The Battle of Kursk - Biggest clash of armor.

Well, time to stick my two cents worth in.......I dont believe the german Infantry was up to a mobile defence at all. By 1943, the mobility of german Infantry was about half that what it was due to the losses in trucks and horses. Every time they were called upon to undertake a major march, the losses went through the roof, particualrly in terms of equipment.

In contrast the Soviet Infantry was going from strength to strength in terms of its mobility, thanks to the 350000 trucks supplied under LL. And whilst the SS and the Panzers generally were an essential attacking arm (whether that be a defensive counterattack, or a full on offensive, they needed the Infantry to fill the gaps and absorb the punishment, otherwise they took inordinate losses themselves.

Manstein, before he got this cockamamie idea of mobile defence realized that the only real hope was to make short withdrawals of twenty to twenty five kilometres to avoid the devastating effects of the Soviet artillery. The key to the German defences wasnt the Infantry ofr the tanks so much, as the ability to avoid the dislocation from the enemy artillery, and to concentrate ones own artillery sufficiently to have a significant effect. These "last minute short legged withdrawals would have been entirely possible along limited sections of the front, because it would have allowed the dweindling supply of MT in the Heer to be pooled wher necessary. Leaving it to the last minute was entirely plausible as well, given the ecellent intelligence work being done by that stage by Gehlen and his staff.

But the wholseale withdrawal from the entire front was a pipe dream and a recipe for disaster, given the parlous state of the German logistics arm by that stage of the war

Good point, Parsifal. My knowledge of the logistics shambles of the German Army of the East, 1943, is not complete - I am still studying that phase of the campaign. I still am not completely convinced, however. Didn't Hasso Manteuffel do something very similar to regain Kharkov after the Red Army push to exploit Stalingrad?

Yes, but it was not the front wide withdrawal being talked about her. What Manstein wanted to do was to withdraw small sections of the front just before the Soviet hammer fell. The Infantry would be pulled back to present a solid undisrupted defence....the Soviet hammer would fall on largely empty space, and then the Panzers would, if the situation was favouraqble, undertake powerful but localised counterattacks. The idea was to cause higher attrition on the Soviets, and thereby wear them down by a process of attrition.

But there were a number of issues that prevented this approach from ever being adopted. In order for this system to work, the German command system needed to be far more flexible than it had been through the recent Stalingrad debacle. Specifically that meant that hitler, and OKH needed to allow the commanders on the spot much greater freedom of decision than they possessed. This never happened, and the outgrowth of that inflexibility was the Bagration debacle (to the north of AGS).

However the Germans also nereded to look at their procurement machine. They were concentrating on the heaviest and most advanced tanks, which I think was a mistake, given all the other shortages plaguing the Heer at that time. I agree with Rommels assessment, he advocated producing bucket loads of Stugs and AT guns instead of the Tigers and Panthers that were being concentrated on at the time. A Tiger cost 300000 RM to field, a panther 185000. A Stug III cost just 52000 and a PAK 75 (towed) cost just 12000. I think Russian attrition would have increased many times over, if the germans had concentrated their efforts on these less glamorous weapons

But the other thing that was sorely needed weas Motor transport. There was no easy fix here, but I think the full implemkntation of the Shcnell plan in 1939, which would have standardised truck production on just a few types, might have helped. I also think that if the germans had managed the occupied territories a little better, they may have derived some benefit from their production, But their economic exploitation of them, chiefly by setting the exchange rate to Germ,any at artificially low levels. made it uneconomic to use the production capacities of the occupied territories all that much

Hello Erich
I have always been surprised how easily Jukes et al accepted the Soviet myth on Prokhorovka and Kursk battle in general. It should have been easy to debug simply by looking German documents. To me in late 80s published Vopersal's Soldaten, Kämfer Kameraden. Band 3 (3rd volume of the history of 3rd PzGrD Totenkopf) and especially Victor Madeja's Russo-German War: Summer and Autumn 1943, a cheap, slim plastic cover "book", were eye openers.

Juha

Excellent, Parsifal...you have filled in some of the gaps in my knowledge, and while I might nitpick here and there (I believe the panther cost 118,500, but I know different websites - even those with authentic document copies from WW II as proof! - have different figures) I broadly accept your figures, as they, AFAIK, tally with the ones I have in the grey matter between my two ears, garnered over the decades from hard and soft copies and the VDU.

BTW I now see where Henrici's "withdrawal just before the attack" tactic had its roots in!

I would say one of the biggest 'mtyhs' is the one where you judge the outcome of any battle on the number of tanks listed as total losses. There seems to be an industry devoted to reversing historical outcomes on the basis that one side-though clearly beaten and often in full flight-did much better because it lost fewer tanks than the winner! Overall strategic situations matter very little in comparison to Tiger losses!
Mark Healy's book on Zitadel has just hit the shops in the UK
Zitadelle The German Offensive Against the Kursk Salient 4-17 July 1943 - Coming Soon - World War Two Books – Military History Books online - Ceredigion - Wales UK

The Infantry would be pulled back to present a solid undisrupted defence....the Soviet hammer would fall on largely empty space, and then the Panzers would, if the situation was favouraqble, undertake powerful but localised counterattacks. The idea was to cause higher attrition on the Soviets, and thereby wear them down by a process of attrition.

Click to expand...

Wasn't a similar plan of action used before Berlin in Apr. 45?

Hello m kenny
Quote:"I would say one of the biggest 'mtyhs' is the one where you judge the outcome of any battle on the number of tanks listed as total losses."

Out of curiorisity, who are you in that quote? IMHO most of us can read maps and the movement of frontline is a very good indicator who was winning and who was losing.

Juha

Njaco said:

Wasn't a similar plan of action used before Berlin in Apr. 45?

Click to expand...

I think so, but by then the situation was hopeless. However, it is worth noting that in the last months of the war, Soviet casualty rates shot right up, to an unsustainable level. Their losses in the final battles have been reported as high as 400000 over a three month period. Even for the Soviets, that was a very high casualty rate. I wonder if at least a part of that casualty list was due to improved tactics by the germans????

The Soviet losses are given as 80,000 dead and 280,000 sick and wounded.
Thats what happened when they decided to take Berlin regardless of costs. I would venture it is more a result of political objectives overiding military prudence.
In the new book 'Bloody Streets, The Soviet Assault On Berlin April 1945' there is a map

showing the position of the 400 Divisions that surrendered on May 12.
Without the removal of Berlin (i.e.Hitler) it is unlikely this surrender would have happened.

Burmese Bandit said:

Excellent, Parsifal...you have filled in some of the gaps in my knowledge, and while I might nitpick here and there (I believe the panther cost 118,500, but I know different websites - even those with authentic document copies from WW II as proof! - have different figures) I broadly accept your figures, as they, AFAIK, tally with the ones I have in the grey matter between my two ears, garnered over the decades from hard and soft copies and the VDU.

BTW I now see where Henrici's "withdrawal just before the attack" tactic had its roots in!

Click to expand...

The production costs of the panther were indeed in the order of 117-119K . By comoparison the MkIV was 105K. However these costs, afaik dont take into account the development costs, which in the case of the Germans were considerable. Because the germans were at the cutting edge technologically with their tank development, this forced them to undertake a lot of primary research for each of their models. Hence, after the development costs are factored into the equation, there is a huge cost blowout. this becomes a massive modifier when the relatively small roduction runs for Germ,an tanks are taken into account

To give you an analogy, the very first ring pull can of Coca Cola, cost a few cents for the can and its contents, plus several millions for the technology. For the competiors of Coca Cola, the cost of their first ring pull can of soft drink was a few cents for the product, plus something less than the the millions spent by the pioneer company. Forty years on, and several billion cans of drink later, the cost for each can of coke is a few cents per can and it contents, and a few cents for the technology. The huge production run reduces the technology cost to negligible proportions

This explains why the Sherman cost less than 50K to produce, there were so many of them, and they used "off the shelf" technology. Plus, the actual costs of production were far less in US factories, because the US were so efficient in getting product across the assembly lines...little time spent means smaller production costs

Just found a very unique site about the battle. Tons of pics and goes into the air operations.

World War II: Battle of Kursk

Njaco

wonder why the webmaster on your last link posed a Ju 87B instead of an Ost Front D ? also listing Hs 129's with JG 51.............ooooooooooops !

Hello
have not time to look Njaco's link but JG 51 had a Hs 129 Staffel in one period.

Juha

ohhhh, sorry Erich, didn't catch that one. I was reading halfway down when I thought it would a good addition to the thread. Whats the saying...don't go off half ......

Maybe I'll learn.

Seems like I remember, at Kursk, the Panther was new and suffered many breakdowns. Perhaps that contributed to the loss.

yes Juha the 13th staffel had Hs 129 in summer of 43 and the special unit became part of the famous SG 9 in October 43, my question is did it even play a role at Kursk, personally no it did not. will do some more hunting to make a positive

Just a brief thank you to everyone on this thread. Its opened my eyes a lot about the battle in particular the losses not reflecting the often reported stories.
I always thought that the tanks charging other tanks was more than a little overdramatic.

it always sounds more sensational doesn't it glider. At least some of the myths-corrections can be assembled and corrected if one has an open mind as a dedicated researcher and historian instead of taking falsehoods as blank fact.

point of reflection is that in the south the W-Ss heavy panzers did not take it in the shorts as nearly 9/10's of the history books have stated, the panzergrenadier elements though on the other hand received heavy punishment through the Soviet dug in positions and the ever present mine fields that could never be avoided.

thought I would throw this image out from Das Reich during the Kursk battles

care of BA, Deutschland