The Best Bomber of WWII: #4

Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules

B-29 compatibility with the Pointblank directive and Operation Pointblank

Of course, the timing is off, but I wonder if the B-29's, theoretically flying higher and faster, would have made as good "bait" as the B-17's and B-24's.
 
Last edited:
B-29 compatibility with the Pointblank directive and Operation Pointblank

Of course, the timing is off, but I wonder if the B-29's, theoretically flying higher and faster, would have made as good "bait" as the B-17's and B-24's.

I think that the Luftwaffe would have been obliged to try and intercept them.

Cheers

Steve
 
The B 29s performance comes at a price, the crews and planes were too costly to suffer the losses considered acceptable with other bombers like the B17/24. if they were met by numbers of Me262s the losses would be unnacceptable.
 
FBJ - Quick question, I read somewhere (maybe Wiki now that I think of it) the 8th and perhaps also the 15th AF were to reequip with the Dominator but then be redeployed to the PTO for the final push on Japan. I guess my confusion, and my question is was the B-32 slated for ETO operations or as new equipment for a move to the PTO?

Thanks.
Pete

I think the original thinking was just focusing the B-32 in Europe. The wrench in the plan was the B-32 was running way behind schedule and production delays perpetuated throughout its development. In the end it was too little too late and the B-29 was able to complete the mission
 
Makes sense, I had forgotten the B-32's development woes, I appreciate your insight, thanks and have a great weekend.

The B-32 contract was placed as a contingency to the B-29. Once the B-29 development was moving along, its not hard to see Consolidated putting its best resources on the B-36. The XB-36 was rolled out in August 1945.
 
The B-32 contract was placed as a contingency to the B-29. Once the B-29 development was moving along, its not hard to see Consolidated putting its best resources on the B-36. The XB-36 was rolled out in August 1945.
There were orders for the B-32 that were cancelled at or around VJ Day that numbered 1,500 aircraft. Contractors don't always have a say where their best resources go - they follow a contract and delivery schedule dictated by the customer unless they are working on a private venture, and the B-36 WAS NOT a private venture. Delays in delivery are negotiated and sometime the contractor is penalized for delays.

From Wiki;

"As the Pacific war progressed, the air force increasingly needed a bomber capable of reaching Japan from its bases in Hawaii, and the development of the B-36 resumed in earnest. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, in discussions with high-ranking officers of the AAF, decided to waive normal army procurement procedures, and on 23 July 1943 ordered 100 B-36s before the completion and testing of the two prototypes. The first delivery was due in August 1945, and the last in October 1946, but Consolidated (now renamed Convair) delayed delivery. The aircraft was unveiled on 20 August 1945, and flew for the first time on 8 August 1946"

Throughout its development, the B-36 would encounter delays. When the United States entered World War II, Consolidated was ordered to slow B-36 development and greatly increase Consolidated B-24 Liberator production. The first mockup was inspected on 20 July 1942, following six months of refinements. A month after the inspection, the project was moved from San Diego, California, to Fort Worth, Texas, which set back development several months. Consolidated changed the tail from a twin-tail to a single, thereby saving 3,850 pounds (1,750 kg), but this change delayed delivery by 120 days. The tricycle landing gear system's initial main gear design, with huge single wheels found to cause significant ground pressure problems, limited the B-36 to operating from just three air bases in the United States: Carswell Field (former Carswell AFB, now NAS JRB Fort Worth/Carswell Field), adjacent to the Consolidated factory in Fort Worth, Texas; Eglin Field (now Eglin AFB), Florida; and Fairfield-Suisun Field (now Travis AFB) in California[13]). As a result, the Air Force mandated that Consolidated design a four-wheeled bogie-type wheel system for each main gear unit instead, which distributed the pressure more evenly and reduced weight by 1,500 pounds (680 kg). Changes in the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) requirements would add back any weight saved in redesigns, and cost more time. A new antenna system needed to be designed to accommodate an ordered radio and radar system. The Pratt & Whitney engines were redesigned, adding another 1,000 pounds (450 kg).
 
Yes, the B-36 was developed on contract money. If you were Consolidated Management and by 1944 you saw the B-29 in production and deployed, and you had a contract to develop a complimentary bomber, the B-32, and a contract to develop what was probably the bomber that would replace both the B-29 and B-32, which project would you assign the best engineers and development team to? I'd staff the B-36 program with the best team I had. I think it could have been one of the reasons for the long gestation period of the B-32.
Just MHO, we tend to look back and consider performance and specifications, but then as now, I'm sure politics, lobbys and profits had a lot to do with which planes were sent to combat. Different topic, but I can't help thinking the reason the USAF chose the 51 over the 47N post war was the politics of the California Congressional Block, and North American knew how to Lobby and play the procurement game in peace time better than Republic. NA kept the P-51 sold. Republic didn't.
 
Yes, the B-36 was developed on contract money. If you were Consolidated Management and by 1944 you saw the B-29 in production and deployed, and you had a contract to develop a complimentary bomber, the B-32, and a contract to develop what was probably the bomber that would replace both the B-29 and B-32, which project would you assign the best engineers and development team to? I'd staff the B-36 program with the best team I had. I think it could have been one of the reasons for the long gestation period of the B-32.
No - I'd sign my assign my best engineers to the programs that had the highest priorities. At manufactures it doesn't work that way and I've worked at several.

The long gestation period involved several changes to the B-32's outward configuration and some of the internal systems.

Just MHO, we tend to look back and consider performance and specifications, but then as now, I'm sure politics, lobbys and profits had a lot to do with which planes were sent to combat.
If you want to believe that, fine, I could tell you back then lobbyists had little to do with what went into combat, if they did the P-51 would have never been built.

Different topic, but I can't help thinking the reason the USAF chose the 51 over the 47N post war was the politics of the California Congressional Block, and North American knew how to Lobby and play the procurement game in peace time better than Republic. NA kept the P-51 sold. Republic didn't.
Unless you have some proof of that, this is just your opinion. The P-47 was operated by the USAF well into the 50's so I really don't understand your point. The P-51 was sent to Korea because there were more of them and they were cheaper to operate.

There's plenty of DOCUMENTED evidence that shows how US aircraft were developed, vetted and procured, there's no "conspiracy theory" behind some of these decisions.
 
There's plenty of DOCUMENTED evidence that shows how US aircraft were developed, vetted and procured, there's no "conspiracy theory" behind some of these decisions.

I don't think there was conspiracy in the War procurement. But I've worked in Aerospace for over 30 years, and I agree with Sydney Camm, when he said "All modern aircraft have four dimensions: span, length, height and politics" You need to get all four right to get a contract and keep your program sold. Sixty years later I think we tend to look at just the airplane specifications.
 
I don't think there was conspiracy in the War procurement. But I've worked in Aerospace for over 30 years, and I agree with Sydney Camm, when he said "All modern aircraft have four dimensions: span, length, height and politics" You need to get all four right to get a contract and keep your program sold. Sixty years later I think we tend to look at just the airplane specifications.

38 years in aircraft maintenance and manufacturing (to include Lockheed, Boeing, Teledyne Ryan and BAE, and a few more) I could agree to a point - going back to your original point about the P-51 and P-47N, nonsense IMO.
 
How well would the Farman 223.4 fare with HP Halifax and Short Stirling ?
 

Attachments

  • EZ6xyTAWkAYdYdw.jpg
    EZ6xyTAWkAYdYdw.jpg
    96.3 KB · Views: 38
[...] or the B-29 (despite the latter gains some additional credit for shortening the war by delivering nukes to Japan. However, this credit should be given to the whole Manhatten project rather than to the carrier plane).

I've only started reading this thread, but I'd argue that the firebombings prior to the A-bomb attack had as much to do with ending the war. It also laid thousands of mines, interdicting interisland domestic transport.

Forgive me if I'm repeating someone else's point on this, but I think the B-29 has much more to be proud of than just the atomic attacks.

And yes, I know I'm replying to an old post.

I'll go back to reading ...
 
I've only started reading this thread, but I'd argue that the firebombings prior to the A-bomb attack had as much to do with ending the war. It also laid thousands of mines, interdicting interisland domestic transport.

Forgive me if I'm repeating someone else's point on this, but I think the B-29 has much more to be proud of than just the atomic attacks.

And yes, I know I'm replying to an old post.

I'll go back to reading ...
I realize too that this is an old thread but I'm in total agreement, I think the B-29 was a major influence in shortening the war in the Pacific and you've stated the reasons quite well.

I do believe that it got to the point where there was perilously little to bomb or firebomb by August 1945. I consulted my uncles diary, when he did some of the POW flights and then the flyover during the surrender ceremony they were low and slow. According to him the devastation was eye popping / horrifying. I believe he felt quite a bit of guilt later on, only once did he let slip about his feelings over civilian deaths that he felt responsible for.

It was an unnerving experience I can tell you, I idolized him along with my dad and my other uncles, but once he really almost fell to pieces talking about it, after quite a few drinks that is. He didn't go to reunions and really didn't even seem to like the B-29, or perhaps the memories seeing one brought back. There are some hairy mission narratives in his diary to say the least.

Sorry, I ramble on.
 
Attached is an excerpt from a lecture given by Professor Thomas Childers of U Penn, on the War, in this excerpt he discusses dropping the bomb. ©1998 The Teaching Company, LLC (P)1998 The Great Courses
 

Attachments

  • 53 Lecture 29e_ Truman, the Bomb, a.mp3
    4.6 MB
Last edited:

Users who are viewing this thread

Back