Thumpalumpacus
Major
Yabut we always get there first.
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No thinking...we knows we are...
No thinking...we knows we are...
I agree. For context, I was a young kid at Johnson AFB and Tokyo from age 3 to 6. Tokyo was still rebuilding and the area around the Palace still showed the scars of March 1945.Another important effect of the B-29 was psychological: it allowed the Japanese population to understand that all the propaganda about the war was clearly BS.
The war really turned after the RAAF received F-35s thanks to the time wormhole that opened in late 1944...
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Hey, indulge me...it's April Fool's day...and these are some great photos...
175 convoys crossed the North Atlantic in 1943. Of those only 20 were escorted at least part of the way by Escort Carriers, 8 by HMS Biter, 4 by HMS Tracker, 1 by both Biter and Tracker, 3 by HMS Archer, 2 by USS Bogue, 1 by HMS Chaser and 1 by HMS Fencer.Liberators
The first Coastal Command Liberators were 11 (10 with 20mm gun pack) LB-30B (ex B-24A) delivered in 1941 as Liberator GR.1. These were followed by 10 LB-30 conversions during 1942 as Liberator GR.II. None of these conversions had turbosupercharged engines.
There was then a batch of 11 B-24D delivered from US stocks as an emergency delivery in March/April 1942 as Liberator IIIA (delivery dates for these and subsequent deliveries are when received at Dorval in Canada. They still had to find their way to Britain to be fitted out to CC requirements)
Deliveries from RAF orders then began in April 1942 with 57 GR.III delivered until Oct 1942. These and the following GR.V were based on the B-24D airframe. It is these that feature in the photo in post #1372 above (taken at Aldergrove in March 1943, the nearest pair belong to 120 squadron & the third, with the "Dumbo" nose to 86 squadron). The GR.V was the first version fitted with centimetric radars (other than for trials and there were several different radars and radomes involved, the earliest having the "Dumbo" undernose radome) and only 4 were delivered between Aug & Dec 1942. In all 220 GR.V were delivered through until Nov 1943. So it was spring 1943 before the GR.V began to reach front line units. But the equipment fits, especially fuel tank arrangements, radar & armament, varied across the GR.III/V fleet with the result that by the end of May 1943 CC broke them down into Class A, B (with sub classes i, ii, iii) and C. And individual aircraft often had their equipment changed, so changing classification.
The CC Order of Battle for 10 May 1943 shows the following Liberator squadrons and their strengths and available numbers:-
Aldergrove:-
86 - 15/8
59 - 14/1 (This unit had converted from the Fortress IIA in Mar/Apr 1943 and was in the process of relocating to Aldergrove)
Beaulieu:-
224 - GR.V 19/5
53 - GR.III/V 2/0 (In process of converting from Whitley VII to Liberators from 11 May)
Reykjavik
120 - GRI/III 19/8
311 squadron converted to the Liberator GR.V from July & 547 from Oct 1943 to augment the Liberator force in CC.
At this time CC also had 2 squadrons of Fortress IIA on Benbecula (30 aircraft with 10 available) and 2 squadrons of Halifax at Holmsley South / ST Eval (converted from Whitley VII Dec 1942- Feb 1943. 34 aircraft with 11 available). There were also 2 operational USAAF B-24D anti-submarine squadrons (plus another 2 still to come on line). The remaining aircraft were Sunderland & Catalina flying boats and some Hudsons.
Available numbers were affected by the sortie length that these aircraft flew and the maintenance they required in between. So the number of land based LR/VLR aircraft available to CC around this time was not huge by any means.
Support Groups
While it is true that a number of destroyers were transferred from the Home Fleet to Western Approaches Command from March 1943, their usefulness was limited by NOT being equipped with centimetric radars (Type 271/272) OR HF/DF (ships allocated long term to Western Approaches had the priority for these equipments over Home Fleet destroyers), although some ships got these during their stint in WAC. And most of them received very little specialist AS training before embarking on their new tasking. There were other limitations. Lack of escort oilers meaning that these relatively thirsty short ranged destroyers had to be sent to ports periodically to refuel. And that also meant that the composition in the groups kept changing so practice as a team was limited.
Escort carriers
The were only beginning to appear in the North Atlantic with only Biter & Archer operating regularly during the March - June period. (other RN escort carriers joined convoys as protection in this period during their delivery voyages to Britain, where they then had to go into refit to bring them up to RN standards - see loss of Avenger & Dasher for the reasons why amongst others).
USN
Somewhere I have some information on USN CVE operations in theis period and their changing tactics if anyone is interested. But no time tonight.
A well argued case.175 convoys crossed the North Atlantic in 1943. Of those only 20 were escorted at least part of the way by Escort Carriers, 8 by HMS Biter, 4 by HMS Tracker, 1 by both Biter and Tracker, 3 by HMS Archer, 2 by USS Bogue, 1 by HMS Chaser and 1 by HMS Fencer.
The first appearance was the Bogue in March which failed in its first two attempts, turning back prematurely due to storm damage and defects (HX 228 and SC123). This was particularly unfortunate in the case of HX 228 because it suffered heavy losses after the departure of Bogue. Bogue was out of action for a month to repair storm damge and a defective catapult. Biter's first convoy was ONS 4 in April followed by Archer with ONS 6 in May.
Bogue HX 228 6-Mar-43 10-Mar-43 Aborted
Bogue SC 123 20-Mar-43 26-Mar-43 Aborted
Biter ONS 4 23-Apr-43 26-Apr-43
Bogue HX 235 25-Apr-43 30-Apr-43
Biter HX 237 7-May-43 13-May-43
Archer ONS 6 9-May-43 11-May-43
Archer ON 182 12-May-43 14-May-43
Biter SC 129 13-May-43 16-May-43
Bogue ON 184 19-May-43 25-May-43
Archer HX 239 21-May-43 24-May-43
On May 24 the U-Boats are withdrawn from North Atlantic.
Biter HX 242 9-June-43 12-June-43
Biter ONS 10 14-June-43 18-June-43
Chaser HX 245 23-June-43 4-July-43
Biter SC 135 1-July-43 4-July-43
Out of the 21 North Atlantic convoys in May 1943 only 6 included an escort carrier. The bulk of the air cover in the Atlantic Gap was by VLR Liberations flying from Iceland.
Chaser is an interesting story. It was on its maiden voyage across the Atlantic and was not intended to be a part of the escort but on its own initiative flew ASW patrols in conjunction with the MAC ship Empire MacAlpine.
After SC 135 there was a hiatus. Bogue had moved to the Mid Atlantic at the end of May, Archer was retired prematurely due to major defects and Biter, which was also a flawed ship, underwent an extensive refit.
The Escort Carriers returned to the North Atlantic with Tracker in September followed by the reappearance of Biter in October
Tracker ON 203 25-Sept-43 30-Sept-43
Tracker HX 258 30-Sept-43 2-Oct-43
Biter ON 207 20-Oct-43 27-Oct-43
Tracker ON 207 23-Oct-43 28-Oct-43
ON 207 was the last battle of the Wolfpacks Autumn offense in the North Atlantic.
Fencer SC 145 29-Oct-43 2-Nov-43
Tracker HX 264 1-Nov-43 3-Nov-43
Biter SC 146 9-Nov-43 13-Nov-43
Biter HX 265 14-Nov-43 16-Nov-43
Tracker HX 270 15-Dec-43 24-Dec-43
ON 207 was a "bait" convoy routed towards a known concentration of U-boats with a heavily reinforced escort including Biter and escort group C-1 plus 3 additional sloops and the MAC ship Amastra. The two most successful escort groups of the war Gretton's B7 and Walkers 2EG were also added. 2EG also included Tracker. Walker later stated that he did not like working with Tracker as his group spent too much time screening her.
The last two convoys escorted by Biter included a pair of own goals. A ditching Swordfish released a homing torpedo that hit the M/S Gylf (it did not sink) and even more spectacularly a Swordfish attempting to land struck the Biters round down. It ended in the water followed by its homing torpedo hitting the Biter's rudder.
MAC ships accompanied a total of 30 convoys in 1943. Empire MacAlpine was the leader with 9. Empire MacAndrew followed with 6 and Rapana with 5. Late in the year 5 more ships were added.
Their first appearance was the Empire MacAlpine in May with ONS 9. Empire MacAndrew's first convoy was ONS 15 in August followed by Rapana with ONS 17 in August. Note that Donitz has called off the wolf packs before the first appearance of a MAC ship.
Empire MacAlpine ONS 9 28-May-43 9-June-43
Empire MacAlpine HX 245 23-June-43 7-July-43
Empire MacAlpine ONS 14 26-Jul-43 9-Aug-43
Empire MacAndrew ONS 15 6-Aug-43 21-Aug-43
Empire MacAlpine SC 140 21-Aug-43 5-Sept-43
Rapana ONS 17 31-Aug-43 16-Sept-43
Empire MacAndrew SC 141 3-Sept-43 17-Sept-43
Empire MacAlpine ONS 18 12-Sept-43 29-Sept-43
Empire MacAndrew ONS 19 26-Sept-43 14-Oct-43
Rapana SC 143 28-Sept-43 12-Oct-43
Empire MacAndrew HX 260 5-Oct-43 20-Oct-43
Empire MacAlpine HX 262 18-Oct-43 2-Nov-43
Empire MacRae ONS 21 22-Oct-43 5-Nov-43
ON 207 was the last battle of the Wolfpacks Autumn offense in the North Atlantic.
Empire MacAlpine ON 209 31-Oct-43 17-Nov-43
Rapana ON 209 31-Oct-43 17-Nov-43
Empire MacKay ONS 22 4-Nov-43 22-Nov-43
Amastra ONS 22 4-Nov-43 22-Nov-43
Empire MacAndrew ON 211 13-Nov-43 29-Nov-43
Empire MacRae HX 266 13-Nov-43 27-Nov-43
Acavas ONS 23 17-Nov-43 -Dec-43
Empire MacAlpine HX 267 19-Nov-43 3-Dec-43
Rapana SC 147 19-Nov-43 4-Dec-43
Empire MacKay HX 268 26-Nov-43 11-Dec-43
Ancylus ONS 24 30-Nov-43 18-Dec-43
Amastra SC 148 2-Dec-43 16-Dec-43
Empire MacAndrew HX 269 2-Dec-43 16-Dec-43
Empire MacAlpine ON 215 9-Dec-43 28-Dec-43
Acavas SC 149 15-Dec-43 30-Dec-43
Empire MacRae ON 216 15-Dec-43 3-Jan-43
Rapana ONS 25 15-Dec-43 3-Jan-43
All of this is a very long winded way of saying that escort carriers did not close the mid Atlantic gap. That was the done by the Very Long Range Liberators. At the beginning of Black May Coastal Command had 30 VLR Liberators in service with Squadrons 120 and 59. A perusal of the convoy reports shows they did the bulk of the work in the mid Atlantic gap.
The British did not devote a significant portion of their escort carrier activity to convoy protection. As I have noted in a previous post the first batch of Bogues received by the RN were deployed as assault carriers in the Mediterranean.
In 1943 the RN only deployed a maximum of 2 escort carrier on North Atlantic duty at any time, except for the one time appearance of Fencer in October. The USN effort in using escort carriers in the ASW role was far larger than the RNs throughout 1943. It wasn't, however, in the North Atlantic.
The MACs were not as effective as escort carriers for two main reasons:
MACs ships were not available in sufficient numbers until 1944. They only started to escort a significant number of convoys in November of 1943 which was after the fall convoy battles were won. Even then they could only escort ½ of the convoys.
- The limited number of aircraft they carried, 4 in the case of the grain ships and 3 in the case of the tankers.
- There were not as operationally flexible. Escort carrier were often switched between conveys in mid ocean to meet immediate needs. MACs were primarily delivery vehicles that had to stay with the convoy. This limited the number of convoys they could escort to an average of one a month.
The Mid Atlantic gap was closed by VLR liberators with escort carriers and MAC ships planning a much smaller role.
I would agree that it was the land based VLR aircraft that played a more significant role in closing the "Atlantic Gap", but would point out that not all Liberators in CC service were considered VLR due to their equipment & fuel tank fits.175 convoys crossed the North Atlantic in 1943. Of those only 20 were escorted at least part of the way by Escort Carriers, 8 by HMS Biter, 4 by HMS Tracker, 1 by both Biter and Tracker, 3 by HMS Archer, 2 by USS Bogue, 1 by HMS Chaser and 1 by HMS Fencer.
The first appearance was the Bogue in March which failed in its first two attempts, turning back prematurely due to storm damage and defects (HX 228 and SC123). This was particularly unfortunate in the case of HX 228 because it suffered heavy losses after the departure of Bogue. Bogue was out of action for a month to repair storm damge and a defective catapult. Biter's first convoy was ONS 4 in April followed by Archer with ONS 6 in May.
Bogue HX 228 6-Mar-43 10-Mar-43 Aborted
Bogue SC 123 20-Mar-43 26-Mar-43 Aborted
Biter ONS 4 23-Apr-43 26-Apr-43
Bogue HX 235 25-Apr-43 30-Apr-43
Biter HX 237 7-May-43 13-May-43
Archer ONS 6 9-May-43 11-May-43
Archer ON 182 12-May-43 14-May-43
Biter SC 129 13-May-43 16-May-43
Bogue ON 184 19-May-43 25-May-43
Archer HX 239 21-May-43 24-May-43
On May 24 the U-Boats are withdrawn from North Atlantic.
Biter HX 242 9-June-43 12-June-43
Biter ONS 10 14-June-43 18-June-43
Chaser HX 245 23-June-43 4-July-43
Biter SC 135 1-July-43 4-July-43
Out of the 21 North Atlantic convoys in May 1943 only 6 included an escort carrier. The bulk of the air cover in the Atlantic Gap was by VLR Liberations flying from Iceland.
Chaser is an interesting story. It was on its maiden voyage across the Atlantic and was not intended to be a part of the escort but on its own initiative flew ASW patrols in conjunction with the MAC ship Empire MacAlpine.
After SC 135 there was a hiatus. Bogue had moved to the Mid Atlantic at the end of May, Archer was retired prematurely due to major defects and Biter, which was also a flawed ship, underwent an extensive refit.
The Escort Carriers returned to the North Atlantic with Tracker in September followed by the reappearance of Biter in October
Tracker ON 203 25-Sept-43 30-Sept-43
Tracker HX 258 30-Sept-43 2-Oct-43
Biter ON 207 20-Oct-43 27-Oct-43
Tracker ON 207 23-Oct-43 28-Oct-43
ON 207 was the last battle of the Wolfpacks Autumn offense in the North Atlantic.
Fencer SC 145 29-Oct-43 2-Nov-43
Tracker HX 264 1-Nov-43 3-Nov-43
Biter SC 146 9-Nov-43 13-Nov-43
Biter HX 265 14-Nov-43 16-Nov-43
Tracker HX 270 15-Dec-43 24-Dec-43
ON 207 was a "bait" convoy routed towards a known concentration of U-boats with a heavily reinforced escort including Biter and escort group C-1 plus 3 additional sloops and the MAC ship Amastra. The two most successful escort groups of the war Gretton's B7 and Walkers 2EG were also added. 2EG also included Tracker. Walker later stated that he did not like working with Tracker as his group spent too much time screening her.
The last two convoys escorted by Biter included a pair of own goals. A ditching Swordfish released a homing torpedo that hit the M/S Gylf (it did not sink) and even more spectacularly a Swordfish attempting to land struck the Biters round down. It ended in the water followed by its homing torpedo hitting the Biter's rudder.
MAC ships accompanied a total of 30 convoys in 1943. Empire MacAlpine was the leader with 9. Empire MacAndrew followed with 6 and Rapana with 5. Late in the year 5 more ships were added.
Their first appearance was the Empire MacAlpine in May with ONS 9. Empire MacAndrew's first convoy was ONS 15 in August followed by Rapana with ONS 17 in August. Note that Donitz has called off the wolf packs before the first appearance of a MAC ship.
Empire MacAlpine ONS 9 28-May-43 9-June-43
Empire MacAlpine HX 245 23-June-43 7-July-43
Empire MacAlpine ONS 14 26-Jul-43 9-Aug-43
Empire MacAndrew ONS 15 6-Aug-43 21-Aug-43
Empire MacAlpine SC 140 21-Aug-43 5-Sept-43
Rapana ONS 17 31-Aug-43 16-Sept-43
Empire MacAndrew SC 141 3-Sept-43 17-Sept-43
Empire MacAlpine ONS 18 12-Sept-43 29-Sept-43
Empire MacAndrew ONS 19 26-Sept-43 14-Oct-43
Rapana SC 143 28-Sept-43 12-Oct-43
Empire MacAndrew HX 260 5-Oct-43 20-Oct-43
Empire MacAlpine HX 262 18-Oct-43 2-Nov-43
Empire MacRae ONS 21 22-Oct-43 5-Nov-43
ON 207 was the last battle of the Wolfpacks Autumn offense in the North Atlantic.
Empire MacAlpine ON 209 31-Oct-43 17-Nov-43
Rapana ON 209 31-Oct-43 17-Nov-43
Empire MacKay ONS 22 4-Nov-43 22-Nov-43
Amastra ONS 22 4-Nov-43 22-Nov-43
Empire MacAndrew ON 211 13-Nov-43 29-Nov-43
Empire MacRae HX 266 13-Nov-43 27-Nov-43
Acavas ONS 23 17-Nov-43 -Dec-43
Empire MacAlpine HX 267 19-Nov-43 3-Dec-43
Rapana SC 147 19-Nov-43 4-Dec-43
Empire MacKay HX 268 26-Nov-43 11-Dec-43
Ancylus ONS 24 30-Nov-43 18-Dec-43
Amastra SC 148 2-Dec-43 16-Dec-43
Empire MacAndrew HX 269 2-Dec-43 16-Dec-43
Empire MacAlpine ON 215 9-Dec-43 28-Dec-43
Acavas SC 149 15-Dec-43 30-Dec-43
Empire MacRae ON 216 15-Dec-43 3-Jan-43
Rapana ONS 25 15-Dec-43 3-Jan-43
All of this is a very long winded way of saying that escort carriers did not close the mid Atlantic gap. That was the done by the Very Long Range Liberators. At the beginning of Black May Coastal Command had 30 VLR Liberators in service with Squadrons 120 and 59. A perusal of the convoy reports shows they did the bulk of the work in the mid Atlantic gap.
The British did not devote a significant portion of their escort carrier activity to convoy protection. As I have noted in a previous post the first batch of Bogues received by the RN were deployed as assault carriers in the Mediterranean.
In 1943 the RN only deployed a maximum of 2 escort carrier on North Atlantic duty at any time, except for the one time appearance of Fencer in October. The USN effort in using escort carriers in the ASW role was far larger than the RNs throughout 1943. It wasn't, however, in the North Atlantic.
The MACs were not as effective as escort carriers for two main reasons:
MACs ships were not available in sufficient numbers until 1944. They only started to escort a significant number of convoys in November of 1943 which was after the fall convoy battles were won. Even then they could only escort ½ of the convoys.
- The limited number of aircraft they carried, 4 in the case of the grain ships and 3 in the case of the tankers.
- There were not as operationally flexible. Escort carrier were often switched between conveys in mid ocean to meet immediate needs. MACs were primarily delivery vehicles that had to stay with the convoy. This limited the number of convoys they could escort to an average of one a month.
The Mid Atlantic gap was closed by VLR liberators with escort carriers and MAC ships planning a much smaller role.
Yeah, 11.5 miles is pretty hard to believe, given the time. However, according to this map showing the jet streams...If it took 44s for the bomb to fall to detonation height, and the Enola Gay was 11.5 miles away, then the Enola Gay would have been travelling at around 940mph.
Something would seem to be amiss.
At 350mph, a B-29 would travel around 4.2 miles. At 280mph, a Lancaster would be ~2.3 miles away (assuming a reduced time of 30s for the drop).
Maybe a misunderstanding, was it 11.5 milkes away when the bomb went off or when the shock wave caught up with it?If it took 44s for the bomb to fall to detonation height, and the Enola Gay was 11.5 miles away, then the Enola Gay would have been travelling at around 940mph.
Something would seem to be amiss.
At 350mph, a B-29 would travel around 4.2 miles. At 280mph, a Lancaster would be ~2.3 miles away (assuming a reduced time of 30s for the drop).
The Lincoln would have been better - if they were available.
Yeah, 11.5 miles is pretty hard to believe, given the time. However, according to this map showing the jet streams...
View attachment 776209
...it appears that the path of the jet stream would be moving in the general direction that the Enola Gay would've been moving on its return trip. According to Google, the average Jet Stream goes about 110 mph.
SO, if the plane's speed was 350, the Jet Stream would've pushed it to about 460.
That puts it, not approx. 4.28 miles from the drop site, but approx. 7.67 miles from the drop site.
Even if that Jet Stream were a fairly fast one, moving at say 250 mph, it would still only put the plane 10 miles from the drop site at the time the bomb went off.
Good post, Wuzak!
The Lincoln was originally called the Lanc IV and V and did not become operational until after VE day from memory so it is doubtful it would have been available in time
Was there any reason they didnt turn gently before dropping or turn after the shock wave passed?In Tibbets' book he explains how they practiced a violent diving turn in the Silverplate B-29s stateside before moving to Saipan. He commented about an officer who wanted to take command and fly the missions and was taken up and shown how the B-29 must be sharply banked and at the same time dived. During the diving turn, the passenger turned white and never mentioned taking over the 509th again.