As I just said, I was not actually making any point, except that the provision of drop tanks was superfluous, until the aircraft was plumbed to take them.
"The case for the P-47 Thunderbolt being the greatest fighter of the Second World War "
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And that was long before they were operational wasnt it?
The only thing stopping them being "operational" was the distance to the theatres, and the lack of enough personnel to base, service and fly them.
Was it? Didnt the pilots need time on type etc. It took around three months for the RAF to get a new squadron operational with a new version of the Spitfire.. How did this have any effect on escort operations in mid to late 1943?
Well, it did take months and months for the AAC to "gear up" from effectively a very small base starting December 1941, but I would have thought you would have known that.
Furthermore, Yanks were not "over there" yet.
And it seems that the "bomber mafia" were concentrating more on getting the bombers into combat.
The "pursuit" aircraft were somewhat delayed.
(less so in the Pacific)
Ah we are now going back to 1941. The USAAF performed its first bombing mission on 17 August 1942, their first aircraft didnt arrive until June. They were performing bombing missions with Spitfire escorts before the P-47 arrived, so what were they thinking the P-47 would do?
It was the Eagle Squadrons doing the flying of the Spitfires - flown largely by US personnel.
The pursuit squadrons that would be flying US made aircraft were not yet ready.
There were not enough ground staff/bases/spare parts.
Was it? The escort over the target was by 4 Spitfire Mk IX squadrons, there were 5 squadrons of Mk Vs for withdrawal The Eagle squadrons operated MkVs.
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Now I'm not sure what YOUR point is with all this.
I liked it better when I was finding it difficult to get past your attitude and planning on ignoring you way back at post #323.
Deleted member 68059
Staff Sergeant
- 1,056
- Dec 28, 2015
Of course the AIR STAFF were, everyone had just signed the Casablanca agreement which meant unconditional surrender ONLY and
the preparation for the complete obliteration of Germany by air. These decisions are made far above the level of any "mafia" members,
leaving AIR STAFF to figure out how to achieve the objective. (Lots of bombers, believe it or not.)
They ended up with some learning to do about needing escorts, the solution of which involved absolutely no
silly plots against the P-47.
But instead of the P-47, the "mafia" forced the use of an escort fighter with over 30% less weight (max fully laden, for
visualisation purposes a fully laden P-51 with an empty Mk-V Spitfire bolted to it is STILL less than a P-47 max laden), HALF
the fuel consumption, nearly HALF the production cost and statistically vastly superior combat effectiveness
against German S.E.F., so much so that this useless replacement for the P-47 was already making close to HALF
the escort kills by the time it was only 15% of the escort.
What a dastardly plot indeed !
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You are personally awarding credit and blame as you see fit. My point is that from Mission 1 US bombers were escorted by Spitfires, the Mk IX was the only one that could operate effectively at those altitudes. There were 4 used at Rouen and 6 used at Dieppe, both in August 1942, so what did the makes of the P-47 and its operators think the P-47 would be used for? What steps did Republic take to make it better? Where is there any evidence of a "bomber mafia" at work here? Just as the fighters were sorting out what to do and how to do it, so were the bombers, the fighters get a sympathetic hearing while people involved with bombers get ridiculous "bomber mafia" accusations as if they were homicidal nutcases.
That declaration was to formalise and announce their intent, work to achieve it had been going on for a long time before.
Did it ever go to war?
For the very last time, knock it off with the snide comments and insults. This is friendly warning number 2. No more…
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drgondog
Major
Nope The FIRST factory series installation was delivered with P-47D-15-RE in October of 1943. Approximately 3200 P-47B/C/D were produced prior to P-47-15-RE. If you want to mention the several P-47D-5s that I discuss below, then 412 were produced before the -5 line even bagan as a block. That was discontinued due to issues experienced during the Ferry flight to UK.
Too much to dissemble here, but:
1. P-47M/N. First YP-47M - installed R-2800-14W, then changed to turbo'd -57 version. Otherwise P-47D-27 fuselage and wing. Hot rod which went to 56th beginning late December 1944, major issues with engine harness lingering through March 1945 - and precluded full combat ops until April 1945. Combat radius same as P-47D-25 & Subs ~ 550 mi. The P-47N major distinctions were twofold - plug/insert in each wing to extend span to 42 feet from 40 feet w/squared tips. Major wing mods to install additional fuel, wider tread/stronger tires, reinforced spars and stringers. The first delivered September 1944 - First deployment April 1945.
2. The Defined AAF Combat Radius for the P-47N was 1000 mi with 550 gal internal plus 2x220gal external. It could carry more but limited to both tire integrity questions and length of takeoff run- exceeding most runways save operational bomber bases.
3. The Defined AAF Combat Radius of the P-47M was 600 mi with 370 internal plus 2x150 gal external. Very slightly less than P-47D-25 due to more fuel consumption for C series engine.
Contrary to opinion of those without technical acumen, there IS a law of diminishing returns for continuous additions of fuel - both for internal and significantly for external stores. The P-47D had the ABILITYto mount C/L plus two pylon external tanks. The result was a combination of significant drag issues due to the extenal stores as well as Induced Drag for increased weight of combined airframe and external stores. At optimal cruise settings for optimal range, the airspeed for 3 store config was 20+mph at higher angle of attack (than 2 store 150s), and 70mph below clean (except for pylons) airframe. The net result was questionable increase in combat radius but a substantial increase to hazardous take offs due to the gross weight overload. Not to mention extremely high operations cost compared to Merlin equipped P-51.
The first action to improve range via wing strengthening was the P-47D-6 and D-10-RE in delivered in July/Aug timeframe. Several 'special' D-5s were modified with attach points on the wing and plumbing - similar to P-51 type pylons and used with 165 gal Lockheed Ferry tanks in August 1943.
The first factory pylon installation was not completed until late October and reached ETO in March/April with P-47D-15-RE.
In parallel, beginning ~ December 1943, BAD1 Burtonwood began modifying C's and D's to Republic specs for wing srengthening and plumbing in attempt to accelerate wing pylon introduction into combat ops. They began dribbling into VIII FC in Febuary 1944 strengthened for up to 2x150gal tanks. Those were capable of 425 mi Combat Radius. That said, group level strength of Depot mods plus arriving P-47D-15/-16 was insufficient for a full group mission with all mission P-47s capable of Celle/Hanover. The FIRST LR escort with full P-47D-25 (with 370 vs 305 gal internal fuel) capability was a rare excursion to Leipzig on July 7, 1944.
By that time, Doolitle/Spaatz had already started conversion of the P-38J to P-51B/D and shipment to 9th and 15th AF FG's. The conversion to P-51Bs from P-47D started w/4th & 355th in February, then 352nd in April, and 359/361 in May, 1944.
For the record, what Arnold did was order the development of the sealed combat tanks by Meteriel Command in February 1942 at the end of the Fighter Conference.
Sources - Bodie, Republic P-47D and M enginering drawing packages, Freeman.
The 31st FG arrived in Britain in June 1942 where It re-equipped with Spitfire V. It learned its trade from RAF squadrons from late July, before flying its first full mission over Dieppe on 19th Aug. It was the first fighter unit in VIII Fighter Command.
The 52nd FG arrived in Britain in July/Aug 1942 and also re-equipped with Spitfire V. It also flew some operations in Aug/Sept.
Both units were withdrawn in Oct to prepare for transfer to the Med immediately following the initial Operation Torch landings.
The Eagle squadrons (71, 121 & 133) remained part of the RAF until 29 Sept 1942 when they were officially transferred to the USAAF along with their aircraft, to form the 4th FG. It began to re-equip with the P-47 in Jan 1943.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Staff Sergeant
- 1,095
- Sep 30, 2021
Spitfire,
32 III Aug 40 to May 41
229 IV Jun 41 to Feb 43
16 X Apr/May 44
471 XI Nov 42 to Feb 45
225 XIX Apr 44 to May 46
973 Total PR type (counted as fighters in official statistics)
431 FR.XIV 1 in Oct 44 then Jan to Oct 45, 1 each in Dec 45 and Feb 46
200 FR.XVIII May 45 to Mar 46
631 Total FR types
100 F-4 Dec 41 to Feb 42
20 F-4A in Mar 42
180 F-5A Jun 42 to Mar 43
200 F-5B Sep to Dec 43
136 F-6K Nov 44 to Mar 45
163 F-6D Mar to Aug 45
799 Total Recon types plus 146 or 147 P-51D accepted as such but delivered as F-6D.
Add the various conversions.
The 9th Air force says F-6 operations began in December 1943, all up 24,784 sorties, F-5 operations began in February 1944, 7,530 sorties, F-3 operations began in June 1944, 641 sorties, what the air force calls P-51 reconnaissance began in August 1944, 1,611 sorties. The 363rd Fighter Group became the 363rd Tactical Reconnaissance Group on 10 September 1944, officially converting from P-51 to F-6, first mission on 12th, 1 squadron transferred to 1st Tactical Air Force on 1 November. The 9th Reconnaissance Group (Provisional) was with the 9th Air Force 11 October to 1 November 1944, then from 21 March 1945. What the air force calls the average operative squadrons for 1944 were 0.6 F-3, 2.7 F-5, 4.4 F-6, 0.4 P-51 Reconnaissance.
The 8th Air Force used the F-5, Mosquito and Spitfire and preferred the British types.
In man hour terms in Dallas did 94 to 95% of the P-51, the rest by subcontractors, Inglewood 90 to 93%, though the P-51H was 86 to 88% until September 1945 when it was 94%
The Spitfire VIII is usually quoted as having a no reserves economic cruise range of 660 miles, but European Theatre escort fighters flew faster, its maximum weak-mixture power setting was 320 mph at 20,000 ft, consuming about 1.1 gallon per minute. Corresponding to an engine setting of 2,400 rpm, +4 lbs boost (66 gallons per hour). The RAF were allocating 23 gallons for take-off and climb to 20,000 feet, and 36 gallons for 15 minutes of combat, leaving 63 gallons for cruise. This gives an endurance of 57 minutes, or a range of 304 miles, for an escort radius of 152 miles, no reserves.
In the period 11 December 1943 to 21 February 1944 the USAAF found it took slightly over 2 months on average between a P-51B being accepted to arriving in Britain. For the P-47D from 28 January to 6 March 1944, around 40 days.
The radius of action table in Roger Freeman's Mighty Eighth War Diary for the P-47 says 280 miles with 75 gallons of external fuel (tanks arrived in July 1943), 325 miles with 108 gallons (September), 375 miles with 165 gallons (officially the 150 gallon tank, March 1944), 480 miles with 215 gallons (November 1944). When the wing shackles turned up a pair of 165 gallon external tanks pushed radius to 550 miles but made handling difficult which is why the 215 gallon tank was developed. In mid 1943 the 200 gallon ferry tank or early RAF paper tank could be half filled and used to get the fighters airborne and to near cruise altitude.
Farmingdale (RE) finished P-47B production in September 1942, switching to C, then to D in February 1943, Evansville (RA) started D production in October 1942. The P-47D-6-RE (42-74615 in July 1943) and D-4-RA (42-22664 in August 1943) came with the external tank booster pump plus provision for 75 or 150 gallon external tanks and elimination of the 200 gallon ferry tank provisions. The wing racks came with the P-47D-15-RE (42-76119 accepted on 30 November 1943) and D-15-RA (42-23143 also 30 November 1943). The early P-47 had 305 gallons of internal fuel to fight with, return home and for reserves, the P-47D-25-RE (42-26389 on 12 February 1944 but the next D-25 acceptance was on 15 March) the D-26-RA (42-28189 27 April 1944) and later 370 gallons.
Farmingdale finished D production in February 1945, M production October to December 1944, 1 N in both September and October 1944 then production from December 1944 to December 1945. Evansville switched from D to N production in July 1945, ending in September.
Thumpalumpacus
Lieutenant Colonel
My point is not about what Republic did or didn't do, but about the fact that your language (whether deliberate or not is unknown to me) was misleading. You should own that error and acknowledge the points that flow from it, rather than wave it away with "regardless".
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drgondog
Major
See below.
There were far more operational fighters in combat than the 'bomber mafia darling B-17D and E'. Fighter production exceeded bomber production.
No, accelerated - see below.
(less so in the Pacific) - Nope. Brett, then Kenney always sucked hind tit to Europe demands.
You may have missed the memo that in 1938 Roosevelt decreed specific goals of 10,000 per year aircraft production goals leading to 20,000 by 1940. I would have thought you would have known that.
In December 1939, General Emmons (more or less Arnold equal, and head of the GHQ combat arm of the AAC) wrote a memo to Arnold stating that there is no question that American bombardment units could Not defend themselves against American Pursuit units" - reference Greer, AHS- Study 89 pg 116 through 129 for complete discussion.
In April 1940 Arnold moved priority of escort fighter with 1500 mi range to top of Emmons Board recommendations. The'bomber mafia' was mis-characterized as early as 1939-1940, as believing that 'the bomber would always get through'.
No such accolytes existed after the July 24 through August 17 series of losses during Blitz Week and Ploesti and Schweinfurt/Regensburg, Eaker had, during a brief period in July, a 300 heavy bomber operational capability on a daily basis. That number to sustain (300) had already moved to require 600+ for inventory to support losses and reparirs and flight crews. If the 'bomber mafia' existed in mid 1943, the mantra moved to 'continue strategic operations with acceptable losses'. Then in June (as recited to you earlier) Lovett (also Emmons on tour for Arnold to 'look around at 8th AF ops) took Eaker's plea for P-38s and P-51B back to Arnold in July 1943. Arnold immediately responded by directing General Seville (Chief Air Defense but also controlled allocations for AAF) to re-direct 55th and 20th FG to ETO (arriving in August) and order the two 9th AF P-39 groups destined for ETO to be re-equipped wth new P-51B-1 (354th and 357th). Both left their P-39s in CONUS.
No more bomber mafia existed after August 17, 1943 - and attempted resurrection was staked after October 14 when General Emmons memo of 1939 proved all too true.
Aircraft production accelerated in late 1939, as well as pilot training, but fortunately for AAF, Brit and French orders for American fighters, trainers and light bombers accelerated in 1939 to 1940 with big orders for DB-7, Curtiss Hawk 75/81s, along with AAF orders for P-38s and P-39s and P-40s. Foreign Release Agreements morphed into Lend Lease 1941.
In September 1940 alone AAF ordered 610 more P-38s, 623 P-39s, 540 P-40s and 820 unbuilt P-47s. The REAL benefit to the AFPC commitments is that they forced combat mods for sealed tanks, armor plate, etc - payed for by AFPC and instituded in AAF purchases.
Even the Mustang received orders for 620 in 1940.
Of all the Pursuit a/c ordered between 1938 and 1941 - only the Mustang was delayed for AAF service. The very first P-47B was delivered on or about the same time as XP-51/Mustang I.
In October, MG Arnold was named Deputy Chief of Staff for Air under George Marshall CIC USA. Notably LtG General Emmons, CO GHQ, outranked Arnold but had dotted line report to Arnold.
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drgondog
Major
BEFORE Eagle squadrons became 4th FG with Spit in October 1942 the following US FGs were assigned 8th AF, in-country and flying combat missions:
1st, 14th FG (P-38) - 1st mission 2 Sep 42 and 2 Oct 42 respectively
31st FG (Spit ) - 29 Aug 42
52nd FG (Spit ) flew combat misions TDY RAF,but based in UK in July 1942
Assigned to 8th AF but no missions before 4th FG
78th, 82nd FG (P-38) assigned and based in UK
78th FG (P-38) 1 December 1942 - no combat, all P-38s and ground crews dispatched to N.Africa, pilots remained
82nd FG (P-38) 2 Oct 42 - no combat
350th FG (P-400) 1 Oct 42 - no combat (thank God)
ALL transferred November/December 1942 to N.Africa.
Your fundamental and monumental gaps in American history are disturbing. I don't recall anyone on this forum over past 17 years arguing so passionately and repetatively with so few facts to work with. I have to respect your perseverance.
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