The Battle Of Kursk - the air battle (1 Viewer)

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davebender said:
Heavy bombers did little to impair the German military-industrial complex. What makes you think they would work any better against the Soviet industrial base?
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The destruction/heavy damage inflicted upon synthetic oil refineries and the German rail transportation system by the combined strategic bombing campaign which caused the fuel starvation of the German war machine and disrupted its logistic supply lines of equipment delivered to the front lines during the final stages of the war in Europe point to another direction.
 
Hello,

Before milosh's post...

davebender said:
IMO aircraft production numbers are meaningless if they didn't have enough fuel. What counts is how many sorties could be sustained with the existing fuel supply.
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100% sure. But what is the relationship between that sentence and german fuel supply in june of 1943th?

twice:
Fur sure, Davebender, how many missions were made by Luft in 1943, in eastern front, and during Kusk battle?
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You did not aswered to my question...


davebender said:
I'm surprised at the number of He-111s still being used for tactical air support this late in the war.
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Oh yes. But weren't they able to carry 2, even 3 tons of bombs at short range? Can you propose better german bombers?

Yes and so what? You insinuate for the secund time about some fuel lack withou providing any support.

You didn't red/understood Juha's post, maybe?

Back to my sources*, in june 43, only on the rear of the Central front ( german Front North, Model's 9th army) 268 locomotives and 1 222 wagons were destroyed as well as 44 strategic bridges, all by soviet partisans, spetsnaz and aviation, particulary light Po-2 night bombers.
A terrible loss, because russian standard railroad gap and ballast, is not produced in germany.

Anyway, even if Plocher was worried, but only 70 years later and only in his memors, there's apparently no document issued from the Luftwaffe about any fuel problems, neither before, nor during Kursk battle. Even more, generaloberst Jeschonnek mobilised prior to battle some important Luftwaffe transport means. This resolved and overcompensate ground logistic problems. Moreover, in june russian roads are becaming dry, and hard again: transportation can be made by simple trucks.

After milosh

Thank you Milosh, , obviously in 1943, Luft had no fuel starvage problems.

The question is closed?

Regards

* Encyclopédie illustrée de l'aviation, Editions Altas, 1984.
 
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When, in 1943 prior to Sicily and Kursk battles?

Or in summer (august) of 1944, when Ploesti was captured by soviets. Are you sure that strategic bombing campaign caused the fuel starvation, and not because german's had simply nothing else nothing to refine?

Regards
 
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ZG 26 in july of 1943th? This Geschwader was disbanded in April 1942.
ZG 76 was not based in USSR in 1943.
Even the III/ZG 1 never went to SSSR.
II/ZG 1 went back to germany loosing virtualy all material in 3/43
I/ZG 1 +stab in full strenght and supply, faught during Kursk battle inside 1st Fiegerdivision

So what did eastern ZG units lost to US heavies in spring of 43. Nuts.

Maybe some of them (II/ZG1) reminded in germany, the unit was not send to SSR, and was transformed to nachtjagd.? But this is speculation, not proof.
For their best of course, Me-110 was not much feared by Yaks in 41, even less in 43 than by Spitfires in 1940!

On other hand night eastern luft fighter squadrons were reinforced by five other squadrons that came from germany, 2 of them participating previously to Berlin defence. Later, IV/JG 5 joined the defence system.
In all 66 planes.

Regards
 
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ZG 26 was not disbanded in 43 sorry your sources for this ? II./ZG 1 did not lose materials in 43 it had Ju 88C's as well as the better armed Bf 110G-2's, re-read some of the older postings on Reich defense on this very forum. I've been studying this **** way too long Altea like about 50 years worth and many many personal interviews of German/US airmen with research going to many authors of the Euro air war. am not even going to debate you, the Destroyer Geschwaders were REFORMED back in Germany for July 1943 Reich defense I have copies of the original documentation. It would be lof your best interest to deleet your above posting or re-edit it.

lastly if you will note in my adresse that I did not say ANY Zerstörer gruppen were on the Ost front only Jagdgeschwader in your quotation of me.
 
Yes Erich your are 100% correct. The Geschwader was reformed in 1943 from I Gruppe and the III. Gruppe of Zerstörergeschwader.
I believe they disbanded in July, 1944? Perhaps joining another Geschwader.

Some people who decide to post false information can be entertaining sometimes lol.
 
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apologies for being in a pissing match but I was planning on writing several books on the Nachtjagd and the Destroyer gruppen back in the 1970=80's until new materials starting to come into light, held off and forwarded my archiv-data base to better known authors, still working on several books of my own and in time hopefully if I don't croak they will be published, one of them was to be about the night air war over the Ost with NJG 100 as it's base using the night ship Togo but this is all another topic base.
 
Stab ZG26

25.9.41 - 29.9.41 Stade Bf 110
???
13.10.43 - 22.3.44 Wunstorf Bf 110
22.3.44 - 31.7.44 Königsberg-Devau Bf 110, Me 410

Formed 1.5.39 in Dortmund from Stab/ZG142. On 29.9.41 redesignated Stab/NJG3.

Reformed 13.10.43 in Wunstorf. In 7.44 redesignated Stab/JG6.

I./ZG26

18.10.41 - 3.42 Kitzingen Bf 110
???
13.10.43 - 12.43 Bad Lippspringe Bf 110
12.43 - 1.4.44 Völkenrode Bf 110

Disbanded 4.42, and was absorbed by ZG1 and ZG2.

Reformed 13.10.43 in Bad Lippspringe from I./ZG1 with:

Stab I./ZG26 from Stab I./ZG1
1./ZG26 from 1./ZG1
2./ZG26 from 2./ZG1
3./ZG26 from 3./ZG1


II./ZG26

18.10.41 - 3.42 Dugino Bf 110
???
10.43 - 2.44 Hildesheim Me 410
2.44 - 24.3.44 Pfaffenhofen* Me 410

Disbanded 4.42, and was absorbed by ZG1 and ZG2.

Reformed 11.10.43 in Hildesheim from III./ZG1 with:

Stab II./ZG26 from Stab III./ZG1
4./ZG26 from 7./ZG1
5./ZG26 from 8./ZG1
6./ZG26 from 9./ZG1


III./ZG26

5.8.42 - 11.42 Kastelli** Bf 110
11.42 - 6.43 Trapani Bf 110
6.43 - 31.7.43 Ciampino/Rome Bf 110
31.7.43 - 10.43 Plantlünne Bf 110
10.43 - 22.3.44 Wunstorf Bf 110

Zerstörergeschwader 26
 
so what is the point now anyway ? I have all this and more plus all the losses for ZG 26, 76 and II./ZG 1. I am seriously debating on closing this thread and allowing Parsifal to bring up a brand new one
 
Erich said:
so what is the point now anyway ? I have all this and more plus all the losses for ZG 26, 76 and II./ZG 1. I am seriously debating on closing this thread and allowing Parsifal to bring up a brand new one
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Erich said:
ZG 26 was not disbanded in 43 sorry your sources for this ?
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I was hoping you would give an explanation as some of ZG26 was disbanded.
 
well as Altea wrote, " ZG 26 in july of 1943th? This Geschwader was disbanded in April 1942.", as a whole, this is not the case, as only some of ZG 26 was disbanded on 4.42.

I did not mean to speak for Erich, wasn't my place. Sorry.
 
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Well, that's it for me. I've found research venues in both Russia and the U.S. regarding the Battle of Kursk. You kids fight it out anyway you want to, I'll communicate with the useful who can stick to aone topic.
 
Hi Guys am back

Picking up from my Post No3

While these operations and preprations were being implemented, Richthofen began to rest and redeploy some of his other subordinate formations.....

Richthofen continued his refit,reorganization, re-equpiment and redeploymentof his LF4 formations. He withdrew Plugbeils FKIV by a process pf staged withdrawals and refits. FKIV at that time was providing essential support to 4PzA and the mobile remnants of 4A (Ru), (some people may be surprised to learn that the Rumanian Armoured Div distinguished itself at this time, earning it commander Radu Korne the Iron Cross). These formations were pulling back, with difficulty, across the Manych River, and needed as much air support as could be spared, The destination of these formations was initially the lower Don. FKIV performed relatively well, and even those formations that were not rested and refitted improved their operational rate simply by redeplyment to better supplied and equipped airfields. Richthofens instructions on 25 January 1943 to FKIVs air staff was to "work in the region southeast of Rostov with maximum forces whilst undertagoing refit of its formatiuons by stages" 51st Nomber Wing was returned to the Corps from transport duties. The refit and reequipment program involved only a few squadrons per week, but this steadily improved FKIVs operational readiness rates, and the formations shattered morale, such that by the time of the partial thaw in mid February, it was back to over 50% readiness states.

27 January LW Kaukasus was renamed LW Kuban to more accurately reflect its new role. Its primary purpose was the defence of the taman Peninsula. It took some time to organize this new role, and the formation was not really ready until the second week of february. Once 17A was in position and fortified, it was Richtohofens intentions to pull out the Corps to the southern Ukraine, where the situation remained very serious. The plan was for the formation to be subordinated to FKVIII. Air defence for the Kuban was planned be passed to a newly created formation, the 9th Flak Div. This Div was being built by General Pickert from fresh Bns and surviving remnants of the previous 9th flak XX, which had been destroyed at Stalingrad. At first this formation lacked heavy guns and searchlights, but the influential Richthofen made request for such equipment in February, and it appears to have arrived in March or April. The division received over 200 heavy guns and searchlights by April and was deplyed well forward in dug in positions along the 17A front line in many instances. It and LW Kuban (and FKVIII) were to be subjected to a sustained soviet air attack in the coming weeks. I will come back to this in further posts.

Flieger Division (FD) Donetz was the only other command subordinated to to LF4. Formed on a makeshift basis 2 jan 1943, under major General Mahnke, this formation had provided the major support elements to Army Detachment Hollidt. Strangely, Richthofen considered this formation to be his least well performing LW organization, due mainly to a lack of HQ staff experience. They tended to make up for this lack of experience with great enthusiasm, something acknowledged even by Richthofen. Similar to his other commands he instituted a program of redeployment and refit. At the beginning of Feb, he transferred the division from its unsatisfactory (and heavily attacked) airfields at Shakti, to the more secure and better supplied fields at Gorlovka (Soviet sources claim this airfield to have ben put under a lot of pressure as well, however the recovery of the formation after its re-deployment to Gorlovka suggest this was not the case at this time). The formation was subjected to the same gradual, staged process of refitas the other formations, and was placed under the direction of Plugbeils FKIV.

By the time resistance had ended at Stalingrad on the 2 February, Richthofen had already begun the process of re-positioning and refit of LF4. Even before the closure of the air bridge he had started a process of re-equipment and refit of his bomber formations (and later, his fighters and ground support assets as well). A big benefit was derived by pulling the assets back to better equipped and supplied airfields in the lower Don region. By April overal numbers were back up to about the 900-1000 mark for LF4, plus there was a sizable Rumanian and Hungraian element in support, and most significantly operational rates were back over 50%. German efforts at recovery were aided by the improvement in the weather in February, which also assisted in Mansteins counteroffensive of February-March. Mention also needs to be made of Milch's efforts which at this time was making a great effect on the re-supply of the forward units. For the LW this meant many units were at last receiving new equipment in reasonable numbers. Richthofen had staged a remarkable recovery, and LF 4 was ready to go back into action.
 
sooo is this just word for word from some book? cause if it is, I think the Kuban Peninsula would be a great conversation. Especially there overinflated claims of ' Germans falling out of the sky every 10 minutes. '
 
no not word for word, but based on eight separate sources. Words are my own, but the sources are:

1) Joel S Hayward: Stopped At Stalingrad - The Luftwaffe and Hitlers Defeat In the East *University Press Of Kansas 1998

2) Alfred Price: Luftwaffe ( Intro By Adolf Galland)McDonald Press 1970

3) Geoffrey Jukes, Barrie Pitt Kursk - Clash Of Armour Pan Ballaantyne Books 1970

4) Von Hardesty Red Phoenix - The rise of Soviet Air Power 1941 - 45 Smithsonian Institute 1992

5) Chris Bellamy Rise Of Soviet Airpower Pan Military Books 2009

6) Brian Moynahan Talons Of the Bear - The story of Soviet Airpower Arrow Books 1988

7) Edited By Peter Tsoura [U Fighting in Hell - The German Ordeal On the Eastern Front[/U] Preidio Press 1995 (series of essays by captured German officers in the USA 1952)

8) VV Lavrentyev PD Kazakav: The Great Patriotic War 1941-5, Moscow Military Press 1982 (I think). In Russian, so I needed some help in reading it.

I have Bergstoms book on order, and hope to have my copy in about a week or so.

When this thread was started I expressed reservations about it on the basis that claims and counter claims are very difficult to verify. German loss records are incomplete, and their estimates of Soviet losses have been shown to be wildly innaccurate. Similar claims can be levelled at Soviet sources, because they suffer from political inference from the Soviet era. Then there is what I call the martin Caidin effect, which has inbuilt innaccuracies that almost defy logic. There will never be a definitive, completely accurate account of the losses for the eastern front.

I am about to make a submission about the fighting in the Kuban. I am aware of the firce debate that rages to this day about that campaign. I would say this however....by Stalingrad, the VVS had learned how to survive, but its battle cordination remained poor. Its ability to impeded LW operations remained limited. By Kursk this situation had changed....the VVS had learned a number of important lessons on what it needed to do, and how it should conduct its operations. Like it or not, the VVS at the conclusiuon of Kursk was dominating the airspace whereas the LW could only selkectively and over a limited area make that claim. For the remainder of the war, VVS continued to dominate the areas immediately over the battlefield. LW to amuch lesser extent. We need to try and understand how that came about, even if we cannot agree on numbers.....
 
Kuban, awesome! as far as VVS claimes/losses, I would trust russian sources/documents as far as I could throw a Jak-9.
ie: untrustworthy.

German loss documents, well some are incomplete.. but unit diaries make up for that.
 
German own losses are accurate enough, but their claims of kills are not very accurate. At the end of the day they are based on guesswork, like all claims.

Russian sources are dodgy from the Soviet era, but I am fairly confident that good work was done from the latter part of the 80s plus there are some reasonable western sources now.

Like I said, accurate figures on losses are hard to find, always disputed, and seldom accurate. that goes for both sides.

Best we can hope for is understand what happened, and perhaps why, forget the details of how many were lost on this day or that. We will never be abale to get a set of numbers that everyone can agree on
 
' Best we can hope for is understand what happened, and perhaps why, forget the details of how many were lost on this day or that '

this is one of the most senseable statements I read in a long while. now, lets figure out what happened at Kuban.
 
The VVS had emerged from Stalingrad somewhat invigorated by its succes, but with nevertheless some obvious shortcomings. It was superior to the bedraggled forces that had doggedly resisted the LW in 1941-2....it had at least learned how not to get itself destroyed.

For the Soviets, Stalingrad provided the means and opportunity to implement some of the Novikov reforms, however a lot was still needed to be done. The VVS claimed to have shot down 1200 LW aircraft november-Feb, in fact the Luftwaffe had lost only 488 a/c to all causes. If allowances are made for flak/artillery and non-combat losses, VVS fighters may have shot down about 150 aircraft (if they were lucky). Still, it was a start....

In the mobile operations that followed the encirclement, VVS again broke down and failed in its mission. The offensive that resulted in the recapture of Kursk and Kharkov had quickly outrun VVs support, and the Russians seemed incapable of conducting a proper mobile operation, particulalry for their air assets. Their supply arrangements remaioned completely unsatisfactory which allowed Mantein to inflict his riposte in March.

Still the benefits and victories of Stalingrad should not be underestimated. For the VVS, the victory had brought honour and recognition. A total of nine air divisions earned guards status. 17 pilots were awarded Hero Of the Soviet Uniond, there were over 1000 lesser awards for VVS flying peronnel. VVS had flown 35000 sorties over the winter to 18500 by the LW. Most importantly, experienced higher echelon air commanders were beginning to emerge, names familir to Soviet airpower: Generals SA Krasovski (17Air Army), S I Rudenko (16 Air Army), GG Khryushkin (8 Air Army) and A Golovanov (ADD).

An important development that grew out of the Stalingrad experience was the establishment of a firm bridgehead in the Kuban Peninsula, which the Soviets rightly saw as a potential threat to their control of the Caucasus. Here was the making of the final precursor to Kursk, the air and land battles in the Kuban

The mixed results gained from their experiences at Stalingrad made the Soviet rethink and reassess what they should be aiming for with their airpower. It was to be further refined in the Kuban operations.
 
Hello,

Erich said:
ZG 26 was not disbanded in 43 sorry your sources for this ?
Click to expand...
Who said in 43 ?

II./ZG 1 did not lose materials in 43 it had Ju 88C's as well as the better armed Bf 110G-2's, re-read some of the older postings on Reich defense on this very forum.
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Where was located II/ZG 1 from april to june 43?


Look Old Sage, you might be the most autorithative author about the subjet, but there are some others i have red, and they could perfectly be erronated. I don't have the pretention to debate with you, j'm just looking for reliable data.
However, so please what JG and ZG units (stabs, gruppen etc...) were taken from the eastern front to be rearmed and refitted in germany from april to july of 1943 included?

lastly if you will note in my adresse that I did not say ANY Zerstörer gruppen were on the Ost front only Jagdgeschwader in your quotation of me.
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Cf please read my previous question

Regards
 
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