Significance of the Battle of Midway

[parsifal]

The major losses for the IJN were its NCO ranks in the carriers (lost in the attacks or trying to save their ships). Those were the bread and butter of its navy to an even higher degree than the USN.

If you count the loss of two or maybe three air leaders from the carriers, and an unknown number from the seaplane groups as significant, then yes, this is a true statement. Overall, the IJN lost 90 aircrew, including those lost in the seaplanes and observers. as Joe B has pointed out very conclusively. Aircrew losses for the Japanese were actually only moderate. The damage to Japanese aircrews were already happening, and were about to take an absolute nosedive with the sea battles relating to Guadacanal.

 

[syscom3]

I was referring to the NCO's who ran the ships. The ones who got things fixed and run with efficiency.

 

[VBF-13]

I was referring to the NCO's who ran the ships. The ones who got things fixed and run with efficiency.

Who ran the craps games? I know on the USN carriers it was the CPOs.

 

[parsifal]

I was referring to the NCO's who ran the ships. The ones who got things fixed and run with efficiency.

ah sorry, misunderstood you. Loss of the trained manpower is never a good thing, and the IJN lost 3000 officers and sailors that day.

However I would say the effects of those losses were not immediately felt. The ships that the aircrew transferred to were already in commission, and just awaiting normalisation of the CAGs, which could be achieved more rapidly because of the saved aircrews from the cariers lost at midway.

On a different tack, Ive participated in approximately 20 large scale recreations of the pacific campaign, as a dedicated wargamer and designer. My favourite simulation of this is SPIs old War In The Pacific, and my own refinement of that simulation, which has been playtested all up about 35 times, but not published (its too complicated to publish unfortunately). The simulation covers the entire Pacific War at roughly individual ship, 10 plane element and Bn/Regt level. Time scaling is generally two days per naval impulse, but variable scaling allows major battles like midway to be fought at 15 minute time intervals.

Repeated testing shows that midway for the Japanese is a mistake. There is no hope of the Japanese winning outright, but the VPs of the game do allow thenm to "win" on points, even though they always are forced to surrender. The aim is to string out the war for as long as possible. if the japanese remain standing until the end of 1945 they are the winners of the game. The VPs are skewed in Japans favour to make a game of it assume that ther is a better chance of a negotiated settlement if the war drags on.

On that basis, the biggest threat for the Japanese is the continued overuse of their air groups on active operations. after the establishment of their defensive perimeter, the bes bet is to hunker down and fortify, dismantle some air groups and put them into the training schools. Start building as much merchant shipping as possible, and start building the cheapest ASW escorts as is humanly possible. The 10 projected IJA CVEs are useful to build because they are cheap. As the Japanese you fight a controlled withdrawing action until the Allies start to penetrate the inner defence perimeter. At that point yo are permitted under the rules to initiate Kamikazes, which you do, and at that point you pull out the stops and throw everything at the US attacking fleets. The best you can hope for as the japanese is a tactical victory at that point, which might gain 3-4 months of delay. You fight every inch of the way, making the marines pay for every atoll they assault, and leaving no airfield easy to take. once the US is in control of Saipan, they will start to decimete your cities. You try to stockpile as much oil as possible from the south, and hopefully coast in to the end of 1945, having not been forced to unconditional surrender terms. no easy feat I can tell you.

 

[beitou]

What the Japanese really would have needed though were low cost escort vessels - and these could have been made "cheaply". Something similar to the Corvette or Frigate type ships, maybe 1000 ton displacement, max speed of 20 knots, even use merchant level construction and give them a few 3-4" guns with the standard 25mm AA and depth charges.




How effective would they be, did the Japanese have a usable asdic/sonar ? How good were their anti sub chasing teams, did they compare to the RN in the Atlantic?

 

[parsifal]

The Japanese possessed workable Hydrophones and reasonably efficient sonars from prewar. They derived technological benefit from several captured British warships fitted in 1941 with modern sonars. They copied certain features of these sonars, and also relied pretty heavily on German technical assistance.

They had an effective surface launched depth charge, but lacked ahead throwing wepons like Hedgehog and mousetrap. They had a army derived mortar but not very efficient. They failed to develop TDCs (targetting computers for more precise use of available weapons). Effective ASW requires the formation of dedicated well integrated ASW teams of ships, well versed in working together. Tactics were pretty poor, the numbers of DCs carried in destroyers insufficient, usage of air co-operation not well integrated. Japanese tended to abandon ASW prosecutions too early, and for reasons that escape me, they tended to set detonation depths too shallow.

The Japanese did not institute a true convoying system until 1943, and even then it was not a well organized system such as the Allies had developed. Convoy discpline was poor. The Japanese never really got the assistance that escort carriers in asw protection.

However, it is a common misconception that the Japanese did not build a large number of ASW escorts, or that many of the designs produced were not efficient. The first escort vessels were the Shumusu class, which were followed by the etoforu class followed by the Ukuru, Mikara , Type C and D classes. About 600 hulls were laid down, with the majority of vessels becoming available 1943-5. There were also large numbers of sub chasers and converted trawlers, generally reaonably efficient designs. Im not sure of the numbers of these other lesser vessel, but in the mid hundreds would be a reanable estimate.

Before the war, Japan estimated the nation required 5,900,000 long tons of shipping to maintain the domestic economy and military during a major war, but in practice during the war this was somewhat of an over-estimation, mostly due to severe rationaing and increased domestic production of certain raw materials. My estimate of minimum shipping requirements is about 4 million tons, which was considerably less than the 6,400,000 long tons (6,500,000 t) of shipping in vessels above 500 tons displacement and in the Japanese merchant fleet and 1,200,000 long tons (1,200,000 t) of smaller craft (ie below 500 tons) at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor. About 600000 tons of shipping was captured and re-used and production 1941-5 was as follows: 44,200, 661,800, 1,067,100, 1,735,100 and in 1945 465,000. The Japanese lost nearly 8 million tons of shipping in civilian service and about 2 million tons in naval service, emerging from the war with about 1.9 million tons of serviceable shipping

Contray also to popular myth, the Japanese were not averse to using their own submarines to sink merchant ships, but the main role was always seen as fleet support, with many submarines in the latter stages used disastrously as supply transports for beleagured garrisons. Japanese I Boats were most active in antishipping operation in East asia (at the beginning of the war, and later off the coast of Australia and in the choke points in the Indian Ocean, with some activity off the US west Coast. in the first year of the war, the allies lost either sunk or captured about 1.6 million tons of shipping to the japanese. For anyone interested in Japanese submarine operations I would highly recommend Carl Boyd and Akihiko Yoshidas book "The Japanese Submarine Force and World War II" published by Bluejacket books, 1995.


Getting back to the technical side of Japanese Sonar, the US Navy produced the following report at the end of the war on Japanese Sonar

http://www.fischer-tropsch.org/prim...Reports/USNTMJ-200B-0343-0412 Report E-10.pdf

There are a whole bunch of similar documents available on line here

REPORTS OF THE U.S. NAVAL TECHNICAL MISSION TO JAPAN

 

[beitou]

Thank you Parsifal, a very helpful post.

 

[Garyt]

Parsifal - trying to send you a PM, not sure if it's working properly

 

[parsifal]

It is ive received it, and in the words of one of my favourite BoB pilots who had an incessant stutter...."IIIIIMMM bbbbl***dy well working oooout mmmmy mmmethod ooof aatttack"

LOL

 

[parsifal]

Japanese Carrier handling proedures are assessed in a USN TM http://www.fischer-tropsch.org/prim...Reports/USNTMJ-200A-0560-0608 Report A-11.pdf

 

[parsifal]

Allied merchant shipping losses to March 1942. Noteworthy are the numbers of ships captured and salvaged by the japanese

http://www.google.com.au/url?sa=t&r...6IHwAg&usg=AFQjCNGzeK2f0Hx69L3Rpg9bKvitTHudLQ

 

[parsifal]

Thread has gone dead somewhat, which is a shame. I hope it was not because of me.

Ive been re-reading Shattered Sword after this thread. Its a very good book, but there are some points that I dont agree with. It is claimed in the book, for example that the Japanese committed insufficient amphibious assets to overcome the garrison. perhaps with the forces embarked. However Ichikis detachment was but one element of the forces mobilised for the operation. in the even that an initial assault was repulsed, there was a full independant Mixed Brigade, the 65th, waiting and embarked at Truk for just such and eventuality.

If the Japanese had gained control of the skies and oceans around the atoll, there is no doubt in my mind the Japanese would have taken the island, either sooner (most likley) with just ichikis detachment, but in the event of a reverse, a few days later with the floating reserve. Shattered Sword doesnt even mention the availability of the reserves, which is dissapointing.

 

[Francis marliere]

Parsifal, as far as I understand things, the arguments of the authors were :
- Japan has no amphibious assaut doctrine nor training. Japan's doctrine and training called for unopposed landings then a quick move toward the enemy.
- Hence IJN has no training, doctrine and communication system for gunfire support. Cruisers and gunfire coul not support efficiently the troops once the assault is on.
- The Japanese fleet has no staying power. If the Ichiki detachement fails, the fleet cannot wait that reinforcements arrive. The Kido Butai would quickly have to withdrawn to refuel and rearm.

Best,

Francis Marliere

 

[buffnut453]

Hi Francis,

I think those assessments are hindsight-based. In late-1941, Japan had probably the best amphibious assault capability in the world. The ability of the IJA to conduct opposed amphibious landings was clearly illustrated during the initial assault in northern Malaya. They had purpose-built landing ships that supported various types of landing craft. The concept of naval fire support for land forces came much later in WWII based on experience in the Pacific and, later, at D-Day. Whilst I will freely admit that the Japanese amphib capabilities were pretty rudimentary compared to the Allies' efforts for D-Day in 1944, in the 1941 timeframe they were excellent.

 

[Garyt]

I really don't think the Japanese saw Midway as having much strategic value.

I think it was done more as a way to draw the US Navy out to battle.

 

[parsifal]

At the beginning of the war the Japanese conducted opposed landings at Luzon, Khota Baru, Sunda, Balikpapaan, Wake, Rabaul, and if i recall correctly also at Ambon. Small scale, yes, the japanese had the amphibious lift capability for about two divisions, and even then did not have the assault capability to land them all at once. However, they had excellent ship to shore and at the beginning their SNLF formations were geared and trained perfectly for small scale operation.

Ichiki detachment was an army formation, formed rather hastily before the war, and used at bataan with fairly mediocre results, when it was part of the 65th Brigade. It was withdrawn from operations, transferred to Truk, where it underwent intensive training in amphibious warfare (according to one of the diaries Ive read). Training exercises were intense and included live fire exercises with ships of Cruiser size and below.

In terms of gunfire and air support, I am aware of what shattered sword has to say, but to be honest, this is one area where they got it wrong in the book. Shattered Sword claims that the Japanese had no real doctrine for close air support of amphibious operations, and neither did they have an efficient fire support system. On both counts the book is wrong. Whilst the Japanese compared to the 1944 Allied efforts was indeed rather pathetic, in 1942, they had the most advanced systems for amphibious support support, though in terms of firepower, it was clearly inadequate. The japanese did not use their fast carriers for ground support but they did use light carriers for this purpose, and these crews were pretty good at it. They also often used their seaplane carriers for direct support as well (At Coral Sea, Shoho was not there as an antishipping weapon, shes was there to provide the air support for the landings). The japanese got a lot of bang for not much bucks with these methods, because the air support was right there, on the spot, at the immediate call of the amphibious commander. The seaplane tenders would literally park a mile, or maybe 5 away from the beach, but real close, and then fly shuttles to and from the battle field, not dissimilar to the US CVEs in 1944, that were used in a similar way. Japanese light carriers and seaplane tenders had been used in this way off Mindanao, and very effectively supported the landings there, and also supporting Java as well. These crews were trained and equipped for this purpose, and whilst not a candle on the allied efforts later in the war, in terms of firepower, in 1941-2, these concepts were astounding, and very efficient, because the air support was there and on immediate call. The allies didnt get this until much later.

So Japanese air support was well thought out, and practised, but was Lightweight

For Naval Gunfire Support, the japanese had a similar doctrine. They tended not to favour using their heavy battlewagons for that purposes. they were not fuel efficient, and were not particularly good in the gunfire support role, except if specifically and specially trained for the purpose. The Americans found this out at Tarawa....you need your ship to shore communications well developed and your fire support plans near perfect for battleships to work well in this role, because they necessarily operate at arms length from the beach. Battleships have to undertake the fire support function from a good distance, unlike smaller warships, that can get in and real personal with the target. the Americans learned this lesson as well at gela. There are risks, however for smaller warships when used in this way, as the Japanese found out at Wake. Even though close in light NGS is far better than the standoff heavy gunnery favoured by the allies, it also is far more hazardous.

Though I have not seen the actual fire support plan for the Midway operation, you can bet that the cruisers were there mostly for show. the real work horses would have been the destroyers, that would have been expected to close to very close ranges and fire over open sights basically. The Japanese were willing to take those sorts of risks, and generally it worked provided the defences were not too strong. If they were, then ouch.....

its very telling that the US appraisals at the time, if the Japanese won the naval battle, was they would be unlikely to be able to hold off the actual assault. Shattered Sword doesnt seem to acknowledge that appraisal, and im buggered if I can find it at this minute. Even if the assault had been repulsed, which is admittedly a possibility (Ichiki was a bit of a head butter when it came to tactical finesse), but there was a floating reserve, albeit either at Kwaj or Truk. If the initial assault had failed, as it did at Wake, the Japanese would simply have activated the reserves and returned 3 or 4 days later with a force roughly 4 times the size to attempt the assault again, .

 

[parsifal]

There is perhaps another point that needs to be made. It should be abundantly clear to most that midway as a strategic concept was a disastrous idea strategically for the japanese. Its effects have been overblown, particularly with regard to impacts on Japanese aircrew losses, but the losses are undeniable, and the loss of the ships themselves, despite not being as catastrophic as is so often claimed, was still a serious and un-reversible loss for Japan. The USNs victory was an enormous conficdence booster, and emboldened them to start taking their first aggressive moves a short time later, and this freedom of manouvre given them as a direct result of Midway did lead to an irretrievable rupturing of the Japanese powers of resistance. .

All this needs to be accepted, but it also dances around the more intriguing question.....was it theoretically possible for the japanese to win some kind of tactical victory from the battle. If it had been the US that lost say two carriers and the Japanese one carrier, and the US losing say 200 aircraft, and the Japanese say 100, Midway not taken, but the japanbese return with all carriers, and 3/4 of their aircrew, would there have been any real advantage to the japanese.

I think there may have been. this sort of outcome would have left the US in relatively a worse tactical situation than they were and put Watchtower into some doubt. Assuming the Japanese came to their senses after Midway, if I were the Japanese, I would immediately have laid up at least 50% of the CAGs and returned them to Japan for extended rebuilding and retraining. The remainder would have diverted to Truk, whilst at the frontier I would have fortified and reinforced the frontier areas as quickly as possible. These are big what ifs, and most unlikely to actually occur, but by the latter half of 1942, the Japanese were losing the initiative, with or without Midway. But with additional carriers and rebuilt CAGs, the Japanese have the ability to make the US hesitate for a couple of months before making their move. Instead of the decisive battle occurring June 1942, it probably would not now occur until february-May 1943 or so the following year, when the first carrier reinforcements begin to arrive along with some new equipment.....the F6F and the TBF mostly. an interesting what if really....maybe 6 US carriers pitted against 8-12 Japanese. American lift capacity around 660 a/c to about 580 japanese. US pilots with a lot more experience now, versus Japanese CAGs with many more veterans and decently trained replacement pilots.

An interesting postulation IMO

 

[parsifal]

One of the things about Shattered Sword that I dont like are the numerous tiny details , really not important to understanding the outcome of the battle, but which nevertheless have the effect of being outright wrong, and for that reason, decreasing the credibility of the overall narrative.

As an example, the book provides some really useful data on the Carrier characteristics. With regard to Akagi, it mentions that the ship had a main armament of 6x8in guns, a maximum speed of 31.5 knots and a practical operating capacity of 63 aircraft. Elsewhere it is stated that the reason for her starboard side island was solely because of air turbulence issues All these statistics are wrong. these characteristics, incidentally relate to the reconstructed (post 1938 version) of the carrier.

In fact the 8 inch guns were removed in 1935, and this lowered the displacement to below the quoted figure of 36500 tons, maximum speed in operational condition was just over 29 knots, and her operational carrying capacity was 78 aircraft at Pearl Harbour. in fact she could carry, comfortably between 85 and 91 aircraft with the enlarged hangars, but Japan never had the aircraft to put oin her. The operating figure of 634 aircraft were all that were availableto put on her, nothing to do with the ship capabilities. She was equipped with a staboard side island, along with Hiryu so that these two ships along with their near sisters Soryu and Kaga, could operate in a tight box or diamond formation, with approaches and landings for the Akagi/Hiryu veing from the port side, and the other two from the Starboard side. It turned out to be a bit of unneccessary (and dangerous) frill operationally

 

[RpR]

I think there may have been. this sort of outcome would have left the US in relatively a worse tactical situation than they were and put Watchtower into some doubt. Assuming the Japanese came to their senses after Midway, if I were the Japanese, I would immediately have laid up at least 50% of the CAGs and returned them to Japan for extended rebuilding and retraining. The remainder would have diverted to Truk, whilst at the frontier I would have fortified and reinforced the frontier areas as quickly as possible. These are big what ifs, and most unlikely to actually occur, but by the latter half of 1942, the Japanese were losing the initiative, with or without Midway. But with additional carriers and rebuilt CAGs, the Japanese have the ability to make the US hesitate for a couple of months before making their move. Instead of the decisive battle occurring June 1942, it probably would not now occur until february-May 1943 or so the following year, when the first carrier reinforcements begin to arrive along with some new equipment.....the F6F and the TBF mostly. an interesting what if really....maybe 6 US carriers pitted against 8-12 Japanese. American lift capacity around 660 a/c to about 580 japanese. US pilots with a lot more experience now, versus Japanese CAGs with many more veterans and decently trained replacement pilots.

An interesting postulation IMO

You must remember the U.S. even when things started to look better had a multitude of prototype aircraft and unbuilt ships on the drawing board.

Had the U.S. not outright won at Midway, those designs that continued on, even when they for the most part knew they would not need them, would have gotten the green light and you would have seen the Japanese facing, a larger variety of aircraft. an even larger number of carriers and even larger Battleships that would have simply hammered them even harder than the way the existing ships did after the U.S. won at Midway
There would have been a larger variety of super heavy bombers probably also attacking the Japanese fleet and more specialized fighters and medium bombers built just for the Pacific.

Had the Japanese won at Midway the China-Burma campaign would have received a greater effort than it did from the U.S., British, Aussie, Kiwi and other European forces involved as Japan would have probably made their presence there far more formidable than it already was.
Some forces in that area were not beaten, they simply surrendered when the Emperor told them to.

As it was the with the victory at Midway, the U.S. could put its major efforts in Europe while fighting a fierce but secondary war in the Pacific, had Hawaii and the Aleutians remained under threat, the U.S. response would have been massive.

 

[Francis marliere]

Parsifal,

as far as I understand the author's arguments, the Japanese did have experience, doctrine, training and hardware for amphibious operations, not for amphibious assaut. The Japanese used to land troops on unopposed (or lightly defended) beaches then attack. The only amphibious assaut was against Wake and was not a success.

I understand the lack of doctrine, training, etc. for naval gunfire support as lack of communications between the troops on the beach and the supporting ships. I may be mistaken but I don't think there was teams in IJA or SNLF capable of directing naval gunfire.

Last, the authors point some difficulties for the Japanese such as the lack of room to maneuver and escape the defenders firepower, lack of antitank weapons to face the platoon of light tanks.

With respect, I am not sure that if the first assault fails, the Japanese could come back 3 or 4 days later. The ships and planes would be low on fuel and ammunitions and would certainly need to refuel and rearm. The USN would have time to position submarines and, if practicable, reinforce Midway with new air units.

Regards,