Tactical Strikes of World War II

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plan_D

Lieutenant Colonel
11,643
22
Apr 1, 2004
I have started this thread because I have noticed that some members, especially syscom, cannot grasp the idea between a tactical target and a strategic target. Nor can some members understand that it's better to send in smaller, faster bombers to destroy smaller tactical targets.

It all started with me describing a Ar 234 attack on the Liége railyards.

"It performed the worlds first jet bomber raid on 24 December when nine Ar-234B-2s attacked the rail yards at Liége. Each armed with a single SC 500 (1,100 lb) bomb the Arado bombers all attacked, and reported success without loss."

I don't like picking up on single people, but syscom has provided the best amount of quotes to show a lack of understanding. Or maybe you're just trying to be right, rather than actually trying to learn.

Here they are:

"Nine jet bombers carrying nine bombs total. Not much of a payload to be considered usefull, is it."

"I'd take a mosquito or a Lanc over a -234 any day."

::Bold added by me::

"But its trading payload for speed, and that means the larger targets it would eventually need to attack would require hundreds of them to accomplish anything."

I will come back to this, as it's said as a point against the Ar 234. Yet later, syscom states that all Allied bombers required hundreds to attack these targets. Making his original assault on the Ar 234 null and void. When ask what these larger targets were:

"Airfields, troop concentrations, bridges, supply depots, harbors, blah blah blah."

"Stop the presses!!!!! OMG..... the Luftwaffe was so good that it only took a few -234's carrying a few bombs to put out of commision tactical targets that required hundreds of allied bombers to do. Oh yeah, and that includes the -88's and other German bombers that needed hundreds of planes to do the same on the Allies."

"By the way, hordes of B26's and -47's and -38's would attack a single target (and I suppose the RAF did the same). And they were just as accurate as the -234. In fact probably more accurate because high speed often means introduces new errors."

"The B26's attacked in wing strength, involving 3 groups or more per target. Thats about 100 - 300 B26's per mission. The fighter bombers would go out a few at a time or send out a whole group. But they are fighters, not bombers."

I would like to be informed what targets these B-26s were attacking. Now, I see that you suppose the RAF did the same. You are claiming that the RAF attack tactical targets with hundreds of light and medium bombers. Okay.


Let's use syscom's template for tactical targets:

Airfields.
Troop Concentrations.
Bridges.
Supply Depots.
Harbours.

Anyone can add more, or disagree with syscoms list. Fine by me. These targets, according to syscom, would take hundreds of Ar 234s to attack.
Or, as he states, 'hordes' of B-26s. And he assumes the RAF would do the same. These targets would be very specific and precise. Attacks on these targets with fighter escort would be called a 'Ramrod' by the RAF.

13 June, 1943, 12 Venturas of 464 Sqdn. raid St. Brieuc airfield.

4 July, 1943, 12 Mitchells of 2 Group raid Amiens.

15 July, 1943, 12 107 Sqdn. Bostons raid Poix.

26 July, 1943, 9 Bostons raid Courtrai.

8 August, 1943, 2 Group squadrons, 88, 107 and 342 send 40 Bostons to raid Naval stores at Rennes. Described as a "fairly heavy raid".

16 August, 1943, 88, 107 and 342 Sqdn. send 37 Bostons to raid armament and steel works at Denain. (More like a strategic attack to me)

27 August, 1943, 107 Sqdn. send 6 Bostons to raid Gosnay power station.

22 October, 1943, 72 B-26s raided Evreux.

25 Octorber, 1943, 24 Mitchells of 98 and 320 Sqdn. raided Brest/Lanveoc airfield.

3 October, 1943, 464 and 487 Sqdn. send 12 Mosqutioes each to Guerledon and Pont Chateau power stations. 12 Bostons of 107 Sqdn. attack Orleans power station, 11 Bostons of 342 Sqdn. attack Chevilly-la-Rue, and 14 Bostons of 88 Sqdn. attack Distre.

It appears to me that the RAF didn't attack tactical targets with hundreds of bombers. Because they knew that would be a waste of resources. It would be better to send in smaller bombers, flying lower and faster to hit with precision.

So, syscoms claim that the RAF attacked with hundreds (100 - 300) of bombers against airfields, supply dumps and other tactical targets is false. Any discussion, or addition is welcome. Or any question on the 2nd TAF operations is also welcome.
 
I agree with you D, I've just finished reading an excellent book titled "The Gestapo Hunters" about 464 sqn RAAF who, as you know, were part of 2TAF. The book lists every operation the squadron flew in both Ventura's and Mossies and the number of a/c used. I can back you up by saying that they definetly did NOT use hundreds of aircraft.

For Example
4 Apr43 - Docks, Rotterdam - 12a/c
2 May43 - Steel works, Ijumuiden,Holland - 12a/c
31May43- Coke ovens,Zeebrugge,Holland- 12a/c
10Jul43 - Luftwaffe assembly sheds,St Omar - 12a/c
3Feb44 - V1 sites,Beaumont Le Hareng - 8a/c
4Feb44 - V1 sites, Beaulieu - 7a/c
5Feb44 - V1 sites, Bois Megle -8a/c

And the list goes on and on (464sqn flew 3053 operational sorties)

Probably the most notable raid was:-
Operation Jericho (Amiens prison raid) on 18Feb44 - 487sqnRNZAF - 6a/c
464sqnRAAF - 6a/c
21sqnRAF -6a/c
plus 1 FPU mossie

Of the 19 a/c that took part 8 did not attack!
If you want any more info on the squadron give me a yell, and I'll see what I can dig up.
 
plan_D said:
I have started this thread because I have noticed that some members, especially syscom, cannot grasp the idea between a tactical target and a strategic target. Nor can some members understand that it's better to send in smaller, faster bombers to destroy smaller tactical targets.

You seem not to grasp the concept that putting an aircraft and aircrew at risk to carry a single 1000 pound bomb which is not a war or battle winner but more of a stunt.

I don't like picking up on single people, but syscom has provided the best amount of quotes to show a lack of understanding. Or maybe you're just trying to be right, rather than actually trying to learn.

Of all the people in this forum, youre the one guy I hope that chokes on his food and noone bothers to help you.

Did you stop taking your meds by any chance?

Here they are: .........

I will come back to this, as it's said as a point against the Ar 234. Yet later, syscom states that all Allied bombers required hundreds to attack these targets. Making his original assault on the Ar 234 null and void. When ask what these larger targets were.

What part dont you understand that a few planes carrying a small number of bombs isnt going to do squat. Doesnt matter if its the allies, the Russians, the Germans, the Japanese. Did you know that an SBD dive bomber could carry a 1000 pounder just like the -234. Even though it was slower, at tree top level, it had some protection.

"Airfields, troop concentrations, bridges, supply depots, harbors, blah blah blah."
I would like to be informed what targets these B-26s were attacking. Now, I see that you suppose the RAF did the same. You are claiming that the RAF attack tactical targets with hundreds of light and medium bombers. Okay.

My sources show that the 9th AF up to about spring 1944, concentrated on airfields in France and the low countries. Often air cover was given by the RAF as all available AAF fighters were busy with the 8th AF. Prior to D-day and then untill the end of the war, they bombed anything of importance that the ground troops wanted hit. Among them were bridges, railyards, road junctions, troop concentrations, river crossings, ammo dumps, petro dumps, supply dumps, blah blah blah.

The 12 AF was supporting the ground troops from nearly day one and bombed the same.

The 9th AF had eight B26 groups and three A20 groups.
The 12 AF had 3 B26 groups, three B25 groups and a single A20 group.

Thats a lot of aircraft that just werent exactly sitting around looking pretty.

If the RAF didnt have any medium bombers, my mistake. And it just shows you that the US dominated the airwar.

It appears to me that the RAF didn't attack tactical targets with hundreds of bombers. Because they knew that would be a waste of resources. It would be better to send in smaller bombers, flying lower and faster to hit with precision.

So, syscoms claim that the RAF attacked with hundreds (100 - 300) of bombers against airfields, supply dumps and other tactical targets is false. Any discussion, or addition is welcome. Or any question on the 2nd TAF operations is also welcome.

I aplogize for thinking the RAF had enough aircraft to mount these raids. Good thing the AAF had the capacity to do it. And obviously the small targets were given to the RAF and big ones given to the AAF.

I would sum it up this way. just because the RAF didnt have the resources necessary to launch raids involving 200 or so medium bombers, didnt mean the AAF couldnt do it.

Now think about how many tons of bombs are needed to take out an airfield 1 square kilometer. It would take lots, and the 9th and 12th air forces had the planes and aircrews to do it.

The concept of one aircraft with one single bomb destroying its target didnt happen untill late in the Vietnam war. Untill that time, it was many aircraft needing lots of bombs to have a chance at destroying its target.
 
The concept of one aircraft with one single bomb destroying its target didnt happen untill late in the Vietnam war. Untill that time, it was many aircraft needing lots of bombs to have a chance at destroying its target.
I cant let that one go by sys.... There are many instances where a single Lancaster dropped a single Grand Slam and the target was destroyed....

Heres two pics to back it up.... Bielefeld Viaduct... On March 14th 1945, Squadron Leader Calder in Lancaster S-Sugar attacked Bielefeld Viaduct in Germany with the first of the 22,000lb Grand Slams, and completely shattered the target.... Bielefeld Viaduct carried the main railway line from Hamm to Hanover and had survived 3,000 tons of bombs in previous attacks....
 

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And it was one heck of a huge bomb that did it.

But yes, you are right.

But like you said, untill this bomb was dropped, 3000 tons of bombs didnt do the trick, did it?

It wasnt untill the advent of the "smart" bombs in 1972 that a single aircraft had a pretty good chance of destroying its target with a normal sized bomb.
 
Thank you, Wildcat. And I'm sure I will ask for information. At the moment, I have a day by day account of the 2nd TAF from June 1943 - June 1944. And I will probably be interested in more detailed information later on.

Syscom:

"You seem not to grasp the concept that putting an aircraft and aircrew at risk to carry a single 1000 pound bomb which is not a war or battle winner but more of a stunt."

There is not one single raid in World War II where a single plane, carrying a single 1,000 lb bomb was sent up to destroy a target such as an airfield. I seem to be grasping the concepts of air warfare a lot better than you.

"Of all the people in this forum, youre the one guy I hope that chokes on his food and noone bothers to help you. Did you stop taking your meds by any chance?"

You tell me that like I would care. I'll try to avoid bringing this down to a slanging match. After all, I am interested in the facts of tactical bombing. I was hoping some of our more esteemed, and intelligent, members could provide information on the US 9th Air Force.

"What part dont you understand that a few planes carrying a small number of bombs isnt going to do squat. Doesnt matter if its the allies, the Russians, the Germans, the Japanese. Did you know that an SBD dive bomber could carry a 1000 pounder just like the -234. Even though it was slower, at tree top level, it had some protection."

Syscom, did you even read mine and Wildcat's sortie listings? Most of those operations were a complete success, destroying their target completely. A small number of planes, with a small number of bombs did a lot.
This thread isn't about the Ar 234. I'll start a thread on the Ar 234 if you wish, syscom. But we're not discussing it here. This thread is for tactical bombing.

"If the RAF didnt have any medium bombers, my mistake. And it just shows you that the US dominated the airwar."

Where do you get the idea that the RAF didn't have medium bombers? What do you think a Mitchell or Wellington is? And if the U.S dominated the air war, why did the 9th Air Force need the RAF to cover them, as you state.

"Now think about how many tons of bombs are needed to take out an airfield 1 square kilometer. It would take lots, and the 9th and 12th air forces had the planes and aircrews to do it."

No, you think for once. We're not after creating one large crater that is one square kilometer. Attacking an airfield aims to do three things; crater the runway, destroy control buildings and destroy communication. That could be done by less than twenty planes carrying a combined load of 10,000 lbs.

"Thats a lot of aircraft that just werent exactly sitting around looking pretty."

Just because they were there, it doesn't mean you use them all on one target. The USAAF would have attacked several targets on one day, just like the RAF did.

"The 9th AF had eight B26 groups and three A20 groups."

Yes they did, you're right. I have the whole order of battle on 5th June, 1944, for the 2nd TAF, ADGB 10 11 Groups and US Ninth Air Force. But what you need to provide is a list of 9th Air Force sorties.

Because I've already demonstrated that the RAF didn't need to attack with large numbers. Maybe the RAF pilots were better...
 
If I could make a couple of observations.

1 Some of the most damaging attacks carried out by the Germans on airfields and specific factories during the BOB, were carried out by fairly small raids often 20-25 planes with specially trained crews. This tactical bombing apprach wasn't a 1943-4 Allied idea.

2 I believe the USA had more faith in the lead bomber concept were when the lead bombaimer dropped their bombs the rest of the unit dropped at the same time. By its nature this would introduce a scatter effect caused by size of the formation. If the Lead bomber was accurate the results could be and often were very impressive, but if he was off, then everyone was off.
The RAF tended to let each plane drop their bombs individually. The RAF Master Bomber was a different concept normally used in large raids. In this case the bombers still aimed their bombs individually but the Master Bomber would advise incomming bombers how to adjust their aim in relation to the marker dropped by the master bomber or more frequently the pathfinder.

When attacking small targets (Amien Prison for instance) I believe this difference in training would be a significant problem for the USAF.

3 The Aircraft
The RAF tended to use the Mossie. By its nature it isn't a formation aircraft. Compared to the B25/B26 its smaller faster more agile, doesn't need to fly in formation for its defence and can carry the 4000lb bomb that can really hurt the target.
4 Tactics
The RAF flew in formation for the transit but for the attack would often split up and use tactics to confuse the defence. One favourite used in Mossies to Lancs was to attack at the same time from different directions and heights to split the AA fire. This couldn't be done using the normal USAF approach.
 
I have to agree with plan_D what he is getting across.

Gotta talk to you about some things though syscom:

syscom3 said:
You seem not to grasp the concept that putting an aircraft and aircrew at risk to carry a single 1000 pound bomb which is not a war or battle winner but more of a stunt.

Got news for you syscom, but anyone with real war experience and Les will back me up with this, believe it or not but the small little things like the tactical bombings that plan_D are talking about greatly help win a war. Infact over time they are what wears the enemy down and what defeats them.

syscom3 said:
Of all the people in this forum, youre the one guy I hope that chokes on his food and noone bothers to help you.

Alright syscom that was uncalled for. If you were meaning that in a joking manner that is cool, but I doubt you were.
 
The RAF tended to use the Mosquito in lots of long-range, tactical, pinpoint strikes.

They would often send out small groups of Mosquitos (from as little as two aircraft up to 2 squadrons worth) for low level, precision strikes against designated targets like important buildings, airfields (particularly N/F fields), radar and AAA installations, HQs, storage depots and even rail tunnels (they would fly down the rail tracks and lob a 4000lb cookie into the mouth of the tunnel :shock: )

The fundamental difference here is PRECISION and ACCURACY. A Mosquito, Ar-234, Stuka, A-36 ect required very few bombs, placed accurately from low level, to have the same effect on a designated target, as a massed fleet of bombers did.

Now obviously you can't use a half a dozen Mosquito to put a port, marshalling yard or factory complex out of action, or to smother a front line in 750,000 lbs of bombs. That requires large amounts of HE delivered en masse from Heavy bombers. But at the same time there is very little chance that a B-17 or B-24 could of done the sort of precision ops that the Mosquito did: flying down roads in towns to hit Gestapo buildings, lobbing bombs into tunnels, dive bombing radar guided AAA positions on night raids, skip bombing freighters in Norwegian harbours without hitting the nearby towns. Even the vaunted dambusters raids weren't as precise.


During the combined late 1943- early 1944 'Crossbow' campaign against German missle installations, the RAF found that to effectively destroy a V1 site the Mosquito needed around 1/4 of the bomb tonnage that a heavy or medium bomber did to do the same job: same effect but only 1/4 of the tonnage required.
 
A few -234's streaking along at a high speed with a single 1000 pounder is going to do nothing.

A squadron of them flying at middle altitudes with several thousand pounds of bombs each could do some damage.

And theres no evidence of these small raids of several planes hitting tiny targets did anything to shorten the war or help things out.

That Mosquito raid on the Gestapo HQ, while deservadly an excellenty planned and executed raid, did nothing. Although the people in the jail probably think it was the most importannt bombing raid in history.

What made the tactical bombing effective and helped the ground troops were mass raids plastering the sinews of war and wearing down the Germans from lack of loguistics.
 
This debate reminds me of something I was told when I was a schoolboy in the 1960s. My French teacher had French friends and often went to stay with them when on holiday. He recounted the tale told in their village about an incident which occurred around the time of D-day.

There was a bridge nearby which the Allies had obviously decided needed 'taking out'. So one day a fleet of heavy bombers arrived at altitude and flattened the area for half a mile around, but missed the bridge. After a pause of a couple of days, a much bigger fleet arrived and flattened the area for a mile around, but still missed the bridge. After another pause, a single Mosquito arrived at low altitude, dropped one bomb and took out the bridge...

There are two separate issues in this debate: strategic and tactical targets, and strategic and tactical bombing techniques. The anecdote above illustrates the difference between the latter very well. It is also worth noting that strategic bomber forces were used in tactical roles in support of the Allied armies in France. Sometimes this worked very well - I forget the location of one incident but I do recall that a massed force of Lancasters bombed a Panzer unit and caused havoc. However, such bombing was usually too inaccurate to be useful and led to many 'friendly fire' casualties.

Having said that, there was in practice a 'grey area' between strategic and tactical, and the air force planners wouldn't have thought in those clear-cut terms: they would just assess each target, estimate the bomb tonnage needed to destroy it, find out what bomber forces were available and send out what they thought was needed (or whatever they could manage).

Tony Williams: Military gun and ammunition website and discussion forum
 
"And theres no evidence of these small raids of several planes hitting tiny targets did anything to shorten the war or help things out."

Just because we usually hear about the humongous B-17 raids over Germany and not the the smaller raids doesn't mean they didn't help. Like Tony says above, imagine how many small bridges and buildings needed "taking out." Imagine how hard it makes troop and equipment movement when several hundred bridges across the countryside are taken out. So there may not be any documented and written studies that say yes, in fact, the small raids helped us tremendously. But everyone on this board knows enough about the War to know that only large, inaccurate, costly raids (though effective) did not win the War alone.

Not trying to pick on syscom, just taking a statement and putting in my two cents. But I would have to agree with the others' opinions on this one.
 
If the RAF didnt have any medium bombers, my mistake. And it just shows you that the US dominated the airwar.

I aplogize for thinking the RAF had enough aircraft to mount these raids. Good thing the AAF had the capacity to do it

now hold on a minute, if it wasn't for the RAF there wouldn't be a war for you to join ;) and i'm not just talking about the BoB, the RAF was a large and very capable fighting force, you learnt a great deal from us as it was but obviously not enough as you stilled relied on numbers, due to our smaller size we developed better tactics and it's often said we had better training, as numerous tactical strikes have proved, heck we even had enough aircraft to operate a cab-rank system, in the heat of battle the infantry knew they could call in the RAF and within minutes them two 88mms that've been pinning them down for the last half hour will be completely destroyed by a fighter-bomber, even if they're only a few hundred yards from the enemy, that's not really a tactical strike it's more air support, but scale that up to a squadron level attacking a railway station, each mosquito at 50ft each cookie's gonna do some serious damage, putting that station out of action possibly perminately, that wa sa center of transportation how will the reserve troops get to the normandy beaches now? many tactical strikes stopped troop movements and communications around D-Day, imagine how many troops were prevented from coming up to the front line, and these raids start to look more important, now imagine these small raids taking place all over france and they start to look more significant, obviously they're not going to win the war on their own but the only weapon that's ever managed that were the atom bombs, the RAF were up there bombing just like you were so don't get any ideas about how much better than us you were ;)

Even the vaunted dambusters raids weren't as precise

let's not be too hasty here ;) (it was a tactical raid so i'm allowed to plug it ;) ) we're talking about a 4 engined heavy bomber weighing around 70,000lbs (i'll have to look that one up... i'm bugged i can't remember it...) having to fly at exactily 60ft, and 230kts (i think), having to release the bomb at exactily the right point, the point being decided by two nails in a peice of wood, the window of time they had to release the bomb was measured in fractions of a second and the approach run was often a steep dive over a cliff before she could be lined up, and all of this in a four engined heavy bomber? you most cirtainly couldn't do that in a B-17! the window for this raid was much smaller than most raids and the fact it was done in heavy bombers makes it one of the most remarkable peices of flying of the war.........
 
You know SYScom from reading this post and many others you have taken part in, I feel you have very little respect for the RAF, a typical American ideology.
For your information, the Americans did not win the war as many Film makers would want you to believe.

I may digress from the point here a few times, but when someone like SYSCOM decides to blast the RAF I get REALLY upset.

There are a few points to make here,
1. The RAF had European civilians the think about, why send in the AAF to destroy a bridge when they would have taken out every town nearby too, full of French civilians.

2. Why send in the AAF to destroy an Airfield when a couple of aircraft with the right bomb load could stop that field working for a good long time.

3. I would like to see how the USA would have handled the BOB is it was them instead of the British.

4. Now if I remember correctly the 1000 lb bomb has a blast radius of around 300 yards, (kill Zone) I maybe wrong, but I don't think the pilot of that single aircraft has to be on the nail head to do the trick.

5. Six aircraft coming low are going to get in before the enemy can respond, forcing them to keep up a CAP which tires pilots and uses resources. 200 coming in high, gives the enemy time for lunch before intercepting.

Sorry if I upset any Americans here, but some people need to quit believing this countries propergander(?).

On a side note, I went to the library to get a copy of the Dambusters, the book was filed under the children's section.
 
I have to agree with pD here syscom. Some of the most effective (and so damaging) raids of the war were precision tactical strikes by a few bombers carrying 1 large bomb or a couple of small ones. To name some examples: the Amiens Prison Raid, the final Tirpitz raid, the raid on the Copenhagan Gestapo HQ, Bielefeld Viaduct and the many other small raids (the one on the Italian tunnel) that are little known about. These generally occumplised things that the heavy bombers had failed to do (see les's pics of Bielefeld Viaduct), so you can't deny the fact they were effective if they managed to achieve what 100's of heavies had failed to do (even if it was small targets). Precision tactical strikes are really useful for taking small target with minimal collateral damage (see Tony's example).
 
No RAF tactical bombers?
Syscom, what roles do you think the Maryland, Battle, Hampden, Mossie, Ventura, Wellington, Blenheim, Mitchell and Hampden were?
Granted, the AAF had the 9th AF but we British had the 2nd TAF aswell.
Tactical bombing prevents transport to the front, it takes out factories and military HQs miles behind the front line preventing communication and is less of a knock out blow- more of a death by a thousand paper cuts bleeding the enemy dry.
 
I believe the same conditions apply today in 1991 the Brits used the same lo level missions to mess up Iraqs runways in the initial assault. The RAF is one of the premier lo level air forces and I have no qualms in stating its much better then the the USAF I justify this statement through personal experiences having worked at the NATO lo level range in Goose Bay for several years . This is a old quip but valid a USAF pilot after coming off the range stated "jeez thats dangerous flying that lo" to which the RAF pilot stated "yes its very dangerous you could've dropped your weapons right on top of us"
 
syscom3 said:
A few -234's streaking along at a high speed with a single 1000 pounder is going to do nothing.

A squadron of them flying at middle altitudes with several thousand pounds of bombs each could do some damage.

And theres no evidence of these small raids of several planes hitting tiny targets did anything to shorten the war or help things out.

That Mosquito raid on the Gestapo HQ, while deservadly an excellenty planned and executed raid, did nothing. Although the people in the jail probably think it was the most importannt bombing raid in history.

What made the tactical bombing effective and helped the ground troops were mass raids plastering the sinews of war and wearing down the Germans from lack of loguistics.

And this post here, just proves to me and probably everyone else here that you have no clue about warfare (I highlighted the most important parts that prove this). I will leave it at that.
 
According to syscom, these small tactical raids did nothing to shorten the war. The attacks on bridges, supply dumps, HQs, airfields and transport networks did nothing for the war effort. This explains a lot.

Beyond the famous Mosquito raids, the RAF used all their medium and light bombers with great effect in the tactical role. Groups of planes numbering less than twenty were often sent against airfields, and would put them out of action for days, weeks or even months.
We all recognise these raids weren't always successful. But, more often than not, the tactical raids would have a higher target destruction percentage than the massive strategic bomber raids.

I have to thank Tony, as his anecdote on the French bridge provided the best example of small, light bombers, carrying small payloads being more useful in certain circumstances.

While I have discovered the USAAF did generally use more bombers against a target than the RAF, it was still not in the region of 100 - 300 bombers on a single airfield. Glider's description of tactics explains the higher numbers of bombers used.

US 9th AF sorties:

22 October, 1943, seventy-two (72) B-26s raid Evreux. *Earlier I mentioned this in the 2nd TAF sorties, this was because 11 Group provided escort on this mission.

24 October, 1943, seventy-two (72) B-26s escorted by 403 and 421 Sqdn. are attacked by twenty (20) Bf 109s of I./JG 3. *I'm not aware of the target for the 9th AF B-26s as I'm getting the information from the 2nd TAF records.

29 November, 1943, seventy-two (72) B-26s raid Chievres airfield.

1 December, 1943, seventy-two (72) B-26s are escorted by 126 Airfield Spitfires on another raid. *126 Airfield is a Mobile HQ

It seems the US 9th AF generally sent seventy-two B-26s on a raid, which I assume to be airfields.
 
Syscom
Once again you seem to be playing your game of comming up with a statement / position whatever without any support and letting others go to a lot of trouble actually doing the research.
Can I ask what evidence you have to support your statement. e.g numbers of bombers used by the USAF in particular missions, periods of time these targets were knocked out of action. Comparing these to the smaller RAF raids on similar targets.
Your statment that these smaller missions were nothing but stunts, I take it you can support that statement.
Personally I always thought the knocking out of a Headquarters was always a prime target. Just knocking out its communications during a battle I always considered to be a significant achievement.
Destroying or even removing the ability for a stores depot to distribute its fuel and food was always a main aim of airpower, has been from WW1 to the modern day
I am happy to be proved wrong on the above, but await the proof from yourself with interest.
How
 

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