Glider
Captain
I had to buy a second hand copy.
Spitfire mk VB/Seafire vs Zero
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John Davies
Airman
- 33
- Jun 17, 2008
"Paper comparisons"; HoHun, you are perfectly right, I should not have used the term. And you are also perfectly right in emphasising that comparing performance figures is only one tool in assessing an aircraft's effectiveness, albeit a valuable one.
I suppose I was trying to make a more general point. It is easy, indeed very tempting, for us to concentrate on these figures, because they are objective, quantified and accessible. But other factors, some of which are intangible, and therefore very hard to quantify, may be just as important, or even more important, than performance figures. But precisely because they are intangible, they may not get all the attention they deserve.
For instance, there is the whole area of tactics, and good or poor leadership. This can make all the difference.
There are other figures, like combat reports, which even though they may be subject to distortion and overclaiming, can still give a useful indication of the "proof of the pudding". And this can lead us to ask interesting questions, like just how did an aircraft like the Fulmar, with a very unprepossessing set of performance figures, rack up such a score, shooting down more enemy aircraft than any other FAA fighter?
There is also the question of the quality of the opposition. This brings in not only the performance figures of their aircraft, but their tactics, leadership, etc.
There is the question of where an aircraft stands historically. For instance, some of the early monoplane fighters gained a reputation for being "difficult", because their pilots were used to flying biplanes, many of which were rather more docile. Of course, by the standards of what came later, these were not especially "difficult" aircraft, but the step up from biplane to monoplane was a big one.
Then there is the question of "what is the alternative", a question which in the real world tends to dominate decisions. Consider the Typhoon. Its thick high-drag wing section restricted its performance. The tail tended to fall off in a fast dive. The engine tended to catch fire on starting, and to asphyxiate the pilot with exhaust fumes, necessitating full oxygen mask use at all times, even at low level. It was an aircraft that should never have been put into production, or at least should have been sent back for a very prolonged period of sorting out. In peacetime it would have been. But without it, the RAF would have been far less effective as a ground-attack force after D-Day, and that might have had a real effect on the course of the battle. And of course the Typhoon gave us the Tempest, which was a great aircraft, and was also the direct ancestor of the Sea Fury.
Or consider the Seafire, which is where we came in. By any reasonable standards, an aircraft with its deck-landing characteristics should never have been sent to sea. It was effective enough in the air, (its kill ratio against both Zeroes and other enemy aircraft shows that beyond any reasonable doubt) but this effectiveness was purchased at a very high cost in deck accidents. But what were the alternatives? Either to have no fighters that could combat enemy aircraft on equal terms, or to become totally dependent on USA production, with the possibility that if USN demand took up all US production capacity, the RN would be left without fighter cover. That was NOT an acceptable alternative; hence the Seafire, with all its problems.
So to understand what went on, we begin to get into politics, or even international relations! Tricky; but how can we avoid it?
Finally, there's the most important factor, the men. In Hanson's "Carrier Fighter", there is a very memorable photo of him and three of his wingmen, walking away from their aircraft after a sortie. You don't see guys like that these days. They have the most tremendous dash and swagger. A modern armed service today would almost certainly consider them a bit TOO dashing for today's very expensive, computerised, procedures-driven mission profiles and aircraft. And a great many civilians would certainly see them as far too macho and politically incorrect! By today's standards, they are an extinct species.
That's why I'm so keen on biographies and, even better, autobiographies, of the men who fought. They give us a fascinating view into a world that has now vanished.
BTW something completely different. That book title, "They gave me a Seafire"…. (and yes, I must get a copy). It sounds suspiciously like a reference to the A25 song.
I suppose I was trying to make a more general point. It is easy, indeed very tempting, for us to concentrate on these figures, because they are objective, quantified and accessible. But other factors, some of which are intangible, and therefore very hard to quantify, may be just as important, or even more important, than performance figures. But precisely because they are intangible, they may not get all the attention they deserve.
For instance, there is the whole area of tactics, and good or poor leadership. This can make all the difference.
There are other figures, like combat reports, which even though they may be subject to distortion and overclaiming, can still give a useful indication of the "proof of the pudding". And this can lead us to ask interesting questions, like just how did an aircraft like the Fulmar, with a very unprepossessing set of performance figures, rack up such a score, shooting down more enemy aircraft than any other FAA fighter?
There is also the question of the quality of the opposition. This brings in not only the performance figures of their aircraft, but their tactics, leadership, etc.
There is the question of where an aircraft stands historically. For instance, some of the early monoplane fighters gained a reputation for being "difficult", because their pilots were used to flying biplanes, many of which were rather more docile. Of course, by the standards of what came later, these were not especially "difficult" aircraft, but the step up from biplane to monoplane was a big one.
Then there is the question of "what is the alternative", a question which in the real world tends to dominate decisions. Consider the Typhoon. Its thick high-drag wing section restricted its performance. The tail tended to fall off in a fast dive. The engine tended to catch fire on starting, and to asphyxiate the pilot with exhaust fumes, necessitating full oxygen mask use at all times, even at low level. It was an aircraft that should never have been put into production, or at least should have been sent back for a very prolonged period of sorting out. In peacetime it would have been. But without it, the RAF would have been far less effective as a ground-attack force after D-Day, and that might have had a real effect on the course of the battle. And of course the Typhoon gave us the Tempest, which was a great aircraft, and was also the direct ancestor of the Sea Fury.
Or consider the Seafire, which is where we came in. By any reasonable standards, an aircraft with its deck-landing characteristics should never have been sent to sea. It was effective enough in the air, (its kill ratio against both Zeroes and other enemy aircraft shows that beyond any reasonable doubt) but this effectiveness was purchased at a very high cost in deck accidents. But what were the alternatives? Either to have no fighters that could combat enemy aircraft on equal terms, or to become totally dependent on USA production, with the possibility that if USN demand took up all US production capacity, the RN would be left without fighter cover. That was NOT an acceptable alternative; hence the Seafire, with all its problems.
So to understand what went on, we begin to get into politics, or even international relations! Tricky; but how can we avoid it?
Finally, there's the most important factor, the men. In Hanson's "Carrier Fighter", there is a very memorable photo of him and three of his wingmen, walking away from their aircraft after a sortie. You don't see guys like that these days. They have the most tremendous dash and swagger. A modern armed service today would almost certainly consider them a bit TOO dashing for today's very expensive, computerised, procedures-driven mission profiles and aircraft. And a great many civilians would certainly see them as far too macho and politically incorrect! By today's standards, they are an extinct species.
That's why I'm so keen on biographies and, even better, autobiographies, of the men who fought. They give us a fascinating view into a world that has now vanished.
BTW something completely different. That book title, "They gave me a Seafire"…. (and yes, I must get a copy). It sounds suspiciously like a reference to the A25 song.
Hi John,
>For instance, there is the whole area of tactics, and good or poor leadership. This can make all the difference.
Absolutely, it's really the combination of man and machine that counts - if one neglects the one, one can't learn much about the other
>Or consider the Seafire, which is where we came in. By any reasonable standards, an aircraft with its deck-landing characteristics should never have been sent to sea. It was effective enough in the air, (its kill ratio against both Zeroes and other enemy aircraft shows that beyond any reasonable doubt) but this effectiveness was purchased at a very high cost in deck accidents. But what were the alternatives?
Good point, and it highlights an aspect that occasionally is overlooked in discussions here: restrictions that limit the choice an air force may have regarding the type to be used in a specific role.
For example, one important restriction for the FAA's choice of a fighter aircraft for the North Atlantic convoy duty was the requirement to be able to take off from an escort carrier. The F4F-3 made it, the heavier F4F-4 (which according to Brown with its folding wings was what the Admiralty really had wanted) just barely made it, and the Fulmar with a take-off run of 960 ft in calm conditions compared to the F4F-4's 640 ft could hardly make it. It's long endurance might have been of excellent use over the North Atlantic, and it wouldn't have encountered superior land-based fighters there, but whatever its qualities, it was "out" due to the restrictions for the role.
>That's why I'm so keen on biographies and, even better, autobiographies, of the men who fought.
Roger on autobiographies! I really enjoy the personal perspective conveyed by these - not only because it's more vivid, but also because often the hopes and difficulties at a specific point in the war are much better captured than by more general books that tend to be "tainted by hindsight".
>BTW something completely different. That book title, "They gave me a Seafire"…. (and yes, I must get a copy). It sounds suspiciously like a reference to the A25 song.
Hm, I hadn't been aware of this before ...
The A25 Song
But it's a genuine treasure!
Regards,
Henning (HoHun)
>For instance, there is the whole area of tactics, and good or poor leadership. This can make all the difference.
Absolutely, it's really the combination of man and machine that counts - if one neglects the one, one can't learn much about the other
>Or consider the Seafire, which is where we came in. By any reasonable standards, an aircraft with its deck-landing characteristics should never have been sent to sea. It was effective enough in the air, (its kill ratio against both Zeroes and other enemy aircraft shows that beyond any reasonable doubt) but this effectiveness was purchased at a very high cost in deck accidents. But what were the alternatives?
Good point, and it highlights an aspect that occasionally is overlooked in discussions here: restrictions that limit the choice an air force may have regarding the type to be used in a specific role.
For example, one important restriction for the FAA's choice of a fighter aircraft for the North Atlantic convoy duty was the requirement to be able to take off from an escort carrier. The F4F-3 made it, the heavier F4F-4 (which according to Brown with its folding wings was what the Admiralty really had wanted) just barely made it, and the Fulmar with a take-off run of 960 ft in calm conditions compared to the F4F-4's 640 ft could hardly make it. It's long endurance might have been of excellent use over the North Atlantic, and it wouldn't have encountered superior land-based fighters there, but whatever its qualities, it was "out" due to the restrictions for the role.
>That's why I'm so keen on biographies and, even better, autobiographies, of the men who fought.
Roger on autobiographies!
I really enjoy the personal perspective conveyed by these - not only because it's more vivid, but also because often the hopes and difficulties at a specific point in the war are much better captured than by more general books that tend to be "tainted by hindsight".>BTW something completely different. That book title, "They gave me a Seafire"…. (and yes, I must get a copy). It sounds suspiciously like a reference to the A25 song.
Hm, I hadn't been aware of this before ...
The A25 Song
But it's a genuine treasure!
Regards,
Henning (HoHun)
John Davies
Airman
- 33
- Jun 17, 2008
Sorry, finger trouble....
John Davies
Airman
- 33
- Jun 17, 2008
Henning fyi the A25 was the FAA's Accident Report Form. The Royal Navy loves slightly archaic language, and in characteristic style it began something like "To my Lords Comisioners of the Admiralty, I have the honour and duty to report......
There was then a blank space, in which the luckless pilot would have to fill in something like... "that on the third of July 1944, I totally misjudged my landing approach to HMS "Victorious", bounced my Corsair over both barriers and destroyed seven of His Majesty's aircraft in the forward deck-park".
There are many different versions of the song. The one you found seems to be the only one that exisits on-line. There probably isn't a single authorised text, because no doubt people made up their own verses to commemorate especially spectacular incidents aboard their own carrier.
Hanson, in "Carrier Fighter", has a telling observation to make. Carrier ops were unusually stressful, not only because you did not have a whopping great airfield to land on, but because there was absolutely no relief, no way of getting away from it. You could not walk out of the gates of the airfield and spend a free afternoon strolling in the countryside. You were crammed in a poorly-ventilated steel hull with over a thousand other guys. Even in your free time, you knew your Corsair was witing for you on the next deck up. And that was the life, no getting away from it for weeks at a time.
So they did what they could to amuse themselves, gathered around the wardroom piano, drank beer and sang. Some of the songs have been collected. Others have not. My feeling is that the ones we still have carry a wonderful flavour of those long-ago lost days.
My personal favourite line is "I get my commission from Supermarine"; a neat double-meaning. Commission as in Commissioned Officer, or as in the commission on a sale? Because of course whenever a young officer bent a Seafire beyond repair, the government had to buy another one from the manufacturers.
Maybe we should start a new thread on surviving aircrew songs! There were quite a lot of them.
There was then a blank space, in which the luckless pilot would have to fill in something like... "that on the third of July 1944, I totally misjudged my landing approach to HMS "Victorious", bounced my Corsair over both barriers and destroyed seven of His Majesty's aircraft in the forward deck-park".
There are many different versions of the song. The one you found seems to be the only one that exisits on-line. There probably isn't a single authorised text, because no doubt people made up their own verses to commemorate especially spectacular incidents aboard their own carrier.
Hanson, in "Carrier Fighter", has a telling observation to make. Carrier ops were unusually stressful, not only because you did not have a whopping great airfield to land on, but because there was absolutely no relief, no way of getting away from it. You could not walk out of the gates of the airfield and spend a free afternoon strolling in the countryside. You were crammed in a poorly-ventilated steel hull with over a thousand other guys. Even in your free time, you knew your Corsair was witing for you on the next deck up. And that was the life, no getting away from it for weeks at a time.
So they did what they could to amuse themselves, gathered around the wardroom piano, drank beer and sang. Some of the songs have been collected. Others have not. My feeling is that the ones we still have carry a wonderful flavour of those long-ago lost days.
My personal favourite line is "I get my commission from Supermarine"; a neat double-meaning. Commission as in Commissioned Officer, or as in the commission on a sale? Because of course whenever a young officer bent a Seafire beyond repair, the government had to buy another one from the manufacturers.
Maybe we should start a new thread on surviving aircrew songs! There were quite a lot of them.
renrich
Chief Master Sergeant
HoHun, I have Shaw's book. Still trying to understand the high yo yo in ACM between a high wing loaded AC versus a low. A book which puts the paper performance question in perspective and has shaped my opinions quite a lot is Linnekin's "80 Knots to Mach 2" Dean in his book actually uses it as a reference. Linnekin is an aero engineer, test pilot and flew props and jets operationally in the USN. If he is still alive, it would be a hoot to have him on this forum. The British certainly contributed a great deal to the F4F4 being a dog in performance by their insistence on 6 guns. There were actually some F4F4s late in the production run which reverted to 4 guns.
Hi Renrich,
>The British certainly contributed a great deal to the F4F4 being a dog in performance by their insistence on 6 guns. There were actually some F4F4s late in the production run which reverted to 4 guns.
Hm, I admit that I thought the same, and was surprised that Brown didn't mention it as he actually served as a squadron's armament officer, too.
However, with regard to the weight comparison, the Bureau of Aeronautics Standard Aircraft Characteristics for the F4F-4 point out:
"Model FM-1 has 4-.50 cal. guns and 1720 rds. ammunition, with gross weight 75 lbs greater than F4F-4. The performance is based on the F4F-4 weights."
Of course, it would have been possible to reduce the number of rounds carried for an actual reduction in weight, but at least for the FM-1, this appears not to have been the goal when changing to the four-barrel battery. Things might have been different for the FM-2, for which I don't have data handy at the moment.
Regards,
Henning (HoHun)
>The British certainly contributed a great deal to the F4F4 being a dog in performance by their insistence on 6 guns. There were actually some F4F4s late in the production run which reverted to 4 guns.
Hm, I admit that I thought the same, and was surprised that Brown didn't mention it as he actually served as a squadron's armament officer, too.
However, with regard to the weight comparison, the Bureau of Aeronautics Standard Aircraft Characteristics for the F4F-4 point out:
"Model FM-1 has 4-.50 cal. guns and 1720 rds. ammunition, with gross weight 75 lbs greater than F4F-4. The performance is based on the F4F-4 weights."
Of course, it would have been possible to reduce the number of rounds carried for an actual reduction in weight, but at least for the FM-1, this appears not to have been the goal when changing to the four-barrel battery. Things might have been different for the FM-2, for which I don't have data handy at the moment.
Regards,
Henning (HoHun)
renrich
Chief Master Sergeant
Dean shows empty weight of F4F3, F4F4 and FM2 respectively as 5426, 5778 and 5328.
Hi everyone,
Since Joe decided not to accept my offer to consider his post never written, I'll go into a bit more detail of what I found flawed in what he has actually written ...
>Back to a common theme, 'markedly inferior' isn't well grounded in fact when it comes to *combat effectiveness v the Zero* which is what we're talking about.
I've already pointed out that Joe truncated my quote "markedly inferior performance" so that he could play his favourite card, the combat record of the USN, and pretend it contradicted my statement. In reality, the markedly inferior performance of the F4F vs. the A6M is a well-documented fact, and the good combat record of the USN was achieved in spite of that inferior performance.
Note that Joe uses the term "combat effectiveness" as if it were a property of the aircraft on the same level that performance is a property of an aircraft. As the results of combat - the only way to measure "combat effectiveness" - are dependend both on men and machines, and on the men and machines of the opposing side as well -, this is a misconception, and Joe has been using this misconception in many threads to downplay the importance both of performance and of tactics.
>your 'calculated' graphs showed IIRC P-40 and F4F as similar, both much inferior to Zero, but that's at odds with tests v captured Zeroes which showed the F4F's turn performance closer to the Zeroes than other US fighters, though still inferior
Note the insidious use of quotation marks around 'calculated'. I could tell you that I consider Joe a honest guy, or I could tell you that I consider him a 'honest' guy ... and you'll know exactly that I think he is a liar if I use the version with quotation marks.
So how comes he thinks he can get away with a poorly-hidden insult on my honesty here? No idea - he certainly did not ask if he could see my calculations before he put the quotation marks up there.
In fact, he has tried to bad-mouth my calculations before, sight unseen ... this is what I wrote back then:
>>My advice is to ask "May I see your math, please?" the next time you're about to launch a post that tries to downplay the significance of a quantative analysis.<<
Though that shut him up for the moment, it's obvious that he did not take the advice. He certainly did not ask for my math, whether to learn anything from it or to find a mistake, and I'm fed up with being sniped at by a guy who deliberately chose to preserve his ignorance regarding the very thing he's "criticizing".
With regard to possibly contradicting data ... those who have actually sorted through different data sets while analyzing performance are aware that there is much conflicting data around, and that it is a routine occurrence to have something contradicting something else. Quantitative analysis is an excellent tool to sort out such contradictions.
That much just as to provide the background for readers who have not followed the discussion in other threads and might wonder what's going on here - I don't intend to spend any more time on this, but I thought I'd provide at least this brief explanation for those who migth have been surprised by the course this thread took.
Regards,
Henning (HoHun)
Since Joe decided not to accept my offer to consider his post never written, I'll go into a bit more detail of what I found flawed in what he has actually written ...
>Back to a common theme, 'markedly inferior' isn't well grounded in fact when it comes to *combat effectiveness v the Zero* which is what we're talking about.
I've already pointed out that Joe truncated my quote "markedly inferior performance" so that he could play his favourite card, the combat record of the USN, and pretend it contradicted my statement. In reality, the markedly inferior performance of the F4F vs. the A6M is a well-documented fact, and the good combat record of the USN was achieved in spite of that inferior performance.
Note that Joe uses the term "combat effectiveness" as if it were a property of the aircraft on the same level that performance is a property of an aircraft. As the results of combat - the only way to measure "combat effectiveness" - are dependend both on men and machines, and on the men and machines of the opposing side as well -, this is a misconception, and Joe has been using this misconception in many threads to downplay the importance both of performance and of tactics.
>your 'calculated' graphs showed IIRC P-40 and F4F as similar, both much inferior to Zero, but that's at odds with tests v captured Zeroes which showed the F4F's turn performance closer to the Zeroes than other US fighters, though still inferior
Note the insidious use of quotation marks around 'calculated'. I could tell you that I consider Joe a honest guy, or I could tell you that I consider him a 'honest' guy ... and you'll know exactly that I think he is a liar if I use the version with quotation marks.
So how comes he thinks he can get away with a poorly-hidden insult on my honesty here? No idea - he certainly did not ask if he could see my calculations before he put the quotation marks up there.
In fact, he has tried to bad-mouth my calculations before, sight unseen ... this is what I wrote back then:
>>My advice is to ask "May I see your math, please?" the next time you're about to launch a post that tries to downplay the significance of a quantative analysis.<<
Though that shut him up for the moment, it's obvious that he did not take the advice. He certainly did not ask for my math, whether to learn anything from it or to find a mistake, and I'm fed up with being sniped at by a guy who deliberately chose to preserve his ignorance regarding the very thing he's "criticizing".
With regard to possibly contradicting data ... those who have actually sorted through different data sets while analyzing performance are aware that there is much conflicting data around, and that it is a routine occurrence to have something contradicting something else. Quantitative analysis is an excellent tool to sort out such contradictions.
That much just as to provide the background for readers who have not followed the discussion in other threads and might wonder what's going on here - I don't intend to spend any more time on this, but I thought I'd provide at least this brief explanation for those who migth have been surprised by the course this thread took.
Regards,
Henning (HoHun)
parsifal
Colonel
what were the performance differences between the F4F-3 and the F4F-4? I have always thought that despite the extra armament, the F4F-4 had some performance increases over its predecessor?
Hi Parsifal,
>what were the performance differences between the F4F-3 and the F4F-4? I have always thought that despite the extra armament, the F4F-4 had some performance increases over its predecessor?
It appears that the F4F-3 was equipped with either the R-1830-76 or the R-1830-86, while the F4F-4 was equipped with the R-1830 exclusively. (The FM-1 had the R-1830-76, too.)
The R-1830-76 and -86 seem to have had identical ratings, so it really comes down to flying weight, with the lighter version performing better.
An article by Leo J. Kohn that prefaces my FM-2 manual reprint includes a table with the following gross weight figures:
F4F-3: 7065 lbs
F4F-4: 7964 lbs
FM-1: 7404 lbs
According to a quick calculation, the lighter weight should result in the following performance advantages for the F4F-3 over the F4F-4:
Top speed: +5 km/h
Inital climb rate: +2.3 m/s
Sea level turn rate: +2.8 deg/s
It doesn't look like there is anything the F4F-4 gained over the F4F-3 with regard to performance, unless you include firepower and deck space area in the comparison.
Regards,
Henning (HoHun)
>what were the performance differences between the F4F-3 and the F4F-4? I have always thought that despite the extra armament, the F4F-4 had some performance increases over its predecessor?
It appears that the F4F-3 was equipped with either the R-1830-76 or the R-1830-86, while the F4F-4 was equipped with the R-1830 exclusively. (The FM-1 had the R-1830-76, too.)
The R-1830-76 and -86 seem to have had identical ratings, so it really comes down to flying weight, with the lighter version performing better.
An article by Leo J. Kohn that prefaces my FM-2 manual reprint includes a table with the following gross weight figures:
F4F-3: 7065 lbs
F4F-4: 7964 lbs
FM-1: 7404 lbs
According to a quick calculation, the lighter weight should result in the following performance advantages for the F4F-3 over the F4F-4:
Top speed: +5 km/h
Inital climb rate: +2.3 m/s
Sea level turn rate: +2.8 deg/s
It doesn't look like there is anything the F4F-4 gained over the F4F-3 with regard to performance, unless you include firepower and deck space area in the comparison.
Regards,
Henning (HoHun)
kool kitty89
Senior Master Sergeant
The F4F-3A used the single stage R-1830-90 (of 1,200 hp) due to shortages of the 2-stage engines, and thus had poorer altitude performance.
The Martlet I used a Wright Cyclone 9 R-1820-G205 of 1,200 hp with a single-stage 2-speed supercharger. (same as used on the Brewster B-339D with the Dutch)
Export version of the F4F-4 (the Martlet IV) used the R-1820-40 of 1,200 hp with single-stage 2-speed supercharger, which was tuned for higher altitudes than the -G205 iirc. (same engine as the F2A-2/3)
WW2 Warbirds: the Grumman F4F Wildcat - Frans Bonn
The Martlet I used a Wright Cyclone 9 R-1820-G205 of 1,200 hp with a single-stage 2-speed supercharger. (same as used on the Brewster B-339D with the Dutch)
Export version of the F4F-4 (the Martlet IV) used the R-1820-40 of 1,200 hp with single-stage 2-speed supercharger, which was tuned for higher altitudes than the -G205 iirc. (same engine as the F2A-2/3)
WW2 Warbirds: the Grumman F4F Wildcat - Frans Bonn
parsifal
Colonel
I have several book references to report
1. Hamlyn Concise Guide to American Aircaft Of WWII, Chancellor Press, first published 1982 my version 2002
2. Encyclopedia Of World Aircraft, Paul Eden Sof Moeng, Silverdale Books 2002
F4F-4
Powerplant: 1200 HP P&W R-1830-86, source 2 says R-1830-36
Max Speed: 318 @ 19400 ft
Service Ceiing 39400 (yeah right), range 770 nm
Initial Climb : 1950 ft per min
Weights: Max T/O weight 7952 lb
Armament 6 x 0.5", and 2 x 100 lb bombs
F4F-3
Powerplant: 1200 HP P&W R-1830-76
Max Speed: 328 mph (528 kph) at 21,000 ft (6,400 m).
Service Ceiing 37,500 ft (11,278 m)
range : 845 miles
Initial Climb :2,265 ft/min
Weights: : 8,152 lb (seems wrong to me)
Armament : 4x Browning M2 0.5" (12.7mm) machine guns with 430 rpg in wings, 2x 100 lb (45 kg) bombs
So according to these sources, I think you are right, the performance is better in the older mark. The exceptions appear to be max ceiling.
However the performance differences are so minor, I would have thought the extra firepowe more than offset that. If it didnt, why would people simply remove the extra two guns, like the RAAF did with some of its Buffaloes in Malaya??
1. Hamlyn Concise Guide to American Aircaft Of WWII, Chancellor Press, first published 1982 my version 2002
2. Encyclopedia Of World Aircraft, Paul Eden Sof Moeng, Silverdale Books 2002
F4F-4
Powerplant: 1200 HP P&W R-1830-86, source 2 says R-1830-36
Max Speed: 318 @ 19400 ft
Service Ceiing 39400 (yeah right), range 770 nm
Initial Climb : 1950 ft per min
Weights: Max T/O weight 7952 lb
Armament 6 x 0.5", and 2 x 100 lb bombs
F4F-3
Powerplant: 1200 HP P&W R-1830-76
Max Speed: 328 mph (528 kph) at 21,000 ft (6,400 m).
Service Ceiing 37,500 ft (11,278 m)
range : 845 miles
Initial Climb :2,265 ft/min
Weights: : 8,152 lb (seems wrong to me)
Armament : 4x Browning M2 0.5" (12.7mm) machine guns with 430 rpg in wings, 2x 100 lb (45 kg) bombs
So according to these sources, I think you are right, the performance is better in the older mark. The exceptions appear to be max ceiling.
However the performance differences are so minor, I would have thought the extra firepowe more than offset that. If it didnt, why would people simply remove the extra two guns, like the RAAF did with some of its Buffaloes in Malaya??
John Davies
Airman
- 33
- Jun 17, 2008
It depends on the projected mission profile, or in plain language who you think you will be shooting at. If you are a USN pilot fighting Zeroes, you don't need too much firepower, because the Zero is quite lightly built, lacks armour and self-sealing fuel tanks, and tends to come apart fairly easily when hit. But you most certainly do need all the manoeverability you can squeeze out of the airframe. So four guns are the choice for you.
On the other hand, if you are an FAA pilot keeping the Fw200 Condors off the North Atlantic convoys in winter, manoerverability doesn't matter so much. Firepower, however, does. You are attacking a large, sturdy, Teutonic aircraft. Your job is to inflict terminal damage on the enemy's pilots, airframe or engines, and you may only have time for one firing pass before he vanishes into the murk. So the more lead you can sling the better. This is why the Admiralty specified six guns.
The performance figures people have researched do not seem to show a great difference between four and six gun versions of the Wildcat. I'd suggest there is one figure which is not accessible, but is probably very important indeed. The rate of roll. This is of great importance in fighter-vs-fighter combat.
Adding an extra gun and its ammunition, on each side, in effect increasing the weight devoted to armament by 50%, will greatly increase the roll inertia that a control input from the ailerons has to overcome in order to initiate or stop a roll. This is colloquially called "flywheel effect". Increasing the mass of the wings and their contents either reduces the roll rate, or increases stick forces, or both.
This would not be of great importance when fighting a Condor, but could be life or death when fighting a Zero. This may be the reason why the six-gun Wildcat had the reputation of being a "dog", even when figures for top speed and rate of climb are not that different.
Regarding F4F-3 versus F4F-4, from F4F Performance Trials :
Detail Specification For Model F4F-3 Airplane
Gross weight: Normal fighter, (110 gallons): 6895 lbs., Overload fighter, (147 gallons): 7432 lbs.
High speed at sea level: Normal fighter: 278 mph. Overload fighter: 277 mph
High speed at max. critical altitude 22,000 ft.: Normal fighter: 326 mph. Overload fighter 336 mph (that looks like an error to me)
Time to climb to 20,000 ft.: 7.6 minutes
F4F-3 #1845 / #1848 R-1830-76
Full load weight: 6260 lbs / 7065 (7300 at take off)
Max speed at critical alt.: 331 at 22,000 ft. / 331 at 21,000 ft.
Time to climb 20,000 ft. ` 10.5 minutes / 10 minutes
Detail Specification For Model F4F-4 Airplane
Gross weight: Normal fighter, (110 gallons): 7426 lbs., Overload fighter, (144 gallons): 7972 lbs.
High speed at sea level: Normal fighter: 275 mph. Overload fighter: 274 mph
High speed at critical altitude 19,400 ft: Normal fighter: 318 mph. Overload fighter: 316 mph.
Time to climb to 20,000 ft: 12.7 minutes.
F4F-4 #4058 R-1830-86
Gross weight: 4 gun: 7370 lbs., 6 gun 7921
Vmax at critical altitude (19,400 ft): 319 mph (7370 lbs)
Time to 20,000 ft: ~12 minutes
Whether -3 or -4, the Wildcat's performance doesn't seem to me to be in the same class as any contemporary Spitfire mark.
Detail Specification For Model F4F-3 Airplane
Gross weight: Normal fighter, (110 gallons): 6895 lbs., Overload fighter, (147 gallons): 7432 lbs.
High speed at sea level: Normal fighter: 278 mph. Overload fighter: 277 mph
High speed at max. critical altitude 22,000 ft.: Normal fighter: 326 mph. Overload fighter 336 mph (that looks like an error to me)
Time to climb to 20,000 ft.: 7.6 minutes
F4F-3 #1845 / #1848 R-1830-76
Full load weight: 6260 lbs / 7065 (7300 at take off)
Max speed at critical alt.: 331 at 22,000 ft. / 331 at 21,000 ft.
Time to climb 20,000 ft. ` 10.5 minutes / 10 minutes
Detail Specification For Model F4F-4 Airplane
Gross weight: Normal fighter, (110 gallons): 7426 lbs., Overload fighter, (144 gallons): 7972 lbs.
High speed at sea level: Normal fighter: 275 mph. Overload fighter: 274 mph
High speed at critical altitude 19,400 ft: Normal fighter: 318 mph. Overload fighter: 316 mph.
Time to climb to 20,000 ft: 12.7 minutes.
F4F-4 #4058 R-1830-86
Gross weight: 4 gun: 7370 lbs., 6 gun 7921
Vmax at critical altitude (19,400 ft): 319 mph (7370 lbs)
Time to 20,000 ft: ~12 minutes
Whether -3 or -4, the Wildcat's performance doesn't seem to me to be in the same class as any contemporary Spitfire mark.
renrich
Chief Master Sergeant
JD, your points are well made but I think that the early Martlet which was originally scheduled for France and wound up in the FAA had only the four 50s and was quite successful against the Condor. In the early going in the pacific the performance of the F4F3 was more on par with the A6M but when the F4F4 replaced the F4F3 with two more guns, less ammo per gun and the folding wings, that additional weight really hampered the performance and the only way the USN pilots survived was by superior tactics and because of the ruggedness of the AC. I believe that the RAFs insistence on the 6 guns was based on their belief that a certain number of hits(statistically) was needed to bring down a bomber and the overall level of gunnery training in the FAA or RAF was not, at that time, equal to that of the USN. A number of the kills for F6F3s were against the big Kawanishi flying boats which were pretty rugged unlike some of the IJN fighters and the 4 -50s were ample. The thing to remember is that in an AC of the Wildcat's size and HP, 400 or 500 pounds made a big difference in rate of climb and overall maneuverability. That is the reason that the FM2 went back to the 4-50s. If you remember, the early F8Fs had only 4-50s also to save weight.
I've read through this thread twice now and was unable to find any figures on the Zero or Spitfire V from flight tests or manufactures' data bearing on aircraft performance characteristics such as speed, climb, roll rate (excepting the NACA chart) turn. I can't believe that's really the case after 10 pages of discussion. Could someone please point out to me where in this thread basic performance data of the Zero is cited, i.e. max speed at SL Critical alt, climb in ft/min, roll rate, turn in deg/sec at specified alt? I must have missed it. Frankly I think the Spitfire – Zero comparison is less interesting than a F4F – Zero comparison. In my view, based on performance data of the Spitfire from trials and what I understand Zero performance to have been, the Spitfire is a class better in performance than the Zero with the exception of turn. The F4F and the Zero, on the other hand, may be closer in performance, at least in basic performance characteristics such as level speed, climb and roll. Without the numbers, however, how can one say?
Ok, on my third read through I found this from parsifal:
Ok, on my third read through I found this from parsifal:
Thanks parsifal. At least we have something now to compare. The 4517 ft/ min climb figure seems doubtful though... Do you know the source for those figures parsifal?
parsifal
Colonel
Hi Richard
I happen to believe that the decision to put six guns and folding wings on the Wildcat was the right one, notwithstanding what i consider to be a very marginal drop in performance.
Firstly the design work for the F4F-4 was done before the US had really become that aware of the Zero. And packing the maximum amount of firepower against strike aircraft was the right decision. Being able to shoot down the attack aircraft has to be the number one priority for a carrier based fighter, not shooting down enemy fighters. If the strike aircraft get through, , and damage or sink the carrier, the whole Task Group is then placed at risk. The fighters of themsleves are expendable.
And as things happened to turn out, the F4F-4 was still competitive against the zeke. It was built like a brick dunny and could out dive and I believe out roll a zeke. Even though a zeke was not strong, it could still absorb some punishment, and having 6 guns instead of four meant that you only needed to keep the zeke in your sights for 2/3 the time that it might take an F4F-3.
Now the wing folding was critical to US success. It meant that overnight their standard Fighter component on their carriers went from about 18 fighters, to over 30. By comparison, the Japanese carriers were embarking about 18-24 Fighters, so the US went fom parity, to superiority in the numbers department. This proved crucila in the 1942 battles
I would also hotly dispute that the USN flyers were that much better than FAA pilots at shooting. Ther was no comparison in the flight training of an FAA pilot to your standard garden variety RAF Jock. It took over a year to train fleet air arm crews, at the beginng of the war the RN was receiving just 16 pilots per year (although this changed rapidly. Whilst I have heard that the USN practced deflection shooting to amuch greater extent than any body else, USN training times for their aircrew were nowhere near as thorough as the early war FAA. Later on, as the need for numbers grew, the FAA did drop its standards, so the later 1942 FAA pilots were not quite as good, but in 1940-42 (warly), the FAA boys showed exceptional skill in the air. As an example, though not an air combat issue, just 18 swordfish, attacked and disabled 3 Italian Battleships, in the middle of the night. Compare the damage they did, to the Japanese in PH, and the amount of damage per aircraft for the british aircraft is FAR in excess of that achieved per a/c by the IJN pilots
I happen to believe that the decision to put six guns and folding wings on the Wildcat was the right one, notwithstanding what i consider to be a very marginal drop in performance.
Firstly the design work for the F4F-4 was done before the US had really become that aware of the Zero. And packing the maximum amount of firepower against strike aircraft was the right decision. Being able to shoot down the attack aircraft has to be the number one priority for a carrier based fighter, not shooting down enemy fighters. If the strike aircraft get through, , and damage or sink the carrier, the whole Task Group is then placed at risk. The fighters of themsleves are expendable.
And as things happened to turn out, the F4F-4 was still competitive against the zeke. It was built like a brick dunny and could out dive and I believe out roll a zeke. Even though a zeke was not strong, it could still absorb some punishment, and having 6 guns instead of four meant that you only needed to keep the zeke in your sights for 2/3 the time that it might take an F4F-3.
Now the wing folding was critical to US success. It meant that overnight their standard Fighter component on their carriers went from about 18 fighters, to over 30. By comparison, the Japanese carriers were embarking about 18-24 Fighters, so the US went fom parity, to superiority in the numbers department. This proved crucila in the 1942 battles
I would also hotly dispute that the USN flyers were that much better than FAA pilots at shooting. Ther was no comparison in the flight training of an FAA pilot to your standard garden variety RAF Jock. It took over a year to train fleet air arm crews, at the beginng of the war the RN was receiving just 16 pilots per year (although this changed rapidly. Whilst I have heard that the USN practced deflection shooting to amuch greater extent than any body else, USN training times for their aircrew were nowhere near as thorough as the early war FAA. Later on, as the need for numbers grew, the FAA did drop its standards, so the later 1942 FAA pilots were not quite as good, but in 1940-42 (warly), the FAA boys showed exceptional skill in the air. As an example, though not an air combat issue, just 18 swordfish, attacked and disabled 3 Italian Battleships, in the middle of the night. Compare the damage they did, to the Japanese in PH, and the amount of damage per aircraft for the british aircraft is FAR in excess of that achieved per a/c by the IJN pilots
John Davies
Airman
- 33
- Jun 17, 2008
True; and Johnnie Johnson would probably have agreed with you, (I've quoted him in an earlier post) and he certainly knew what he was talking about. And yes, you are quite right, UK authorities did work on a pretty crude statistical notion of how many bullets you needed to spray into the target area to ensure a kill. I can't help wondering if they made a clear distinction between rifle calibre and .50 weapons?
However, it is also worth remembering that a good many FAA pilots were trained in the USA by the USN. Hanson ("Carrier Fighter") gives an account of his basic and advanced training, if I remember rightly at Penescola. (I don't have my copy to hand ATM). So maybe some of them were taught how to shoot?
I take your point about the undesireability of adding weight to a small fighter. I'd still emphasise that if you have to add weight, a fairly outboard position in the wings is one of the worse places to do it.
Seafire squadrons in the Pacific theatre were authorised to remove both the wingtips and the outer .303 MGs from their aircraft, leaving one cannon and one MG (probably as an insurance against cannon feed jams) on each side. This combination simulataneously increased roll rate and reduced stick forces. Since the basic Spitfire airframe was highly manoeverable to begin with, the results must have been fairly startling. But it all goes to show that weight far out in the wings of a fighter is NOT a good idea!
The decision whether or not to adopt this modification was left at squadron level, and not all of them did it. But the fact it was so much as considered suggests to me that even the Merlin-55 equipped Seafire LIIIs and FIIIs needed every edge they could get against the Zero. They had a pretty impressive performance. They were highly manoeverable aircraft, with an impressive rate of climb, angle of climb, and rate of accelleration. The tactics Brown describes in "The Seafire" of keeping the speed well up above the Zero's best fighting range, and proceeding in a series of near-stall turns, obviously worked, to judge from combat reports. But even so, the FAA clearly treated the Zero with considerable respect.
Which leads me to the obvious conclusion that if the pilots of a pretty advanced development of the Merlin-engined Seafire had to work hard at it to get a decisive advantage over the Zero, then anyone who went up against a Zero in a Wildcat had to be a real hero!
