If you are defending against bomber attack you are normally trying to keep fighter versus fighter engagements to a minimum, some are definitely necessary to worry the escorts but they up your casualties and it is unacceptable bomber losses that will end the campaign, a bomber is a much bigger investment in personnel and material than a fighter and a bigger threat to ground targets, so bomber first, fighter second. The attacker is trying to force the opposite, fighter first, bomber second.
Attacking the long range escorts early is one of those ideas that has significant problems, it requires earlier warning and tracking for a start. Then after the intercept the defender needs to know which bomber formations are going to be without fighter cover and be able to track and intercept them. Much simpler to delay intercept and hit part of the raid with a form of local air superiority, so there are enough interceptors to engage the escorts as well as attack the bombers, or a succession of interceptors, stripping the escorts away. The deeper into hostile airspace the combats are the fewer damaged aircraft return.
In one sense the bombers are providing escort to the escorts, by making themselves the main target but there are quite a few moves and counter moves available. If early interceptions are tried the attacker can provide escorts for the escorts in the form of shorter range airpower, or run dummy raids, where the bombers plan to turn back early. WWII proved wearing down the defences was a prerequisite for a sustained effective bombing campaign.
If the defenders have the numbers it is unlikely any bombing campaign will last, if the defenders are outnumbered then the priority will definitely be shooting down bombers, while holding down friendly losses, also opening up the second debate whether shooting down some before bombing and so usually reducing damage on the ground is better than shooting down more after bombing.
Ranges: The P-47B at 50% power used 73 gallons per hour at 16,000 feet, the P-47D combat allowance was 89 gallons, meaning 30 minutes reserves plus combat is 125 gallons, leaving 180 gallons for range. With 305 gallons on board the P-47D needed 101 gallons from warm up to 25,000 feet moving 57 miles, if it had 600 gallons on board it was 124 gallons and 81 miles. To have 180 gallons available for return requires something around 300 gallons external given the extra drag with tanks attached.
The ferry range is 650 miles on internal fuel with a 40 gallon fuel reserve running the engine at 28.5 inches 1,720 RPM
What altitude? At 15,000 feet the P-47 combat range is 190 miles, at 25,000 feet it is 170 miles, engine at 31.5 inches 2,280 RPM. What speed? The P-47B at 75% power used 123 gallons per hour. The inline engines in the table say going to 75% power cut range to 75% that of using 50% power, the P-47 is said to be around 2/3 the range. How big a formation?
Easy to see why over the Pacific running at 50% power at 15,000 feet or lower in smaller formations that could stay quite loose until around the target would routinely go 50+% further than over Europe. Before considering fighters and bombers only needed to be around each other close to target, so each could do their best cruise.
A 200 gallon external tank, say 116 gallons to 25,000 feet, covering about 73 miles, 84 gallons left, around 40 minutes at 75% power, which works out to around 300 miles out in a straight line, start using main tanks, this enables the P-47 to get to around 380 miles before returning. The fighter pilots wave at the bombers as they pass them inbound and again outbound. If the fighters weave to stay all the way with the bombers moving around 80% the speed, then 380 miles becomes 305 miles radius with combat. 375 miles is just short of Hamburg, and just to Kassel and Frankfurt.
The above has used figures from the P-47B and D, so not entirely consistent. The fighter range chart in many publications gives the P-47 combat radius as 375 miles in August 1943, which would be with the 108 gallon external tank, according to the 8th Air Force that is the correct radius for a mission at 10,000 feet, at height the external fuel required was 150 gallons, add another 50 gallons for say another 70 miles radius. Regardless the combat radius figures being given are for a single aircraft flying straight line at faster cruise, not weaving or having to keep formation.
P-47 escort fighter accompanying B-17 at 185 mph IAS (266 mph TAS at 20,000 feet, the 8th AF heavies were not as fast, more like 230 to 240 mph TAS) Full power (max continuous) climbing to 25,000 feet Cruise at 210 mph IAS, 300 mph TAS, Tanks dropped when empty or at radius 15 minutes combat at military power 5 minutes combat at war emergency power. Return to base at required cruising speed accompanying bombers, 30 minutes fuel reserve
Internal, external fuel, combat radius, note, Helps show external tank drag, 65 more gallons internal = 75 gallons external.
305, 0, 150
305, 75, 250
305, 108, 300
305, 300, 450 65 gallons dropped
370, 0, 250
370, 75, 350
370, 108, 400
370, 300, 625
The early P-38 used wing leading edge volume for cooling, bigger radiators allowed the volume to become fuel, the P-51 had a void area behind the cockpit, adding some weight there actually helped counter balance the heavier engine, the P-47 required major changes to the fuselage and ultimately the wing to carry more internal fuel.
In December 1943, British Ministry of Aircraft Production. External fuel tank production for P-47. No figures available before December.
Actual, Program, type
5,943, 5,000, 90 Imperial/108 US Gallon, Paper composition
3,095, 2,000, 90 Imperial/108 US Gallon, Metal composition
First production of 150 US Gallon Metal composition tanks in February 1944.
"P-47 was prevented from bomber escort by Deceipt and Treachery in 1943" I translate that title as another the good guys are so good they cannot make big errors or be defeated, they can only be betrayed from within. The rest of humanity generally requires good guy help to begin to bang rocks together.
By definition as not all US fighter sorties were bomber support the USAAF could have done more escorting in 1943, the same could be said of the RAF. The USAAF could also have done more bombing of Germany, to end October 1943 such attacks were under half of all sorties, there had been around 100 more bombers attacking targets in France, but of 740 bombers MIA 507 had been from missions to Germany, 209 from missions to France. The 8th Air Force reports its fighters did not start what it called heavy bomber support until April 1943, then managed 8,470 support sorties, plus 7,331 other fighter sorties to over 10,000 heavy bomber sorties (9,974 attacking/4,966 on Germany) April to October 1943. The RAF ran regular insertion and withdrawal cover sorties.
In 1942/43 the 8th Air Force was tasked with proving bombing could seriously disrupt an enemy economy by accurately hitting key targets, as much of US air strategy and effort was being geared to the idea, to do that it needed to fly to Germany. To do that meant flying beyond escort range (the P-38 of the time had 300 gallons internal and had higher fuel consumption than the P-47, so its effective combat radius was less, but it could carry more external fuel and so enter combat with full tanks). The leadership kept to the 1942 plan that enough numbers would compensate for lack of escorts over Germany, even as they worked to obtain external tanks from both the US and Britain, even as the loss figures kept generally trending up over Germany and even as the defences were being strengthened. Part of the tactics were due to the idea the German fighter defences were "coastal", not in depth, hence fighter sweeps as well as escorted missions to France. Known facts like the use of Luftwaffe night fighters to oppose day raids pointed to a defence under strain, ideas of Luftwaffe losses pointed to the defences heading towards a breaking point.
Of the 109 raid days/nights 17 August 1942 to 24 October 1943, exactly half the 740 bombers reported missing were on 11 days, and yes not all the raids had escorts all the way to target, 3 P-47 groups operational as of 13 April 1943, 4 operational as of 12 August, 5 as of 9 September, 6 as of 14 September, then 7 P-47 and 1 P-38 group operational as of 15 October. As of 15 June there were 164 serviceable P-47, up to 200 on 27 July, 238 on 10 August, 195 on 17 August, 278 on 7 September, 390 on 8 October, then 432 P-47 plus 57 P-38 on 15 October. June to October the 8th Air Force generally had 1 serviceable fighter per 2 bombers, and that was with the B-24 groups being away for most of the time. As of 31 December, 83 P-38, 584 P-47 and 52 P-51 to 700 bombers.
On 13-Jun-43 there were 26 MIA, raids on Bremen/Kiel, no US escorts
On 22-Jun-43 there were 20 MIA, raids on Huls/Antwerp, 137 US escorts to Antwerp, 7 enemy aircraft claimed destroyed
On 26-Jul-43 there were 24 MIA, raids on Hannover/Hamburg/Convoy off Germany, no US escorts
On 28-Jul-43 there were 22 MIA, raids on Kassel/Oschersleben, 123 US escorts, 9 enemy aircraft claimed destroyed
On 12-Aug-43 there were 25 MIA, raids on Bochum/Recklinghausen/Gelsenkirchen/Bonn, 131 US escorts, 2 enemy aircraft claimed destroyed
On 17-Aug-43 there were 60 MIA, raids on Schweinfurt/Regensburg, 240 US escorts, plan disrupted by fog, 19 enemy aircraft claimed destroyed
On 06-Sep-43 there were 45 MIA, raids on Stuttgart etc., badly disrupted by weather, many B-17 ran out of fuel, 176 US escorts, 1 enemy aircraft claimed destroyed
On 08-Oct-43 there were 30 MIA, raids on Bremen/Vegesack, 274 US escorts, 12 enemy aircraft claimed destroyed
On 09-Oct-43 there were 28 MIA, raids on Anklam/Marienburg/Danzig/Gdynia, 153 US escorts
On 10-Oct-43 there were 30 MIA, raids on Munster, 216 US escorts, 19 enemy aircraft claimed destroyed
On 14-Oct-43 there were 60 MIA, raids on Schweinfurt, 196 US escorts, 13 enemy aircraft claimed destroyed
A significant reason USAAF bomber losses declined in November and December 1943 was much more non visual bombing, and Germany always had the highest percentage of non visual bombing (72% in November, 70% in December). Essen had been attacked on 27 September using H2S and again on 2 October, while Duren was attacked on 20 October using Oboe, otherwise to end October it was all visual attacks, good weather also helping interceptors
