The Bf 109 aka ME-109 landing gear myth research thread.

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Story is nice, but I do not trust after above "correction" of "facts" by your part.
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You begin to enter fantasy land...
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Fact - you like that word much.. so here is for you.
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Stop the sarcasm or your stay here will be short.

Short story - BC day bombing in 1941 was decribeable two words: insignificant. Costly.
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Why would you say 'insignifigant'? I think at this time period, BC FC were going on the offensive so soon after th BoB and were learning how to "Give it to them back". Maybe there wasn't any tangible, physical success but the experience gained was immense.
 

Hello Parsifal
Based on what, Price names the sqns, Nos 71, 111, 222, 452, 485 and 602 Sqns flew close escort and escort cover for the bombers, Biggin Hill Wing (72, 92 and 609) formed the top cover force and so on. So which 3 sqns did not participate according to your sources. And why the Target Support Force (Hornchurch and Tangmere Wings) didn't do what it was supposed to do? IMHO it's very difficult to give target support while flying over England while the target was in France. And how could Bader, the leader of the TANGMERE Wing report contacts with 109s over the target (Lille) and how the Wing's only loss, FltLt Draper from 41Sqn, got captured if the Wing stayed over England? And for sure during Circus 96 the Target Support Force did what its name implied, ie gave support over the target area.

One example for 5 Wings covering ½ sqn of Blenheims.
Circus 81 19 August 1941 called also "Leg Operation"
Target the Gosnay Power Station in France
Bombers 6 Blenheims of No. 2 Group, Bomber Command
Escort Wing - 41, 610 and 616 Squadrons (Tangmere)
Escort Cover Wing - 452, 485 and 602 Squadrons (Kenley)
Target Support Wings - 306, 308 and 315 Squadrons (Northolt) and 403, 603 and 611 Squadrons (Hornchurch)
Rear Support Wing - 72, 92 and 609 Squadrons (Biggin Hill)

Juha
 
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Tante

The losses you are quoting for daylight operations are for all BC operations. Many of these ops were unescorte raids into areas other than western Europe (treating germany as central europe and scandinavia as NorthernEurope ). Just as an example, to use that April 1941 month again, 167 sorties and a total of 15 daylight bomber losses. I know of at least 32 of those sorties. they occure on 8 april, one near brest, one near the frisian islands, and one off Bergen. Brest operations. two small vessels sunk, 2 enemy aircraft (Bf109s) confirmed lost (from german records) no loss to the Blenheims. They were escorted, incidentally. Secons mission, by 1.5 squadrons, intercepted by Bf110s, 2 a/c lost for 1 Bf 110 damaged. Last mission off Bergen by a squadron strength formation lost another Blenheim to an Me 110. Many more losses outside the operational area than you think. The majority were over hard targets in or near Germany.

I'll stand corrected about the bomber sorties over Dieppe, any ideas on how many allied ships were hit or damaged as a result of this activity?

I never claimed that the operations over France by 2 gp were massive. yet they were strong enough for the KM to abandon their forward positions at Brest, and for all three major warships stationed there to take serious damage. Are you saying this was insignificant, because for Britain, it was vital these ship remain imobile, evidently this paid off in May with the loss of the Bismarck. i consider these to all critical outcomes for the war. We can only speculate what might have happened if Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had been ready to sortie in May.
 
Hi Juha

We are getting boggred down with the details i guess. Maybee you are right....maybe there were more fighters being poured into the fight than I thought, which certainly explains the increased losses in the latter parrt of 1941. We will have to just accept disagreement on the numbers i think.

What is of more interst to me is that if you are correct, and the RAF could put all those aircraft over France and suffer the loss of 400 aircraft in that six month period, in enemy airspace, then how can this not be seen as air superiority....th ability to place ones own forces over enemy controlled territory, do what was wanted to be done, and then return with tolerable losses.

By comparison, LW suffered nearly as many losses (280ish) in one month of operations in the first half of 1941 as the british did over the whole of france in the second half of 1941. It matters not that the two situations have differnt numbers involved, the difference is, the british had gained complete control of their airspace, the germans after may did not. These are trhe sole measures that apply to whether a force has air superiority or not, not whether their flyers are elite, or what one side does with their advantage....just whether they have that advantage.

Remember what sparked this debate some pages back....whether or not the RAF had won air superiority over western europe (as opposed to central europe) or not. I still think its is pretty clear that they had gained such advantage.
 
Tante
The average loss ratio for all bomber command in 1941 on daylight raids was 6.5% (from the Bomber Command Stats). As has been pointed out correctly those are all BC raids wherever they went and a lot were unescorted to Germany in small numbers.

For no 2 Group there is no doubt that 4,900 sorties were made over N Europe and losses were:-
95 - Flak
39 - Fighters
16 - Battle accidents
61 - Unknown

Loss ratio approx 4.3%

Details from No 2 Group page 470

Now however you slice the cake or want to comment, there is no doubt that fighters were not the major risk, flak was. One of the major tasks for No 2 Group was anti ship strikes, always a dangerous job for any airforce, it was called Project Channel Stop. If you want a good book on the subject read the book of the same name. Flak was deadly, fighters hardly get a mention.

The basic truths were:-
a) Flak was the major threat
b) The RAF chose when and where to attack, they dictated the action and had control of the air
c) Unescorted raids beyond the Channel Coast paid a heavy price.
 
Hello Glider
IIRC Theo Boiten in his book Blenheim Strike gives an impression that in fact 109s were a real risk to the 2Group Blenheims during those shipping strikes against coastal convoys and ports after Germans got themselves organized. Of course also German flak was murderous.

Juha
 
Hello Parsifal
As I have wrote FAF could attack all targets it wanted in the Karelian Isthmus during the big Soviet strategic attack during Summer 44 even if greatly outnumbered by VVS and VVS KBF without any of the escorted bombers lost to Soviet fighters even if escorts were size of 10-20 Bf 109Gs. And that was achieved with very light fighter losses and with clearly positive loss rate vs VVS fighters. So in that sense we did clearly better than RAF over France in 41-42. Still we don't claim that FAF had air superiority over the Isthmus, only brief local air superiorities over targets and around the FAF bombers.

I don't see that RAF had "th ability to place ones own forces over enemy controlled territory, do what was wanted to be done, and then return with tolerable losses" over France in daytime, only over the narrow northern and NW coastal regions of France inside the limited range of the standard Spitfire and even so with clearly negative fighter vs fighter loss rate in 41 and at least most of 42. Outside the range of Spitfire daytime losses of RAF over France tended to be forbiddingly high, so after a short while Stirlings and Halifaxes were withdrawn from daylight ops.

Juha
 

In light of day? In 1941.. sorry.. difficult to believe there were BC bombers in daylight over Germany, save of course - odd ones. Hooton writes: BC (largely 2 Group) was 7,68%, excluding anti-shipping operations. So difference is 6,5 vs 7,68, but latter is without anti shipping operations, so perhaps that one was less costly.


Thank you for book recommendation! Sorry to say I disagree about flak being major threat, this downplay role of fighter. Sure, on face it shows - flak greatest cause. But there is also: 61 unknown. I think it is more likely fighter. Few certain lost to struck by lightning, engine fault, hit telephone wire etc. but these will be few in number. I would say 39 known lost to fighter, + 50-60 probably lost to fighter. We should look at German claim, but I have no time now. However later I will post link.

Regarding b) There's much truth to that. But I do not think they controlled air. Certain - they were capable of more than in 1940, but that controll depend much on "goodwill" of Germans. I think that get ignored is that major difference in situation between 1940 Battle and 1941 is:

a, German raid bigger in size in 1940
b, RAF had really no choice wheter to defend or not.. target were vital. In 1941 the RAF target were not vital to German, so they could ignore. So there is bit of false feel of "command" of air. Really that "command" begun when Luftwaffe was transferred east, decision made entirely regardless of RAF; and "command" lasted until German considered RAF target important enough to step in. So perhaps - intermittent air superiority is best word?

I always had feeling - Britain Air staff a bit clueless in 1941.. what to do? What now? So they come up idea of baiting raids, essence target to destroy German aircraft. It did not make much sense I believe, and most historian seem to agree, still better than sit in British isles and do nothing. But I also think it was very costly, for meagre result - some experience about how to get nose bloodied (already experience of 1940 France, so why repeat?) and some propaganda value - "RAF is attacking"!
 
I have no idea as to the unknown causes. I do know that in 1943 74% of unknown was estimated to be flak and accidents the majority of the rest, but that was in 1943.
When you know that fighters cause approx 26% of the known causes for losses I do think its a big assumption to assign all of the rest to fighters. If I had to guess then it would be in a similar proportion to the known causes.
Accidents happen, I read of one raid where two aircraft were brought down and twenty two others were damaged by bird strikes. Exceptional I agree but they do happen. Throw in damage, mechanical problems, navigation mistakes, inexperience, bad weather and accidents do happen.

I do agree that RAF high Command were poor for most of the war. For instance I agree that using three wings to escort 3 Sterlings or 6 Blenheims is a waste of time. Why not use three squadrons then the Germans will have to fight as 40 ish Sterlings/Halifax's/Wellingtons will do a lot of damage and no doubt the losses would be proportionately less.
 
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I also think that RAF high command was a bit lost in 41-42, there was nothing wrong to use 5 Wings of escort fighters, but the bomber component should have been something like 3-6 sqns of Wimpys. Wimpy Mk IIIs were almost as fast as Blenheim Mk IVs but carried a decent bomb load and had better defensive armament but were cheaper than the heavies. Stirling was another possibility, as fast as Wellington Mk III, carried a good bomb load and had slightly better defensive armament, expensive but not as good as night bomber as Halifax but more maneuverable. Lack of ceiling wasn't an handicap in the role of escorted day bomber attacking precision targets like armament factories, depots, airfields etc in France. After all Spits Mk IIs and Vs were less outperformed at low and medium altitudes than at high altitudes by 109s and 190s.

Juha
 


Hi Juha


I am glad you raised this as an example because it helps illustrate some of the complexities of determining air superiority. Tante says that its "my thesis", which kinda brings a smile to my face. I wish it were "my thesis", in actuality its standard 2nd year OTS strategic studies course material for any staff officer.....anyway, enough rambling, lets get down to analyzing the theory....incidentally if the assumptions I make about FAF air warfare theory are incorect, please feel free to correct me. I dont pretend to know FAF strategy all that well.

I am assuming that FAF were based on those of Germany by 1944. German air theory was never about gaining total air superiority(in the way the Americans and tyhe british were seeking in 1944), it was always about getting air superiority over the battlefield, and its immediate surroundings. In other words a far more tactical application of airpower. They could then use relatively cheap to produce ground attack aircraft like the Ju87 to deliver pinpoint attacks onto the battlefield. Medium bombers were used to hit enemy airfields and logistics to isolate the enemy formations, deny them of effective air support. Fighters were used to keep any surviving enemy Divebombers/Ground attack aircaft away from the battlefield, and to engage enemy fighters where needed to achieve those objectives. The strategic goal of all that was to win battles on the ground, to assist the ground forces in taking and holding ground. Destroying the enemy air force was an integral, and essential part of thqat strategy

Soviet theories on air power on the other hand did not see the destruction of enemy airpower as essential, just nioce to have. These concepts were developed during the war, and recognized certain limitations that the Soviets laboured under in their war with Germany. The Russians never really mastered the qualitative advantage of the german fighter arm, but at some point they realized the achilles heel of the german system.......limited numbers. It was not really necessary to clear the skies of German Fighters, because there were not enough of them to make any real difference to the outcome of the battle. They got better at their trade, to be sure...better pilots, better machines, better doctrine, all of which improved the exchange rate, but they could never get to the situation where their fighters could drive the germans completely from the sky. So they adapted the theory to suit thei capabilities. Soviet doctrine after 1942 was never about destruction of the enemy air force. Soviets were never interested in achieving air superiority in the sense we understand it. They were not interested in racking up huge tallies of enemy fighters or indeed strike aircraft. These were all bonuses, to be sure, but the real prize for them was in providing direct assistance to their ground forces, assisting the advance. All other finer points of airpower were subordinated to that one goal. Soviet fighters were there to firstly harass and break up enemy bombers, and lessen their impact on the battle. They were there to also make sure their own bombers were able to complete their mission. Survival of the Soviet bombers after completion of the mission was an optional extra, not essential.

Now, equipped with a somewhat rudimentary knowledge of Soviet airpower theory, ask your self the question again about whether the Soviets gained air superiority, or whether the Finns (or the germans on the east front generally) were at all successful in achieving either an air auperiority air parity or even an air denial strategy on the eastern front??? The answer has to be no in every case. The Finns shot down a lot of Soviet aircraft, but did this make any difference??? not even a minute of difference. Did they succeed in halting the Soviet Ground offensive. No, not a bit. Did Finn bombers stop any offensives. I dont doubt they carried out some impressive ground support missions, but they stopped nothing as far as I can see. Did the Soviets provide effective ground support to their attacking armies in '44? Not sure, but I think so.

So on that basis who achieved their missions and who did not. Finns achieved none of their missions, Soviets achieved all of theirs. Reason was massive numbers but also effective doctrine and strategy to concentrate effort at the right points and extract maximum benefit oit of their airpower, something sadly missing from their application of airpower in 1939-42.
 
Hello Parsifal
the FAF doctrine, if there was any clear one, is a rather complicated question. Before 1939 there was in higher echelon some flirting with douhetism, the head of FAF was a colonel (later promoted to GenMaj.) transferred from field artillery to command the FAF, he was a good organizer but influenced by his staff because of his lack of experience in air force questions and the "bomber boys" had his ear. Now with 18 Blenheims the idea of douhetism was naïve. The Winter War forced the high command to accept that for a very small air force which main potential enemy was a superpower, fighters were the main a/c type.

Now the main tasks of Finnish air defence (the FAF and AA artillery) were;

To protect Finland proper
IMHO in that Finns succeeded fairly well, mostly because of AAA, SU tried to force Finns out of war by massive air attacks against Helsinki and some other cities by ADD (the strategic arm of the VVS) in early 44 but the attacks failed to inflict massive damage, in fact damages were surprisingly light, thanks to effective AAA.

To help Navy to keep sealines open
also in this FAF succeeded fairly well, war-booty SB-2s of LLv 6 succeeded to sank and damage some Soviet subs, HLeLv 34 succeeded fairly well with AAA to protect Kotka and Hamina (important harbours) against Soviet air attacks in 43-44, Kotka was also important because of it was the northern base of KM ships guarding the submarine net across the Gulf of Finland which bottled Soviet subs in the Kronstadt area 43-44 and so kept them away to the essential sea routes.

To give as good protection to the ground forces as possible
IMHO FAF did that rather well when one thinks resources available.

To give adequate recon info to the High Command and to the ground forces.
IMHO FAF did that fairly well but there were some lapses even if the main reason for the main plunder of Finnish intelligence, the lack of adequate warning on the Soviet Summer 44 offensive was more result of failure of inner workings of High Command and of apathy of the HQ of IV Corps.

To support the ground forces
IMHO FAF did that fairly well, again when what was possible for a small AF against a superpower, but could have been a bit more effective without a couple badly planned/executed bombing raid in 42 and 43 which produced unnecessary losses to the weak bomber force without hurting SU much.

It was not duty of FAF to stop a major Soviet ground attack, it was clearly beyond its resources. That was the duty of infantry and artillery with the help of small technical arms (AF, armour, combat engineers etc)
And nobody at least above the rank of lieutenant thought that FAF could shot down so many Soviet planes that VVS would give up its attacks.

On air superiority over France, see my message #407

Juha
 
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I am getting confused over the sources you are quoting. You quoted the BC stats web page that I double checked with my copy of the Bomber Command Diary and 6.5% was the loss ratio figure from the site and the book. The Bomber Command book includes No 2 Group which at that time was part of BC.
The No 2 Group figures I have quoted and can be checked from the book which I have also quoted.

I don't know about Hooton but where he gets 7.8% is a mystery. The most expensive period I can find is November 1941 to 22 Feb 1942 when losses reached 7.4% on Daylight raids. July to 10th November the loss rate was 7.1%, March to July it was 4.0% and finally Oct 1940 to March 1941 the loss ratio was only 1.6%

I strongly suggest you get a copy of The Bomber Command War Diaries.
 
Tante Ju said:
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Not sure of your point with that chart TJ... if you are using it to illustrate 8th AF FC over Germany, vs total 8th FC, then you continuously miss the point of the discussion and really miss the point on the order of battle for 8th FC.

January 1 1944 - P-47 equipped (4th, 56th, 78th 352nd, 353rd, 355th, 356th, 359th) ----> limited range 330+ sorties max; P-38 equipped (20th, 55th); P-51 (354th on loand from 9th AF) -----> max 140 sorties w/no early returns past Frankfurt/Koblenz

April 1 1944 - P-47 equipped (56, 78, 352, 353, 356, 359, 361) -----> limited range 400+ sorties max; P-38 equipped (20, 55, 364); P-51 (354, 4, 355, 357)---> maximum 300 sorties w/no early returns (German)

May 1, 1944 - P-47 (56, 78, 353, 356, 361) ----> 220+ short range sorties; P-38 (20, 55, 364); P-51 (4, 339, 352, 355, 357, 359) ----> 450+ sorties into deep penetrations

So, the discussion is Long Range escort against the Luftflotte Reich out of range of the P-47 FG's
 
From what I've gleaned from reading is many times that aircraft that returned from a mission damaged were struck of charge as unrepairable but were not added to losses for a mission .
 
pbfoot said:
From what I've gleaned from reading is many times that aircraft that returned from a mission damaged were struck of charge as unrepairable but were not added to losses for a mission .
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That is not a uniquely RAF issue. Many aircraft from all sides made it home, only to never fly again. Many others came home with a wounded or killed crewmember. It raises the question "when is a loss a loss?" Always take reported losses with a grain of salt, from all sides
 
 
Mr Drgondog
You are great source of information , Senior Member, respectable person but PLEASE dont put in my mouth words that i never said.
I never said G6 was equal to P51. I wrote Mw50 equiped Bf109 were not iferior
I never said FW190A7, early A8 were equal to P51. In fact i wrote BMW 801 was useless in high altitude
I never said controllers were useless , i wrote that they were bad.
I never said that Jagdwaffe could deal easily with the mustung. I wrote it would be a scenario similar with spits in 41/42 over France. It was not easy. But the conditions allowed Jagdwaffe to have positive results. But in 43/44 with the Bombers slaughtering women and children HAD to enange the bombers ,they did in a wrong way and suffered the consequences.
German pilots were certainly inferior, in that period. American rookies were entering combat with over 400hrs flying experience (please give the exact number) using the oceans of fuel rubbed by the countries of Latin America.
Even if controllers were succesful in "guessing" the target, i mentioned a great number of reasons that made concentrations dificult.
If i undertood correctly in your post you suggest that typical scenario was 40 P51s jumped by 150 huns , counter attacking destroying 40-50 ,if lost any it was due Flak, malfuction ,"unknown reason",or wish of the pilot to visit Swiss . Super race of pilots.The presence of 500 bombers carrying indicantaries was unimportant to you.
outnumbered escorts? No Outnumbered LW ?yes The fact that some day units had to share their aircrafts with night fighter units sounds like an airforce with excess of aircraft?
My answer to your questions is tactics.The main reason was tactics. But why didnt you asked Mr Galland,you have met him i believe. He was so popular in America.
It s the first time i did not enjoy reading one of your posts. I feel its a good time this conversation to end. I withdraw.
 
cause he won't like the answer Adolf Galland would have givin him, or Gunther Rall Horst Petzschler for that matter.

" the Luftwaffe was outnumbered "

American Industrial might made sure of that. but he'll continue calling me full of crap, and slap the face of Galland,
Rall, Petzschler, and most others for even sugesting it. becouse I'm directly quoting from them, and he calls me a liar,
ergo, they are all liars.
 
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