It is amusing to see how the attitudes of the fledgling AAC, with visions of becoming a separate branch co-equal to Army and Navy, and disciples of Doughet and Mitchell were assigned the moniker of 'Bomber mafia'. It could actually be true for the Spaatz, LeMay, Emmons and Arnold leadership in 1938. At that time, there were no heavy bombers capable of bomb load/rangeand speed at 25000 feet in the world. There were no fighters on the horizon, including Spit and Hurricane andB 109 and 110 deemed capable of successul interception. Proponents and acolytes in the ranks, such as Chennault foreseeing that Pursuit aviation would grow faster than heavy bombardment techonolgies, were burned at the stake for heresy.
That said - The Spanish Civil War highlighted bomber vulnerability and the air battles in Poland and France tempered even the most ardent (Spaatz, Brett, Armstrong, Olds) to tone the religious fervor from the 'bombers will always get through' to 'most can make it if we have enough inventory for on-board firepower to take a toll of interceptors'. Unfortunately even that vision, while temporarily supported by wildly outrageous bomber gunner claims, unravelled completely during Blitz Week, Ploesti and Schweinfurt/Regensburg.
It was clear that development priorities of 1938/1940 which included computing gunsights had not availed 8th AF B-17s and B-24s with improved survivability. ONLY the 1939 Kilner-Lindberg and Emmons Board findings and objective of the "1500 mi Range Pursuit" was starting to yield external combat tanks and increased internal fuel capacity for existing Pursuit/Fighter aircraft.
Thus, the Fighter Conference in January 1942 - immediately after Pearl Harbor - when the ranges required in the PACIFIC, truly lit a fire under development of the Long Range Fighter. Only with the happy circumstance of the marriage of the Merlin 61 with Mustang I airframe, was s/e LR escort conceived as doable. Republic with P-47B/C was slow to realize the importance of wing and fuselage changes required in time to play the most important role for airpower prior to D-Day. Namely the attrition of the LW via denying sanctuary anywhere in 8th and 15th AF combat radius, whereas retreat to extent of P-47D range had led to successful rates of attrition for LW and devastating heavy bomber losses for AAF
As a postscript - Note also, that RAF never envisioned Merlin Mustang to either perform daylight escort of RAF BC or replace the Spitfire. The Mustang IMO was destined for 2 TAF, continued Army Co-operation, and perhaps medium bomber close escort - an Ace of All Trades - a s/e Swiss Army knife. DITTO for the US Army/AAF CAS Directorate mainstream, encumbered with tactical army requirements and envisioning a battlefield air superiority fighter to replace P-39 and P-40. That the USA and AAF had moved on from 'dive bombing' to glide or low level bombing enhanced the utility of P-51A replacing the A-36, followed by P-51B.
Happy accident #2 was that the base Mustang airframe design, in the case of the P-51B, could achieve the highest internal fuel fraction increase. The fuselage tank, combined with design features of pylon mouted fuel tanks originating in the A-36, combined with superior medium through high altitude performance - became the darling of the 8th and 15th AF.
And everybody (mostly) lived happily thereafter. The AAF sufficiently proved their worth to gain equal status to the Joint Chiefs table. Then the Bomber Mafia resurrected and combatted the Carrier Mafia for $$ for the rest of time. But that is another story.