I guess it's not enough. See how things went wrong at Tarawa because the US still lacked experience.

I did give you a source, Rottmans book. now ive also given you the factual account of the actual Midway bombardment undertaken in December. Trying to cmpare the defences at midway to those at Betio has to be a joke, surely. betio was one of the most heavily fortified atolls in history, Midway was barely dug in properly

 

[gjs238]

She was equipped with a staboard side island, along with Hiryu so that these two ships along with their near sisters Soryu and Kaga, could operate in a tight box or diamond formation, with approaches and landings for the Akagi/Hiryu veing from the port side, and the other two from the Starboard side. It turned out to be a bit of unneccessary (and dangerous) frill operationally

Did the four carriers ever operate that way together?

 

[parsifal]

I think so, but ill have to look up some historical launch dispositions.

The japanese all but abandoned the tight diamond or box pattern after the battle, it being deemed the tight grouping of the carriers had made it easier to sink them in a single strike. After that ther was greater dispersion of the carriers, similar to the way the USN was operating, for example at Coral Sea, where the distance between the two carriers probably contributed to there being only one loss instead of two. Mind you, the Japanese carriers in that battle were also given the benefit of greater separation distances as well, and this probably helped Zuikaku avoid much damage in the battle.

 

[Francis marliere]

Parsifal,

thank you for your long answer.

With respect, I won't answer to your kind words such as "you need to do some research before saying things like that", " you are mistaken", etc. English is not my native langage and I sometimes fail to understand somes shades of meaning. Such words in French would be quite rude or unpolite and I want to keep this discussion pleasant and open-minded.

I wrote quickly, from memory, and did not take the time to check the facts. Indeed allied opposition at Kota Bharu and Rabaul was stronger than I wrote. My bad. However, I still fail to see some of your points.

You wrote : "The assaults that were delivered were against enemies more experienced, better equipped and more numerous than the defences that existed at Midway at that time. US armed forces on the ground were extremely weak, and quite unready for ground combat. (...) in the case of Rabaul, ther are some very interesting comparisons that can be made. The harbour defences at rabaul were superior to the shore based defences at Midway, the ratio of troops about the same, and the frontages actually smaller. The Australians were experienced troops, but were simply unable to withstand the assault"

It's the first time I read that the USMC soldiers (including raiders) were "very weakk, and quite unready for ground combat". Please forgive me if I am a bit sceptical. As far as I see things, the USMC is a prestigious elite corps whose members are said to be very good soldiers. IMHO the difficulties encountered by the Japanese during the invasion of Wake shows how good the Marines were early in the war.

While Australian soldiers gained an excellent reputation in North Africa the NG, please note that the 2/22nd Bn has no experience of combat. As 2/22nd Battalion | Australian War Memorial tells us, the unit was raised in July 1940 and did not leave Australia before going to Rabaul. Hence I do not understand why you say that the Australian were "experienced" and why you rate them superior to the marines.

You probably did not miss that of the 1400 defender of Rabaul, only 700 were regulars (2/22). As Lark Force - Lost Lives - The Second World War and the islands of New Guinea shows, the other infantryman were New Guinea Volunteer Rifles, who lacked adequate training and weapons. I guess you have also noted that the harbour defences at Rabaul were made of 2 old 6" guns which were hardly "superior to the shore based defences at Midway".

You also wrote : " The 3rd Battalion, 144th Infantry Regiment, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Kuwada Ishiro, was held up at Vulcan Beach (but did get ashore) by a mixed company of Australians from the 2/22nd and the NGVR, but elsewhere the other two battalions of the South Seas Force were able to land at unguarded locations and began moving inland". That valids my arguments : the Japanese lacked firepower, etc. in amphibious assauts. Their landings succeeded because they quickly landed troops on undefended beaches then moved toward the enemy.

In your second message, you express the opinion that the Chinese soldier of 1937 is superior to the USMC of June 42. My opinion is that marines have better training, morale, weaponry, doctrine and leadership than the Chinese infantryman. Chinese units were notoriously unreliable and their real strengh was often inferior to their theorical strengh. China was at this stage a failed state and corruption was endemic. Some generals were known to sell the equipement of their troops to make some money.

You wrote "As would be the case for Midway. The invasion points would be defended by two companies, against two full reinforced regiments....roughly 5500 men to 300". Please let me ask how you make your calculation because it may be of interest. As far as I understand things, Midway islands are pretty small. Every man in the island would quickly be able to engage the enemy. For the attackers, it's another story because they probably don't have enough landing crafts to bring 5.500 men at once. They would have to make several trips with less and less crafts as time goes because of battle damage, groundings on reefs, mechanical failures, etc.

May I ask your sources relative to "There were no mines, and no significant hardening of the beach defences" ?
My sources (SS, but also http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmchist/midway.txt and Midway Islands' Undaunted Defenders ? May '96: World War II Feature) say the contrary :

"the extremely extensive system of obstacles, mines, and
demolitions projected by Colonel Shannon was brought to final completion.
By now Sand Island was surrounded with two double-apron tactical wire
barriers, and all installations on both islands were in turn ringed by
protective wire. Antiboat mines made of sealed sewer pipe, and obstacles
fashioned from concertina-ed reinforcing-steel lay offshore. The beaches were
sown with home-made mines consisting of ammunition boxes filled with dynamite
and 20-penny nails; although electric detonation was planned, every such mine
also had a bull's eye painted on an exposed landward side, so that it could be
set off locally by rifle fire. Cigar-box antitank mines were filled with
dynamite to be fired on pressure by current from flashlight batteries, and
whiskey-bottle molotov cocktails of high-octane gasoline and fuel oil stood
ready at every position."

"Barbed wire sprouted along Midway's coral beaches. Shannonbelieved that it would stop the Japanese as it had stopped theGermans in World War I. He ordered so much strung that one Marine exclaimed: "Barbed wire, barbed wire! Cripes, the old manthinks we can stop planes with barbed wire!" The defendersalso had a large supply of blasting gelatin, which was used tomake anti-boat mines and booby traps. "

You believe that the island would be devastated by air strikes and naval gunfire : "An idea of the vulnerability of the atoll to bombardment can be found in the accounts of the bombardments carried out in December, as part of the Pearl harbour attacks." While I don't say that Midway is immune to air and naval attacks, I am not so optimistic.
First, we cannot know how many Japanese planes would be available after the carrier battle. May be none, as what happened, if the carriers are sunk, damaged or in poursuit of the US Fleet. We cannot know neither how many ships would perform NGFS since many of them would be with the main fleet, seeking battle with the USN.
Then, accuracy of gunfire and air strikes would be IMHO very low. The first salvoes or bombes could be aimed accurately but the following ones would probably not because of dusk and smoke.
Anyway, we should not forget that the initial strike on Midway was not considered sucessfull since 25-30 planes (number depends on sources) were lost and a second strike judged necessary. According to Midway under Japanese air attack-4 June 1942 "On Midway itself, twenty men had been killed. Camouflage had effectively protected the 5-inch coastal guns, and much of the damage to installations was repairable".


Let me add a few points if you don't mind. According to http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmchist/midway.txt there was only 2.500 assaut troops (the rest probably being reinforcements and garrison) and their landing on Midway was problematic :

"The actual landing on Midway was to be accomplished by approximately
1,500 Special Naval Landing Force troops who would storm Sand Island; and by
1,000 Army troops of the Ikki Detachment, to land on Eastern Island.
Summarizing the enemy landing plan, Captain Toyama stated:

We were going to approach the south side (of Midway), sending out landing
boats as far as the reef. We had many different kinds of landing boats but did
not think that many would be able to pass over the reefs. If they got stuck
the personnel were supposed to transfer to rubber landing boats. We had plenty
of equipment for a three months' occupation without help, but were not sure of
our boats.

Assault elements in the landing would be backed up by the 11th and 12th Construction
Battalions plus miscellaneous base-development detachments."

As you see, landing assaut troops, then reinforcements and supply would be very difficult.

By the way, I repeat my argument over the possible loss of ships to air, submarine and PT attacks before and during the landing, meaning less troops and less landing crafts for the operation.

Best regards,

Francis Marliere

 

[Francis marliere]

double post

 

[parsifal]

Did the four carriers ever operate that way together?

Took a quick look at SS and it is clear that the approach to midway was using their standard diamond formation. Parshal has done a number of dispositional diagrams for various times of the battle. At 0710, when the first attacks by VT-8 and AAC B-26s were underway, the Kido butai was on a SE heading, with Akagi at the bottom of diamond, Soryu at the top and hiryu abeam to port, and Kaga to the Stern. This is the wrong positioning of the carriers to use this port/starboard side islands idea, but the diamond formation is clearly there. Spacing at that time was about 6000 yards abeam, and the carriers astern were about 7000 yards distant.

parxhall then has a disposition diagram for 0753. The KB was still heading SE, in the same basic diamond formation, and no changes to disposition, but the TF had now dispersed just slightly to about 7000 yards. This was still the case at 0815 when attacked by Norris and the B-17s. By this stage Hiryu, Akagi Soryu and BC Haruna were all making smoke and were undertaking evasive manouvres to starboard. At 0917 Akagi (and presumably the other carriers altered course to generally a northeast heading , except for the landing on operations that began just after the course change, and completed at 0932

At 0920, when attacked by Owens' VT-8, the carriers were still in a rough diamond or box pattern, heading ENE, with Soryu now port side lead, Hiryu Staboard side lead with Kaga astern of Soryu and Akagi astern of Hiryu. TDs were now greatly reduced, though Parshals diagram does not include a scale for this time frame. Owens' attack was head on from the NE, and unexplainably (to me anyway), the carriers took evasive action by altering port, thus presenting broadside on to the attackers, though admittedly it depends on the timing, since the manouvre was actually an "S shaped manouvre....they may have altered to port early to present broadside on and maximise flak effcts, and then turned to starboard at the time of the attack commencing to again present bow on to the launched torpedoes.

by 0940, when VT-6 delivered their attacks on the Kaga, the carriers were now on a basecourse heading of NW, still in the same relative positions to each other, but the diamond formation was now even more squashed flat than in the previous time periods. this time the torpedo bombers delivered an "anvil attack, which would have been very nerve wracking for the Kaga. no hits, however.

Parshall has a further dispositional diagram for 10am, and the following commentary...."The fleet dispositions at this time had been so distorted as to no longer resemble a box formation at all, rather a ragged line ahead , with Kaga trailing on the port quarter". the Japanese were beginning to buckle under the pressure, finally. More importanlty, the AA escort was now almost completely out of position. Kirishima was astern kaga, but outside effective AA supporti8ng range, and Haruna out of position completely . Tone and Chikuma were well astern and also out of effective AA range. The fighters were at deck lkevel, no wonder the SBDs had a field day. unsupported carriers, with little or no defensive CAP and no supporting AA fire....a divebombers dream come true basically.

 

[Garyt]

I've read that the Japanese doctrine was to spread out their forces and rely upon evading strikes, whereas the US doctrine was one of keeping the vessels of the task force closer together and relying on supporting flak for defense.

I'm not sure how rigid this idea was for the two navies, and if this was even US doctrine at the start or evolved that way through the course of the war.

 

[bobbysocks]

wow there is a ton of good info here...i will have to read it slowly later....thanks all for posting. good stuff

 

[oldcrowcv63]

"At 0920, when attacked by Owens' VT-8, …"

I think you meant to write Waldron's VT-8.

 

[parsifal]

I just transferred what I saw in SS. Im not that intimate with USN squadron commanders.


Gary, with regard to whether the japanese used manouvre whilst the USN went more for massed firepower, I think as a generalization thats true, but there are so many exceptions to this general statement. A ship violently manouvered is not an ideal AA platform, but its a harder target than a ship steaming at a measured pace with less violent manouvres.

Both sides however put aa lot of importance on maintaining station, because if your not, you are probably opening up gaps in the fire screen, and not providing mutual support to the other carriers. The japanese were using a tight box formation for their carriers, because the overwhelming weight of AA fire came from the Carriers themselves, and it was intended that if a ship came under attack, the other carriers would be able to provide some protective fire over the carrier being attacked....mutual support. The down side to this was of course that grouping the carriers made them an easier target.

The diamond formation used by the japanese was too widely spaced for mutual fire to be provided, but close enough for them to spotted and attacked more or less simulataneoulsy. Because the Box had been pushed out of shape, the escort was also out of position, so this made the USNs job just that much easier.

I suspect the formations being used by the Japanese were adopted, and the carriers placed and spaced as they were, not for defensive reasons, but because this disposition made launch and ranging of combined strikes a bit easier. at 6 yards spacing, communication by flag or aldis lamp was possible, and the spacing meant aircraft could be launched and form up relatively easily. Not a lot of help when you are under attack however, as the morning progressed the Japanese showed clear signs that their C&C over the TF was slipping. They were buckling under the pressure, though I bet they were not exactly aware of it at the time.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Total digression prompted by Pars VT-8 misque. The events we discuss here recede into a past that is perhaps not quite as distant as it may seem. occasionally that becomes crystal clear in an unexpected moment. Picture a young naval cadet visiting the original ramshackle Naval Aviation museum in Pensacola circa 1970. He's resolving a Midway aircraft-type argument with a classmate, using the display of a model TBD memorializing VT-8 at Midway. The cadet becomes aware of a gaggle of 'blue-haired' ladies gathering around the display. They gather closely around the display and suddenly one realizes the historic connection to their own lives. "My God! that's Adelaide's husband's squadron and plane!" one explains. The ladies were friends of Ms. Waldron's who happened to be visiting the museum that same day and moment. It's a moment I'll never forget.

 

[syscom3]

"Shattered Sword" talked at length of the IJN carrier formations at the start of the battle and how incessant American attacks stretched and distorted their formation. By the time the Enterprise and Yorktown Dauntless's went into their dives, any semblance of an organized battle group was long gone. That is one of the reasons the Japanese command and control failed them at that point.

 

[parsifal]

yep, and it makes sense that this is a reflection of the gradual breakdown of C&C in the TF.

I also read in SS that Nagumo was not the preferred commander for the Striking Force. Yammamoto before the war wanted Ozawa to be in Command. Even in 1942, whilst Ozawa was only given relatively minor Commands (his usage of the light carrier Ryujo in the PI and Indian Oceans was outstanding) he showed clear superiority over Nagumos rather manic unpredictability

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jisaburō_Ozawa