Significance of the Battle of Midway

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Pars, you are probably right, but considering the damage done to the USN carriers, it seems to become most clear in the details. (Here considering only the initial attack on the american carriers by units of the IJN fleet carriers) A lot of the original cadre from Midway were apparently still flying and fighting at SC and they certainly achieved some notable success. Murata's torpedo run being perhaps foremost among them. Together Air Group Commander Takahashi's 21 Zuikaku VB and Squadron CO Murata's 20 Shokaku VT, executed a classic coordinated (near-simultaneous VB VT) attack scoring with three bomb and two torpedo hits (out of 8 drops from the 11 VT in the first Chutai) on Hornet despite its somewhat effective CAP defense against the VB and the 2nd VT Chutai (which had the more favorable near-beam aspect for their drops) and pretty fair ship handling by Mason. Apparently, Murata and company scored twice with stern aspect shots!

Regarding attacks on Enterprise, considering that only one CAP F4F appears to have been able to score against Seki's Shokaku 19 VB with its depleted escort, one might expect better results than two hits (and a damaging miss). In comparison, Imajuku's 16 Kates arrived on the scene too late to coordinate with the VB component and half (2nd Chutai) met a very effective CAP interception that probably helped along with perhaps bad weather, to disrupt the intended anvil attack. Low cloud cover may have rendered the torpedo attack ineffective as one chutai of 8 unescorted Kates, unopposed by CAP, attacked with a bow aspect while the second Chutai of 8 escorted Kates was effectively opposed by CAP during its attack on the Enterprise's stern.

One might justifiably expect more from so many attackers. But USN AAA had supposedly become far more effective presumably because of a substantial increase in the number of barrels aboard the defending screen. (I had heard a while back, don't recall the source, that the proximity fuse made its debut at Santa Cruz but I understand that didn't happen until some months later.)

It's likely that, as you say, aircrew attrition and diminished quality of replacements in all A/C types played a role in reducing the damage to the USN units, especially in the case of Enterprise.
 
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oldcrowcv63 said:
I had heard a while back, don't recall the source, that the proximity fuse made its debut at Santa Cruz but I understand that didn't happen until some months late
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According to Norman Friedman (Naval Anti-Aircraft Guns and Gunnery), the first use of proximity fuse was in January 1943. The AA weapon that made its debut at Santa Cruz was the 40 mm Bofors (albeit in small numbers).

Best,

Francis Marliere
 
Whatever the odds, based on carrier numbers, All CV vs CV battles produced significant casualties on both sides, with the more vulnerable IJN A/C generally being in somewhat worse shape at battle's conclusion.
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You know, if we look at the carrier losses, Midway was pretty simple, 3 carriers lost at the start due to having flight activities going on the hangar decks, including excess ordinance lying around. As I think you mentioned, use of early warning radar by the Japanese after Midway would make this far more rare. The only later situations of this happening were when some of the US carriers were struck by kamikazes. The Japanese kamikazes did not attack in waves like standard airstrikes, but a few here, a few there but intermitently throughout the day.

I thought this was not a good idea, why waste planes in sporadic attacks of a few at a time? But looking at it deeper, it makes sense. One big issue is the Allies can either cease flight operations and drain their AVGAS lines every time a bogey shows up on the radar - or they can keep on with flight operations but be more vulnerable. And a few bogies are likely not to generate as much concern, plus there is a limit on how many dive bombing (or kamikaze) planes can attack a ship in any given instance of time. This means more planes do not "split up" the AA fire as much as one would hope. The Essex class carriers that took extreme damage from 1-2 bomb or kamikaze hits are good examples of this.

But aside from getting hit while conducting flight operation, carriers were not as fragile as it would seem. Even though they were not struck by airstrikes, Shokaku and the Taiho were also struck in the middle of flight operations, albeit with torpedoes and not bombs.

Lexington was also sunk in a similar way to the Taiho. Avgas fumes getting into the ship, then exploding later. I don't think it's a coincidence that both of these were closed hangar carriers - which the US got away from after the Lexington class. The open hangar types basically had rolled sheet metal doors all around the hangar instead of walls - making it far easier to open to ventilate, or jettison ordinance off the side. Even a hangar deck explosion was not as bad, as an open hangar reduced the "enclosed space" issue than magnified the effects of an explosion. And it was easier for another ship to assist in fire fighting.

I know we always look at the US as having better damage control, which made the IJN vessels therefore "more vulnerable". I think this is true, but their are other factors. Older ships were in general less resistant to fire and flood. Even if recently refitted, a carrier built in 1925 and refitted in 1940 is still not as damage resistant as a ship built new in 1940.

If you look at the Shokaku and Zuikaku, these were both pretty resistant to damage and escaped after being heavily damaged many times. The had a fairly thick armored hanger deck protecting the magazines and engineering areas, about 5.5"-6" vs 3"-4" for the Yorktown and Essex classes. They were also brand new at the start of the war. I'd also add their armored hangar decks compared favorably to the Kaga and Akagi, who's hangar decks were similar to the Yorktown class.

I do think overall Japanese carriers were less damage resistant - lesser damage control, but also if you look at the Japanese vs. US "fleet carriers", Japan had a much higher percentage of pre 1940 carriers. This though had much to do with the US out producing Japan in newer, more damage efficient carriers. The close hangar design the Japanese stuck with I think also contributed to the fragility of their carriers.
 
An invasion of Hawaii was strongly favoured by yammamoto, and his staff,
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I never knew that. Thinking about it, It might have been the one thing that could have brought the US to the negotiating table. If not, depending on how intact it coul dbe taken, it would give the Japanese a strong forward base against the US. I think it would have been doomed to failure though, they underestimated the amount of troops needed it seems (45,000 would seem to be at best half of what was needed).

But a successful attack and occupation of the Hawaiian islands seems to fit Yammamoto's high risk high reward style. Very doubtfully would it had success, but were it to be it could have had a major effect on the war.

Any idea how many combat aircraft were stationed at Pearl at this time? And what type?
 
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The basic problem with Taiho and Lexington was not their closed hangars but their very poorly designed avgas systems and it was avgas explosions outside their hangars that doomed both ships. The first 3 IJN carriers lost at Midway were lost for much the same reason that Franklin and Bunker Hill were nearly lost; massive conflagrations that were started by bombs that penetrated the unarmoured flight decks into open hangars loaded with fuelled and armed aircraft. The lack of armoured containment systems around the hangars allowed the resulting fires to destroy or nearly destroy the ships. Franklin would probably have been scuttled if operated by the IJN at Midway because she lost power for many hours.
 
The basic problem with Taiho and Lexington was not their closed hangars but their very poorly designed avgas systems and it was avgas explosions outside their hangars that doomed both ships
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I know the initial explosions were not in the hangars - It was the AVGAS tanks being ruptured by torpedo hits. Where the closed hangars come into play is that an open hangar ship is very easy do ventilate - a closed hangar much more so tougher to ventilate. From Combinedfleet.com:


If this were an open hangar carrier, ventilation would have been very easy, merely roll up all the hangar sides as one would open a garage door. Far more ventilation than knocking holes in the ship's side, and far more simpler to accomplish.

The explosion of AVGAS fumes later occurred in the Hangar area:




Yeah, pretty much what I just mentioned above. And by draining AVGAS lines and ceasing air operations, the carrier is rendered far less vulnerable.
 
I don't want to sidetrack the discussion, but Taiho could have ventilated her hangars by lowering both elevators allowing the air to naturally circulate. Instead they opted to continue air ops and turned on their forced air ventilation systems which forced the vapour into other areas of the ship which then doomed her when it exploded. Taiho sank from explosions within the hull that were under the waterline, yet her hangars were well above the waterline and although they did explode they couldn't have sunk the ship. Lexington's damage report states that the initial avgas explosions occurred forward of the forward elevator, outside the hangars.
 

And an open hanger vessel could have opened the hangars up and continued air operation. Opening up the hangars will provide a lot more ventilation than lowering the elevators would.

Taiho sank from explosions within the hull that were under the waterline, yet her hangars were well above the waterline and although they did explode they couldn't have sunk the ship
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Explosion at the hanger deck can indeed sink a ship - though it might be slowly. Enough interior concussion damage could be done to hurt the ships structural integrity - and cause it too slowly sink due to progressive flooding. But what was the coup de grace was apparently some of the magazines exploding, which would have been set in place by the initial AVGAS explosions.

Even on the Lexington, the explosion was forward of the hangar. That means roughly hangar level. My point being, if you can open the hangar doors you provide a method to thoroughly ventilate the hangar level.
 
I hope you like bacon, lol. Really, this is very good. Let's see if we can climb a higher ladder, still. The Japanese kicked a hornet's nest, on that "date which will live in infamy." But let's go back, just a little further. If they were paying attention--and, you know, Yamamoto was, he "knew"--we were already turning the corner, coming out of our Depression. The "signs" were there. I'll just get right down on the street, 22nd Street, in Cicero, Illinois, my home town. We had a Western Electric plant, there, it was a four-story building. Even as late into our Depression as 1939, it was still a virtual ghost town. By 1941, it was employing around 60,000 people, in three shifts, around the clock, just making communications and related component-equipment. My grandmother worked there. So, too, did my dad, just before his induction. If they were paying attention, they knew they couldn't win this. And, there's possibly your strongest rationale for Yamamoto, and his aggressiveness. The others, naturally, are going to have colder feet. He "knew" our capability, much better than they.

It's interesting to speculate on how far he'd have gone had he had complete autonomy. Maybe we're talking through our hats, talking an invasion of Hawaii. But, maybe we're not. That one's always going to be up for grabs, I think.
 
Imperial Japan had a proud history of decisive battles with Russia and, like England, being a secure island nation, the original Divine Wind victory being an example of the latter. The Doolittle raid caused a profound loss of face. Just how deluded Yamamoto was is illustrated by the planning in the US while he was planning Midway.

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I wouldnt go so far as to say he was deluded. Thats quite derogatory, and he doesnt deserve to be derided. the opposite actually. Yammamoto was against the german alliance, did not want to go to war with the west, did not think that Japan could win a long war with the US, and thought the likely outcome of an aggressive act against the US was a long drawn out war. He is a complex character at the best of times. Was a devoted navy man, and husband and father, yet drank and visited geishas regularly. He was smart, and possessed a keen military eye.

Tactically he was the first to put carriers together in a group and make them train together so that they worked more effectively as a team. One of the first to recognize that one of the most important attributes of aircraft in the pacific was range, and one of the first to develop the concept of the task group. So he was smart. His country having decided to make war, not his choice, like any patriot, he applied himself with all his energy and strength to getting the best for his country. he did not enjoy the same degree of control over his fleet as nimitz did. he was somewhere between halsey and Nimitiz really. Perhaps a Nelson or a jellicoe

He was never happy with the Midway plan. But he also knew time was running out for japan. The Japanese needed to do something to force a full showdown and decisive defeat of the US, in the way he had been trained a decisive battle in favour of Japan would force the US to the peace table. Either the US would make peace, or the field of battle left in favour of the Japanese thereby allowing them to consolidate their position to the point of being unassailable.

To reach that point, Yammamoto believed they had to march up the main street of Washington and knock on the door of the White House. he had a very good concept of American resolve. He also knew that Japan had no hope of doing that, so the next best thing was a comprehensive shock and awe program. midway was meant to do that. If Yammamo had had his way all of Japans energies would have been devoted to invading Hawaii, which he hoped might give them the leverage to end the war. All he got was a watered down version....the MI operation. Both scenarios, the invasion of Midway, and the invasion of Hawaii, were unlikely to secure the peace he was looking for. only with the complete defeat of the USN would he able to achieve a situation of impotency for the US, and even then, such reprieve was temporary, One year maybe, at best as the US increased its production, and mobilisation even further.

This isnt delusion, its realism, Japanese style. Being stuck in the losing team, knowing your team doesnt really have the wherewith all to achieve victory makes you think outside the box. Yammamoto did that. He could play on my team anytime if we went to war. during the planning for his destruction, I think it was Nimitz who asked, what the implications would be if he was killed....someone replied.....it would be like if the Japanese killed you (nimitz). The US command relaised he was irreplaceable for the Japanese navy, and took the opportunity to get rid of him.
 
Based on what?

The airbase at Midway was done before the war, including a completed hospital.
The allies finished already started, not new plan by mid-1943, so the Japanese would have captured already started work, not start from scratch.
The Japanese never left Wake which was less important than Midway.

You are trying to reduce the importance of Midway, for some reason, to make it less that it really was.
You are thinking too much in internet extremely short term information exchange type think. That was NOT around in the forties.
If the Japanese would be so moronic to abandon a major base only 1,500 miles from Hawaii, had they won and not the U.S.,then they would have been to stupid to successfully attack Hawaii in the first place.
 

The way I heard it was that when Nimitz was asked what Yamamoto's value was to the IJN, he or someone else said "at least a carrier battle group" (or something like to that effect). Haven't be able to find any quote or confirmation.
 

If you cant supply the island, then what use is it? Basic logistics is what you're forgetting. Midway is several days sailing from the nearest Japanese base. Midway is also only 6 hours flying time for B17's and B24's to pummel it.


I can also imagine that in August 1942, the first US counter offensive would be Midway.
 
I hate to burst your bubble, but Midway was ONLY useful as a waypoint, established originally as a fuelling station for trans-pacific passenger flights.

It had NO real strategic value as it's distance from Hawaii was at the max range for aircraft and in NO way influenced West coast operations. It did not possess a harbor large enough to be an anchorage to Capital ships and the only 2 islands large enough for airstrips were limited in area usuable to store aircraft on a large scale.

Had the Japanese succeeded in securing the island, the U.S. submarine action would have made it costly to Japanese shipping, especially being as close to their homebase in Pearl. And the Japanese would have had to allocate more resources to hold onto it than they would have been willing to commit. They were already proving that fact with their operations in the Aleutians.

And with the Aleutians in mind, tell me, just how much of a tactical success was the Aleutians? It was such a stunning success, that it had nearly a zero impact on the Pacific war.

The ONLY islands that Japan could have taken, that would have a serious impact on the U.S., would be Santa Catalina island, Santa Barbara island or any of the channel islands off the coast of California.
 


Hi bob

Sys and GG have pretty much given reasons why it was untenable. I think if Midway had fallen, at the very least it would have become a live firing range for the US carriers and surface fleets, a place to send all those older subs that lacked the range to get to the main Japanese shipping lanes, and the subject of much attention by the US marine Corps. As it was, Ichikis detachment and the SNLF formation were both needed elsewhere in the pacific. Something not fully realised was that at this stage of the war, there were only about 3 divisions or equivalent, in the Pacific, and the forces committed to midway represented about 15% of that force structure. Already, on the southern front, the Japanese were facing 3 American Divs (not yet combat ready but getting there), plus the MAF, based around US 2 marine Div. there were two divs in the central Pacific, a further division in the far north. The Australians had recalled the AIF, delivering the 6 and 7th Divisions for offensive operations.These were combat ready and seasoned troops. There were 11 militia divs,. of which about 5 were ready, and perhaps 2 in the combat area already. Japan needed to additional garrison troops, and eventually deployed the equivalent of 10 such divisions into the theatre, but in mid 1942 they were not yet ready to do that. This was one of the reasons why the army was so against open ended commitments in the pacific. from their perspective, the pacific was a secondary front, that distracted thyem from their main game in China. .
 

Not sure I concur with your "first counter offensive" because maintaining supply lines to Australia is so important. I don't believe Midway was quite as vital, at this stage of the US war effort, as sustaining Australia. Even so, if not the first counteroffensive, then surely the second. That decision is above my pay grade…

But I do think your suggestion that Midway would be pummeled by B-17s (and 24s) is totally correct and probably more damaging to the IJN effort than might be expected in a cursory examination. As previously mentioned, the heavy bomber force in Hawaii had been heavily reinforced (~60 B-17s). Midway airfield is a small target. 21 A6Ms would be woefully insufficient for the island''s defense, especially without RADAR. IJN defending Zeroes would be as vulnerable as were the Marine fighters at Wake Island. The fleet units and an occupied airfield will be subject to 24 hour attack, including by ASV equipped a/c. Note how quickly Wake Island's VMF a/c were reduced w/o radar. The IJN Zeroes on Midway will be similarly exposed. IJN surface and IJA ground units become more vulnerable as the invasion attempt progresses due to the need for spatial concentration.

I doubt they would have lasted as long being under continuous day and night attack as would any surface units clustered around the small island. ASV radar suggests the strong possibility of round the clock assault on any attempt to occupy the island or sustain an occupation. Add to that the certain USN Sub presence to interdict the island's resupply and you have a new candidate for starvation island.

Seems to me that Midway can only fall with the USN suffering a Midway in reverse which is improbable for two reasons.

1. The USN has RADAR and is unlikely to be caught in quite the same vulnerable state as Kido Butai.
2. The IJN has a split agenda, island capture and destruction of USN carriers which translates to reduction of the initial force that can be brought to bear on the USN.

Even in the event of a serious USN defeat (one or two CVs sunk, and a third damaged, assuming SS's (page 166) 30 torpedo armed Kates can be added to the attack on the USN forces with a similarly sized VB component. Adding a substantial strike escort will deplete the defenders of Kido Butai to the point where it is likely to suffer more serious damage rather than less. (perhaps a Mk 13 torpedo hit or two It happened at Coral Sea! )

With two new USN CVs on scene, something like CV parity is restored soon after the events of Midway are resolved.
 
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Gjs,

From the wiki page you posted:

"The official start of construction took place on March 8, 1942 after hundreds of pieces of construction equipment were moved on priority trains by the Northern Alberta Railways to the northeastern part of British Columbia near Mile 0 at Dawson Creek. Construction accelerated through the spring as the winter weather faded away and crews were able to work from both the northern and southern ends; they were spurred on after reports of the Japanese invasion of Kiska Island and Attu Island in the Aleutians."

My understanding of the allied View of the Alaskan Theater and the Aleutians was as a future launching point for the B-29 raids on the main Japanese islands, perhaps as an alternate to the central pacific route. In the event, Fletcher took command of Naval air forces in the Theater and used the resources provided him to wage a campaign of harassment of the Kurile islands using Lockheed PV-1 -2 Venturas and Harpoons.

PBS NOVA did a show on the recovery of crew remains of a plane lost on one such mission:

NOVA | Last Flight of Bomber 31 | TV Program Description | PBS
 
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