The Great P-47 Range Debate on you tube now.

[33k in the air]

The attached spreadsheet highlights longest combat engagements flown for 56FG with each of the tank combinations. Missions identified with 8th AF Victory Credits Board June 1945 but Kent Miller's Pilots and Units of 8th AF Fighter command pretty well matches the VC Board data.

Thanks for posting that, it's a great resource. I do have a couple of quick questions about it.

(1) In some of the entries in the fourth column, the distance value is followed by letters in parentheses, e.g. HA, SM, etc. What do these letter combinations mean?

(2) In some cells the entry is followed by asterisks, e.g. in row 21, in the fourth column, it says 286** (SM)..To what do the asterisks refer?

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

If you are defending against bomber attack you are normally trying to keep fighter versus fighter engagements to a minimum, some are definitely necessary to worry the escorts but they up your casualties and it is unacceptable bomber losses that will end the campaign, a bomber is a much bigger investment in personnel and material than a fighter and a bigger threat to ground targets, so bomber first, fighter second. The attacker is trying to force the opposite, fighter first, bomber second.

Attacking the long range escorts early is one of those ideas that has significant problems, it requires earlier warning and tracking for a start. Then after the intercept the defender needs to know which bomber formations are going to be without fighter cover and be able to track and intercept them. Much simpler to delay intercept and hit part of the raid with a form of local air superiority, so there are enough interceptors to engage the escorts as well as attack the bombers, or a succession of interceptors, stripping the escorts away. The deeper into hostile airspace the combats are the fewer damaged aircraft return.

In one sense the bombers are providing escort to the escorts, by making themselves the main target but there are quite a few moves and counter moves available. If early interceptions are tried the attacker can provide escorts for the escorts in the form of shorter range airpower, or run dummy raids, where the bombers plan to turn back early. WWII proved wearing down the defences was a prerequisite for a sustained effective bombing campaign.

If the defenders have the numbers it is unlikely any bombing campaign will last, if the defenders are outnumbered then the priority will definitely be shooting down bombers, while holding down friendly losses, also opening up the second debate whether shooting down some before bombing and so usually reducing damage on the ground is better than shooting down more after bombing.

Ranges: The P-47B at 50% power used 73 gallons per hour at 16,000 feet, the P-47D combat allowance was 89 gallons, meaning 30 minutes reserves plus combat is 125 gallons, leaving 180 gallons for range. With 305 gallons on board the P-47D needed 101 gallons from warm up to 25,000 feet moving 57 miles, if it had 600 gallons on board it was 124 gallons and 81 miles. To have 180 gallons available for return requires something around 300 gallons external given the extra drag with tanks attached.

The ferry range is 650 miles on internal fuel with a 40 gallon fuel reserve running the engine at 28.5 inches 1,720 RPM

What altitude? At 15,000 feet the P-47 combat range is 190 miles, at 25,000 feet it is 170 miles, engine at 31.5 inches 2,280 RPM. What speed? The P-47B at 75% power used 123 gallons per hour. The inline engines in the table say going to 75% power cut range to 75% that of using 50% power, the P-47 is said to be around 2/3 the range. How big a formation?

Easy to see why over the Pacific running at 50% power at 15,000 feet or lower in smaller formations that could stay quite loose until around the target would routinely go 50+% further than over Europe. Before considering fighters and bombers only needed to be around each other close to target, so each could do their best cruise.

A 200 gallon external tank, say 116 gallons to 25,000 feet, covering about 73 miles, 84 gallons left, around 40 minutes at 75% power, which works out to around 300 miles out in a straight line, start using main tanks, this enables the P-47 to get to around 380 miles before returning. The fighter pilots wave at the bombers as they pass them inbound and again outbound. If the fighters weave to stay all the way with the bombers moving around 80% the speed, then 380 miles becomes 305 miles radius with combat. 375 miles is just short of Hamburg, and just to Kassel and Frankfurt.

The above has used figures from the P-47B and D, so not entirely consistent. The fighter range chart in many publications gives the P-47 combat radius as 375 miles in August 1943, which would be with the 108 gallon external tank, according to the 8th Air Force that is the correct radius for a mission at 10,000 feet, at height the external fuel required was 150 gallons, add another 50 gallons for say another 70 miles radius. Regardless the combat radius figures being given are for a single aircraft flying straight line at faster cruise, not weaving or having to keep formation.

P-47 escort fighter accompanying B-17 at 185 mph IAS (266 mph TAS at 20,000 feet, the 8th AF heavies were not as fast, more like 230 to 240 mph TAS) Full power (max continuous) climbing to 25,000 feet Cruise at 210 mph IAS, 300 mph TAS, Tanks dropped when empty or at radius 15 minutes combat at military power 5 minutes combat at war emergency power. Return to base at required cruising speed accompanying bombers, 30 minutes fuel reserve
Internal, external fuel, combat radius, note, Helps show external tank drag, 65 more gallons internal = 75 gallons external.
305, 0, 150
305, 75, 250
305, 108, 300
305, 300, 450 65 gallons dropped
370, 0, 250
370, 75, 350
370, 108, 400
370, 300, 625

The early P-38 used wing leading edge volume for cooling, bigger radiators allowed the volume to become fuel, the P-51 had a void area behind the cockpit, adding some weight there actually helped counter balance the heavier engine, the P-47 required major changes to the fuselage and ultimately the wing to carry more internal fuel.

In December 1943, British Ministry of Aircraft Production. External fuel tank production for P-47. No figures available before December.
Actual, Program, type
5,943, 5,000, 90 Imperial/108 US Gallon, Paper composition
3,095, 2,000, 90 Imperial/108 US Gallon, Metal composition
First production of 150 US Gallon Metal composition tanks in February 1944.

"P-47 was prevented from bomber escort by Deceipt and Treachery in 1943" I translate that title as another the good guys are so good they cannot make big errors or be defeated, they can only be betrayed from within. The rest of humanity generally requires good guy help to begin to bang rocks together.

By definition as not all US fighter sorties were bomber support the USAAF could have done more escorting in 1943, the same could be said of the RAF. The USAAF could also have done more bombing of Germany, to end October 1943 such attacks were under half of all sorties, there had been around 100 more bombers attacking targets in France, but of 740 bombers MIA 507 had been from missions to Germany, 209 from missions to France. The 8th Air Force reports its fighters did not start what it called heavy bomber support until April 1943, then managed 8,470 support sorties, plus 7,331 other fighter sorties to over 10,000 heavy bomber sorties (9,974 attacking/4,966 on Germany) April to October 1943. The RAF ran regular insertion and withdrawal cover sorties.

In 1942/43 the 8th Air Force was tasked with proving bombing could seriously disrupt an enemy economy by accurately hitting key targets, as much of US air strategy and effort was being geared to the idea, to do that it needed to fly to Germany. To do that meant flying beyond escort range (the P-38 of the time had 300 gallons internal and had higher fuel consumption than the P-47, so its effective combat radius was less, but it could carry more external fuel and so enter combat with full tanks). The leadership kept to the 1942 plan that enough numbers would compensate for lack of escorts over Germany, even as they worked to obtain external tanks from both the US and Britain, even as the loss figures kept generally trending up over Germany and even as the defences were being strengthened. Part of the tactics were due to the idea the German fighter defences were "coastal", not in depth, hence fighter sweeps as well as escorted missions to France. Known facts like the use of Luftwaffe night fighters to oppose day raids pointed to a defence under strain, ideas of Luftwaffe losses pointed to the defences heading towards a breaking point.

Of the 109 raid days/nights 17 August 1942 to 24 October 1943, exactly half the 740 bombers reported missing were on 11 days, and yes not all the raids had escorts all the way to target, 3 P-47 groups operational as of 13 April 1943, 4 operational as of 12 August, 5 as of 9 September, 6 as of 14 September, then 7 P-47 and 1 P-38 group operational as of 15 October. As of 15 June there were 164 serviceable P-47, up to 200 on 27 July, 238 on 10 August, 195 on 17 August, 278 on 7 September, 390 on 8 October, then 432 P-47 plus 57 P-38 on 15 October. June to October the 8th Air Force generally had 1 serviceable fighter per 2 bombers, and that was with the B-24 groups being away for most of the time. As of 31 December, 83 P-38, 584 P-47 and 52 P-51 to 700 bombers.

On 13-Jun-43 there were 26 MIA, raids on Bremen/Kiel, no US escorts
On 22-Jun-43 there were 20 MIA, raids on Huls/Antwerp, 137 US escorts to Antwerp, 7 enemy aircraft claimed destroyed
On 26-Jul-43 there were 24 MIA, raids on Hannover/Hamburg/Convoy off Germany, no US escorts
On 28-Jul-43 there were 22 MIA, raids on Kassel/Oschersleben, 123 US escorts, 9 enemy aircraft claimed destroyed
On 12-Aug-43 there were 25 MIA, raids on Bochum/Recklinghausen/Gelsenkirchen/Bonn, 131 US escorts, 2 enemy aircraft claimed destroyed
On 17-Aug-43 there were 60 MIA, raids on Schweinfurt/Regensburg, 240 US escorts, plan disrupted by fog, 19 enemy aircraft claimed destroyed
On 06-Sep-43 there were 45 MIA, raids on Stuttgart etc., badly disrupted by weather, many B-17 ran out of fuel, 176 US escorts, 1 enemy aircraft claimed destroyed
On 08-Oct-43 there were 30 MIA, raids on Bremen/Vegesack, 274 US escorts, 12 enemy aircraft claimed destroyed
On 09-Oct-43 there were 28 MIA, raids on Anklam/Marienburg/Danzig/Gdynia, 153 US escorts
On 10-Oct-43 there were 30 MIA, raids on Munster, 216 US escorts, 19 enemy aircraft claimed destroyed
On 14-Oct-43 there were 60 MIA, raids on Schweinfurt, 196 US escorts, 13 enemy aircraft claimed destroyed

A significant reason USAAF bomber losses declined in November and December 1943 was much more non visual bombing, and Germany always had the highest percentage of non visual bombing (72% in November, 70% in December). Essen had been attacked on 27 September using H2S and again on 2 October, while Duren was attacked on 20 October using Oboe, otherwise to end October it was all visual attacks, good weather also helping interceptors

 

[drgondog]

Thanks for posting that, it's a great resource. I do have a couple of quick questions about it.

(1) In some of the entries in the fourth column, the distance value is followed by letters in parentheses, e.g. HA, SM, etc. What do these letter combinations mean?

(2) In some cells the entry is followed by asterisks, e.g. in row 21, in the fourth column, it says 286** (SM)..To what do the asterisks refer?

HA=Hlesworth. SM-Steeple Morden BO= Boxted.

286** (SM) refers to target distance from Steeple Morden to Duren - in which 3 ships ran out of fuel, compared to sam target from Halesworth for 56th FG of 238mi (fromHA) with same 108gal C/L tank.

I used the 56th FG because it had base on coast and had shortest range to common targets.. therefore theoretically reach farther targets for a fight to make point of 'best actual expectation of target city of fight location achieved'.

 

[tomo pauk]

What I don't understand is how a fighter escort can get the maximum fuel use out of a drop tank to achieve the range needed for deep penetration escort, given the tank would have to be dropped when contact with enemy fighters were incurred.

This would usually happen on the Enemy coast, after a mere 150 miles if flying over the Netherlands for more southerly targets, but more useful if flying over Hamburg or Denmark for more Northern targets.

Meeting the escorts 150 miles away from the UK was something that LW avoided like a plague come mid-1943, since this means they need to deal with Spifires escorting the bombers, and later with P-47s - not a good idea due to the LW being out-numbered, and with 4-mots gainng a free pass if the escorts are engaging the LW that early. It also means that LW fighters will land to re-arm and re-fuel while under the threat of low-altitude fighters (Typhoon, later Tempest, plus LV SPitfires), and also surrendering the altitude and speed advantage to the escorts.

LW was trying to hit the bombers at double that distance instead - hence the need for the long range escort.

I can see the tank(s) being dropped with a lot of fuel still in them or the poor P-47 / P-51 has to run the danger of being jumped by an enemy fighter while carry this extra weight and drag.

'Poor' was not an adjective for P-47s nor for the P-51s - every mile the air combat is closer to the UK, it is ever better for the Allies. Both RAF and USAAF would've eagerly accepted the LW giving fight 150 miles away from the UK, since that means they can focus all of their fighters (both LR and SR types) to the fight. 100 miles away - even better; granted, LW was not that stupid.

Also note that USAAF and RAF were providing the staging of the escort, with one part of fighters covering the 1st 200-300 miles (depending what was available), then the 'target' (long-range, mostly the USAAF's job) escorts taking over, and the 3rd part of the escorts taking over the returning bomber stream 200-300 miles away from the UK. This is for 1944, when really long-range fighters were being available in numbers.

 

[pbehn]

'Poor' was not an adjective for P-47s nor for the P-51s - every mile the air combat is closer to the UK, it is ever better for the Allies. Both RAF and USAAF would've eagerly accepted the LW giving fight 150 miles away from the UK, since that means they can focus all of their fighters (both LR and SR types) to the fight. 100 miles away - even better; granted, LW was not that stupid.

It seems like a great idea at first to meet any raid as soon as possible to make escorts drop tanks, but range was also important for interceptors. With the short rang of the Bf 109 and Fw190 the LW would need astronomical numbers of aircraft and pilots to defend all its territories. To "just" defend Germany itself and meet any raid with several hundred fighters also required thousands of planes and pilots to cover all possible routes across the coast, through Benelux and France.

 

[CurlyWurly]

Meeting the escorts 150 miles away from the UK was something that LW avoided like a plague come mid-1943, since this means they need to deal with Spifires escorting the bombers, and later with P-47s - not a good idea due to the LW being out-numbered, and with 4-mots gainng a free pass if the escorts are engaging the LW that early. It also means that LW fighters will land to re-arm and re-fuel while under the threat of low-altitude fighters (Typhoon, later Tempest, plus LV SPitfires), and also surrendering the altitude and speed advantage to the escorts.

LW was trying to hit the bombers at double that distance instead - hence the need for the long range escort.



'Poor' was not an adjective for P-47s nor for the P-51s - every mile the air combat is closer to the UK, it is ever better for the Allies. Both RAF and USAAF would've eagerly accepted the LW giving fight 150 miles away from the UK, since that means they can focus all of their fighters (both LR and SR types) to the fight. 100 miles away - even better; granted, LW was not that stupid.

Also note that USAAF and RAF were providing the staging of the escort, with one part of fighters covering the 1st 200-300 miles (depending what was available), then the 'target' (long-range, mostly the USAAF's job) escorts taking over, and the 3rd part of the escorts taking over the returning bomber stream 200-300 miles away from the UK. This is for 1944, when really long-range fighters were being available in numbers.

Good point on the shorter range interceptors being in on the act over the Enemy coast.

I have read of many intercepts near the coast, did the Germans concede these area around the turn of 43/44. I've looked at the 8th AF's missions after 2nd Schweinfurt in October 43, I think Munster was the furthest penetration after that before long range escort was sorted out.

While I've not seen detailed accounts of how P-51 flew escort missions, I wonder if some from the first relay were told to hang back from initial German intercepts nearer the coast, to see the bombers further on into the mission, with the later relays taking over as was part of the process of pushing back the Luftwaffe from the coast to gain air supremacy.

"Poor" wasn't meant to be a description of the P-47 & P-51 overall, but just when handicapped performance-wise with the bulky drop tanks. Were these aircraft sitting ducks if an FW-190 jumped them while lumbered with the drop tanks.

 

[tomo pauk]

I have read of many intercepts near the coast, did the Germans concede these area around the turn of 43/44. I've looked at the 8th AF's missions after 2nd Schweinfurt in October 43, I think Munster was the furthest penetration after that before long range escort was sorted out.

LW was probably trying to relocate a tad East by mid 1943?
RAF was providing the escort with Spitfires, so there is a 'wisdom' in saving the strength of the LW bomber killers, both 1-engined and 2-engined, in order for these to try and do their job unhindered by the escorts. Then we have the advent of P-47s, 1st without drop tanks, and later (early Autumn of 1943) with drop tanks, that were very valuable despite the small size (75, and then 108 US gals).

While I've not seen detailed accounts of how P-51 flew escort missions, I wonder if some from the first relay were told to hang back from initial German intercepts nearer the coast, to see the bombers further on into the mission, with the later relays taking over as was part of the process of pushing back the Luftwaffe from the coast to gain air supremacy.

In early 1944, when the P-51 escorts became a thing in the ETO, the 1st relays were done by P-47s (plus again Spitfires), since there was some 600-700 of them vs. under 100 of P-51s and a similar number of P-38s. P-47s were also covering the home-bound leg.
Once there were hundreds of P-51s, it was easier to spare them for tasks other than LR escort.

Gaining the air supremacy meant destroying Luftwaffe, just pushing them into Germany proper will not cut it for that to be attained.

"Poor" wasn't meant to be a description of the P-47 & P-51 overall, but just when handicapped performance-wise with the bulky drop tanks. Were these aircraft sitting ducks if an FW-190 jumped them while lumbered with the drop tanks.

Drop tanks have a good feature in the ability to be dropped on short notice.
Fw 190 was not that good at jumping at the P-47s and Merlin Mustangs cruising at 300+mph and above 25000 ft, since the 190s were in disadvantage at high altitudes due to the engine having an obsolete S/C.

 

[drgondog]

Geoffrey Sinclair summarized 1942/1943 operations and strategy very well.

The only point I would add is that when citations of number of escorts dispatched are made, mental context should modify the statistic to "X number of fighters escorted to and from the German/Netherlands border - or frequently only halfway to the target. In the case of the Schweinfurt nissions - only to shallow Germany, 200mi short.

When the P-38 was re-introduced in October 1943 they could provide target escort near Bremen, and Frankfort - but even then there were gaps between Penetration escort by P-47s and R/V of bombers by P-38s near the target. Ditto for the return.

Only introduction of P-51B and P-38J with increased internal fuel permitted planning for 'potentially' seamless Relay escort -

Mental gymnastics for late 1943/early 1944 include remembering that endurance 'to the limit of endurance' for P-47D was ~ 3hrs, P-38 4hrs and P-51 5hrs. After internal fuel mods were applied Feb 1944 thru D-Day, P-47D (no added internal fuel, but wing racks added in March (w2x108gal tanks) 3 1/2 hrs, P-38 5 1/2 hrs (w2x165gal tanks), P51 7hrs (w/2x75gal tanks)

 

[Holtzauge]

I have watched most parts of Greg's video now and about 52:10 into the video this is what I hear:

"Bomber mafia derailed attempts to put fuel tanks on escorts"

"They were so convinced in their belief that bombers did not need escorts that they derailed attempts to add drop tanks"

"Clung to these beliefs during 1942 and most of 1943"

"Even trying to use other bombers as bomber protection rather than supply drop tanks"

But what I don't get here is if the USAAF leadership truly believed that escorts were not needed, then why are the B-17 raids over the European continent done in 1942 and 1943 that were within the range of the escorts (with no drop tanks) escorted by Spitfires and P-47s?

If the "Bomber mafia" were so convinced that escorts were not needed, then why use escorts in these shorter range missions but then suddenly decide that they were not needed for longer range missions when drop tank were needed? Isn't that rather odd?

Because the B-17's were escorted in 1942 and 1943 when the fighters had the range without drop tanks but then they were not when the range was larger and drop tanks would be needed.

So if they really had the ability to add the 200 G drop tank to the P-47's for the Schweinfurt raid and did not do it, this begs the question of why they were using P-47's to escort without drop tanks earlier on when the bomber's mission was within range?

This point in the video seems rather contradictory to me and rather like a strong point for Bill's argument that the P-47 simply could not carry a suitable drop tank at the time.

Or am I missing something here?

 

[ggiumarra]

But what I don't get here is if the USAAF leadership truly believed that escorts were not needed, then why are the B-17 raids over the European continent done in 1942 and 1943 that were within the range of the escorts (with no drop tanks) escorted by Spitfires and P-47s?

If the "Bomber mafia" were so convinced that escorts were not needed, then why use escorts in these shorter range missions but then suddenly decide that they were not needed for longer range missions when drop tank were needed? Isn't that rather odd?

I recall that Eaker was of the opinion that a minimum of 300 bombers on a mission were required to make them self-protecting and that most if not all of these earlier raids I believe (but am not 100% sure) fell below that threshold.

So if they really had the ability to add the 200 G drop tank to the P-47's for the Schweinfurt raid and did not do it, this begs the question of why they were using P-47's to escort without drop tanks earlier on when the bomber's mission was within range?

Well, Eaker had been given the fighters, was he supposed to leave them unused? I strongly suspect in any event that by late 1943 he was talking out of both sides of his mouth in order to curry favor with Arnold something presumably any subordinate leader would be cognizant of from the moment their superior appoints them to a position of responsibility.

FWIW: though I think the USAAF was collectively culpable for not developing a long-range escort fighter sooner, I'm not convinced that Arnold was the chief culprit. I put the blame more on Echols and Eaker, with Arnold's sins being more of the omission variety. Those are my provisional conclusions since I would like to like a lot more evidence before crying "deceit and treachery". Just because certain evidence is consistent with a particular conclusion doesn't make it conclusive.

Just to be devil's advocate: the upper brass of the AAF, like Arnold, may have considered they had their long-range solution, should one be needed, in the P-38 so were complacent in pushing the range attribute in other fighters not considering that the P-38 would be in such short supply for so long and then might have such mechanical problems when finally given the role of long-range escort in NW Europe. That complacency may have been magnified by the hope that once the "critical mass" of bombers was reached, as I referred to above, fighter escort might indeed be superfluous. That doesn't relieve all culpability but perhaps casts it in another light.

I am also of the belief that if there are two possible explanations for a phenomenon, conspiracy and incompetence, that the the true cause usually lies in the latter.

 

[CurlyWurly]

I recall that Eaker was of the opinion that a minimum of 300 bombers on a mission were required to make them self-protecting and that most if not all of these earlier raids I believe (but am not 100% sure) fell below that threshold.

Looking at missions carried out by the 8th AF, by the end of 1943 they often had more than 500 bombers in the air, but would have them splitting up and attacking 3 different targets. Some inconsistent thinking going on there.

 

[special ed]

We are looking at the wrong time line. In the 1930s through mid 1941, the U.S. was concerned with protecting our borders. An enemy had to come across an ocean to attack us. Therefore, interceptors were what we needed, not the idea of "long range escorts". The purpose of the XP-38 and XP-39 were to be the high altitude interceptors. Long range was not thought needed as they could land and refuel if more intercepts were needed. Remember, junior officer LeMay 's B-17 intercepts, at low altitude, of the Italian liner, to the consternation of the USN. An enemy would have to come to us, so there was no thought of "long range escorts" needed. No need of massed bomber formations attacking another continent. That idea changed 7 DEC 41.

 

[CurlyWurly]

We are looking at the wrong time line. In the 1930s through mid 1941, the U.S. was concerned with protecting our borders. An enemy had to come across an ocean to attack us. Therefore, interceptors were what we needed, not the idea of "long range escorts". The purpose of the XP-38 and XP-39 were to be the high altitude interceptors. Long range was not thought needed as they could land and refuel if more intercepts were needed. Remember, junior officer LeMay 's B-17 intercepts, at low altitude, of the Italian liner, to the consternation of the USN. An enemy would have to come to us, so there was no thought of "long range escorts" needed. No need of massed bomber formations attacking another continent. That idea changed 7 DEC 41.

That was the problem, the idea really should have changed September 1939 if not earlier, given past history with the European Axis powers and Japanese expansionism in China.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I am also of the belief that if there are two possible explanations for a phenomenon, conspiracy and incompetence, that the the true cause usually lies in the latter.

Hanlon's Razor kicks ass.

 

[special ed]

Half, or more, of the U.S. citizens were of the idea that if the Europeans wanted to fight, let 'em. The Chinese and Japanese have been fighting for centuries, let 'em, and we will keep out sitting safely behind our oceans.

 

[CurlyWurly]

Half, or more, of the U.S. citizens were of the idea that if the Europeans wanted to fight, let 'em. The Chinese and Japanese have been fighting for centuries, let 'em, and we will keep out sitting safely behind our oceans.

Pubic opinion shouldn't dictate military preparedness, capability, strategy and tactics.

 

[special ed]

Agree, but in the U.S. depression years, the Army used trucks to represent tanks in training as well as wooden dummy rifles. There wasn't money for adequate preparedness.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Pubic opinion shouldn't dictate military preparedness, capability, strategy and tactics.

Because our Constitution places the military under civilian control and names the President as Commander-in-Chief, public opinion is an ineluctable factor in military considerations.

 

[33k in the air]

Half, or more, of the U.S. citizens were of the idea that if the Europeans wanted to fight, let 'em. The Chinese and Japanese have been fighting for centuries, let 'em, and we will keep out sitting safely behind our oceans.

That may have been the case in 1939, but by mid-1941 public opinion had changed considerably. By that time, the majority of Americans were in favor of increased defense spending, aiding Britain more directly even if such efforts risked war with Germany, and fully expected that the U.S. would at some point enter the war. By November 1941, with the heightened tensions with Japan, a majority of the American public felt that war with Japan was likely in the near future.

 

[CurlyWurly]

That may have been the case in 1939, but by mid-1941 public opinion had changed considerably. By that time, the majority of Americans were in favor of increased defense spending, aiding Britain more directly even if such efforts risked war with Germany, and fully expected that the U.S. would at some point enter the war. By November 1941, with the heightened tensions with Japan, a majority of the American public felt that war with Japan was likely in the near future.

We are not really talking spending large amounts of money or getting into the war before being attacked or declared war on. Just a bit of strategic thinking and having things like drop tanks worked out or 20mm cannons for fighters etc.

Some thinking along those lines in 1939 could have saved the 8th Airforce from the bloodbath of 1943 rather than learning on the job.

More guns on the B-17s and B-24 was the wrong solution.