I certainly agree with you but I am talking about aircraft such as the He 177.
Kurfurst said:
Agreed
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??? Udet was basically the Luftwaffe`s greatest 'fan' of dive bombers (which wasn`t a bad idea at all, it gave the LW it`s most iconic, and very successfull Ju 87 I might add), an idea he embraced after a visit to the US. So overall I believe with Udet at the steering wheel, such operational requirements would only receive encouregment from the high brass.
Kurfurst said:I agree. Basically what the Germans would need is a good deal of foresight and predict what was coming to them in 1944 (easy to say..); perhaps if they`d gave high priority for fighter production and prepeare for stragetic air defense in early 1943, thing would have been somewhat different in the air. But the war was lost on the ground, not in the air.
The reason the He 177 failed is because it was designed to be a dive bomber.
Ernst Hienkel said himself that all the Greifs problems were the dive bombing requirement and blamed Udet for it.
Hitler was not the type to be persuaded! Some Luftwaffe pilots wanted an attack on London because it would draw up the Raf.
How much did Goering do day to day in the Luftwaffe? not much I wager!
The dive bombing was an extra requirement on top of its regular duty as a level bomber.The reason the He 177 failed is because it was designed to be a dive bomber.
Yes but one of the reasons that they did not want Heinkel to develop it with 4 engines in 4 nacelleswas because they did not believe it could dive bomb with 4 engines in 4 nacelles.
At least that is one of things I have allways read about the He 177.
You are absolutely correct, however I firmly believe that someone who might not have been such a lackey to Hitler might have tried to convince Hitler to do things differently.
You know, upon more thought I think you may have been right, another commander could have won the BoB, IF they had a good plan on how to do it. I don't know enough about Udet, Kesselring or others, to know how they would have handled it.
The problem the Germans had in the BoB is that this was all new territory, I think it might be difficult for ANYONE to correctly determine the best strategy. They were also against some tight time constraints, as after "Alder Tag" (Eagle day - Aug 13) they would have only 40 - 50 days before the Autumn storms would make a channel crossing impossible. The Germans would try something for a few days, if it did not seem to be working, they could not keep trying for a few weeks, they would try something else.
At first they tried bombing the Radar towers, but after several days this did not seem to have an effect, the RAF were still scrambling to meet the LW. What the Goering did not know was that they HAD knocked out part of the radar net, but the British had developed a system of coast-watchers, who would call in the # and type of LW planes that crossed the channel, so they still had some advanced warning.
Next he concentrated on knocking the S.E. airfields out of action, this did have some effect, although they could not know exactly how much, as the RAF would still intercept the bombers. The Germans were losing a large # of bombers, so Goering ordered the fighters to concentrate on escorting the bombers more closely. This turned out to be an error, the LW fighters were more effective when intercepting RAF fighters, not tied down with escort duties. But it would be hard not to make the order that he did, considering that the bomber pilots were crying out for more support.
The Sept 6 order to let up on the airfields and begin the "Blitz" was another big mistake, but at the time it was hoped that the terror would make the Brits "come to their senses" and negotiate a truce. That was what Hitler would really prefer.
The biggest error though was the 28 days that were allowed to pass from Hitlers War Directive # 16 on July 16 1940, (desruction of the RAF to prepare for Sealion) and "Alder Tag". During this time the LW only made some minor attacks on British shipping in the channel, and allowed the RAF Fighter Command to build up again after Dunkirk. If the Germans had attacked the RAF during this month, they could probably have won contol over SE Britain.
The British fighter strength at the time of the final British evacuation from France (June 18 1940) was about 300, of which about 260 were Spitfires Hurricanes. (about 40 more were the obsolete Gladiators Defiants). There were also about 70 night fighters (Blenhiem Is). The British production was about 250 fighters per month, so by Aug 13 (Alder Tag) there were about 650 - 700 day-fighters, + about 80 or so Blenheims. I have checked 3 sources and none of them agree about the exact number of RAF fighters, if anyone else has more detailed #s please post them.
I think that an immediate attack on the RAF at the end of June would have had the best chance of success.
I agree with that, there were bad political decisions made by both sides. I think Pearl Harbour could be considered as one. The Greek intervention by the British was another.I am certainly not saying Udet would have done any better but they needed a Military Commander and not a Politician in the position.
I agree with that, there were bad political decisions made by both sides. I think Pearl Harbour could be considered as one. The Greek intervention by the British was another.
During July 1940 Hitler was really trying to sign an armistice with the British, he knew that the KM was not prepared for a cross-channel invasion. But this delay killed their chance to invade.
A significant difference i see occurring with Richtofen at the controls is that that the bulk of the Jagdwaffe would instead have been committed to support the Wehrmacht and not to intercept/attack the numerous USAAF heavy bomber streams.
Saving the lives of innocent German civilians that would get killed by the thousands by enemy bombers was a noble plausible task for sure, but in my view it was not there where the war priorities were...the civilian population of the time was extremely resilient and there is no evidence to suggest any sort of civilian uprising came close to occur due to extenuation during those dark days of 1944 and 1945 when the heavies of both Spaatz and "Civilian Bomber" Harris gutted some major German cities.
From this idea i´d expect a response in the direction that might suggest if the large number of B-17s and B-24s that were shot down by the Luftwaffe carry on with their bombing runs -because less enemy fighters are committed to intercept them- then the damage caused to the German military industry -and civilians- is of course far greater, something that would still cause the war to have a very similar duration.
I would not think so.
From the small number of Luftwaffe fighters committed to deal with heavy bombers, one can expect the skilled performance of Luftwaffe controllers to vector those few fighters to slam in the proper moment and still cause significant losses.
I do not see the British, U.S. and allied armies reaching the German border before the end of 1944...so perhaps the futile Ardennes Offensive is not even seriously contemplated, so more German forces are available for launching against the soviets who were overbled and exhausted.
You can't be serious Udet. You are robbing Peter to pay Paul.
The USAAF alone in the ETO had just under 9000 combat planes on hand and just under 4500 combat planes on hand in the MTO. You are looking at close to 20,000 combat planes when the RAF is included.
Even fully fueled P-51s which were sitting on the runway waiting to takeoff had good success against the LW fighters during Bodenplatte. These LW fighters didn't even carry bombs, yet you expect bomb laden fighters to slow the Allied advance. How are these bomb laden LW fighters to take off with an Allied aluminum air umbrella over their bases?
Basically you are allowing the heavies to roam at will over occupied Europe. That means your German transportation system would be wrecked sooner (so much for the re-supply of your German troops at the front), airbases would be bombed into the stone age forcing those units based on those bases to pull back further from the front allowing more time for interception by RAF and USAAF fighters of the slow unwieldy LW fighter bombers and their escorts, and more precise bombing of your German war industries.
You expect significant heavy losses with fewer LW fighters when larger numbers could not? Fewer LW fighters attacking the heavies means less escorts required.
The RAF and USAAF dealt quite easily with attempts by the LW to slow the Allied advance. A few more LW planes would just decimate the LW sooner than it was historically and quicken the collapse of Nazi Germany.
I recently found out that Goering's nephew was a B-17 pilot over Germany..
48 missions!
Werner G. Goering Crew
Werner Goering was born and raised in Salt Lake City, the young Goering spoke fluent German. After an extensive background check, he was assigned to the 303rd Bombardment Group -- Hell's Angels -- of the 8th Air Force, based at Molesworth, England.[1] This fact was kept secret by the Army Air Force during the time that young Goering flew missions against Nazi Germany. However, the AAF still assigned him a "uniquely qualified" co-pilot -- First Lt. Jack P. Rencher. Rencher was given orders to shoot him if he ever tried to land in Germany. According to Rencher, however, the only time young Goering wasn't eager to rain destruction on Nazi Germany was when he had to bomb Cologne, where his grandmother lived. "He was neat, clean, a sharp dresser and in every sense military minded," Rencher said. "While I served with him he and I got along well together and I believe made an excellent team. I know of no one I would rather serve as copilot with."